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MACHINERY—A BLESSING OR A CURSE.

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IN the controversy that led to the final destruction of machinery throughout Erewhon it was argued that man was becoming a parasite of the machines—an “affectionate machine-tickling aphid,” that the machines were rapidly gaining ascendancy over human life, and if not actually themselves alive and conscious, were at least able to indicate their wants and to insist on regular feeding and attention compelling man’s slavish devotion to their interests. Samuel Butler’s ironical warning appears less fantastic to-day to those who have seen the first mechanical Robot stalking down Piccadilly, and who are becoming familiar with talking, calculating, ledgering, and typewriting automata. Lord Lytton in *The Coming Race* pictured a Utopia in which the whole work of society was done by machinery, which was under the care of the children and adolescents, who had under their command a mysterious agency named Vril by which they could animate at will the automata which acted as attendants in the house and in the workshop. That prospect, too, appears to us to-day hardly extravagant.

The other day New York saw the opening of a gigantic power plant operated without a human being in its walls, and designed to supply electricity to 300,000 of its inhabitants.

But is it Utopia to which this astounding development is hastening us? A more disquieting prospect is suggested by Capek's play *R.U.R.* and by the German film *Metropolis*. The one pictures a world of machines made in the likeness of men, the other a world of men made in the likeness of machines. Both show us with the vividness of a nightmare—if also with a nightmare's distortion—a vision of what human life may become if the machine civilisation is allowed unchecked to run its course.

I.

An inquiry into the balance of advantages and disadvantages following from the multiplication of machinery reveals the superficiality of the sweeping generalisations which are offered on the one side or the other. Nor is it possible to tabulate a neat list of gains which can be set out under separate heads like the credit side of a balance sheet with a neat list of losses over against them on the debit side. The business of ethical accountancy is not so easily susceptible of neat arrangement. An item which at first appears to be an unmixed evil or an unmixed good turns out on close examination to be less easy to place or to appraise. We find ourselves constantly needing to distinguish and subdivide and disentangle, and even then the threads of good and evil are inextricably interwoven. Moreover, to return to the figure of the balance sheet, it is not enough to look at the profit or loss account for the preceding year alone—what is needed is a comparative statement by which each of the items as well as the totals can be judged in relation to a period of years. From this standpoint it would be necessary to ask, first, how the machine civilisation compares in various points of importance to mankind with earlier conditions of human life and labour, and second, in what respects we have advanced or receded during the actual period of machine industry. It is, for example, important to recognise that there are conditions incidental to the early stages of machine industry in this country that are not essential to it and that have largely disappeared in later stages. The Hammonds are careful to point out that the displacement of hand labour by machinery was not the chief cause either of the distress of the period of which they are treating in *The Town Labourer* (1760–1832) or of the revolt of the workers. That

cause they assign to the new power of capital, which exploited not only machinery but human life.

“The real conflict of the time is the struggle of the various classes, some working in factories, some working in their own homes, to maintain a standard of life. The struggle is not so much against machinery as against the power behind the machinery, the power of capital. . . . The miner, who had never been a domestic worker, and the hand-loom weaver, who remained a domestic worker, were just as sensible of this power as the spinner who went into the factory to watch a machine do the work that had been done in the cottage, and the shearmen who tried unavailingly to keep out the gig-mill.”¹

The same point is brought home to us if we recall that Tom Hood's *Song of a Shirt*, with its picture of the domestic seamstress, belongs to the same time as Mrs Browning's *Cry of the Children*, with its picture of the child worker in the factories. We must not then attribute to machinery or the machine system the worst evils of the Industrial Revolution in its early days. Here, as so often, it is only too easy to commit the fallacy of reasoning of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, a fallacy that confronts not only those who argue that machinery is responsible for all the evils of industrialism, but also those who argue that machinery is responsible for all its benefits. That those benefits are immense, whatever the precise part that machinery has played, and without wishing to exaggerate its importance in comparison with other factors, it is impossible to deny.

“The artisan or mechanic and his family, and to a lesser degree the unskilled labourer and his family, are to-day enjoying a definitely higher standard of life than the corresponding sections of the population at any previous period in the world's history.”²

There is no reason, it would seem, to lament with Mr Penty the passing of “the good old days” to which he looks back in his *Old Worlds for New*. Whatever good and pleasant features were to be found in the life and labour of mediæval Europe, there were countervailing evils that should deter anyone from wishing, even if it were possible, a restoration

¹ *The Town Labourer*, pp. 15-16.

² Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in a contribution to an American publication, *Whither Mankind?*

of the old ways. The Italian historian Ferrero is said to have recommended anyone who has romantic yearnings after the good old times "to spend one night in what our forefathers called a bed."¹ And Mr J. B. S. Haldane remarks in *Dædalus*: "Bad as our urban conditions often are, there is not a slum in the country which has a third of the infantile death-rate of the royal family in the Middle Ages."

But let us turn from the general conditions of living in which we may trace so imposing an advance, to the particular conditions of work, in respect of which the introduction of machinery has had a most easily discernible and direct influence. If I spend more time and emphasis on points at which gain is to be registered, it is because they are the least often recognised.

II.

And first, what about *toil* or *drudgery*—meaning heavy, exhausting, and monotonous labour? Here there is a good deal to be said for the view that the use of machinery has "taken the backache out of industry." And lest anyone should suppose that that merely means the elimination of healthy muscular exercise, let us look at what toil actually meant to the pre-industrial worker. Take the work of the carpenter. Before the days of steam mills for sawing, planing and moulding, carpenters suffered fatigue and strain from sheer toil that made them prematurely old. "All but specially skilled men," says Marshall, "were compelled to spend a great part of their time with the jack-plane, and this brought on heart disease, making them as a rule old men by the time they were forty." And he quotes Adam Smith's description of the way in which workers would over-work themselves and ruin their health and constitution in a few years.

"A carpenter in London and in some other places is not supposed to last in his utmost vigour above eight years. . . . Almost every class of artificer is subject to some particular infirmity occasioned by excessive application to their peculiar species of work."²

Marshall also comments on the extent to which machinery has taken over monotonous work.

"Nothing," [he says] "could be more monotonous than the occupation of a weaver of plain stuffs in the

¹ Cited in Johnston: *Citizenship in the Industrial World*, p. 17.

² Marshall: *Economics of Industry*, p. 148.

old time. But now one woman will manage four or more looms, each of which does many times as much work in the course of the day as the hand-loom did, and her work is much less monotonous and calls for much more judgment than his did. So that for every hundred yards of cloth that are woven, the purely monotonous work done by human beings is probably not one-twentieth part of what it was."

Take a further account of weaving in Witney, in 1767, that comes to us from Arthur Young's *Southern Tour*.

"There are about 500 weavers in the town. . . . Journeymen, in general, on an average, earn from 10s. to 12s. a week, all the year round . . . but they work from 4 to 8, and in winter by candle-light."

Even to-day, in the non-industrial parts of China, you find conditions of work that are not less exhausting than the conditions of the Shanghai factories—terrible as those are.

An American observer, writing in 1924, says :—

"Nearly all the lumber used in China is hand-sawn, and the sawyers are exhausted early. Physicians agree that carrying coolies rarely live beyond forty-five or fifty years. The term of a chair-bearer is eight years, of a rickshaw runner four years, for the rest of his life he is an invalid."

A Chinese contributor to the volume *Whither Mankind?* remarks that Japan was the inventor of the rickshaw, but that to-day in the industrial centres of Yokohama and Tokio the rickshaw coolie is rapidly disappearing. And his disappearance has been brought about not by humanitarianism, but "by the advent of the 'one-yen-within-the-city' Ford car."

The same writer, Mr. Hu Shi, emphatically insists that the term "materialistic civilisation" is far more appropriate to the pre-industrial civilisations of the East than to the industrial civilisations of the West. He asks us :

"Do we seriously believe that there can be any spiritual life left in those poor human beasts of burden who run and toil and sweat under that peculiar bondage of slavery which knows neither the minimum wage nor any limit of working hours ?"

At many points, then, we must admit that human toil has been appreciably diminished by the increased use of

machinery, and that a good deal more human toil and drudgery—both manual and clerical—might be relieved if human life were not considered cheaper than the installation of machinery. It is said that in Lisbon (even in 1925) the work of coaling steamships (for which machinery is available on the spot) was performed by cheap female labour. There is work still done to-day in England—in charging boiler-house furnaces or the ovens of a hand-labour coking plant, that is exhausting, degrading and monotonous. In a coal mine without modern equipment—and there are many such—there is the “tramping” of tubs from the coal face to the haulage road, and the pushing and pulling of tubs on and off the cages. All such work should be handed over to machinery.

Contrast this picture—a little overdrawn no doubt, but substantially accurate—of modernised methods in the Ruhr coalfields.

“The mechanics or other attendants who control a modern boiler-house, free from smoke, dirt, and fumes, the men who operate the electrical machines by which a modern coking plant is entirely operated, the pithead worker who sits at a switchboard and controls the automatic devices which move the tubs from the cage, empty the coal on to the screens, and return the tubs to the cage, the engineer who controls the gigantic machines which scoop up 200 tons of brown coal an hour, the men who operate the various kinds of conveyors, which have abolished an immense amount of pushing and lifting, are all using intelligence and skill. Their work is comparatively clean. They finish the day fresh enough, physically and mentally, to foster interests apart from their employment. They have a new status in industry which was never attainable by the old-type labourers, whose work has been transformed by the new machines.”¹

There are other considerations that require to be taken into account, but it is that kind of contrast which explains the enthusiasm of the advocates of machinery, enthusiasm that leads one of them to the extravagant but understandable exclamation that 1769—the year of Watt’s first “fire-machine”—was “the great milestone of mankind,” because on that day “man ceased to be a beast of burden and

¹ Meakin : *The New Industrial Revolution*, p. 241.

was given his first decent chance to become a human being,"¹

If this view be thought exaggerated, it is certainly less so than the opposite judgment expressed by J. S. Mill :—

“ It is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made, have lightened the day’s toil of any human being.”

III.

But now, what of *skill*? How far has the development of machinery eliminated human skill?

Here it is desirable to distinguish various factors that all come under the term “ skill,” but which vary greatly in the extent to which they are severally present in different occupations and operations. Four factors, in particular, may be distinguished :—

- (a) Craftsmanship—involving constructive design, and artistic execution.
- (b) Manual dexterity—a matter of repeated practice and ranging from mere muscular habituation to what we call “ knack.”
- (c) Technical expertise—involving experience and knowledge of tools or machines and mechanical processes.
- (d) Sagacity and judgment—involving higher mental operations.

In point of craftsmanship—as I have defined it—it would appear at first sight that the position is one of unquestioned and unqualified loss. But here, too, we have to take into account different stages in the development of industry and also different classes and numbers of workers.

Unquestionably certain workers and certain kinds of work have lost heavily by the changes wrought by machinery and machine production; and we look back longingly to the great days of craftsmanship both in Europe and in India—the mediæval times which Ruskin and Morris recalled for us, or more recently Mr Penty and Dr Coomaraswamy.

But the Webbs have done well to remind us of other considerations.

“ In the hey-day of the mediæval gild, there were always, even in the most artistic cities, far more manual workers outside the favoured circle of masters, journey-

¹ Van Loon in *Whither Mankind?* p. 43.

men, and apprentices, than within it. . . . What a multitude of labourers quarried the stones, dragged and carried the stones and lifted the stones of the Cathedral walls on which half a dozen skilled and artistic masons carved gargoyles ? ” ¹

In our own time it is further to be remembered that some of the worst conditions surviving in industry are to be found in the production of hand-made goods. Take this statement :—

“ It is the workers who turn out beautiful hand-worked lace and delicate garments whose working conditions are most appalling, even in advanced industrial countries. And let every social reformer who sentimentally raves over the superior beauty of the craftsmanship of hand production in oriental rugs remember that this work was being done in the year 1921, in Persia, by children of five or six years of age employed in appalling conditions for twelve or fourteen hours per day.” ²

Another important reminder comes from an account of Thomas Chippendale and eighteenth century cabinet making. In a recent life of Chippendale, Mr Oliver Brackett says :—

“ It is often argued that the craftsman of past centuries took a greater interest in his work than the modern man who lives in the age of machinery. In the former case it is assumed that the head, the heart and the hand worked together in union. This theory contains something of truth and something of romance.”

And he goes on to say :

“ It would be natural to expect that a small cabinet maker, whose work was the offspring of his own imagination and his own hand, should with an artist's pride watch his conception shaping itself into reality. But in a workshop, with twenty or thirty men at the bench, much division of labour would be found, and the efforts of an individual craftsman would no doubt be confined to the repetition of some detail of execution which might have to be repeated time after time.” ³

¹ *Whither Mankind?* p. 139.

² Cited by Johnston, *op. cit.* p. 29.

³ Cited by Gloag, *Artifex*, p. 84.

Take again watchmaking in French Switzerland before and after the introduction of peculiarly delicate machinery. There was already before machinery came into force a considerable division of labour, and Marshall emphasises the fact that machinery displaced the work of operatives

“who had indeed acquired a very high and specialised manual skill, but who lived sedentary lives, straining their eyesight through microscopes, and finding in their work very little scope for any faculty except a mere command over the use of their fingers.”

Then came

“a beautiful machine which feeds itself with steelwire at one end, and delivers at the other tiny screws of exquisite form . . . and the person who minds it must have an intelligence, and an energetic sense of responsibility, which go a long way towards making a fine character, and which, though more common than they were, are yet sufficiently rare to be able to earn a very high rate of pay. No doubt this is an extreme case; and the greater part of the work of a watch factory is much simpler. But a great deal of it requires higher faculties than the old system did, and those engaged in it earn on the average higher wages; at the same time it has already brought the price of a trustworthy watch within the range of the poorest classes of the community and is showing signs of being able soon to accomplish the highest class of work.”¹

Here is a case where the skill in question was of the specialised kind that I have called manual dexterity, and where it has given place to the kinds of skill I have called technical expertness and judgment.

This same change, not from skilled work and unskilled work, but from one type of skill to another, is to be found over a wide range of industry. Professor Harry Jones argues that “as work becomes more and more mechanical, the proportion of unskilled labour required is reduced rather than increased.”

“Every considerable improvement” [he says] “of machinery and enlargement of plant calls for an increase in the number of indirect workers, such as mill engineers, cranemen, joiners, repairers, etc., most of whom are

¹ Marshall, *Economics of Industry*, p. 317.

skilled craftsmen. . . . Thus, while it may be true that in some industries the demand for unskilled workers is growing relatively to the demand for skilled workers, and that in more cases skilled craftsmen employed in particular trades are *relatively* less in demand, it is at least doubtful if the proportion of labour as a whole required for unskilled work is on the decrease.”¹

Moreover, pride in work and in the whole product of work is not necessarily abolished by machine conditions. In some instances there was more ignorance of the whole process in certain specialised undertakings than there is to-day when the completed product passes out from a long chain of inter-related processes.

A recent study of development in five great industries during the period 1886-1926 brings out some remarkable facts in relation to this question of changes in the form of skill. Mr J. W. F. Rowe (*Wages in Practice and Theory*) finds, for example, in the engineering industry an increase of skill and accuracy among pattern-makers ; a new class of “semi-skilled” workers in the foundry, where pneumatic hammers and riddles and electric cranes have eliminated the heavy work, and where the brass moulder, the loam and sand moulder and the coremaker are on the whole more skilled than hitherto ; and, in spite of the disappearance of the all-round turner in the machine shop, a more specialised turner who has to work to more complicated designs with elaborate blue prints, so that brain work has overtaken manual dexterity. Two further points should be noted, (1) that since the introduction of machinery the skilled man has not had to spend so much of his time at unskilled work, (2) that large new fields of skill are constantly opening out to satisfy the needs of mass production, and in particular the application of skill to the design and construction of machinery. At the same time it must be noted that there are larger areas of industry coming under mass production methods in which, while the more highly skilled work is changing from manual dexterity to technical expertness and intelligent judgment, the majority of operatives are doing repetitive process work of a character that is semi-skilled, if not unskilled. And although repetitive work and monotony are not confined to machine work, it must be admitted that this is the most serious aspect of mechanisation. It may of course be expected that machinery itself will increasingly take over the more monotonous

¹ *Social Economics*, cited by Johnston, *op. cit.* p. 40.

repetition work both of manual and clerical occupations, and leave to human control departments of work that require judgment and decision and are on that account not without variety and interest.

IV.

The main evils associated with modern mechanisation and mass production appear to follow not from machinery itself, but from the use that is made of it. The very possibility of turning out a vastly increased amount of commodities by mass production methods is tending to fasten attention upon quantity rather than quality. The valid charge against modern industrialism is not that it is increasing the number of mechanical contrivances—for these, whether we think of labour-saving devices or mechanical means of locomotion, must be reckoned on the whole as a human advantage—but rather that it is increasing the number of useless gadgets and gewgaws on which we waste alike our money, our attention, and our time.

But this, it must be noted, is a question of the education of the demands of the consumer¹ and his attitude to life and life's values, which determines to what use we shall put the machinery at our disposal.

The same consideration applies to the æsthetic aspect of the question.

The machine civilisation has produced ugliness and smoke and squalor and multiplied the cheap and nasty. Here again it is profit-making on the part of the producer, and lack of taste or false taste on the part of the consumer that is the actual cause of the evil. And the decline in standards cannot be wholly or even mainly charged to the influence of machine-production. The hideous defilement of nature and the callous treatment of man in the early days of the Industrial Revolution argues a thoughtlessness and inhumanity that were already present and that found expression in the despoilers of the mining valleys and the founders of the "dark satanic mills." The ugly building of the new manufacturing towns and the wanton development of smoke-laden industrial areas, were due to a want of any regard for human life or artistic design or natural beauty. It is only in our own time that we are slowly beginning to trouble about town planning and design, and about the avoidance of smoke by methods of smoke consuming that have long been

¹ See article in the present issue, "*The Rationalisation of Consumption*," by G. A. Johnston.—EDITOR.

known to us, as well as by the substitution of clean electricity. The "slick pitiful commonplace vulgarity" which a recent writer¹ finds to be characteristic of our machine civilisation is no new disease, and has had no little part in producing our present distresses.

Moreover, to-day a new æsthetic conscience is beginning to develop, by a happy combination of craftsmanship and machinery, a new and better standard of taste in industry, and the leaders of the Design and Industry Association are not turning their backs on the machine, but devising means of using it to produce both beautiful and useful things.

In building, in furniture, in metal work, pottery, tiles, glass, textiles, printing and other industries, there is growing up a new "industrial art," which is no longer attempting to imitate by machinery the products of the old handicrafts, but to discover new forms of beauty and design appropriate both to the materials and the methods concerned.

If the contents of a good deal of modern printed matter incline us to Rousseau's description of the invention of printing as a "means of immortalising the errors of the human mind," the form at least of modern books has shown a wonderful improvement during the present century.

The growth of a new social and artistic conscience that is increasingly concerned about the conditions under which men labour as well as about the products of their labour is indeed both the hope of a way out of our troubles, and also an evidence that we have not become wholly enslaved to what Dr Jacks calls the "cult of mechanism."

"It is the *worship* of machinery, and not the use of it, that does the harm," says Mr Bertrand Russell,² and we may well add that there are other false gods than Vulcan whose worship is in question, and not the least the worship of Mammon and of Mars.

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¹ R. M. Fox, *The Triumphant Machine*.

² *Prospects of Industrial Civilisation*, p. 269.

THE RATIONALISATION OF CONSUMPTION

G. A. JOHNSTON.

THIS article owes its origin to a suggestion from the Editor. Writing to me in reference to my article on "Rationalisation: The Philosophy of Industry," which appeared in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for July, 1928, the Editor pointed out that the philosophy of industry should really include consumption as well as production. Should not a philosophy of labour (= industry), he suggested, involve a philosophy of leisure, inasmuch as the direction of the currents of industry is largely determined by the demands of leisure for goods and services? Dr Jacks concluded by suggesting that my article, which had dealt exclusively with the rationalisation of production, needed a sequel in another dealing with consumption. In accordance with that suggestion, this paper is therefore an attempt to consider certain aspects of the problem of the rationalisation of consumption.

I. Rationalisation, we saw in the previous article, as applied to production, implies the better organisation of all the mechanism and processes of production in order, by the elimination of waste, to produce the maximum value of goods and services. The crux of the problem is the elimination of waste.

Now, if we attempt to find an exact parallel in consumption, we should have to say that rationalisation of consumption implies the better organisation of all the mechanism and processes of consumption in order, by the elimination of waste, to produce the maximum value of well-being.

The problem of the rationalisation of consumption is more difficult than that of the rationalisation of production, because it is much more difficult in consumption than in

production to determine what is waste. In the case of production it is reasonably easy to determine what is waste. The report of the Committee on the Elimination of Waste in Industry of the Federated American Engineering Societies, due to the initiative of Mr Herbert Hoover, was able, as a result of a few months' inquiry, to determine to two points of decimals the total percentage of waste to be found in various industries and the percentage of waste due separately to management, labour, and outside contacts. It is safe to say that this Committee, or any similar committee, would have found it very much more difficult to determine the extent of waste involved in consumption. "Wise consumption," wrote Ruskin in *Unto this Last*, "is a far more difficult art than wise production."

If the object of consumption were mere subsistence, it would be relatively easy to eliminate waste from consumption. It is not difficult to eliminate waste from the consumption of the gold fish or the cow ; but in man the purpose of consumption is not mere subsistence, not mere being : it is well-being ; it is not merely life, but the good life. And it is in the infinite extension involved in the qualification "good" or "well" that all the difficulty resides ; for there are so many different conceptions of the good life and well-being. The anchorite regards most of the consumption of the ordinary middle-class family as waste. The ordinary middle-class family regards much of the consumption of the rich as waste, and so on, and even people in the same station of life and with the same incomes may each regard much of the consumption of his neighbour as waste.

Endeavours have indeed often been made to distinguish between necessities and luxuries, the general underlying conception being that expenditure on necessities is not waste, whereas expenditure on luxuries is waste. A useful catalogue of the main necessities for consumption was given by Marshall in his *Principles of Economics* :

"They may be said to consist of a well-drained dwelling with several rooms, warm clothing with some changes of underclothing, pure water, a plentiful supply of cereal food with a moderate allowance of meat and milk, with a little tea, etc., some education and some recreation, and, lastly, sufficient freedom for his wife from other work to enable her to perform properly her maternal and her household duties, and in addition, perhaps, some consumption of alcohol and tobacco and

some indulgence in fashionable dress are in many cases so habitual that they may be said to be conventionally necessary, since in order to obtain them the average man and woman will sacrifice some things which are necessary for efficiency."

Now this list would appear to be an obviously common-sense one, but Marshall was careful to add the reserve that these were necessities "for the efficiency of an ordinary agricultural or of an unskilled town labourer and his family in England and in this generation." This qualification is obviously necessary, because the distinction between necessities and luxuries varies not only in time, but in space. What one generation regards as a luxury the next may very certainly regard as a necessary, and what is regarded as a luxury in one country would be regarded as the most necessary of necessities in another. The rapidity with which standards of luxury change is illustrated by the criticisms made in 1914 by Mr Hartley Withers of the motor car as a luxury and the motor car industry as a luxury trade. No one would now dream of regarding the motor industry as a luxury trade, and to a large proportion of individual owners of motor cars in countries like the United States, England and France, these are not luxuries, but necessities.

It is the difficulty of deciding what consumption may be regarded as consumption of luxuries and what consumption may be regarded as consumption of necessities which makes it hard at any moment to know whether luxurious expenditure is increasing or decreasing, and most people would consider it a hazardous undertaking for statisticians to decide whether expenditure on luxuries is increasing or decreasing. It is, however, of interest to note that Professor Bowley and Sir Josiah Stamp in their *The National Income*, 1924, definitely state that, in their opinion,

"The sum devoted to luxurious expenditure in 1924 is (allowing for the rise in prices) definitely less than in 1911, but it is still sufficient to bulk large in the eyes of the public, since it is concentrated in small areas, enlarged by the spending of visitors from overseas, and advertised in the newspapers. It is, however, equally evident, if we are to depend on appearances instead of on statistics, that there is a great deal of income available for cheaper amusements."

II. There is no doubt that there is an increasing belief in wide sections of public opinion in various countries that

welfare is to be increased by the stimulation of consumption. In the United States a definite philosophy of "consumptionism" has arisen which is based on the view that consumption ought to be expanded to the widest possible extent in order to stimulate production. According to this philosophy, human nature is capable of development on a wide gamme of new wants, and these should be created or developed with a view to the stimulation of production and trade.

This philosophy is clearly in direct contradiction to the philosophy of thrift, of "do without," of "making do," which was so prominent a feature of the life of England in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. According to the philosophy of thrift, saving was a virtue for its own sake, and not merely because, owing to the blessings of compound interest, saving would ultimately result in much greater benefits. The Victorian theory was that thrift and frugality were in themselves desirable. The theory of consumptionism, on the other hand, is that every man, for the expansion of personality, should endeavour to extend his consumption to the greatest possible degree.

It is of some interest to note in passing that the endeavours—not always disinterested—to spread this gospel in countries where the wants of the people are still simple have not always met with success. In certain African colonies, for example, where the natives are still content to live as their ancestors did from day to day on the products of the chase and of rudimentary agriculture, the blessings of consumptionism have been urged by traders and planters anxious to secure the labour of the natives. "If you will work for wages," the natives are told, "you will have money with which to buy the products of civilisation." The response to this call has in many cases not been enthusiastic. The whole difference between the philosophy of consumptionism and the philosophy of the simple life, which in its various aspects was advocated by Thoreau and is now preached by Gandhi, is indicated.

Consumptionism, while it may be interested in the welfare of the individual consumer as a by-product, undoubtedly has as its main aim the benefiting of the producer. It is a commonplace that the machinery of production could produce a much greater output than it does if the demand of the consumer could be made effective. This is by no means a new discovery. In 1846 a pamphlet was issued with the title *Not Increased Production, but Increased Consumption, the Salvation of the Country*.

The producer attempts to stimulate consumption in two main ways: by advertisement and by the instalment system.

Paradoxically enough, the producer's advertisement appeals in general only to the consumer who does not want a particular article at all. It appeals to the consumer who has a certain amount of money to spend and has only the vaguest idea of what he will spend it on. His desires and wants are indeterminate, and it requires the stimulus of an advertisement to incite him to decide to satisfy one particular desire rather than another. The chief purpose of advertisement is to create new desires and to stimulate the will to buy.

But the producer goes further than this in his attempt to stimulate consumption. He wishes to induce the consumer not only to purchase what he can pay for, but to purchase what he cannot yet pay for. This is the system of selling by instalments. The practice of instalment selling, as it is called in the United States of America, or the hire purchase system, as it is called in England, though it has been in operation for only some ten years and has attained important proportions only in the last four or five, has already stimulated investigation and reflection by economists. The purpose of the instalment selling system is obviously to stimulate consumption.

Professor Seligman, who published last year an important investigation of the system, is definitely in favour of it, and suggests that it contains the germ of "another revolution in economic science and economic life, scarcely inferior to its predecessor."¹

So far the system has been applied only to a relatively limited range of commodities. Those to whom it appeals constitute, however, a very wide stratum of society, all in fact but the very rich and the very poor. The chief articles with which it deals are houses, motor cars, furniture, pianos, radio equipment and encyclopædias. Professor Seligman estimates that in 1925 instalment sales of all goods amounted in the United States of America to $4\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars out of a total volume of retail sales estimated at 38 billions. Of this total of $4\frac{1}{2}$ billions of instalment selling automobiles accounted for more than half.

In some cases instalment selling, leading to the assumption of unwise burdens and the pledging of the future, may lead to individual debt, and intensify the slump in a period of cyclical depression.

¹ *The Economics of Instalment Selling*, New York, 1928.

On the other hand, it has been claimed that it may encourage saving and investment. Instead of buying outright, the purchaser invests his money and purchases out of income.

This is not the place to weigh in detail the advantages and disadvantages of the instalment system. For our present purpose it is enough to note that it is becoming more and more marked a feature of the distributive systems of many countries, and that its aim everywhere is to stimulate consumption.

III. Consumption is to some extent, but not altogether, conditioned by the material means of consumption. The citizen can consume only what the State gives him the right to consume, and as a general principle in the modern industrial world the State gives a man the right to consume only what he can pay for. Consumption is, then, in general, conditioned by the financial means of the individual consumer. To this general rule there are, of course, certain exceptions. In the modern industrial State all citizens consume, without paying directly for them, certain commodities and services provided for the benefit of all the citizens by the State itself or by subordinate public authorities. Roads, bridges and parks are at the disposal of all. The services of the police and certain other officials are similarly provided free of direct individual payment by the citizens. Apart, however, from such exceptions, it is true that consumption depends on the financial means of the consumer.

Statistical inquiries have been made in various countries to show the proportion of the financial means of consumers which is expended on various categories of consumption. A general result of these inquiries is to support the law of consumption first enunciated by Engel, that as the income of a family increases a smaller proportion is spent on food and a greater proportion is spent on education, health, recreation, amusement, and so forth. An inquiry made in 1918-19 into family budgets by the United States Bureau of Labour showed that in the case of families with an income of under \$900 44.1 per cent. was spent on food, whereas in the case of families with an income of \$2,500 and over 34.9 per cent. was spent on food. The difference in proportion becomes much more marked when the income passes beyond the moderate and becomes large. According to an inquiry conducted by the American National Bureau of Economic Research, a family with an annual income of \$5,000 spends

27·2 per cent. on food, whereas a family with an income of \$50,000 spends only 6·1 per cent. on food. It is interesting also to consider the variation in income scales of expenditure on recreation and amusement. While on the lowest levels this item accounts for a negligible proportion of the total income, it is exceedingly elastic, and as an income grows this item grows not only absolutely, but also relatively to the income. It is, in fact, the only rubric under expenditure which seems capable of indefinite expansion.

Such inquiries do not, however, conceal the fact that two families which possess equal means of consumption may not by any means obtain the same benefits from the consumption on which they choose to make their expenditure. The dividend of welfare supplied to different men by a given sum of money is by no means the same. Even if all incomes were equal, there would be inequality in real welfare. Even if the main heads in the family budget are the same, the proportions spent under the various heads may vary enormously. Any examination of family budgets collected by Government departments or social workers will show that few of such budgets will conform to the ideal budget established by the social reformer. Equality in financial economic power by no means results in equality in the actual expansion of the self which takes place in consumption.

On the other hand, whatever may be the individual choice with a view to consumption, there is perhaps an increasing tendency for consumption to be determined by group standards. Consumption, as it takes place in any one country, is to be regarded partly as a group inheritance and partly as a group acquisition of habitual tendencies of consumption. This may be seen clearly in the case of the consumption of food. In general, consumption is a group activity, and its conditions are determined by the instincts, the conventions and the traditions of ever widening groups.

This consideration lends additional weight to the criticism, often advanced, that modern civilisation, from the standpoint of consumption, is a failure.

“Consumption” [writes Mr Delisle Burns], “or the enjoyment of utilities in industrial society, is crude and uncivilised. It is expressed in the dismal streets, featureless houses, and hideous clothing of industrial city areas. Production has, of course, immensely increased in volume and variety since the Middle Ages, but consumption seems not to have developed so fully.”

This criticism requires to be submitted to examination. Take the instances mentioned by Mr Delisle Burns. Some of the streets of our industrial towns are indeed dismal. But how do they compare with those of the Middle Ages, unlighted, with an open sewer running down one side and so badly paved that men and horses were frequently bogged? And the houses? Those of the Middle Ages were generally extremely ugly and extremely badly built. And the ordinary costume of the worker of the Middle Ages was roughly dressed leather, verminous and filthy, and never changed till it wore out.

But, it may be said, at least in the Middle Ages the taste of the people could satisfy itself in beautiful buildings such as the cathedrals. The cathedrals were indeed beautiful. But have we lost the art of appreciating beautiful architecture, and therefore of creating it? No one who has seen such recent examples of architecture as Liverpool Cathedral and the City Hall at Stockholm would dare to say that the modern world has lost its taste for beauty. The City Hall at Stockholm is particularly interesting, not only because the general direction of the work of building and decoration was in the hands of a committee composed largely of representatives of the working class, but also because an enormous amount of latitude was allowed to individual workers in elaborating their own conceptions in its decoration. It could not have been created had the taste of the consumers in the city of Stockholm not been extremely highly cultured.

IV. The consumption of spare time, or leisure, is clearly consumption of a most important kind. It is in the consumption of spare time that waste in consumption is most extensive and has the worst social consequences. This is particularly serious, because for the first time in the history of the world leisure has now a real meaning. This is because, on the one hand, there is no longer in any country a numerous idle class, and, on the other hand, there is no longer in any country any wide section of the community completely deprived of spare time. The rationalisation of leisure would therefore appear to be a more important problem now than at any other period in the history of the world.

The view has indeed been maintained that it is impossible to rationalise the consumption of leisure because leisure would cease to be leisure if it were rationalised. This view clearly reposes on a psychological doctrine, which may be stated as follows: In spare time instincts and impulses which are baulked or suppressed during hours of work may be given

free expression. The conditions of the modern industrial world are such that in production rigid discipline is necessary, and the free expression of instincts and impulses becomes increasingly difficult. In leisure time, however, these instincts may be given free play, and it is therefore impossible to rationalise them, because *ex hypothesi* they are and should be free and uncontrolled.

It is not difficult to see that this conception involves a false view of liberty, according to which liberty is the complete absence of all organisation and all law. But this false view of liberty would not now be maintained by any serious student of political philosophy. Liberty is not inconsistent with law ; it is, in fact, impossible without it.

Now leisure is simply liberty in one of its aspects. It is not ultimately irrational, and therefore it is ultimately capable of rationalisation. Yet there is some truth in the view which we have been discussing. Owing to the rigidity and lack of elasticity of life in production, there is an increasing tendency to irresponsibility and irrationality in consumption. It is difficult to rationalise consumption, because it is in consumption that in the modern industrial world human personality seeks primarily to indulge its impulses for change and variety. The rationalisation of consumption depends in the last resort on the possibility not of imposing from the outside rules and regulations with regard to consumption but of so educating the individual citizen that he may freely develop within himself the reasons for his consumption and thus rationalise his consumption, not necessarily on precisely the same model as his neighbour's consumption. Reason does not involve uniformity. In this sense all the difference and variety required for the development of human personality may be regarded as consistent with the demand that consumption should be rationalised.

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G. A. JOHNSTON.

GENEVA.

THE LINKING OF EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION.

PROFESSOR G. H. TURNBULL.

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As recently as July 18, 1929, the President of the Board of Education announced in the House of Commons the decision of the present Government to introduce the necessary legislation to raise the school-leaving age to 15 as from April 1, 1931. This means presumably that effect will now be given to the recommendations of the Hadow report and to the policy outlined in the Board of Education pamphlet, *The New Prospect in Education*, of giving full-time post-primary or secondary education to all children from the age of 11+ to 15. The present time is particularly opportune, therefore, for a critical consideration of these recommendations and that policy.

Their main outline may be briefly summarised. In order to discover the type of post-primary education most suitable to a child's abilities and interests, a written examination on the lines of the present examination for scholarships and free places in secondary and central schools should be held; this would be an examination in English and Arithmetic, supplemented, wherever possible, by an oral examination. It would be given to children of 11 or 12, by which age they show differences in interests and abilities sufficiently to warrant their being drafted into schools of different types. For border-line cases the possible value of written psychological tests is admitted. Moreover, the presence of "misfits" in the existing secondary schools is realised, and it is urged that pupils should be freely transferred at 12+ or 13+ from one type of secondary school to another according to their developing interests and abilities.

There are to be two main types of post-primary education. One will be similar to that given in the existing secondary schools (which are to be rechristened "grammar" schools); the other will be that given in modern schools (which will be our present central schools under another name) and in the senior classes of elementary schools, the latter being intended for children who do not go either to the grammar school or modern school.

In spite of the fact that the children are to be selected at the age of 11 for these types of post-primary education, there is really nothing to distinguish the types from each other for the first two years. The modern schools and senior classes are not to be inferior in promise or quality, but are to give a humane and general education; the studies are to be English and a foreign language, history and geography, mathematics and general science. The difference between the types appears in the third and fourth years, when a vocational bias enters into the work of the modern schools and senior classes. This bias means an emphasis on practical aspects of certain subjects to enable the pupil on leaving school to adapt himself easily to any occupation in the group of occupations (industry, commerce or agriculture) to which that bias is related.

It would appear, therefore, that the kind of post-primary education to be given to a particular child will depend upon his or her ability and interests, and upon the type of occupation to which he or she is later to proceed.

The discovery of children's abilities, upon which turns the whole problem of post-primary education, seems simple and straightforward to these reformers, but really it is very difficult. The very variety and relative independence of abilities would appear to make ridiculous the idea of discovering them by means of a written examination in English and Arithmetic and an oral test. Even assuming, as we may legitimately, that it is possible for this examination at its best to fulfil its intended purpose of measuring "intelligence" with some degree of accuracy, there still remains the fact that the application of this examination will grade the pupils according to "intelligence," and that presumably those with the highest grade will be passed on to the "grammar" schools, that the modern schools will get the next grade, and that the senior classes will be left with the remainder. Now modern psychological research informs us that "intelligence" is a factor in man's ability to do many sorts of things, but informs us also that there are other

factors involved in the ability to do various things, and that these other factors are at least equally important in deciding what occupation a young person should follow and the type of education most suited to him. These other factors are not estimated at all by means of the written examination in English and Arithmetic and the usual oral test ; so that what is only a partial estimate of ability is made the basis of the system of selection, and yet that estimate decides the form which the selected child's further education shall take, and consequently, within certain limits, the kind of occupation to which it will ultimately proceed.

Nor are the types of post-primary education proposed really distinct from one another. In the first two years they are practically identical, and even in the third and fourth years the education given in the modern schools and senior classes is to be a general education with only the slightest tincture of vocational flavour. How, indeed, could it be otherwise ? How could the types be distinct when they are really based only upon different quantities of the same ability and when the same conception of education as something general underlies them both ? And what is the good of talking about the possibility of transferring " misfits " in the two types when the curriculum is substantially the same in both and the same general conception of education is embodied in both ? A " misfit " in one would almost certainly be a " misfit " in the other. What chance under the curriculum of the " grammar " school would a pupil have of showing and developing those practical interests which are to warrant his transfer to a " modern " school ? And what is to prevent a considerable number of pupils in modern schools and senior classes from showing a real capacity for studies leading up to the first school examination, when many of them are pupils selected because of their ability to study such subjects and when the curriculum of the modern school or senior class which they are attending is permeated by those studies ?

These criticisms point clearly to the need for rethinking the whole problem of post-primary education in relation to the abilities of children and the kind of occupation to which they will ultimately proceed.

In any attempt to solve the problem of selecting children for post-primary education account must be taken of the important contribution of modern psychological research to the subject of abilities. Professor Spearman has shown that every human ability is compounded of two types or kinds of

factor or constituent. The first is "g"—a general factor—which in some degree enters into and is therefore common to many abilities, which is sometimes called "intelligence," and which is throughout constant in amount for any individual, although it varies greatly in amount from individual to individual. The second type of factor is specific ("s"), and varies not only from individual to individual, but even for any one individual from one ability to another. There are various kinds of "s." Some are so specific as to be limited each to a particular kind of performance or operation; others enter in some degree into and are therefore common to a number or group of performances or operations and are in consequence often called group factors. There is at present no final classification of these specific factors, because they are not yet all clearly discriminated. It seems, however, from the recent work done by Dr. Cox,¹ that there is a group factor, mechanical ability or aptitude ("m"), upon which success at engineering largely depends.

Of course, two operations or a group of operations which are closely similar may demand for their performance approximately the same amount of "g" and the same amounts and kind of "s." Further, although both these factors occur in every ability, they need not be equally influential in all; e.g. Professor Spearman tells us that in talent for classics the ratio of the influence of "g" to that of "s" is rated to be as much as 15 to 1; whereas in talent for music the ratio is only 1 to 4.

Even assuming, with Professor Burt, that some at least of these specific factors in ability do not usually mature before the age of 12, it should nevertheless be possible, by giving suitable tests for "g" and for the various specific factors to children at regular intervals after 11+, to discover their particular bent and capacity, and thereon to base some reliable estimate of the kind of occupation for which each child is best suited. It is interesting to note that this has already been attempted. The *Times Educational Supplement* of January 19, 1929, describes, under the heading of "Vocational Guidance," the examination of a considerable number of secondary school boys who were in need of guidance as to a career. The examination, conducted by members of the staff of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, comprised tests for general and specific abilities and personal interviews with each boy singly. The reports recommended a suitable career for each boy. Again, a

¹ *Mechanical Aptitude*, 1928.

report ¹ published by the Industrial Fatigue Research Board describes a similar experiment in vocational guidance conducted by the National Institute of Industrial Psychology with 600 boys and girls of school-leaving age, selected at random from London elementary schools.

It would seem, therefore, that the selection of pupils for different types of secondary education might be done by means of these tests. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Departmental Committee on Scholarships and Free Places, which in 1920 advocated the use of written tests in English and Arithmetic, followed by an oral examination, for selecting suitable pupils for secondary education, were of the opinion that, although psychological tests might be the basis for further progress in selection, they could not at that time supersede the ordinary examinations advocated, because no test of purely general ability had been discovered and the science of psychology was not sufficiently firmly established. There was considerable justification in 1920 for that verdict, but the advance of the science since then makes its reconsideration imperative.

Moreover, it would seem desirable that until they had been tested after the age of 11, their abilities revealed and their future occupation indicated, all children should have full-time schooling of the same type, with the same curriculum. It would appear important, however, that this curriculum should cover the various kinds of specific ability, in order to give these a chance to develop in the children who possess them. How much rethinking of the curriculum for this stage of schooling, the primary stage in the real sense of that term, such a suggestion involves it is difficult to say, until the various specific factors are clearly differentiated. Dr Cox, in dealing with the specific factor of mechanical aptitude, touches upon this problem, and suggests that woodwork and handwork offer possibilities for the exercise of mechanical aptitude in schools, provided that the children are thrown upon their own initiative and encouraged to devise and plan for themselves the objects they make. He thinks that the practical science lesson may also offer opportunities, especially when the pupils are required to suggest and fit up their own apparatus, a view which finds support in the statement of the Board of Education ² that the science lesson should satisfy the natural inclination of many pupils to design and improvise apparatus.

¹ No. 53.

² *Suggestions to Teachers*, 1927, p. 219.

The possibility of using psychological tests to discover children's abilities and to determine their careers and further education is an attractive idea, and they have probably a great future. On the other hand, there are certain facts which make one hesitate at present to recommend this solution with confidence.

In the first place, the necessary psychological tests are as yet only in a comparatively rudimentary state of development, in spite of the fact that "g" is capable of easy and accurate measurement and that adequate tests have been devised for some group factors, mechanical aptitude, for example. Much further research, both into the nature and range of specific abilities and into the devising of tests to discover these abilities, is needed before a complete equipment for the purposes of selection and of vocational guidance is available. This work will undoubtedly be gradually completed, and it is quite possible that these tests will afford such reliable information on the subject of children's abilities as to help us to decide what types of secondary education to provide, and how to fit the child with the right type. That time is not yet, however.

Moreover, it is most difficult to determine the extent to which special abilities are needed for various modern occupations. Mr Henry Ford has stated that the skill required for 85 per cent. of the jobs in his workshops can be acquired in not more than a fortnight; 43 per cent. can be learned in not more than one day, 36 per cent. require from a day to a week, and 6 per cent. from a week to a fortnight. This is a very different state of affairs from the days when a worker was a craftsman who needed to serve a long apprenticeship.

Of course, Mr Ford's statement cannot be taken as necessarily typical of British industries and occupations. Yet it is probably increasingly true of this country too, that under modern industrial conditions the class of highly skilled workers tends to be a restricted one, and that on the whole, therefore, specific abilities are becoming less needed for modern occupations.

In view of the undecided future of psychological tests for educational selection and for vocational guidance, an alternative solution would be that the interests shown by the child from 11+ onwards should decide the type of secondary education for him and his future occupation. Children's interests at first are often notoriously transient, but they tend ultimately to become stable, fixed and dominant. A stable and dominant interest, let us say in some kind of

future career, or in some form of mental or manual activity, would appear to be (because probably based on ability and rooted in some primitive "urge" or desire) a very adequate reason for differentiation of education and choice of vocation.

The acceptance of this suggestion would involve a profound reaction upon the school curricula and the activities of children from the age of 11 onwards. We should have to secure that these curricula and activities were such as to cater for and develop the possible interests, many and varied, of the children, and that the children had adequate facilities in school for developing each his or her particular interest. In view, too, of the possible transference of interest from one thing to another, there would have to exist suitable machinery for adjusting the school course to the changing interests of the child. Moreover, we should have to bring the pupils into touch with possible interests in the larger world of occupations, and for this purpose of stimulating and creating interests regular talks on occupations might be valuable.

Under this scheme the young person's occupation would be decided along the lines of his or her dominant interest when that definitely appeared. Full-time schooling would take place until that time, just as, under the other scheme, full-time schooling would continue until psychological tests had indicated the young person's particular bent or capacity and the kind of occupation for which he or she was best fitted. It is difficult to say in any particular case to what age, therefore, full-time schooling would continue; at any rate, it would not necessarily be 15.

No matter which of these or other possible solutions of the difficult problem of deciding the future vocations of pupils be adopted, however, the question of continued education still remains to be settled.

Of course, if the young person's occupation gave him an adequate continued education, no such problem would arise. But the facts are that occupation alone is for no young person a complete and adequate continued education, and that the occupations of most young persons are very unsatisfactory educative influences. Mr Ford's opinion of the training required for the jobs in his works has already been quoted. Recent investigations by the Emmott, Malcolm and Balfour Committees into the industry and commerce of this country show that apprenticeship is still important, that even in industries in which mechanical methods have been perfected and great specialisation has resulted there are numbers of learners who are trained to a fair degree of skill,

but that most workers are unskilled and many only in casual employment. Of some 600,000 boys and girls who leave school every year for employment, only about 30 per cent. have any prospects of adequate training, and the remaining 70 per cent. are neither apprentices nor learners nor subject to any system of training. This conclusion is scarcely affected by the perfectly valid argument that the present annual intake into skilled industry is materially below the pre-war average.

Although, therefore, it is an exaggeration when Mr Aldous Huxley in his recent novel, *Point Counter Point*, suggests that the occupation of every industrial worker is "just a dirty job that's got to be done, but is utterly irrelevant to the real human life," the fact remains that 70 per cent. of our young workers can only exist at their work; it does little or nothing to educate them.

It is essential, therefore, that for both types of young worker, apprentices and learners on the one hand, and those in occupational blind alleys on the other, some form of continued education should be provided. But it does not follow that entry into occupation should be postponed in favour of an extension of full-time schooling, even for those who will not become apprentices or learners. There are good reasons why for both groups a system of part-time continued education up to the age of 18 is more suitable and desirable than an extension of full-time schooling beyond the age at which the future occupation of the young person can be determined.

In the first place, the assumption that full-time schooling is necessarily the best thing for the adolescent has never been proved and is probably unprovable. Secondly, the idea that schooling and education are synonymous is a fallacy which is never explicitly stated, but which undoubtedly underlies much of the argument and many of the statements concerning schools and education. Thirdly, there is the false notion that what is called a good general education, of the kind given in the ordinary secondary school to-day, with possibly some slight modifications such as are suggested for the third and fourth years in the Hadow report, is necessarily the best kind of education for any and every child and the best preparation for any and every kind of future occupation. Finally, a system of part-time continued education up to the age of 18 would enable the young person to be helped continuously throughout the critical years of adolescence.

It is not fair to urge in reply that continuation schools

have been tried and have failed. The system never had a proper chance ; because it was found difficult to operate, it was left largely untried. Yet the considerable measure of success that has attended the isolated experiments gives reasonable grounds for hope that an extension of the experiments, especially if the scope and functions of the continuation school were properly conceived, would prove a remarkable success in continued education in the best sense of the word.

For apprentices and learners, the education given by their occupation, if supplemented in the way to be described later, would probably suffice, and it may well be that we have not yet sufficiently explored the possibilities of continued education here. Generally speaking, the occupation would teach workshop practice and impart technical skill in the specialised manual operations. The continuation school would teach the principles underlying such practice and the conditions and relations of the occupation. The scope of its course would vary from trade to trade ; in some it might well consist of the origin and development of the trade, the properties of its materials, the use and care of tools, the processes and methods employed and the use of the finished products. The Balfour Committee suggest that a technical school course would always include one or more of certain things, and their summary is so adequate a description of part at least of the work of the continuation school that it is worth repeating here : 274

- (a) Craft training in the actual operations performed by the students, or in other work done within the same industry, for the purpose of perfecting the individual skill of the students, or to render them more available for transference from one operation to another within the industry, or to give them a general outlook over the operations of the industry as a whole.
- (b) Instruction about the methods and routine of the industry, the qualities of the materials used, the construction and functions of the several appliances and the purpose and effects of the several processes through which material passes in the course of manufacture.
- (c) Instruction in the uses of drawing in connection with the industry, *e.g.* the making or reading of working drawings, the design of structures, etc.
- (d) Instruction, including experimental work in laboratories, in mathematics and the exact sciences (mechanics, physics and chemistry) which find application in the industry.

- (e) Instruction in such matters as book-keeping, costing, estimating and other topics belonging to business organisation, whether as regards individual undertakings, or the industry considered collectively.

The actual share to be taken by the industry and by the schools respectively in the education of such workers could only be decided after careful investigation of each occupation, and for this purpose there would have to be the most intimate co-operation between representatives of industry and educational authorities. There are signs that such co-operation is growing. The Board of Education has already made some detailed surveys of education for various branches of industry and commerce. Lord Eustace Percy, when President of the Board of Education, proposed that the reorganisation of the Board's Inspectorate as a National Intelligence Service on all questions of education should result in an attack on the problem of education for industry and commerce along two main lines : by inquiries into the general organisation of such education in the main industrial regions of the country, and by inquiries into education for particular branches of commerce and industry throughout the country. As a first step he arranged for one regional inquiry (West Midlands) and two particular inquiries (education for salesmanship and methods of education for engineering). The Malcolm and Balfour Committees have emphasised the desirability of the various industries and trades formulating their own views concerning educational provision and presenting them to educational bodies in order to see how far the requirements can be met. There are now movements for the co-operation of education on a regional basis with a particular industry (*e.g.* cotton) ; there are also movements towards regional co-operation in the whole range of technical education, not merely affecting a particular industry, but affecting all the industries in the region (*e.g.* a general committee for Yorkshire). National co-operation is also essential ; central bodies representing each of the several industrial and professional interests should be formed for the country as a whole, to set standards of craftsmanship and knowledge for the industry, in order that the system of education may be adjusted to meet these standards and the educational needs of the different types of workers. The extension of these movements to embrace the whole country and all its industries and occupations is desirable and urgent in the interests of the continued education of the skilled and semi-skilled workers.

The supplementing spoken of a moment ago will be

achieved not only by the continuation school teaching the principles, conditions and relations of the pupils' occupations, but also by its being a "club for juveniles" which will be a means of socialising them during the years of adolescence. It will not only deal with the fundamentals of these occupations, but will at the same time help to liberalise the lives of the young employees. Such liberalisation will come partly from them realising and understanding the "relations" of their occupations. As Professor Bowman says¹: "Every trade and every occupation has its point of contact somewhere with the great things of the spirit, with science and art, with history and literature." It behoves us, therefore, to use our pupil's occupation as a starting-point for the exploration of these "relations." The realisation and understanding of them will in turn make the occupation more and more of an adequate life for the worker; he will do his work with more insight and will have more satisfaction in the contemplation of it. Moreover, the pupil's motivation will become much more effective; meeting situations and problems in the course of actual contact with his occupational environment will stimulate in him the desire to analyse, understand and cope with these situations and problems, and for this purpose to seek the knowledge and ability and insight which the school can give.

There is a widespread belief that a liberal education is something essentially different from a vocational education, and that a particular type of curriculum can alone secure a liberal education. This belief, which is based solidly on tradition and strengthened by class-consciousness, is probably the strongest motive for the advocacy of further full-time schooling and may inspire adverse criticism of the continued education which has just been suggested for apprentices and learners. It is not my intention to go at any length here into this question of liberal and vocational education. What is now called a liberal education was once, and is still for many pupils, a vocational education. It is possibly quite well adapted to its particular purpose and suitable for a limited number (by no means to be identified with a limited *class*) of people, those namely, the academically-minded and -inclined, who combine high "g" and a large amount of what Professor Spearman calls "logical ability." It is certainly not suitable for all. Moreover, education is always vocational, in the best and truest sense of that word, and we are wrong in opposing

¹ "Adult Education and Vocation," *Journal of Adult Education*, September, 1927.

“ liberal ” and “ vocational. ” The difference is rather one within education itself, not so much in the content of that education as in the spirit which animates it, the attitude it fosters, and the means or methods by which its purposes are achieved. There is therefore no reason why a so-called vocational education, adequately conceived and properly carried out, should not be liberalising in its influence upon the pupil.

That the conception of the continuation school as a source of technical instruction for young workers and, at the same time, as a means of socialising them and permitting them to realise and share in the advantages of community life is no mere vision is proved by the scheme for combining industrial and cultural training for young adolescents from 14 to 18 at Hugh's Settlement, Quarley, Hants.¹ That a school may be a community centre for educational and social activities is further shown in the Sawston Village College scheme, now being carried on by the Cambridgeshire Education Committee. That it is possible to combine both club and school so as to attract the boy to whom the ordinary club does not appeal and whom the regular evening school repels, is suggested by the experiment known as the Stewart Headlam Men's (Junior) Institute, recently begun in London.

For those whose work is such as to make vocational education hardly practicable or necessary, and such as to provide no satisfaction or mental stimulus, continued education in the part-time continuation school would be a non-vocational training, a training for the right use of leisure, while in their case, too, the strong claims and needs of adolescence would make the “ club for juveniles ” equally important and valuable as a socialising influence. It would seem, as Mr Aldous Huxley suggests, that short of a social revolution, all we can do to help these is to make them live dualistically, in two compartments, in one compartment as industrialised workers, in the other as human beings—keeping the bulkheads between the two compartments watertight. If that is the lesson we have to teach many of the young workers, the continuation school as described can play a vital part in teaching it.

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¹ Described in the *New Ideals Quarterly* for April, 1929, p. 383 ff.

“PLAYING THE GAME” AS DIVINE

HUGH BROWN, LL.B., D.LITT.

IF we accept the idea that the æsthetic point of view is fundamental in theology, and that the world is intelligible only when seen as a thing of beauty, our first step will naturally be to think of the universe as a perfect work of art, and of God as the artist. That is to say, we conceive of God as having designed and created the world and all it contains, determining every detail of its structure, action, and destiny, without blemish, according to the counsel of His untrammelled will. This is, on the whole, the fundamental attitude of religion whenever it rises above the undergrowth of local myths and the distraction of personal desires and fears into the clear light of comprehensive cosmic ideas. It is the justification of disinterested worship. Religion does not, it is true, think in æsthetic terms, but the impulse to worship is essentially æsthetic. It comes from an overwhelming sense of the splendour of God as displayed in the natural and spiritual world.

The art conception appears in two forms: pantheism, in which the artist is regarded as embodying himself so completely in his work that he loses himself in it, and identifies himself with it; and absolute theism, in which the artist remains distinct from his work, embodying in it his creative purpose, but not his whole being. The attraction of pantheism is its thoroughgoing assertion of the divine perfection. It seems clear that if any part of the artist does not appear in his work, he is an imperfect creator, and if any part of the work does not express his nature, it is an imperfect creation. God and His world cannot each have the fulness of perfection if they are separate. On the other hand, absolute theism, while maintaining God's complete self-sufficiency and limitless supremacy, follows common religious feeling in insisting upon His separate identity. He transcends His work.

Two difficulties confront the art conception in both of its forms—the problem of freewill; and the problem of evil.

Freewill appears to imply a lack of control in the artist, and evil a defect in his work. I do not propose to discuss these two problems on their merits. By the exercise of some ingenuity it may be possible to reconcile the appearance, or even the reality, of freewill and evil with the art conception. It may be maintained, for instance, that the sense of freewill is an illusion designed to give interest to the artist's creatures, and that the things in the world which seem evil when considered by themselves are not evil when seen in relation to the whole, just as certain discords in music are beautiful when heard in their proper setting. Or again, it might be argued that freewill is real, but consistent with God's perfect control, since it merely means that God controls his creature from within instead of without, and that evil is real, but deliberately and justifiably created by God, since by the nature of things the highest good can exist only in the presence of evil.

It is possible that such arguments as these may not be unsound. Nevertheless, many theologians have felt that they are precarious and unsatisfying. The whole predestination idea, however interpreted, seems to them repulsive, and the evil in the world is so vast that its deliberate creation seems intolerably cold-blooded. They accordingly feel compelled to give up the art conception altogether, and regard the cosmic process as a fight between God and the powers of darkness.

The fight conception may take various forms, according to the strength and character attributed to the opposition. We may conceive God as supreme, though not absolute, and the resistance to Him as scarcely ruffling the surface of His serene control, or we may think of Him as engaged in a desperate struggle which taxes all His strength, and may end tragically. Again, we may imagine Him as trying to impose His designs upon an alien and refractory, but not hostile material, or as striving for the salvation of the world against a malignant adversary.

The milder forms, which try to approximate to the art conception, are popular with those who take their theology lightly, but they deal only half-heartedly with the difficulties which make that conception unsatisfactory. Typical of these forms is the regal conception. The king, or at least the symbolic king of our imagination, is the supreme power in his realm, and tolerates no open challenge to his authority. He is responsible for the general management and policy of the state, and lays down certain laws which his subjects

must observe. He cannot, as a rule, keep them from breaking these, but he can punish them if they do. He expects to be treated at all times with reverence, and on state occasions with the proper ceremonial. So long as his subjects satisfy these requirements, they may conduct their lives as they please without interference. He has, however, a kindly interest in their welfare, and encourages them to petition him if they have special need of his help. He has no particular end in view except the efficient government of his kingdom, and encounters no resistance except the occasional and not very formidable unruliness of his subjects. This scheme has had great influence upon popular religious thought, but its conception of God is too casual and easy-going to deserve serious consideration.

There are two forms of the light conception which appeal to the theologian.

The first commends itself especially to the scientifically-minded. It represents God as an all-pervading and persistent influence, spiritual, though not personal in any way that we can understand, which is at work upon the natural world, patiently coaxing order out of chaos, and bestowing upon brute matter form, unity, beauty, and spiritual value. Tennyson's "increasing purpose," and Matthew Arnold's "tendency, not of ourselves, which makes for righteousness," come under this heading, which indeed includes nearly all modern theological thought that is neither traditional nor absolutist.

The scientific God is no doubt valuable as a first refuge from the tendency to agnosticism which besets the scientific temperament, but He makes only a feeble appeal to religious feeling. It is almost impossible to represent Him to the imagination. We rather infer that He must somehow be in the world than perceive that He really is there. Indeed, He is little more than a vague hypothesis to account for certain ill-defined phenomena. Perhaps He can be most clearly conceived as an artist whose work is still unfinished, and will be finished only at infinity, but this variant of the art conception, though it suggests possibilities which we may consider later on, is unsatisfactory in its present form. It postpones the perfection of the world indefinitely, and yet gives no adequate account of either freewill or evil. Freewill is a temporary unruliness of the material of creation which will be ultimately got rid of, and evil has no positive virulence, but is merely a rawness and lack of harmony due to the unfinished state of the world. It seems scarcely

worth while breaking away from the art conception at all unless we get more in return.

It is in its more strenuous form that the positive virtue of the fight conception appears, the conception in which God is confronted with the Devil. The argument of the apologists for evil, that the highest good can exist only in the presence of formidable evil, is here pushed to the logical conclusion that the full divinity of God can be manifested only when in conflict with a really formidable Devil. In no other way can He possess the heroic virtues.

The appeal of the militant God to religious feeling is very powerful. Our idea of the divine nature is clarified. The veil of paradoxical mysticism is swept away, and we are allowed to believe that the moral and æsthetic distinctions on which we lay so much stress are substantially justified. God is good, as we understand goodness, and has a straightforward abhorrence of evil. He calls into activity our practical rather than our contemplative powers. Our task is not now to understand God's design in permitting evil, but to aid Him in destroying it. It is not now necessary to reconcile our freedom with God's eternal purposes, but to use it to further them. We find ourselves in a simplified world, where the decks have been cleared for action. There is still a place for understanding and worship, but they have become dynamic. Ecstatic adoration has given place to strenuous, enthusiastic loyalty.

The virtues of the fight conception are obvious, but the price we have to pay is enormous. There is no plan or purpose in the world as a whole, and no security that any will ever be established. If we follow out our conception unflinchingly, we must face the possibility that God may fail. His great enterprise may break down tragically, and the universe may end in darkness. Faith in God must always be accompanied by fear of the Devil.

In our own lives, moreover, we have to fear not only the Devil, but God Himself. That we should fear the Devil is natural enough. We know only too well how strong a hold the powers of evil have upon our souls, and we have always before us the dread that they may overwhelm us. But the fear of God is a more searching and terrible thing. In the first instance it is we who have to decide whether we shall be on the Lord's side or not, but in the last resort it is He. He is fighting a pitched battle for the salvation of the world, and has to consider whether we are helping or hindering. He will no doubt try to make use of any good that is in us, but if

He decides that we are working against Him, or merely cumbering the ground, He will cast us aside. And it is by His eyes that we are judged, not our own. If we cannot enter into God's purposes, no good intentions will save us. To sensitive religious natures nothing can be more terrific than the feeling that God's scrutinising eye is upon them. In the art conception, communion with the divine mind is a source of bliss ; in the fight conception, it is a necessity of the soul's existence.

Few religions have adopted either the art or the fight conception in its purity. Most of them feel the need of both, and have either compromised between them, or simply held them side by side without reconciliation. Christianity, in most of its forms, takes the latter course. It insists upon both the creative and the militant God. God the Father is the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent creator and disposer of all things in the universe, both good and evil. His will is supreme and absolute, and the Devil is His servant. God the Holy Spirit finds Himself in a world much of which is alien and abominable to Him. His nature is uncompromisingly good, and He is the inspirer and director of all that makes for righteousness. His will is constantly thwarted, and the Devil is His mortal enemy. It is *asserted* that God will be the final conqueror, but it is clear that a large share of the ultimate spoils of war is to fall to the Devil.

I have drawn the distinction between the Father and the Holy Spirit more explicitly than it is drawn in Christian theology itself. The Church has no interest in defining a gulf which it has no means of bridging. It accordingly offers no serious account of the status of the Devil, and treats the unity of the Father and the Holy Spirit in the Godhead as a mystery which faith must be content to accept.

Now it may be that the Church is justified in grasping both horns of the dilemma, even though they seem quite incompatible. If two inconsistent beliefs appear to be both necessary, it may be well to accept both provisionally, in the faith that a deeper understanding would make the inconsistency vanish. Nevertheless, the position is unsatisfactory. Its difficulty is not merely logical, like some of the paradoxes we meet in metaphysics, where something which seems intuitively clear becomes puzzling to the intellect. It is genuine and substantial, and perplexes the whole mind. Faith may keep us from undue worrying, but it will not enable us to act intelligently in an ambiguous situation. Moreover, when two conceptions are held together

unreconciled, there is always the danger that their worst elements may be conjoined instead of their best. Probably there is nothing more horrible in theology than the combination of the doctrine of Predestination, which belongs to the art conception, with the doctrine of Damnation, which belongs to the fight conception, to form the doctrine of a forordained Hell.

It is often stated that the solution of the problem is beyond the powers of the human mind. In the last resort this may indeed be so, but I do not think the human mind has yet reached the end of its resources. There is one conception, intermediate between the art and fight conceptions, which, though not very promising in appearance, and hitherto singularly neglected, may give us help. This is the conception of the game.

The neglect of the theory of the game by philosophers is strange, and in sharp contrast with their elaborate treatment of art. Even when, following Schiller, they have investigated the play of children, which contains the germs of both art and games, they have considered it only as the ancestor of art. Yet games have at least as massive a hold upon the affections of humanity as art. They appeal to all classes. The rich have more varied opportunities for indulging their sporting tastes, but the poor make up in intensity what they lack in diversity. In the public schools and universities, games are cultivated almost as diligently as learning, and more diligently than art, but many experts at games are uneducated men who show little intelligence at anything else. The game at its best is played by adult men, but many women and almost all children are keen players. It has been popular in all countries and all ages. It is suspected that even the philosophers who affect to despise games pursue their speculations with much of the game spirit.

Some of the causes of the philosopher's indifference to games will appear later, but one of the most obvious is the apologetic attitude of game players themselves. Artists can be very impressive about the importance of their art, but game players as a rule are anxious to make it clear that they do not take games really seriously. People who are never thoroughly in earnest except when playing a game will say: "After all, it is only a game." They feel that their devotion needs an excuse, and give all sorts of utilitarian reasons for playing, such as exercise, fresh air, mental recreation, opportunities for social intercourse, and the like. There may be persons who really play games for such

reasons, but they are few, and despised by the true game player. The real reason for playing games is æsthetic. We play them for their beauty.

In ascribing beauty to games we are perhaps doing some violence to the usages of language, but it is plain that the game has the main characteristics usually attributed to beauty. A game is at least as self-contained as a work of art. Our attitude to it is quite as disinterested. The delight it gives, too, seems to be a rational consequence of its structure, and not to be simply given, like the pleasure of a physical sensation. The only objection to applying the word "beauty" to games is that we have got into the habit of confining its use to objects of the art type. I suggest, however, that this usage is unnecessary and misleading, and that the game is a fundamental form of beauty co-ordinate with the work of art.

In contrasting the game with the work of art and the fight, I shall, for the sake of clearness, deal in the meantime not with actual works of art and fights, which generally contain more or less of the game element, but with the extreme ideal types from which every trace of the game is absent. Let us first note some of the chief characteristics of the game which distinguish it from the pure work of art.

(1) The work of art is the product of a single mind, the game of a conflict of minds.

(2) The work of art is completely prepared for perception before the mind of the perceiver is brought to bear upon it, and the process of creation is irrelevant to the product; the game is perceived as it is created, and the process and the product are identical.

(3) The work of art is determined in every detail by the will of its creator; the course of the game is undetermined, and its result uncertain. It is to be particularly noted that the uncertainty of the game is not a defect, but essential to its value. Any suspicion that the course of a game has been predetermined, or that the result is a foregone conclusion, destroys all its interest.

(4) A work of art aims at perfection; a game does not. One cannot expect to perfect a design when constantly thwarted by a keen and able opponent. Yet the game has its compensations. If most of our combinations are frustrated by our opponent, those which succeed against him will be of the first order. They have been tried in the fire, and so produce a certain feeling of genuineness, which the artist who has things all his own way, can never quite achieve.

(5) Such occasional constructive successes, however, though delightful to the game player, are of the nature of luxuries. They approximate to the beauty of art rather than the characteristic beauty of the game. The main attraction of the game lies elsewhere. We find joy in a keen, hard-fought game even if it contains no special flashes of brilliance. We are not so much aware of a feeling of beauty as of passionate interest. This is the feeling which custom has made us hesitate to class as æsthetic, but I shall include it under the general term "beauty." Its attraction is at least equal to that of the art type, though different in character.

(6) The game, though narrower in range than the work of art, is richer in texture. *Paradise Lost* surveys Earth, Heaven, and Hell, whereas football is merely concerned with the question whether a certain leather ball shall or shall not pass between two upright poles. On the other hand, what we perceive in a work of art is a harmony of external sensations and the images aroused by them, whereas in a game what we perceive is a harmony of all our mental activities, whether cognitive, emotional, or practical. At any moment in a game of football, for instance, we have to grasp the external situation, calculate the best way of meeting it, taking into account the possible actions of both opponents and allies, control the action of our bodies, concentrating our whole effort upon making it as efficient as possible, while at the same time we are besieged by all sorts of desires, hopes, and fears, about the success of our effort and its bearing on the result of the game.

(7) Our attitude to a work of art is single-minded. We simply wish to enjoy it. In playing a game, however, we have two objects. Our formal object is to win it; our real object is to enjoy it. Yet if we are to achieve our real object we must concentrate all our attention on the formal object. This is one of the reasons why the æsthetic aspect of the game has been so persistently neglected. To obtain its æsthetic joy we must ignore it. The game type of beauty has therefore a curious underground quality unlike anything in art.

(8) Our attitude to a work of art is balanced and impartial. In a game we take a side and see everything from the point of view of that side. Even if we are only spectators, we must, if we wish to get the proper enjoyment out of the game, identify ourselves sympathetically with one side, and see the play as a partisan. If we attempt to take a detached contemplative attitude to a game as if it were a

work of art, we miss its essence. This, again, is a stumbling-block to the philosopher who likes to see things steadily, and see them whole. In a game such vision is a positive defect.

(9) Time belongs to the essence of the game as it does not to the work of art. Pure art is either independent of time, as in painting, sculpture, and architecture, or transcends it, as in music and poetry. A symphony, for instance, takes time to perform, but when we judge it as a work of art, we judge it as a whole, as if all its parts were visible to the mind at once. We may not be able to perform this feat perfectly, like Mozart, but if we are to appreciate the design of a composition at all, we must do it to some extent. In playing a game, on the other hand, we live from moment to moment, distinguishing sharply between present, past, and future. No doubt we always feel the game as a unity, but we never see it as a whole until after it is finished, and then our enjoyment, if any remains, has become reminiscent and secondary. Our primary enjoyment takes place while the game is still unfinished. Its completion is its death. When we have finished a game, we do not, unless it has produced beauties of the artistic order, cherish its memory, but simply begin a new one.

(10) The game, therefore, has none of the standard philosophic virtues. It makes no effort after perfection, wholeness, eternity, or absoluteness, and violently repudiates necessity, certainty, immutability, impartiality, and kindred conceptions. For the philosophic virtues we must turn to art, and it is therefore not surprising that philosophers, when they have considered the æsthetic aspect of things at all, have in fact always turned to art rather than games for material and inspiration.

If we now compare the game with the pure fight, we note the following distinctions.

(1) The game is a form of beauty, whereas the fight, as such, is not. The game is an end in itself; the fight is a means to an end beyond itself. We fight, not for the pleasure of fighting, but for victory, and the fruits of victory. In the game, victory is only the formal end; in the fight, it is the real end. In the fight, as such, there is no beauty and no joy. This is the fundamental distinction. The others are consequences of it.

(2) The game is played according to rules; the fight is not. The purpose of the rules is to secure self-containedness, unity, and economy by defining and simplifying the object and conditions of action so that all irrelevant activity may be

excluded, and the most varied combinations be obtained from the barest elements.

(3) The fight, as such, has value only when it is won; the game has value whether it is won or lost. It is no doubt better to win a game than to lose it, but it is much better to play and lose than not to play at all. A lost fight, on the other hand, is pure loss, with no compensation.

(4) There is a fundamental mutual understanding between the parties to a game; there is none between the parties to a fight.

(5) The value of a game lies in the present; that of a fight, if any, in the future.

Let us now see what use can be made of the game conception in theology. Let us suppose that the universe is neither a great work of art nor a great fight, but a great game.

This conception, unlike the other two, makes no appeal to religious feeling. It lacks both the assurance of security and perfection which we find in the art conception, and the moral strenuousness of the fight. Its formal objects are trivial, and its ambiguity of attitude looks like make-believe, which is a kind of insincerity. The very self-containedness of the game, which is an æsthetic virtue, makes it difficult for religion to assimilate. She can use art for her own purposes, but it is difficult to treat a game otherwise than as an end in itself. Serious religion has therefore always felt the game to be a rival, and a stupid and frivolous rival, rather than an ally.

The unfriendliness of religion to the game conception is no doubt partly due to its unfamiliarity, at least in a serious form. The possibilities of the game analogy have never been brought fairly before theologians. But I do not think that this is the whole explanation. The fact that no attempt has been made to explore these possibilities is itself probably due to a natural antagonism between the game spirit and what we are accustomed to consider the religious type of mind.

The recognition of this antipathy suggests two conclusions. The first is that the game conception cannot by itself represent the whole truth about the world. The second is that the religious type of mind is itself one-sided, and requires to be supplemented. Theology has perhaps been too apt to consider only the religious point of view. The serious, long-sighted children of eternity are perhaps too contemptuous of the light-hearted, high-spirited, short-sighted children of time, who are too inarticulate or preoccupied to state their own case. It is possible, further, that this supplementary non-religious point of view can be best stated in terms of the

game conception. Let us therefore disregard for the moment the coldness of religion, and consider what light this conception can throw upon the scheme of things. I think it fits the facts at least as well as either the art or the fight conception.

It seems obvious, to begin with, that the universe is more than a mere fight. Though the human, and even the living world may appear to be in a constant state of war and anarchy, science makes it clear that behind all this strife there is a stable background of law and order. We find ourselves set down in a physical and social arena whose outlines are on the whole well-marked, the rules we have to observe are simple and definite, and we are supplied by nature with certain objects of action, which in practice we readily accept, though we may philosophise about their validity when we have leisure. If we submit to these conditions with a simple mind, and strive with undivided energy, we are rewarded by a profound interest and joy in life which is independent of our success or failure in accomplishing the object we have set before us. That is to say, the world has the structure of a game, and, if accepted in the proper spirit, affords its æsthetic joy.

If the fight conception lays too little stress on the background of law and order in the universe, the art conception lays too much. The characteristics of art, its inevitability, necessity, and perfection, are manifested most clearly in the lowest planes of existence; in the higher we find freedom, uncertainty, imperfection, and conflict. The world is no doubt full of beauty of the artistic type, but this appears chiefly in the physical setting of the spiritual life. If we try to describe the æsthetic appeal of man and his spiritual history, we must admit that it has not the balanced perfection of the work of art, but the absorbing interest of the game.

It may be objected that a gamelike world would lack the security of an artistic world. From the point of view of the formal object of the game, the objection is valid. If the cosmic game is genuine, its result is uncertain, and we must be prepared to find it lost. But from the point of view of the real object, the objection is invalid. Since the main value of the game depends, not upon its result, but upon the spirit in which it is played, the joy of the game can be secured, no matter what the result may be.

The objection from the side of the fight conception, that the game lacks moral strenuousness, is also less true than it looks. The game develops a conscience of its own which has been recognised as particularly whole-

some. Indeed it is the moral rather than the æsthetic aspect of the game which has attracted the attention of serious thinkers. Its value in education is highly prized, and “Play the game” has become one of the watchwords of our civilisation. Many perverse things are inspired by the artistic conscience, and many cruel ones by the common moral conscience, but the game spirit promotes a scrupulous sense of fairness and chivalry, and keeps a bracing wind blowing through the soul. The exertion of the keenest partisan energy is controlled by the underlying determination to maintain intact the æsthetic spirit of the game, so that it shall not degenerate into a mere fight. Many men to whom nothing else is sacred would die rather than violate the integrity of the game.

If, then we accept provisionally the game conception of the world, how are we to think of God? Apparently our conception must be dual. On the one hand, we must think of Him as the presiding genius of the cosmic game as a whole, determining its setting, conditions, rules, and formal objects of play. In this character, He resembles the creative God of the art conception. On the other hand, since the value of the game is essentially partisan, and can be appreciated only in a partisan spirit, we must also conceive of Him as identifying Himself with one side, and exerting all His strength, subject to the conditions of the game, to bring victory to that side. In this character He resembles the militant God of the fight conception. Good, on this supposition, would be the side God favours, and evil that which He opposes. We must suppose also that whereas in the eyes of the creative God evil is of value as one of the contending sides in the game, in the eyes of the militant God it is something to be strenuously resisted. The Devil is thus the servant of the creative God, and the enemy of the militant God.

In the Godhead of the game world we have therefore two persons, corresponding roughly to the First and Third Persons of the Trinity, and these two are one. Their identity, moreover, is no longer a sheer mystery. The game scheme makes it diagrammatically clear to the mental eye. The Second Person of the Trinity has not yet appeared.

In this scheme each man has his own private game to play. Since the great cosmic game does not allow of perfect adjustments, these private games will not be so neatly laid out as the artificial games we make for ourselves, just as the beauty of a natural scene lacks the balanced symmetry of an artist’s landscape. Yet it is extraordinary how thoroughly

the average man's life falls under the conditions of the game. Practically nobody conducts his life according to principles and methods which he has worked out for himself. He is born "either a little Liberal or else a little Conservative." In politics, religion, business, and social life, he finds laid out for him a prepared arena, a side which naturally invites him, and ready-made objects, conditions, and rules of action. He has only to accept the part offered him, and play it with his whole heart, and the creative God will provide for him. He may meet with all sorts of reverses, and perhaps fail in all he undertakes, but the joy of the game will accompany him through life, and he will die feeling that life has been very much worth living. If he has an original mind, so that he refuses to accept the part which naturally offers itself to him, he is free to choose another. His game will then be more complicated, but even more absorbing. If he is fortunate enough, or has enough insight, to choose God's side, he will share in the divine cosmic joy, but even if he chooses wrongly, he will have fair and chivalrous treatment, and can still have the reward of the whole-hearted player. Only the lazy and faint-hearted, the "laggard in love, and dastard in war," meet with no consideration from the creative God of the game.

It is clear from our account that the God we have described cannot be worshipped in the ordinary religious sense. If we are to play a game well, the knowledge that it is a game must remain in the background of our mind. That is to say, we shall be in closest communion with the First Person if we forget Him, and with the Third if we look upon Him as if He were the militant God of the fight. At the same time, even when earnestly furthering the interests of the Third Person, we must instinctively preserve the spirit of the First, and be sensitive to note any violation of it. This attitude appears paradoxical when stated, and probably could not be assumed in cold blood, but absorption in the game produces it automatically.

Finally, the game conception favours, though not decisively, the doctrine of personal immortality. The game itself is mortal. When it ends, it vanishes. But the players remain, and the same players may play a whole series of games. It may be that when the cosmic game is finished, the physical framework of the universe vanishes, and a new game begins in a new setting, but not with an entirely new set of players. It may be that those who played their parts with spirit in the old universe, whether for good or

evil, will be retained to play again in the new, the laggards and dastards being omitted to make room for new creations.

Having now given a brief sketch of the possibilities of the game conception, I hasten to add that I do not consider it satisfactory as it stands. It seems more like an ingenious speculation which may interest the intellect, than a genuine vision of reality which can illuminate, strengthen, and content the soul. On the other hand, I do not think that it can be wholly dismissed. It is extraordinarily suggestive, and seems to open the way to a field of theological truth which cannot be reached otherwise. I believe that it can be supplemented so as to be credible.

In the meantime we may note the following advantages of the theory :—

(1) It takes a thoroughly æsthetic view of the universe without demanding from it a perfection which it obviously has not.

(2) It recognises and insists upon freedom.

(3) It explains both why evil should exist and why it should be combated.

(4) It gives fair consideration to the non-religious temperament.

(5) It makes a wholesome contribution to morals.

(6) It favours personal immortality.

(7) It suggests an intelligible interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity as to the First and Third Persons.

Its main disadvantages are :—

(1) It does not satisfy the deeper intuitions and feelings of religion.

(2) It is vague about the mechanism by which its results are brought about ; it does not suggest, for instance, how we are to conceive the process of creation.

(3) Its treatment of good and evil is too formal ; it does not sufficiently recognise the intrinsic goodness of good and badness of evil.

(4) It gives no account of the Second Person of the Trinity.

It will be observed that while the advantages of the theory are positive and substantial, its defects are of the nature of omissions. That is to say, the game conception needs to be supplemented rather than altered. Our problem is therefore to found upon it a larger conception which will utilise its possibilities and at the same time do justice to the best elements in the art and fight conceptions, and so have a chance of satisfying religious feeling.

GREENOCK.

HUGH BROWN.

A CRITICISM OF THE NEW REALISM, AS EXPOUNDED BY PROFESSOR S. A. ALEXANDER.¹

EDMOND HOLMES.

PROFESSOR ALEXANDER'S name for the New Realism is "Empirical Metaphysics." He identifies metaphysics with philosophy on the one hand and science on the other. "Philosophy (by which I mean metaphysics) is itself one of the sciences delimited from the others by its special subject-matter." And "its method will be like theirs empirical." He seems to have overlooked at the outset a difference between science and metaphysics which is profound and far-reaching : science, as science, never concerns itself with the *status* of its own subject-matter, whereas metaphysics does and must.

In common with all other New Realists, Professor Alexander limits experience to sense-experience ; and he therefore starts with the assumption that the physical world is "the Universe." It is true that he recognises the existence of a perceptive faculty called "intuition," by which space and time and the "primary" qualities of things are apprehended ; but he is careful to remind us that "primary qualities are apprehended by intuition through sensation," that "intuition is contained in sensation and masked by it," and that ; "all our experience is provoked through the sense-organs."

What do we mean by experience ? There are always two factors in it—a subject and an object. For the purpose of empirical metaphysics the subject of experience is of course the mind of man. Mind is a particular aspect of what we call spirit or soul or self. If the objects of experience are

¹ In *Space, Time and Deity*.

real things—and the empirical metaphysician must needs assume that they are—it is the percipient mind which guarantees their reality. So one instinctively assumes. But, for Professor Alexander, experience seems to guarantee its own reality, and in doing so to guarantee the reality of its objects. Where, then, does mind come in ?

As mind is not the object of its own *sense*-experience it cannot be allowed to guarantee its own reality. On this point Professor Alexander is emphatic. He tells us that

“ the effect of the empirical method in metaphysics is severely and persistently to treat finite minds as one among the many forms of finite existence having no privilege among them except such as it derives from its greater perfection of development.”

The nearest approach to an argument in support of this assumption is the statement that “ mind as an entity superior both to things and to passing states . . . is never experienced and does not therefore enter into the view of an empirical metaphysics.” From the air of assurance with which this statement is made, one would imagine that it cannot be challenged. But it can be. I, for one, am ready to challenge it. For me the mind as an entity superior both to things and to its own mental states is the only object of what I may call a self-certifying experience, the only object of experience which presents itself to me as intrinsically real. My experience clashes with Professor Alexander's and flatly contradicts it. I accept the experience of self-awareness as a revelation of reality—the revelation of self to self. Professor Alexander, having assumed at the outset that sense-experience is alone valid, and having satisfied himself that mind, as it presents itself to me (and to most men), is not the object of such experience, denies existence to it as a self-conscious entity, real in its own right, and relegates it to the humble position of one of the objects of its own sense-experience.

But what is the value of an experience, the objects of which are real, but the subject of which, *quâ* subject, is an illusion ? The duality of subject and object is of the very essence of experience. If either factor in the process is to be absorbed into the other, the object must be absorbed into the subject. For the subject is the guarantor of reality ; and it may conceivably be able to raise the object to its own level by taking it up into itself. But if the subject, *quâ* subject, if mind, *quâ* mind, *quâ* spirit, *quâ* self, is unreal, its guarantee becomes ineffective, and the objects of its guarantee, *with itself*

as one of them, disappear into an evanescent mist of illusion. An experience which is real on its objective side only is no experience. It is as unreal, or rather as meaningless, as a one-sided equation.

But let us assume, for argument's sake, that mind has been justly punished for its past arrogance, that it has deservedly taken its place beside the non-mental objects of its own experience? What then? Are we any nearer to a final solution of the problem of reality? I cannot see that we are. What does Professor Alexander mean by reality? He tells us in his Introduction that "in respect of being, or reality, all existents are on an equal footing." Here, in the two words "or reality," he solves to his own satisfaction the problem to which Bradley devoted 626 pages of closely reasoned argument. In thus identifying reality with being, Professor Alexander exemplifies a tendency which seems to be characteristic of metaphysics as such, and which counts for so much in his exposition of his own system, that I must turn aside to consider it—the tendency to play fast and loose with words.

The misuse of words in metaphysics takes two forms. Metaphysicians invent a jargon of their own, which they take quite seriously. Science, too, has a jargon of its own, which scientists take quite seriously. But in science the jargon is needed; it meets a genuine demand; and, within the limits which science as such imposes on itself, it does effective work. In metaphysics the use of a jargon is the outcome of a divergence from the broad highway of human thought and feeling into a byway which will probably end in an *impasse*.

But the coining of pseudo-technical terms is a trifling offence compared with the misuse of familiar words, the open disregard of what I call their inherent meanings; and this is an offence of which the metaphysician, in his desire to follow out a particular line of thought, is often guilty. Either he puts his own interpretation on a word which is in common use, and so begs the question which is in dispute, or he stretches the meaning of the word to breaking-point and so turns its sense into nonsense.

By the inherent meaning of a word I mean the meaning which is the outcome of subtle movements of thought and feeling and experience (in the widest sense of the word) in many ages and many lands; which has been defined, more or less accurately, by centuries of usage; which reflects in its general trend the influence of countless associations;

which has been insensibly modified by myriads of varying contexts ; and which is charged, along the dominant stream of its own tendency, with potentialities of further development. The inherent meaning of a word, as so defined, cannot be lightly disregarded. It avenges itself on those who ignore it—in general by stultifying their arguments, and in particular by making them contradict themselves through its refusal to be ignored.

Professor Alexander identifies reality with being (in the sense of existence). This is a misuse of words. If usage counts for anything, it must be admitted that the word "reality" is much more fully charged with meaning than the word "being." There is surely—to go no further—a difference in respect of reality between dependent being and self-existent being. There is surely a difference, in respect of reality, between the "one" that "remains" and the "many" that "change and pass." There is surely a difference between the antithesis of reality and unreality and the antithesis of being and non-being. Aristotle, whose authority in such matters carries weight, distinguished between "existing" and "existing *as fully as possible*"; and this is equivalent to a distinction between being and reality. If

"We are no other than a moving row
Of magic shadow-shapes that come and go,"

it may be said that we exist, but it cannot be said that we exist as fully as possible, as fully, for example, as does the "Master of the Show." Professor Alexander tells us that "there are no degrees in truth and still less in reality." If this is so, why do we apply to "reality" such epithets as *ultimate, innermost, higher, supreme, transcendent, absolute, intrinsic, fundamental*, and the like—epithets which would be meaningless if applied to "being," in the sense of "existence"? Professor Alexander finds it difficult to keep down to the level of his own crude dualism. He uses such phrases as "an ultimate reality," "perfectly and absolutely real," "relatively real," "the ultimate nature of reality," "primary reality," "fuller reality," "realities of a lower order." If there is no gradation in reality, if all "existents" are equally real, such expressions as these are a waste of words.

But let it be granted that all existents are real and equally real. What then? The problem of "appearance and reality" has ceased to trouble us. But a new problem, equally elusive and otherwise untractable, has taken its

place. What is the criterion of existence, of "is-ness"? What does Professor Alexander mean by "existents"? Objects of experience would, I presume, be his answer to this question. But there are many kinds of experience. Are they all equally trustworthy? And if not, why not?

Do the objects of mystical experience exist? Do the objects of clairvoyant sense-perception exist? Do the objects of prophetic vision exist? Do the objects of telepathic experience exist? Do the objects of the "varieties of religious experience" described by William James exist? Does the "next world" of the spiritualist exist? Does the "astral plane" of the occultist exist? Does the *aura*, the coloured emanation from a human being which some persons claim to be able to see and describe, exist?

Professor Alexander's attitude towards experiences which are abnormal in kind rather than in degree is dictated to him by the conception which he has formed of his mission. He identifies metaphysics with science and relies on intellect for the solution of his problems. Science builds its structures on a basis of accepted fact; and metaphysics, if it is to take rank as a science, must do the same. But metaphysics, unlike science, must examine its own foundations, and must satisfy itself that its basis of accepted fact is objectively, and even exclusively, real. It must distinguish sharply between accepted fact and reported fact, excluding the latter from its purview until it has passed a test which, if it is abnormal in *kind*, it cannot possibly pass. We must therefore expect Professor Alexander, as an empirical metaphysician, to ignore, and in effect rule out, all the exceptional experiences which I have enumerated. He has in point of fact narrowed experience down to sense-experience, the sense-experience of the "standardised man"; and he could not well have done otherwise. But this involves a corresponding narrowing down of the universe. The denial of mind, *quâ* self, *quâ* spirit, real in its own right, which is said to be a central feature of "empirical metaphysics," carries with it so many other denials that we need not look beyond it for the key to Professor Alexander's "science of being as such." For him the outward and visible world is the real world and the whole world. Reports of other worlds, of other planes of being, must be dismissed as idle tales.

It is notoriously hard to prove a negative. A philosophy which is built on a basis of comprehensive negation rests on an insecure foundation which is liable at any moment to be undermined, with fatal results to the superincumbent struc-

ture. Towards the end of his book Professor Alexander makes the following significant admission :

“ If convincing experiment should in the future demonstrate the persistence of mind without its body which here subserves it, I should have to admit that the doctrine of this book would require radical alteration and, as far as I can judge at present, destruction.”

It is a pity that Professor Alexander did not study the evidence for survival before he elaborated a system of thought which a single proved case of survival would suffice to destroy. Had he made such a study the book might never have been written.

But the book has been written, and we must criticise it on other grounds than that it rules out a future life. The “ real,” as distinguished from the “ notional,” basis of the “ New Realism ” is belief in the intrinsic and exclusive reality of the material world. The thinker who starts with this postulate will go on to look for ultimate reality in the elements into which matter is ultimately resolvable by scientific or quasi-scientific analysis. The physicist, when he pushes his analysis of matter to, or at least towards, its final limit, finds that matter dissolves under his hands into a “ complex of metrical symbols,” a “ schedule of pointer readings,” and so forth. He is content that it should do this, for he makes no assumption as to the *status* of the object of his study. But his “ ultimates ” are useless for the metaphysician. The next step beyond them would take him into a world so unsubstantial as to be scarcely distinguishable from nothingness. Ultimate reality would come perilously near to being indistinguishable from ultimate unreality. “ The modern scientific theories,” says Professor Eddington, ‘ have broken away from the common standpoint which identifies the real with the concrete.’ But empirical metaphysics, having started, in its attitude towards the material world, with acceptance of the common standpoint, has a prejudice in favour of the concrete, of which it cannot easily rid itself. And so it comes to pass that Professor Alexander, a typical exponent of the New Realism, diverging in his analysis of experience from the path of physical science, has gone straight to the two ideas which seem to be ultimate in popular thought when it contemplates the material world, the idea of Space and the idea of Time, invested these with objective, quasi-concrete being and combined them (under the influence of the mathematical conception of Time as the

fourth dimension of Space) in "indissoluble union," into an all-embracing whole, the one self-existent reality to which all our "empirical finites" "owe their being," and out of which the world of our experience is for ever "emerging."

Let us examine this conception. "The hypothesis of this (Professor Alexander's) book is that Space-Time is the stuff of which matter and all things are specifications." This is a bold, far-reaching and all-embracing assumption; and it obviously does not admit of proof. Professor Alexander takes great pains to elucidate it; and elucidation, in metaphysics, may be accepted as a substitute for proof. But does Professor Alexander elucidate his thesis, in the sense of throwing light on its inner meaning? I cannot think that he does. The truth is, as it seems to me, that his thesis has no inner meaning on which light can be thrown. You can get no more out of Space-Time than you put into it; and in like manner you can get no more out of the assumption which invests Space-Time with absolute reality than you put into it. As "matter and all things" are "specifications" of Space-Time, so are all Professor Alexander's arguments "specifications" of his initial assumption. He does indeed present the assumption to us under many different forms. His statements and re-statements of it fill two bulky volumes. But they leave us where they found us. They do not carry conviction to one who is not already convinced. No amount of repetition can compel assent to a proposition which does not on other grounds command assent.

What do we know about Space-Time? Four-dimensional Space, in which Time plays the part of the fourth dimension of Space, is a mathematical conception. But mathematicians do not concern themselves with the problem of intrinsic reality; and there is no place in mathematics for the Space-Time of Professor Alexander's philosophy. Professor Eddington, who as a mathematician accepts the idea of four-dimensional space, and recognises the existence of "frames of space-time," takes great pains to dissociate time from space. He "discerns," and would have us discern, "an absolute distinction between space-like and time-like separation of events—a distinction which justifies and explains our instinctive feeling that space and time are fundamentally different"; and he tells us that "events can stand to us in a temporal relation (absolutely past or future), or a spatial relation (absolutely elsewhere), but not in both."

For the empirical metaphysician experience—by which he means sense-experience—is the revealer of reality. What

experience have we of Space-Time ? We have experience of a kind—chiefly negative—of space. And we have experience of a kind—more positive and personal—of time. We have experience of space as emptiness ; and of time as duration. Of Space-Time as a substantial reality of cosmic scope, of Space-Time as an indissoluble and all-embracing whole, of Space-Time as “ the one stuff of which all things are made,” we have no experience whatever.

Nor can we think rationally or even coherently about it. We can think of it, through the medium of the conception of four-dimensional space, as the conclusion to a chain of mathematical reasoning. We can play with it as a metaphysical postulate, whose very extravagance, like that of a fairy-tale, makes matter-of-fact criticism of it seem out of place. But we cannot think seriously about its nature or its behaviour without losing ourselves in a fog of puzzles and contradictions. We are met at the outset by an obstacle which cannot be surmounted. We can think of time as succession in space. And we can think of space as enduring through time. But we cannot think of Space-Time as either *in* space or *in* time. A compound which is presumably indissoluble, and which is presented to us as all-embracing, cannot have its being within one of its own component parts. Can an apple-dumpling, in its indissoluble unity, get inside its own crust ? Can Space-Time, in its indissoluble unity, have location in space or movement in time ?

But if we cannot think coherently about Space-Time, perhaps Professor Alexander can. He professes to be able to do so ; and he has in fact elaborated his thoughts about it into a complete “ philosophy.” What has he to tell us about this creation of his mind ? Many things. Here are some of them : “ Space and Time are, in their indissoluble union, the ultimate reals in their simplest and lowest form.” Space-Time is “ the primary reality.” It is “ the lowest of all stages.” It is “ the bare elements of the world.” It is “ the universe in its lowest expression.” It is “ the universe in its primordial form.” This on the one hand. And on the other hand it is “ the experiential Absolute.” It is “ the totality of all substances.” It is “ all existence and all substance.” It is “ the all-embracing stuff.” All “ existents ” are “ pieces ” of Space-Time, or “ bits ” of Space-Time, or “ modes ” of Space-Time, or “ specifications ” of Space-Time. Or, again, they are so many “ Space-Times.”

Thus Space-Time is on the one hand the universe in its lowest expression and on the other hand the universe in its

totality. It is Alpha from one point of view ; and Alpha and Omega from another. There is some confusion of thought in this. But it could not well have been avoided. If the universe in its lowest expression is self-existent and intrinsically real, and if there is no gradation in reality—then, however much the universe may gain in complexity, it will never really rise above the level of its own lowest expression. It was Space-Time in the beginning of things, and it will be no more than Space-Time at the end.

But how does Space-Time—the primary reality, the lowest of all stages, the universe in its primordial form—transform itself into the world of our experience ? In his attempt to answer this question Professor Alexander has recourse to various metaphors. These cluster for the most part round two ideas—the idea of Space-Time as a *matrix*, and the idea of Space-Time as *stuff*.

A *matrix* is a womb ; and a womb contains embryos, potentialities which are waiting to be fertilised. How did the empty womb of Space-Time become full of possible existents ? And by whom or what have they been fertilised ? There is no answer to either question.

A *stuff* is a (more or less) raw material which has to be worked up into various finished articles. It has in itself no principle of self-transformation. Who or what has worked up, and is still working up, the stuff of Space-Time into the “empirical finites” which lie around us ? There is no answer to this question.

How does Professor Alexander evolve the universe out of the matrix of Space-Time ? By making the matrix do what a matrix never does—“*break up*” into finites of ever-increasing complexity. He deals similarly with Space-Time as stuff. “Space-Time,” he tells us, “is the stuff of which all existents are composed, and it breaks up of itself into these complexes within the one all-embracing stuff.” How can a stuff, or raw material, break up into a multitude of finished articles ? And having done this, how can it remain “all-embracing” ? Can a bowl break up into a multitude of fragments and yet remain the bowl that contains them all ? In another passage Professor Alexander seems to regard “stuff” and “matrix” as interchangeable terms. He tells us that “Space and Time are as it were the stuff or matrix (or matrices) out of which things or events are made ;” and he proceeds to make confusion worse confounded by saying that they are “the *medium* in which things are precipitated and crystallised.” Elsewhere he tells us that “the universe

consists of things which have developed within the one matrix of Space-Time." (Does the period of gestation last for ever ?) And, again, that "within the all-embracing stuff of Space-Time the universe is an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existence."

When metaphors which are used seriously and in good faith and in no spirit of paradox, refuse to work, when they tangle up and obscure the thoughts that are behind them, we may safely conjecture that those thoughts are confused and self-contradictory, and that the mind of the thinker is moving in a wrong direction.

We are not in the least helped to an understanding of the universe by being told that Space-Time, whether as a matrix or a stuff, breaks up of itself into finites of ever-increasing complexity. We have no evidence whatever that Space-Time does anything of the kind; and we have no reason to believe that it can or will ever do so.

There is a gap, to go no further, between Space-Time in its elementary bareness and the electron or whatever else may prove to be ultimate in the physicist's analysis of matter—a gap which has not been filled up, and which, as far as we can see, will never be filled up. How is Space-Time to pass beyond that gap and so begin its work of world-building? It must *jump* the gap. No other course is open to it. And having jumped that gap, it will have to jump more gaps.

This is the weakness of the "New Realism" that when, in his quest of reality, the thinker has resolved, by "analysing it to the death," the familiar world into what he regards as its ultimate elements, he can make no use of these. If he could use them constructively, as Science, when "Applied," uses its ultimates or penultimates, if he could take them and out of them build up a new world, "remoulding" the old "to his heart's desire," he would not have laboured in vain. But he cannot do this. What can he do, then, but reverse the process of analysis, make its goal his starting point and its starting point his goal—in other words, on the foundations to which he has dug down build up in successive stages—electrical (shall we say ?) material, vital, mental—the world of "empirical finites" in which we live and move and have our being? He began by accepting that world as intrinsically real, as being in itself what it seems to be to his perceptive faculties, and his analysis of it has added nothing to its reality. A synthetic philosophy, which tries, by imaginative insight, to discern the real in and beyond the

apparent—in other words, which identifies the real with the ideal—may be creative in theory and so prepare the way for creation in practice. A philosophy which is “analytical to the death” is doomed, self-doomed, to perpetual sterility.

I have touched incidentally on what seems to be a central feature of empirical metaphysics—its attribution of absolute validity to the sense-experience of the “standardised man.” This is the necessary counterpart of the assumption which dominates that philosophy—that the world of our experience is intrinsically real. But it cuts two ways. It provides for the glorification of what is ultimate in our analysis of the material world—in Professor Alexander’s case, of Space-Time; but in doing so, it also provides, as we shall now see, for the rehabilitation of *mind*.

Professor Alexander tells us that “Space-Time is absolute and independent of the observer.” Who or what guarantees its absoluteness? The mind of Professor Alexander. For there is nothing absolute in this world of ours “but thinking makes it so.” And thinking is done by mind. If the Absolute could announce itself to us as such, its message would have to be received by mind, and mind would have to satisfy itself as to the genuineness of the message and the authenticity of its source.

But let us follow Professor Alexander in his attempt to present to us a world which is real in itself and independent of mind. We have seen that a jump—a prodigiously long jump—takes him from Space-Time to *matter*. Another jump will take him from matter to *life*. A third jump will take him from life to *mind*. Let us pause there for the moment. Corresponding to each jump on the part of Professor Alexander, there is an “emergence” on the part of the evolving world. Matter is an “emergent” from Space-Time, or perhaps from some intermediate level of being which has not yet been determined. Life is an emergent from matter. Mind is an emergent from life. When Space-Time is no more than bare Space-Time it is endowed with certain qualities which Professor Alexander calls *a priori*, or “categorical,” or *primary*. When it becomes matter it is endowed with a new set of qualities which Professor Alexander calls *secondary*. When it becomes mind it is endowed with a third set of qualities which Professor Alexander calls *tertiary*.

Now it is the earnest conviction of Professor Alexander that the primary and secondary qualities are inherent in Space-Time as it passes through its various stages, that they are intrinsically real, that they owe nothing to mind. This

is equivalent to saying that the world which is clothed in these qualities is in itself what it seems to be to the perceptive and apprehensive mind; and this again is equivalent to saying that mind, through the senses, is competent to see the world as it really is. This is surely a great concession on the part of Professor Alexander. For even if it does not involve the restoration of mind to the throne from which it has been expelled, it does undoubtedly involve the exaltation of it to a "privileged position." But I will not, for the moment, press this point.

Let us examine the qualities which are said to be inherent in Space-Time, both in itself and in its various manifestations, and let us see if Professor Alexander can make good his contention that they are "wholly independent of the observer," that is, of mind.

The primary qualities—substance, causality, identity, universality, particularity and the rest—differ from the secondary qualities in being predicable of all "existents," in being "all-pervasive," or, as Professor Alexander would say, in being inherent in Space-Time as such. According to one school of thought they are ways of looking at things, or thinking about things, which mind brings with it to the contemplation of its objects. They are undoubtedly ideas of the human mind; but, according to Professor Alexander, the ideas are in the mind because the things for which they stand are outside the mind, essential aspects of Space-Time as such. *Substance*, for example, is "a specially defined volume of Space-Time." "The self-identity of a thing is its occupation of a space-time." "*Causality* is the relation of continuity between two different motions" ("motion" being another name for Space-Time), and so on. Mind has nothing to say to the primary qualities except to apprehend them through the medium of the perceptive faculty which Professor Alexander calls "intuition," a faculty which (as we have seen) "precedes all sensation, but only in the sense that it is contained in sensation and masked by it."

Professor Alexander makes no attempt to defend his position. In dealing with this, as with other contentious matters, he seems to think that dogmatic statement needs no other support than that of frequent repetition. Given enough of the latter, the statement is self-proved.

But the subjective element in the primary qualities is not to be got rid of quite so easily as Professor Alexander assumes. Let us take the idea of *causality* and apply it to a concrete case. A ship is lost at sea. What was the cause of the

disaster ? The violence of a gale might be one answer to this question, the carelessness of a pilot another, the state of the tide a third, the impatience of the captain a fourth, the untrustworthiness of a chart a fifth, the breakdown of the engines a sixth. Here are six answers to our question, any one of which might be accepted as correct if it happened to give the inquirer, with his particular object in view, mental satisfaction. The cause of a thing has been duly set forth—not absolutely, of course, but relatively and provisionally—when the mind of the inquirer rests in the account given. The search for cause resolves itself into the search for mental satisfaction. In the case of a shipwreck the engineer would have one point of view, the calculator of tides another, the cartographer a third, and so on. An exhaustive inquiry would take account of all the causes enumerated, and would, no doubt, in the course of its investigation, unearth many more. But from first to last it would be a demand for mental satisfaction, a demand for an account of the disaster in which mind—mind, *as such*, one might almost say—could rest.

Does Professor Alexander seriously believe that his formula would prove adequate in such a case as this ? He tells us that causality is “the relation of continuity between two different motions.” Another thinker might say, with at least equal show of reason, that causality is the projection into the world around us of an inner experience, the experience of one’s own power of initiating action, of getting things going. Statements about the primary qualities can neither be proved nor disproved. They are therefore eminently suitable for metaphysicians to dispute about. Let us leave them in their hands.

What of the secondary qualities—colour, sound, scent, savour and the various qualities which the sense of touch makes known to us ? Surely the percipient mind plays some part in the production of these. Physicists whose judgment carries weight assure us that it plays a leading part. Professor Eddington, for example, in the introduction to his work *The Nature of the Physical World*, ‘contrasting the familiar external world with “the external world of physics,” tells us that the latter “has become a world of shadows,” and goes on to say :

“It is all symbolic and as a symbol the physicist leaves it. Then comes the alchemist Mind who transmutes the symbols. The sparsely spread nuclei of electric force become a tangible solid ; their restless

agitation becomes the warmth of summer ; 'the octave of æthereal vibrations becomes a gorgeous rainbow.'

Elsewhere, speaking of " colour in the familiar world and its counterpart electro-magnetic wave-length in the scientific world," he says :

" Here we have little hesitation in describing the waves as objective and the colour as subjective. The wave is the reality¹ or the nearest we can get to a description of reality ; the colour is mere mind-spinning. The beautiful hues which flood our consciousness under stimulation of the waves have no relevance to the objective reality."

Thus Professor Eddington. But Professor Alexander, faithful to his self-imposed mission of belittling mind *ad majorem Spatii—Temporis gloriam*, denies to it any share in weaving the vesture of the familiar world. If grass seems to be green, the reason is that it *is* green. If bluebells seem to be blue the reason is that they *are* blue. If a rock seems to be hard the reason is that it *is* hard. If sugar seems to be sweet the reason is that it *is* sweet, and so on. The secondary qualities are all strictly objective. Mind has nothing to do with them except to apprehend them through sense-perception.

When doctors disagree, who shall decide ? I am in entire agreement with Professor Eddington. But I am neither a physical nor a metaphysical expert. And so, if I am to intervene in this quarrel, I must content myself with asking Professor Alexander one or two simple and fairly obvious questions : Is there such a thing as "blue distance" ? Are there any

" Blue hills that are really blue ? "

Is " the blue Mediterranean " really blue ? Is the sky on a summer day really blue ? Are the glorious colours of a sunset really there (wherever " there " may be) ? The answer to these questions is, I presume in each case, *No*. One must not stand too far away from the things which one contemplates. But on the other hand, one must not stand too near to them. One must not pry into them too closely. For the " standardised man " snow is undoubtedly white. But if we pry into it, we find that it is composed of crystals of transparent

¹ Here the meaning of the word " reality " is obviously determined by its context. When Professor Eddington, in a later chapter, deals with the problem of Reality, he uses the word in a wider and deeper sense.

ice. At what precise distance, then, is one to stand from an object in order to see it as it really is? If by changing one's position one can change the appearances of things, the part that mind plays in perception cannot be wholly passive.

Let us pass on to the tertiary qualities. In regard to these Professor Alexander makes an admission which undermines the foundations of his philosophy so effectively as to imperil the security of the whole structure. He insists that "the tertiary qualities" (or "values," as he sometimes calls them) "are as real as the primary or secondary"; but he adds that "unlike the qualities of external things they imply the amalgamation of the object with the human appreciation of it." They imply more than this. We are told in another passage that

"the tertiary qualities, truth and goodness and beauty, though they differ from the primary or secondary ones in being creations of mind, are not the less real. Their dependence on the mind does not deprive them of reality. . . . The mind is the highest empirical finite we know. Strange that its touch should be thought to derealise its creations."

"Creations of mind"; of mind, which is no more than "a set of events occurring in the body," of mind, whose psychoses are all neuroses; of mind, which "has neither life nor energy"; of mind, which is "one among many forms of finite existence, having no privilege among them except what it owes to its greater perfection of development." How can this be? We are expressly told that Space-Time, which includes all things and is all things, is "absolute and independent of the observer"; that the objects of our experience owe nothing to the percipient mind; and so on. That mind—dethroned and degraded, expelled from the privileged position which it had usurped, lowered to the level of the non-mental objects of its own experience—should suddenly become creative, not in any metaphorical sense of the word, but in the sense that the highest qualities known to us owe to it their reality and their very being—this is surely one of the strangest of all the transformation scenes in the kaleidoscopic drama of metaphysical speculation.

And the more closely we examine it the stranger does it become. Let us take the case of *beauty*.

"In the beautiful object [says Professor Alexander], whether of art or nature, one part is contributed by the

mind. . . . The beautiful owes some part of its meaning to the mind, and so far it owes to the mind, not only its *percipi*, as every perceived object does, but its *esse*."

Now one of the chief factors in the production of beauty is *colour*. In what relation does colour stand to mind? Science analyses colour into electro-magnetic waves. To the percipient mind these waves present themselves as the various colours. To what is the transformation of waves into colour due? Professor Alexander will not allow that it is due in any respect or degree to the interpretative action of mind. For him the colours are purely objective. Mind perceives things as red, blue, yellow, etc., because the objects of its perception *are* red, blue, yellow, etc. "If colour were, as it is alleged to be, the creation of mind, we should have the unintelligible result that a set of vibrations is seen not as vibrations but as colour." The part that mind plays in perceiving colour is purely passive and receptive. But what if the colour happens to be beautiful? According to Professor Alexander, the mind then ceases to be passive, and becomes not active only, but creative. The beauty of the electro-magnetic waves is a creation of mind. But surely the translation of the waves into beauty is a far higher achievement than the translation of the waves into colour. And if mind can perform the more difficult feat, why should it be thought incredible that it could perform the easier?

But if mind can perform the easier feat, if it can translate certain vibrations into colour and others into sound, where, in our search for what is purely objective, "absolute and independent of mind," will this unweaving of the vesture of Nature stop?

I will not attempt to answer this question; but I will ask another. Given that mind can create the tertiary qualities, in what sense can it be said to endow them with reality? Professor Alexander claims that they are objectively real.¹ Can this claim be sustained? Beliefs, opinions,

¹ Professor Alexander does not seem to be quite easy in his mind as to the reality of beauty. He reminds us that he who sees a work of nature or of art as beautiful sees it "incorrectly." "Considered from the point of view of cognition the beautiful object is illusory, for it does not as the external reality possess the characters which it possesses for the æsthetic sense." His faith in the intrinsic reality of the external world is touching. No thinker has ever striven so earnestly to de-subjectify himself, to subordinate reality to objectivity. He has even convinced himself that pleasure and pain are objective, not subjective! But is not æsthetic appreciation a higher kind of cognition? Who can be said to see a

æsthetic tastes, standards of right and wrong vary widely from age to age, from race to race, from country to country, from man to man. Architecture, decoration, furniture which are thought beautiful in one age, fall into disrepute in another, and may come into their own again in a third. Scenery which enchants one man makes no appeal to another. Murder is reprobated in most countries; but there are countries in which it is thought morally wrong not to carry on a blood feud. Opinions—ethical, political, economical, sociological—which pass as correct to-day will be called in question to-morrow and discarded the day after; the orthodoxies of one generation are the heresies of another. And so on.

What, then, is to be the test of reality when we are considering the tertiary qualities of things? "So far as a man is good," says Professor Alexander, "he embodies the common judgment; he is the wise man of Aristotle"; or he is the "standardised man." "A mind which judges truly is one which judges coherently with the judging of other minds. Truth implies possession by a standard mind." It is the same, I presume, with beauty. That is beautiful which is judged to be so by the man of correct taste, the standardised man in the sphere of æsthetic values. Now it is safe to appeal to the standardised man as against the colour-blind man, the man who is hard of hearing, the man whose sense of smell or of taste is defective. But is it safe to appeal to him as against the saint, the prophet, the sage, the poet, the creative artist? Was Christ a standardised man? Was Buddha? Was Plato? Was Shakespeare? Was Michael Angelo? In creating the tertiary qualities mind seems to be calling into being a new, an ideal world. If this is so, then the tertiary qualities owe their reality, not to their endorsement by the standardised man, but to the ideality which is at the heart of them, and which is the supreme principle of unity in their infinite diversity.¹

So much for the Qualities. Let us now go back to the problem of Emergence. We are living in an emergent world. Let this be granted. Two questions at once arise. Out of what is the world emerging? And why is it emerging? Professor Alexander knows the answers to these questions.

stately beech-tree as it really is—the artist who admires its beauty or the woodman who measures it in his mind's eye and sees it as so many feet of timber, so many logs of firewood, so many loads of brushwood?

¹ Is it not Brahma who says in one of the Upanishads,

"I am beauty itself among beautiful things?"

No one else does. The world is emerging out of Space-Time. And the reason why it is emerging is that there is in Space-Time a *nisus*, a sustained effort, which makes for emergence. If Professor Alexander is satisfied with these answers I do not grudge him his satisfaction. The first answer is a fantastic assumption. The second is about as convincing as the well-known answer to the question why does opium send one to sleep? Because it has a sleep-producing virtue.

But in any case the world *is* emerging. The whence and the why of its emergence may be unknown; but the steps in the process of emergence can be traced. We have already traced them, in Professor Alexander's company—for here he is on safe ground—as far as mind. The successive stages are *matter*, *life*, and conscious life, or *mind*. What comes next to mind? Here, as it seems to me, Professor Alexander deliberately goes astray. His answer is *deity*. *The right answer is "self-conscious mind, or spirit."*

Professor Alexander has no use for spirit. He seldom mentions the word. There is a passage towards the end of his book in which he warns us against identifying deity with spirit. Apart from this he virtually ignores it. The truth is that, as a claimant to reality, spirit is a formidable rival to Space-Time. It gives us, if we accept its self-revelation, a new test and a new measure of reality. For the empirical metaphysician reality is the objective counterpart of sense-experience. In self-consciousness, in the revelation of spirit to spirit, of self to self, sense-experience, as the revealer of reality, is transcended and superseded. The experience of self-consciousness is self-certifying. For spirit, which reveals itself to itself, which is at once subject and object, shines by its own light and guarantees its own reality.

What can Professor Alexander do, then, if he is to safeguard the intrinsic reality of Space-Time, but reject the experience of self-consciousness and so convict the rival claimant of imposture? He is bound in any case to reject it. For in his philosophy sense-experience is the only revealer of reality; and it is not through the senses that I know, and am known to, myself.

Professor Alexander assures me that "the mind as an entity superior both to things and to its own mental states, is never experienced." I have already met this statement with point-blank contradiction. Professor Alexander repeats it in many forms; but in whatever form he may repeat it, I will meet it with point-blank contradiction. My experience clashes with his; and my experience is not invalidated in the

slightest degree by his dogmatic limitation of experience to sense-experience, a limitation which is wholly arbitrary, and against which experience, in the larger and deeper sense of the word, unceasingly protests.

And I am not alone in my acceptance of self-consciousness as a genuine experience and a revealer of reality. When Professor Eddington says "I very much doubt if any one of us has the faintest idea of what is meant by the reality or existence of anything but our own Ego." "I know that I think with a certainty which I cannot attribute to any of my physical knowledge of the world." "Mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference"; he is giving forcible expression to feelings which are, I believe, shared by most thoughtful men, men who are able to think disinterestedly because they have no metaphysical axes to grind. The eminent psychologist, William James, speaks to the same general effect when he tells us (with reference to the inner life of the spirit) that "the inner recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real facts in the making and directly perceive how events happen and how work is being actually done"; and when he says (in his analysis of experience) that "the inner state is our very experience itself, its reality and that of our experience are one."

Professor Alexander assures me that though I can never "contemplate" myself, I can and do and must "enjoy" myself. Let me assure him on the contrary that though I can and do and must "contemplate" myself, I do not often "enjoy" myself. The word "enjoy" applied, as Professor Alexander applies it, to a permanent mental state, is so inappropriate and yet so necessary for Professor Alexander's purpose, that I cannot but think that the purpose--the denial of validity to self-consciousness as an experience without wholly denying self--is at fault.

Empirical metaphysics, as expounded by Professor Alexander, seems to me to turn the real order of things upside down. The ascription of ultimate reality to the ultimate elements of things, whether these be atoms or electrons or the "pointer-readings" of the mathematician, or the Space-Time of Professor Alexander, will have one inevitable result. As we follow the world in its ascent from the first beginnings of things to the present stage in its development, we shall find that there is a constant tendency for each stage in turn to drag the stage next above it down

to its own level, and to sink to the level of the stage next below it.

This is equivalent to saying that the one fundamental reality, as it ascends from level to level, tends to shed something of its reality; its presumed inability to make further gain—for what is absolute cannot transcend itself—turning at last to actual loss. More especially is this the case when it passes, in its ascent, beyond the limits of sense-experience. When we are told, for example, that mind is “a set of events occurring in the body and principally in the brain,” that “the mental process and the neural process are one and the same existence,” that “the mind is equivalent to the totality of certain neural processes as they are enjoyed,” we instinctively feel that for him who says these things the brain, with its 14,000,000,000 neurons, the brain which can be seen, touched, handled, dissected, is the substance and the mind the shadow; the brain the solid actuality, the mind an empty name.

This tendency to drag back higher to lower levels of existence gives rise to reckless departures from usage in the use of familiar words—a characteristic feature of the empirical philosophy on which I have already commented, and which alone, as it seems to me, suffices to discredit it. Words which are applicable to the higher levels, and which have their established meaning by reference to these, are transferred by a stretching of their meaning to lower levels, till at last breaking-point is reached, and what is supposed to be sense becomes sheer nonsense. The words “mind” and “knowledge,” which properly belong to the level of conscious life, are applied to the lower levels and at last to the lowest of all. We are told, for example, that “a secondary quality is the mind of its primary quality”; that “knowing may be used in an extended sense for the relation between any finite and those of lower order”; that “the material floor is assured of the materiality of the table”; that “in Space-Time the instant performs to the point the office of mind”; that “point-instants have conscious enjoyment and assurance”; that the “monad” (point-instant) “has an intimate first-hand and perfect knowledge of the world.”

We are told, again, “deity” being the next higher level to mind, that “for any level of existence deity is the next higher level”; that “for creations possessing only the primary qualities—their god was matter”; that “God’s deity is the issue in Time of a tendency or *nîsus* in the

world . . . an issue which is dependent on the nature of things lower than itself"; that "God's deity depends on mind, and this in turn on finites of a lower order until ultimately we reach the simple matrix of Space-Time"; that "God's distinctive character of deity is not creative but created"; that "God is an infinite creation of the universe of Space-Time."

A system of thought which cannot express itself except by turning the established meanings of familiar words inside out and upside down has surely strayed far away from the broad high road of human experience, in the larger and deeper sense of this word. For experience is for ever moulding and modifying the meanings of words; and the wanton misuse of them implies defiant disregard of the rulings of the "general heart" and general mind of men.

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LONDON.

IS RELIGION TO BE DEPERSONALISED ?

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"Yourself, a new-born bard of the Holy Ghost, cast behind you all conformity and acquaint men at first hand with Deity."—EMERSON.

I

NONE of us, I suppose, would call in question William James' assertion of the right of individualism : "There is very little difference between one man and another, but what little there is, is very important ;" but we are more inclined to emphasise the first clause of the sentence than the second. The economic interpretation of history, the inevitabilities of racial movements, the anthropological sweep down the centuries, the glittering victories of man over nature and the ensuing subtle victory of nature over man, the fronting of humanity not against armies of individual spirits, but against whirling atoms, electrons, vibration—all this makes it seem presumptuous to brood longer over the individual units of the human mass. We have lost our arrogance. Our pride-centres in the achievement of our race, of our time, of our methods. Noble prizes point the arrow of attention on individual after individual, it is true, but we scarcely hold the names in memory for a single year. Mass production, stock companies, electric appliances, are the evokers of our gratitude.

And there is no one of us, I think, no matter how much he may have berated this heartless, depersonalised age, who has not covertly experienced a sense of relief, of freedom, in this fading out of our personalities. Ideals are not so tautly held. Conscience has relaxed. Secret sins have first ceased to be important and then to be sinful. Interpretations of Scripture which have served as the foundations for ecclesiastical loyalties have become hair-splittings,

and we have been therefore let off from the painful intricacies of *exegesis*. Philosophies are still presented with carefully wrought arguments, but pleasant laughter playing around them renders them innocuous. Instead of Carlyle and Newman we have Shaw and Chesterton. Tolerance is everywhere; the weights are off. In this impersonal atmosphere we have found breadth, freedom, relaxation. We have lost ourselves and have not cared to advertise for them. The universe has taken on vastness, and we move about in it curiously and carelessly, it doesn't matter where, it doesn't matter how.

But after some years of this free movement, it doesn't matter where or how, something from within bursts out: "It ought to matter where; it ought to matter how." And with that mysterious word "ought" we escape the relentless tide; we have found ourselves and our souls.

Had the current been as powerful as we thought it, I wonder if we could have escaped so easily. Perhaps these impersonal forces in which we were caught only command an eddy. Notwithstanding all that may so easily be said, is the main current against us indivisible? Has not this same impersonal discipline of anthropology, established beyond controversy that the movement of evolution, looked at in its widest sweep, has been a movement from animals through human herds to individuals? The further we get from origins and the nearer we get to goals, the more do we come into sight of individuals and find ourselves reckoning with them. It is manifest that as the centuries multiply the tribal element of consciousness wanes and the individual element of consciousness waxes. Elijahs, Buddhas, Zoroasters, do not abound in the stone age, nor Shakespeares, Goethes, Darwins, either. Authorities on ancient times have recently singled out Akhnaton as the first individual in history. Whatever we may see of exaggeration in this statement, it is, after all, a fact that is exaggerated. The further we come toward a possible goal in the development of our world the closer we find ourselves at grips with individuals. Priests give way to prophets, "safety first" to the ideal first. And though for a long time, perhaps even until now, priests outnumber prophets, the religious history that mankind remembers is the history the prophets have made. In the Old Testament the prophets have overshadowed not only the priests of Baal, but the priests of Jahveh as well. So determinative of progress is the function of individuals that a philosopher like Bergson declares that it

is individuals who make history, and that a seer like Emerson declares that if you wish to know what the world has at heart in these ages you must follow the great men.

And the eagerness with which men are following this advice of Emerson is a sign to me that even in our own age the current is not running against us individualists as strongly as it usually appears. All over the world men are sitting at the feet of masters who are endeavouring to uncover, or at least to point out, the mystery of individual souls. Brandes in Denmark, Papini in Italy, Maurois in France, Ludwig in Germany, Strachey in England, Bradford in America, are sufficient proof that even in this impersonal age men are not to be lured away from the high and compelling charm of individual personality. There seem to me to be two chief reasons for the unprecedented interest of our time in biography. The first is that the sciences of psychology and economics have put in our hands tools which have hitherto been lacking to biographers, and that the spread of the scientific temper has made it forever impossible to identify funeral orations with adequate portraits of men's souls. We no longer want elegy and eulogy; we want truth. The ultimate truth about the motives and qualities and harmonies of men's souls may prove fully as elusive as the ultimate truth about the universe; it may prove more complex; the search for it may prove fully as rewarding and may demand as lofty equipment from those who dedicate themselves to it. But one thing is certain: only as a man expects to find no inconsiderable light on the question, "What is Truth?" from the study of the noblest products of creation, only as he approaches the study of individual men in the highest scientific temper, will biography maintain a lofty place in human culture.

But modern biography is not only a product of our scientific age: it is a protest against our scientific age, or at least our impersonal age. Through biography men have unconsciously been seeking to conserve the high values of individual life by fleeing for refuge out of mechanics and economics and sociology, with the very tools of these disciplines in their hands, into communion with the unlying spirits of our race. It is certainly valuable testimony to the underlying truth of individualism to find the science of biography, of "psychography," born, just after important schools of economists and sociologists had been tolling the death of personality.

This rebirth of individualism in an age inclined to exalt society at its expense reminds me of that far deeper move-

ment which marked the first triumphs of our religion. At about the time that Christ was born men went so far as to deify each succeeding Roman emperor and thus publicly to worship society incarnate. Not even Comte went farther than that. And the essentially pagan attitude of such extreme devotion to the group is manifested by the fact that Christianity was born precisely because the noble army of martyrs insisted that religion was not an adhesive plaster to hold society together, but an individual attitude of soul, good for all possible worlds, but chiefly for the unseen world. The only way that Christian civilisation came into being was by insisting on the adjective and letting the noun take care of itself. Has not something analogous been true of all great civilisations? I wonder if our preoccupation with the maintenance of civilisation may not be a fearsome sign of its decay.

II

Remembering, then, how the evolution of the creative energy has been detaching individuals from the mass and has been entrusting more and more of its destiny to them, and believing that in religion personality comes to its supreme flower, I will present the first of the three propositions I wish to advance, the only incontrovertible one of the three: The three religions which can in some degree substantiate their claim to be universal bear upon their banners the names of individuals. The long life of Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism seems to establish another of Emerson's striking affirmations: "A man is greater than a town."

There are many differences between these three enduring claimants for hegemony in the religious realm, but we should not fail to notice that they all agree in providing an escape for their adherents from the drab level of society by revering the experience of an individual. Most students of what is significantly called comparative religion are seeking a common denominator of religions. That may be the ground for their neglect to underscore the central place of a strictly individual experience in each of the most nearly universal religions; for this tends to prove that religion cannot be de-natured like alcohol without losing its dynamic in the process, that if you de-individualise it its essence escapes. Perhaps another of Emerson's apodictic sentences may suggest a truth now widely discarded: "We condescend to meet."

One important reason for this undeniable fact in the history of religion is that as men of these diverse religions revere the founders thereof they find their souls expanding. They rejoice in the majesty of personality, bounded yet striking out of bounds, like their own. And that in which they rejoice and by which they expand is not the indeterminate abstraction that psychologists and sociologists are forced to leave us and to call personality, but rather concrete, discrete, living, loving individuals. And as the members of these various religious fellowships find their individualities taking on worth in the historic process of the reverence of sublime individuals they go so far as to dare to imagine God not as personality merely, but as a personality, to address Him as a mightier one of themselves, it may be with hands like their hands, at least with a heart like their hearts, and to indulge in that sublimest of all human occupations, prayer. The most learned and the most moving book on prayer that has ever been written—and it has the advantage of being the most recent—finds in it the essence of religion. It sets forth the fact that the great religious fellowships of which we have been speaking took their rise not only in individuals, but in the hours when those individuals separated themselves consciously from the group and went apart to pray. At every great pivotal period of religion there stands a great individual wrestling in prayer. Heiler insists that the dynamic of religion resides in individual converse with a personal God. Whether this be true or not, I venture the assertion that our own sense of failure in religion is more or less concomitant with our neglect of prayer in favour of treatises on sociology.

Christians, of course, believe that of these three un-national religions the noblest is our own, and it is the one of the three which centres most around its individual founder. In its most primitive form Buddhism seeks escape from personality—in company, strangely enough, with its founder—and to sink into Nirvana has remained its conception of bliss. One of the most frequently recurrent strains in the Koran is Mohammed's sense of horror at the Christian blasphemy of pushing an individual into the aura of the divine. While Mohammed was as aware as was Jesus of being an exception among the sons of men, he was constantly insisting that he was not God's son, but His spokesman. It was not his person that counted, but his message. He retreats behind the Koran ; he ordered it so.

With Jesus, on the other hand, words were only casual

outgivings of a spirit—short lyric flights of song. It was his own spirit that he commended to men as the supreme suggestion of Deity. No more, of course, than Mohammed, did he dream of being included in the Godhead. But it was his person that he left standing in the holy place which his people had been so determinately holding vacant for the Messiah. He wrote no new tables of stone for the holy place. What he had for men could not be learned; it could only be imparted. In other words, religion with him was an essentially personal matter. Whether we agree or disagree with him, it is safe to say that no individual has ever been so uplifted and uplifting in the consciousness of individuals as he. I am just as certain that it is on that account that nowhere has the individual attained so great a significance or come to such development, nowhere has the individual "pilgrim" made such progress, as in our own religion.

When Moses went up into the mountain to pray he came down with ten commandments in his hand; when Mohammed came out of a trance he dug its yield into a bit of hide or bone; when Jesus came down from his mountain of prayer he brought with him the names of twelve individuals. We have often contrasted the Law and the Gospel; should it not lie largely in the distinction between the abstract and the concrete, that is to say, between standards and living characters?

I am inclined to pick upon Rousseau as the most influential individual of the eighteenth century, perhaps of modern times. Certainly to him both French and American revolutions are signally indebted; in him also the modern theory of education has its rise. He wrote much on religion and suffered ostracism from contemporary philosophers partially from that fact. In the *Emile*, we have the most effective plea for natural religion ever composed, effective enough to produce martyrs as eminent as Robespierre and Saint Just. One of the most arresting passages in modern literature is his condemnation of Christianity in the *Social Contract* as a stabiliser of society. He agrees with Marcus Aurelius in outlawing Christianity, and for the same reason: because it recognises a higher authority than the State. For him it is an arsenal for rebels because it exalts the conscience of the individual above statutory law, because it deals with men as immortals rather than as citizens. He had read, "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's," as well as Napoleon and Bismarck, but he saw that in this division of goods Cæsar was to have only pennies

while God was to have souls. Consequently, when he sought to stabilise society by religion, he imposed upon the State not Christianity, but a deliberate substitute for it.

So I return to my first proposition and declare that the classic, enduring, historic religions induce reverence by means of the contemplation of individuals and thereby enhance the value of individuals. Neither Buddha nor Mohammed would flie away much of that central challenge of Jesus: "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"

III

My second proposition has to do with the service of worship in our individualistic religion. It is, I think, the most questionable of the three. I present it as a subject of thought and as a confession of prejudice, not quite daring to present it as an affirmation of conviction. I think I can present it best by repeating an old tale, intended to combat my proposition, which enthralled the pagan Diderot as it fell from the lips of the Abbé Galiani, before the French nation decided against him :

"One day, in the depths of the forest, a dispute arose between a nightingale and a cuckoo. 'What bird,' said the Cuckoo, 'has a song so simple, so natural, so measured, as mine?' 'What bird,' said the Nightingale, 'has a song more varied, more brilliant, more affecting, than mine?' The Cuckoo: 'I say few things, but they are things of weight, of order, and people retain them.' The Nightingale: 'I enchant the woods; you make them dismal. You are so attached to your mother's lessons that you would not venture a single note she had not taught you. Now, for me I recognise no master. I laugh at rules. What comparison between your pedantry and my ecstasy?' They agreed at length to refer their quarrel to the judgment of a third animal. As they crossed the meadow they spied an ass. 'Ah!' said the Cuckoo; 'our luck is excellent; our quarrel is a matter of ears; here is our judge. . . . The birds fly away and perch on branches. The Ass follows them with the air of a chief justice crossing Westminster Hall; he stretches himself flat on the ground (please notice the posture) and says, 'Begin; the court listens.' Says the Cuckoo: 'My lord, I beg of you to note carefully the nature of my singing; above all things, my lord, deign to mark its artifice and its method.' Then, filling its

throat and flapping its wings at each note, it sang out, 'Coucou! coucou! coucou! coucou! coucou!' And after having combined this in every possible way it fell silent. The Nightingale, without any prelude, poured forth his voice, launched into the most daring modulations, pursued the freshest and most delicate melodies, cadences, pauses and thrills. It was tender, glad, brilliant, pathetic, but it was not made for everybody. Carried away by his enthusiasm, he would be singing still had not the Ass, who had yawned once or twice, stopped him and said, 'I suspect that all you have been singing there is uncommonly fine, but I don't understand a word of it; it strikes me as bizarre, incoherent and confused. It may be you are more scientific than your rival, but he is more methodic than you, and as for me, I'm for method.' "

Now my proposition is that the Abbé is not altogether right, that we must insist that the cuckoo shall not monopolise the woods, that the service of worship most congenial to the classic religions that gather about the figures of individuals is that which leaves the most room for the nightingale and expects to hear his notes.

In transferring this ancient fable to our proposition I suppose no one will have serious objection to letting the nightingale stand for the prophet, the cuckoo for the priest, and the ass for the congregation, which, I presume, is what the good Abbé meant. The Abbé preferred the priest because the people could understand his limited range, but even the Abbé was willing to admit that the nightingale might be more scientific. For in religion the seer who disregards the rules and sings because he must has the most authentic message. And in the end, as Jesus and the prophets show, more people are moved by it than by the monotonous coucou of the priests.

We must, however, beware of pushing the figure too far. A humble priest is a better inducer of worship than a false prophet. If a priest be sufficiently humble he becomes for me a prophet, and his mumbo-jumbo fades away. What is of most moment to remember is that the service of worship is the springboard, and not the sea. Like the Sabbath, it is made for man. Its chief function, I suppose, is to convince us that we are not living in an illusory world, that we are not eccentrics, that our quest for God and desire to serve him are impulses in wide commonalty spread. To join any group of

worshippers establishes this conviction. But there is more than this that we seek in public worship ; even there we should like to hear the nightingale. In an affecting passage, Cardinal Newman pictures worship in a cathedral, not as a mass movement along fixed rails, but as a temple where complete freedom is given to the individual worshippers :

“ A catholic cathedral is a sort of world, everyone going about his own business, but that business a religious one, groups of worshippers and solitary ones—kneeling, standing—some at shrines, some at altars—hearing Mass and communicating, currents of worshippers intercepting and passing by each other, altar after altar lit up for worship, like the stars in the firmament, and the bell giving notice of what is going on in parts you do not see, and all the while the canons in the choir going through matins and lauds, and at the end of it the incense rolling up from the high altar, and all of this without any show or effort but what everyone is used to, everyone at his own work and leaving everyone else to his.”

Even more effectually than Cardinal Newman's individualistic picture of catholic worship the Friends' meeting, to me the most perfect form of Christian worship, yields a like impression. In the Friends' meeting there are present the two indefeasible elements of all common worship, the theme and the variation, the standard and the adventure, the background of the group so necessary for humility, poise, peace, and the foreground for the unaccountable, for the dynamic, for the song. In this Quaker worship the standard, the background, the theme, is silence. But the silence is not empty, it is full of floating fragments of the songs of the nightingales, and when we enter the fellowship of silence we seem to put transmitters on our spirits, and those who have ears hear. But for all the tender majesty of the inhabited silence, for all the haunting, perduring melody of the nightingales—of Isaiah, and Hosea, and Jesus, and Francis—that is not the highest in worship. The highest thing is that all the worshippers believe that that sacred common silence has a right to be broken, that a living individual has the right to interrupt the reminiscent fragments of the song even of Jesus. “ As the hand glides over the zither and the strings give forth their sound, so speaketh the Spirit of the Lord in my members.” The right to break the silence, the ranking of the frail worshippers with the prophets, of the stammerers

with the nightingales, bestows upon the individual, whether searching out his own fragment of song in the silence or impelled to add a snatch of his own, a majesty which attends him even in the clamour and turmoil of the public squares. And it seems to me that the function of all true worship is to produce listening souls, for—to paraphrase Epictetus, denouncing the rituals of his day—"everywhere the music is by the side of every man."

Now the obvious answer to this confession of mine for a predilection for the Quaker worship is that experience has shown that it does not work. And I am obliged to assent. Jackdaws mistake themselves for nightingales. The silence, too, seems empty to those who are accustomed so to lose themselves in work that they find themselves only as they are touched by emotions which sweep over groups of which they are a part. But, so far as that is so, do we not tend to make the springboard the sea? Do we not tend to fence religion off from our individual lives, to confine it to church assemblies, so that when a man is asked his religion he is apt to answer that he is a Methodist Episcopalian, or a Protestant Episcopalian, or a United Brother, or an Albright Evangelical? In college communities, where at present all religious services are scorned, one which is condescendingly endured is a musical service where an organ has a large part to play. I have wondered if the service of silence could be more widely employed if it were undergirt or punctured by a reverent organ. However that be, it seems to me that our religious services fail if our congregations on leaving church feel that they have performed their religious duties and have received their religious consolations. The ritualist too often conceives life as culminating in public worship, while Jesus, who dreaded long prayers, conceived public worship as culminating in life. Luther, who, obedient to the heavenly vision of his individual soul, shattered the peace of catholicism, has thus expressed the non-conformist ideal of prayer :

"Wherever there is a Christian, just there is the Holy Ghost. He does nothing but pray unceasingly. For though he does not always move his lips or utter words, the heart so moves and beats so unceasingly with longing that one can no more find a Christian without prayer than a living man without a pulse. . . . There are two kinds of speech in prayer: one when we speak to God and the other when God speaks to us. And His speech is far more comforting than ours."

In Luther's company it is easier to understand still another word of Emerson : "Whoever would be a man must be a non-conformist." When we become so enamoured of the notes of the cuckoo that the mere thought of a nightingale puts our nerves on edge, I think we are reverting to the uncreative periods of religious life.

In the great epochs of religious life, however, the cuckoos retreated into the thickets. Think, for example, of the public worship to which Jesus had the custom of resorting on the Sabbath day. It was to the synagogue that he went, not to the temple. And he seemed even to weary of the meagre ritual of the synagogue. The Law was too impersonal a background to remain unchallenged. Like most ritual, too, it had the habit of usurping the foreground also. "It hath been said by them of old time, but I say unto you," is not a saying that makes for ritual, but in its holy audacity the Christian religion was cradled. One has only to read the letters of Paul to the Corinthians to discover how little the early Christians bothered with ritual. Is it not at least doubtful whether the Clementine and the Mozarabic liturgies, the Persian, Byzantine and Egyptian rites, are products of those ages of which we should be proudest ? If men pant for God as harts pant after water-brooks, is it likely that they will spend much time carving cups from which to drink ? Is not the essence of Protestantism, both of England and of New England, of Pilgrim and Puritan, an attempt to respond to the summons to Ezekiel, and throwing away our crutches, to stand upon our feet that God may speak to us, even though it be in tones that are far from approval ? Protestantism is a disentangling of ourselves from routine, from liturgies, from the mass. It is the letting the thunders roll by ; it is awaiting the still, small voice.

IV

My last proposition is that the audacious doctrine of immortality, without which no religion has been able permanently to endure, is fundamentally an assertion of the worth of the individual soul. It is not an orthodox poet who has given almost classic form to this conviction of mine :

"Set where the upper streams of Simois flow
Was the Palladium, high mid rock and wood ;
And Hector was in Ilium, far below,
And fought, and saw it not, but there it stood !

"It stood, and sun and moonshine rained their light
On the pure columns of its glen-built hall,
Backward and forward rolled the waves of fight
Round Troy, but while this stood, Troy could not fall.

"So in its lovely moonlight lives the soul,
Mountains surround it, and sweet virgin air ;
Cold plashing, past it, crystal waters roll ;
We visit it by moments, ah, too rare !

"We shall renew the battle in the plain
To-morrow ; red with blood will Xanthus be ;
Hector and Ajax will be there again,
Helen will come upon the wall to see.

"Then we shall rust in shade, or shine in strife,
And fluctuate 'twixt blind hopes and blind despairs,
And fancy that we put forth all our life,
And never know how with the soul it fares.

"Still doth the soul, from its lone fastness high,
Upon our life a ruling effluence send ;
And when it fails, fight as we will, we die,
And while it lasts we cannot wholly end."

It seems to me well-nigh impossible to read that poem reverently without feeling that which lies deepest in us assert itself once more and bestow confidence and glory upon us.

Yet it is this same Matthew Arnold who has given utterance to perhaps the noblest of all those poems which attempt to retain the majesty of the soul without insisting upon its permanence. One does not forget the lines—

"Hath man no second life ? Pitch this one high !
Sits there no judge in heaven our sin to see ?
More strictly then the inward judge obey ! "

It was with him as with all of us : the universe and its unimaginable God seem too vast for us to presume upon them, yet our inner struggles have such vast issues and rely upon such ineffable presuppositions that we cannot think that we were made to die.

And so the aristocrat in Matthew Arnold, following some vague intimations in the Johannine writings, strikes the balance in an individualistic sonnet of great force. For those differences in individuals upon whose importance William James insisted it claims consequences which stagger most of us, but which enshrine the cold doctrine of conditional immortality in a moving confession of individual faith :

"Foil'd by our fellow-men, depress'd, outworn,
We leave the brutal world to take its way,
And, Patience ! in another life, we say,
The world shall be thrust down, and we upborne.

“ And will not then the immortal armies scorn
The world's poor, routed leavings ? or will they
Who fail'd under the heat of this life's day
Support the fervours of the heavenly morn ?

“ No, no ! the energy of life may be
Kept on after the grave, but not begun ;
And he who flagg'd not in the earthly strife
From strength to strength advancing—only he,
His soul well-knit, and all his battles won,
Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life.”

This same feeling for the necessity of belief in immortality and for its immense presumption lies at the bottom of that development of the Kantian philosophy which has recently issued from that Teutonic incubator, where all enduring metaphysical theories are hatched, under the name of the philosophy “*As If*.” In this philosophy there are three fundamental principles. The first is that God, freedom, immortality, are illusions. The second is that human life can be lived worthily only by living *as if* those illusions were true. The third is that the essence of human nobility lies in seizing those two principles together. We must dedicate ourselves to God, freedom and immortality, the while we know that they are but fictions of the mind. Were they realities, they would so dwarf our temptations, our sufferings, our conflicts, that human life would be stripped of any merit in struggling through them. That a philosopher of international fame should arrive at this paradox is certainly an indication both of the indispensable place of the immortal hope in our earthly pilgrimage and also of the difficulty of maintaining it.

No apologist for individualism in religion can regard minutes wasted which are spent with Leo Tolstoi. I cite a series of brief extracts from his diaries which reveal his sense of the necessity and of the presumption of our faith in immortality and which, at the same time, supply a worthy answer to the philosophy of Vaihinger, of which I have just spoken :

“ I had an exquisite thought : ‘ There are three problems : What is the most important time ? What man ? What act ? The time is the immediate, this minute ; the man, he with whom you have immediate business ; the act, to save your soul, that is, to do the act of love.’ ”

“ As soon as you go away into the past or into the

future you go away from God, and then you immediately become lonely, deserted, unfree."

"God is one, and His will in respect to me is one, and He wants only my present. What I am doing this minute is what He wants; and what was, has been, and what will be is not my business."

"We think of the future; we build it. But nothing future is important, because the important thing is to do the creative work of love, which can be done under every possible condition, and therefore it is altogether indifferent what the future will be."

And yet the diaries also contain the underlying intuition which alone supports the immediacy of living for which Tolstoi calls :

"Man is a being beyond time and beyond space who is conscious of himself in the conditions of space and time."

"One should conquer the fear of death; and when you cease to fear it, you cease to serve yourself, a mortal, and you will serve an immortal, God, from whom you came and to whom you are going."

"Not long ago I experienced a feeling, not exactly a reasoning, but a feeling, that everything that is material and I myself, with my own body, is only my own imagination, is the creation of my spirit, and that only my soul *exists*. It was a very joyous feeling."

"I say this in regard to this dogma of the soul: What we call the soul is the divine, spiritual, limited, in us in our bodies. And it is this limiting which gives it a form, just as a vessel gives form to a liquid or gas that is enclosed in it. But we only know this form. Break the vessel, and that which is enclosed in it will cease to have that form which it had, and will spread out, be carried off. Whether it combines with other matter, whether it receives a new form—we know nothing about this. But we know for a fact that it loses that form which it had when it was limited, because that which limited it was destroyed. The same with the soul. The soul after death ceases to be the soul and remaining a spirit, a divine essence, becomes something other, such that we cannot judge."

Thus Tolstoi preserves the worth of the soul and loses its presumption. We do not front toward illusions, with

Vaihinger, and yet self loses its egoism. The crassness of personal reward drops away, and the meaningfulness of our struggles abides.

Oh, how it abides ! We have been speaking of prayer as the essence of religion ; here is a prayer of Tolstoi :

“ Father of my life and of all life, if my work is already finished here, as I am beginning to think, and the ending of my spiritual life, which I am beginning to feel, means a transfer into that other life—that I am already beginning to live there and that here these remnants are being taken away little by little—then show it to me more clearly, that I may not seek and weary myself. Otherwise it seems to me that I have many well-thought plans, yet I have no means not only for carrying them through—this I know I ought not to think of—but even for doing something good, something pleasing to Thee, as long as I live here. If I always felt that life consists only in the fulfilment of thy will, I would not doubt. But doubt comes because I bite the bit and don’t feel the reins.”

To cite but one more recent witness to the necessity and presumption of faith in immortality, let us leave Count Tolstoi, the gigantic Protestant, and listen to Baron von Hugel, the Roman Catholic, speaking and writing to his niece. He strikes down the audacity of the immortal hope by subordinating it to something higher ; he seems willing to sacrifice it altogether, but the heavenly fire refuses to devour the offering. He says :

“ The central fact of religion is not survival, but God. I am almost not interested in survival unless it means God. Survival must mean God, or it means nothing ; there are people who try to prove God only as a means to immortality ; they have got it all upside down. How secondary is immortality to God ! Look at the Psalmists ; they hardly believed in immortality ; they did not think about it ; yet theirs is the deepest expression we know of love of God, of sanctity and holiness and joy. To know God here is something ; to know Him and have union with Him here through our Lord—that would be enough without immortality.”

And yet see how the inevitable belief, nay, conviction, abides ! I quote again :

"Our bodies are clumsy old fellows ; we want too much of them ; we try to express angel faces in worsted, to play Bach on a penny whistle, Beethoven on a hurdy-gurdy. The soul lives in two worlds, hence the tension. . . . I feel a grave limit in Shakespeare ; he has not got that sense of the supernatural, of the Other Life, of God, our Thirst and our Home. No dying figure in Shakespeare looks forward ; they all look backward."

And then a few days before his death :

"I wait for the breath of God. Perhaps He will call me to-day, to-night. I would like to finish my book, but if not, I shall live it out in the Beyond."

Souls who live with God seem to become assured of immortality. God and immortality seem inextricably intertwined. When Professor Barnes, of Smith College, seeks to set up the hybrid which he calls "a secularised, social religion," he rightly asks us to renounce both our belief in personal immortality and our belief in any God who can serve as a pivot of personal religion. It looks as if we must keep both or lose both. I am confident that the basis of our belief in immortality does not lie in our interest in what lies beyond the grave, not even in our longing for resumption of personal communion with those who have gone before us. Both of those factors enter into the audacious doctrine of immortality, but they are not its essence. When we think of our beloved dead, it is as spirits, and no more as living voices. Our deepest longing is not to be in the nursery again with their hands on our heads or with our hands on their heads ; what we first of all vehemently desire is that the characters they builded themselves into should not fade completely away and, fading, mock their struggles and triumphs, their penitence and meekness. Even *In Memoriam*, for all its longing "for sweet converse gone," finds itself yearning most for "a deeper bond that is to be." It longs for meeting, but it will be satisfied with a meeting-place to say : "Farewell. We lose ourselves in light." The main thing is that the souls for which the ages have been in travail should not lose themselves in dark. So if we might hope that in that immensity which we call the eye of God there were some spot before which we could present our souls and our repentances, our joys and our ideals and our longings and He could understand what we would have had them become, and He could catch from them some new joy because of the

goal toward which they were set, we could sacrifice the dogma of the immortality of the soul without any paralysing regret. But to most of us, I fancy, that hope seems more presumptuous, less human, less real, than the universal hope of religious men of the later ages for what we call the immortality of the soul. Hence we cling to it, and in great company. And the fundamental reason why we cling to it is the reason of Goethe : " He is dead for this world who believes in no other." God, freedom and immortality are precisely what Kant called them, *postulates*, postulates of character-forming reason. We can say with utter sincerity we believe in immortality not in order to live for ever, but in order to live nobly at all. We believe in immortality as we believe in evolution, not as infallible doctrine, but as the highest formulation we can give of a reality that may be higher far than our doctrine, higher, but not lower.

And so we individualists fail to turn from the mighty hopes that make us men for the sake of a prosperous earthly society, where the majority makes the law which the minority perfectly obeys, where disease is banished, distance is annihilated, and labour is contact with electrons. We hold before us rather the picture of the multitude which no man can number who have washed their robes, singing " Salvation to Him who sits upon the throne." And awe overcomes us as we realise that there will be no robes, no throne, no songs, but a reality we cannot conceive, which shall take some of its glory and some of its shadow from what we have done and longed for and failed in here on earth.

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IS RELIGION TO BE DISESTABLISHED ?

JAMES HENRY TUCKWELL

“Has not the time come when it behoves the leaders of the Church to recognise that the State has in India alone some three hundred millions of non-Christian subjects whose religious liberty it guarantees, and that the mind of the State, in consequence, has to view its duties to religion in a much wider perspective than that of any controversy among contending sections of the Established Church or, indeed, of any controversy whatsoever which turns exclusively on the internal differences of the Christian religion ?”—L. P. JACKS.

THAT a serious crisis is approaching in the history of our Established Church the signs of the times leave little room for doubt. Just when the crisis will actually be upon us, and whether when it does come the Church will herself ask for disestablishment, or be disestablished without solicitation on her part ; or, again, whether any sort of concordat, more or less temporary, will be arrived at to tide over existing emergencies—all this at the present time would require a prophet to foretell. But what we wish here briefly to discuss is a far more important question, namely, Are we going, whatever our decision regarding the future status of the present Anglican Church may be, to continue as a nation still to recognise religion as such, religion, that is, not merely as embodied in a particular creed or institution, but as a principle integral to human nature itself ?

We would, in the first place, point out what we take to be the real significance of the recent rejection by the House of Commons of a Revised Prayer Book twice presented for its acceptance by the Church. It was certainly not simply a refusal on the part of the Commons to endorse the Catholic principle implicated in the reservation of the Sacrament. No doubt that motive was present as one, perhaps the chief, element in the decision. But it would be incorrect to regard the vote on either occasion as distinctively Protestant in the usual meaning of the term. The House of Commons has, of

course, long since ceased to be a definitely Christian assembly ; and its procedure on these occasions, accordingly, cannot be legitimately claimed as a definitely Christian act. And yet it was, by general consent, not the act of an assembly in spirit religiously indifferent, still less sceptical or agnostic. Rather was there on each occasion a fervour, a passionate earnestness, unmistakably religious. If, then, the attitude of the House of Commons on these occasions cannot be interpreted as Protestant, as the word is usually understood, nor even as distinctively Christian, what are we to take to have been the precise character of the religious emotion which the discussions admittedly aroused ? There would seem to be but one conclusion, namely, that the refusal to accept the Revised Prayer Book was Protestant, indeed, but Protestant in a far wider than the usual sense of the term. For, as we have already said, there was more in the Commons' vote on each occasion than merely a refusal to sanction reservation of the Sacrament. Though not formally expressed, there was nevertheless, beyond doubt, a far-reaching determination not to submit with unquestioning obedience, in matters of religion, to the authority of the Church. *Obedience !* That is the distinctive note of the Catholic Church, and that is the note which could be unmistakably heard in the voice of the Church on both occasions. And to this demand for *obedience* the answer of modern democracy, as represented in the House of Commons, has been a decided and, we believe, a final negative.

Indeed, that such was the real crux, the heart and centre, of the whole situation, was placed beyond doubt by the attitude of the Church, by the ecclesiastical wrath that followed the refusal of the Commons to endorse its will. "What a flagrant infringement of the Church's right, what a gross denial of her liberty, to determine of herself what shall be her faith and in what manner she shall worship God !" Such was the ecclesiastical outcry that greeted the Commons' refusal to recognise in religion the exclusive authority of the Church. It was in truth all a very instructive instance of confounding the issues. The answer to such ecclesiastical querulousness is, of course, obvious.

"You have [is the reply] a perfect right as a Church, and you may also have perfect liberty, to believe what you will and to worship as you wish. But you have been asking vastly more than this. Surely, you have forgotten, in your resentment, that you are not merely a

Church. You also represent officially the religion of this nation as a whole. The buildings in which you fulfil your functions, many of them amongst the most magnificent and venerable in the world, are not your own, but the property of the State. In other words, your religion is the State religion, and you must not be allowed to forget or ignore this essential fact. Do not your Archbishops and Bishops constitute the first of the Three Estates of the Realm? Do they not sit in the House of Lords as our rulers and lawgivers in things both temporal and spiritual? What, accordingly, you have been demanding is not merely your liberty as a Church to determine how you yourself shall worship God, but further the right to impose your will on the nation, to determine, *i.e.*, by your unquestioned authority what its faith shall be."

The refusal of the House of Commons was clear and decisive, and if the Church were again to make such an attempt to impose its authority on the nation, the answer, we may be sure, would be more emphatic still. Indeed, seldom, if ever, has so democratic a verdict been delivered by the People's Chamber on the subject of religion; for it carried with it necessarily, by implication, the preparedness of the nation, if need be, to take the responsibility for its religion, for good or ill, henceforth upon itself.

Such, so it seems to us, is the crisis in religion the nation is rapidly approaching. The time, that is to say, of its religious tutelage is coming to an end; and it will have reached its maturity in this as in other respects. Is it, then, to be war between Church and State? Must the Church be disestablished? And, if so, will that carry with it necessarily the disestablishment of religion also, and the complete secularisation of the State? The latter, in our opinion, would be a national disaster of the first magnitude and wholly unnecessary. It can be avoided, in our judgment, if, as we have intimated, apart from whatever the fate of the present Established Church shall be, the State shall continue to recognise religion, not merely in the form of a particular creed or institution, but as a universal principle, a principle as wide as humanity itself. But we are here confronted naturally by the twofold question what we mean by a *nation* and what we mean by *religion*. These are, no doubt, big subjects; nevertheless, we shall endeavour to indicate, as briefly as may be, what, in our judgment, the answer in each case must be.

What, then, is a nation ? “ A nation,” says Renan, “ is a spiritual principle, the result of profound historical complications, a spiritual family, not a group determined by the configuration of the soil.” “ A nation,” he declares, “ is a living soul.” In these words Renan gives us, with the insight of genius, the answer to our first question : *What is a nation ?* In a nation there is, then, a spiritual principle ; that is to say, there is, in a real and not merely figurative sense, a soul of the people, a *geistiger Band*, to use Goethe’s well-known phrase, without which they would not be a nation. And such a view gains full confirmation from biological science. For a nation cannot be adequately explained as a mere aggregate of individuals. So far from being merely a collective name for the individuals that may at any time compose it, a nation must be interpreted rather as a living organism, a sort of person or real selfhood, with a body and members and will of its own. Behind or, still better, within the ever-changing personalities, the aggregate of individuals, that at any given moment compose the State, we have to postulate an enduring psychic entity or self. Apart from such hypothesis, to speak of the life of a nation would obviously be meaningless.

This view as to what constitutes a nation conducts us, then, into the realm of biology and to the consideration of the essential difference between the living and the non-living. Life is always and everywhere a self, and this can never be said of any purely material object. No physical object, that is to say, is ever an end in itself. But descend to the last rung in the ladder of life, to the lowly bacteria, and you will be confronted even there with beings already displaying activities that can be interpreted only by the categories of self ; regarded in the light of mechanical categories alone, they remain pure miracles. Thus life starts with the principle of selfhood, the selfhood, *i.e.*, of primitive cells. But in the course of evolution these unicellular forms of life aggregate, and as they aggregate a profounder self emerges, and what are termed *metazoa* appear. Nor does the process stop here. The metazoa also aggregate, and in their aggregation a still profounder, more inclusive self emerges, and we have the *spirit* of the hive, the *group-soul* of herds and crowds ; and at last, yet still within the line of biological evolution, we have the soul of a people or nation, the interpretation of which, like that of the individuality of a species, has caused so much perplexity to our purely mechanical science. Thus does the whole evolutionary process present itself, from beginning to end, as the evolution of selfhood, life’s essential

and distinctive principle, denoting, that is to say, its internal unity and coherence, as contradistinguished from the manifold externally related forces of the physical world.

But in this evolution of selfhood there is also a revelation, a disclosure of the nature of Ultimate Reality. Here the profoundest philosophical religions, with an apparently inevitable dialectic, arrive at an identical conclusion, namely, that Ultimate Reality must be regarded as in some sense an absolute all-inclusive Self. What else is the Atman of India, the Tao of Lao-Tsë, the Idea of the Good of Plato, the Absolute Idea of Hegel ?

If, then, the evolutionary process is to be interpreted as the evolution of the principle of selfhood, it must necessarily be present in its own proper character throughout the whole process, *i.e.* in its character of an immanent or embodied Self. And so, returning to the spiritual unity characteristic of a nation, we see in its selfhood a reflection, or rather an embodiment, of the nature of Ultimate Reality. This, then, is why we have family, tribal, and national religions. Religion in each case represents the unity or spiritual tie that binds all the members of the community together into a whole. Without this *geistiger Band* there would be only an aggregate of individuals, no real community. And the serious question arises, therefore, whether, without some recognition of this spiritual bond, a community of intelligent beings could permanently hold together.

The foregoing exposition naturally brings us to our second question : What is religion ? Now religion when traced to its root in human nature is invariably found to disclose in one form or another a fundamental desire to experience unity, to realise wholeness—a craving or aspiration which, philosophically interpreted, is evidence of the presence within the finite self of the divine Reason, a form of its immanent activity. In primitive tribal religion the deity is a symbol of the tribe's wholeness ; and if, for any reason, the tie that binds the god and his worshippers together is thought to be impaired, certain significant rites are resorted to in order to restore the harmony. And this sentiment of wholeness or inclusive harmony spreads itself in ever-widening circles—from the family to the tribe, then to the nation, then to humanity, nor will be satisfied till it realises its identity with life itself regarded as a universal principle. This is expressed in the well-known formula *Tat twam asi* (That art thou), of Hinduism. In truth, the heart of man abhors limits ; it would stretch itself in all directions until it

included the whole universe. But such expansion would be an endless process, the horizon ever receding as approached. To the reflective self-consciousness of man another possibility has been revealed. Within the finite self depth after depth is disclosed—fathomless, infinite. The consciousness of self, that is to say, develops inwardly through meditation, into what is known as the Cosmic Consciousness, and we have the mystic's rapturous experience of oneness with the Absolute, the final identification of his private self with the all-embracing Self of God. Thus the Cosmic or Mystic experience is no bare, contentless immediacy, no mere rapturous meaningless delight, but a rational inclusiveness in which there is a fusion of thought and feeling at life's highest level. This blissful culmination of man's rational nature, this full unfolding of the "active reason" within him, is what Aristotle calls a "beholding" or "theoria," and with this beholding of the highest truth man participates in the very essence of deity.

Yet such an immediate experience of the divine, it must be noted, is the privilege of the soul only in its solitude, in the silence of what has been aptly termed *The Great Within*. Solitude has been said to be the mother of genius, and it is certain that silence is the indispensable condition of the profoundest religious experience. The heroes of the religious life have invariably sought solitude before coming forth as the leaders and teachers of mankind. And further it is noteworthy in this connection that William James, as a psychologist, in his work *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, expressly passes over the experience of men and women at church, *i.e.*, as members of a community, since community life, as he says, presents us rather with second-hand religion than with religion in its most original and primordial form. For the latter, accordingly, we must look to the experience of the heart when in its stillness it is alone with the divine.

In the light of the foregoing reflections, we may now return to our main question: Shall we, as a nation, disestablish religion? And, first, it is vitally important to bear in mind the fact that we are not a newly arrived and comparatively inexperienced people on the earth, like, say, the United States of America, a people which, with all its greatness and genius, is still young, still but a loosely aggregated whole with many a tangled problem yet to solve. Much less can our position be compared with that of any one of our colonies or dominions, which, with all their youthful vigour

and self-confidence, nevertheless often turn to the mother country with a veneration, affection and regard which have proved stronger and more influential than any material bonds. In other words, we are a mature, an ancient, people, and our religion, far from being an accident, has had a deep determining influence on our history, on our character and our life. Before the Reformation, like the rest of Europe, our national religion was Roman Catholic. Since then it has been represented by *The Book of Common Prayer*. From this book the religions of the various nonconforming sects may be regarded as offshoots. But since the Great War, particularly, it has become evident that the nation as a whole, from various causes, has shown itself to have outgrown, not only Roman Catholic and Anglican Christianity, but equally the Christianity of Protestant Nonconformity, even in its broadest and most developed forms. In other words, the people have outgrown Christianity as a whole; we have ceased to be, that is, in any real sense a Christian nation.

It is accordingly important for our present purpose to take a brief glance at our religious evolution as a nation. It has often been noted that we are not a simple, a homogeneous, people. Our history and our language alike proclaim our composite nature. At least two distinct and divergent strands enter into our national constitution and culture. There is what may be roughly termed the Latin or Southern strain and the Teutonic or Northern strain in our blood, each with its distinct characteristics, not easily blending with the other. The Latin or Ultramontane belongs to the South, its civilisation is Mediterranean, its religion likewise. Christianity, that is to say, is essentially a product of the Mediterranean basin. It arose spontaneously, naturally and inevitably at a certain epoch of European history and culture, and for centuries it met the spiritual needs of the Greco-Roman world in which it arose. It, however, spread northwards beyond the Alps and for a time apparently conquered the Teuton, the man of the North. We say apparently because it was only for a time, for some few hundred years, till the Reformation, when the inevitable reaction came. Since then, and never more so than now, it has become increasingly clear that Ultramontane or Mediterranean religion cannot retain permanent hold on the Northern mentality. The main reason is seen in what would appear a radical difference between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon. In his well-known work *The Crowd*, M. Le Bon remarks that "it is more especially in Latin crowds that authoritativeness and

intolerance are found developed in the highest measure." In fact, their development, he says, "is such in crowds of Latin origin that they have entirely destroyed that sentiment of the independence of the individual so powerful in the Anglo-Saxon." Latin crowds, he adds, are only concerned with the collective independence of the sect.¹ There seems much truth in these statements of Le Bon. And Christianity, it is hardly needful to point out, is essentially a community religion, the religion of *The Ecclesia*, the faith, not of the individual as such, but of the religious society to which he belongs.

Now we have noticed the word "pagan" has become once more a favourite epithet with the ecclesiastic in his description of the non-church-goer. He is a pagan, we are told ; the people are becoming *pagans*. And yet

"the enlightened tolerance, the genial catholicity of appreciation, which finds even in paganism a message from the only and everlasting God, is indeed a privilege newly and exclusively granted to the highest moods and broadest minds of to-day."²

The Teuton then, we may rest assured, is not to be scared back into the Christian fold by being told he is a pagan. Even the man in the street, as he is called, is getting somehow to know that Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and other great thinkers and saints were also pagans. What the Teuton therefore needs, and what alone will save him for religion, is, not the demand for the surrender of his independence, the abandonment of his self-reliance, but rather that he should be brought to see his true, his deepest, self to be no isolated fragment, but one and identical with the rational Self of the universe, the all-inclusive Self of God. In other words, the man of the future will have to be assured that religion is an essential element of his rational nature.

For the people of this country, then, taking them as a whole, we conclude that the religion of authority is coming, or rather has come, to an end, and the religion of Reason, in the deepest significance of that term, must now take its place. There is no need to think the people are becoming or have become really godless. What they need to be more clearly convinced of is that religion is a necessity of man's nature, that man, in the long run, can in truth only cease to be religious by ceasing to be rational. Let our people

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

² *Dyer, Gods of Greece*, p. 7.

know this, let it be pointed out to them that only a rational being can be religious, and we need not doubt that their seeming irreligiousness will pass away. To-day, however, the impression has got abroad that there is no alternative between being a Christian and having no religion at all. What, therefore, let us repeat, the people need to-day, what in truth in an inarticulate way they are actually asking for, is a rational faith, a faith, *i.e.* based on knowledge, on knowledge of the universe, of its structure and of man's place and destiny in it. Such knowledge, we contend, they may now have, and have in ever-increasing measure.

The bearing of these reflections on our question, Shall we as a nation disestablish religion? will be obvious.

One important fact, to begin with, has ever to be borne in mind in this connection, namely, that since *The Prayer Book* was drawn up as the expression of our national faith we have grown from a comparatively small people of four or five millions to a great empire, including an almost endless variety of nationalities and religions, and amongst the latter, especially in India, the most profoundly philosophical in the history of the race. We may rest assured, therefore, that we shall not permanently hold India, at all events, to us by material ties alone. It is no doubt our mission to confer invaluable and greatly needed material benefits upon her, but her nature is far too deeply rooted in the spiritual for these to constitute the sole or permanent bond of union between us. No careful observer of our present position in India can doubt that we need to show her religious sympathy and appreciation to an extent we have never yet done; and this is possible only in one way, namely, by a more intelligent and unbiassed study of her faiths. Untold mischief has been wrought in the past through the prejudiced and inaccurate representations of these faiths by the *ex parte* statements of missionaries and others. Surely, in view of our great imperial interests and responsibilities, nothing could conceivably be more important than that our people at home should be provided with the opportunity of gaining a more correct and sympathetic acquaintance with the faiths of their fellow-subjects abroad. We have our university extension lectures. Why not, along similar lines, extend to our people religious knowledge in the broadest sense of the term? If religious plays and even Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, as some are pleading, might be appropriately presented for the benefit of the people in our cathedrals and parish churches, why not, we would ask, impart to them in these same edifices

a deeper knowledge of religion itself, of religion, that is to say, not merely in the form of a special creed or cult, but as a universal principle ? Such a national recognition of religion as an essential element of our common humanity would assuredly prove of immense benefit not only to the people themselves, but also to the empire as a whole. Perhaps it would be well here to give a concrete illustration of what is in our mind. In the year 1926 Professor Radhakrishnan, King George V Professor of Philosophy in the university of Calcutta, was on a visit to this country and delivered a series of lectures entitled, *The Hindu View of Life*, at Manchester College, Oxford, an institution happily uncommitted to denominationalism in any form. Now Professor Radhakrishnan is one of the most cultured and distinguished thinkers of India at the present time, and his command of our language is almost perfect. The authorities of Manchester College are to be congratulated on their liberality and discrimination in inviting this great Hindu scholar to deliver his lectures at their institution. But, we naturally ask, how comes it that this great Hindu, one of our fellow-subjects, cultured, distinguished as a thinker, than whom no one living is more competent to expound to us in our own tongue the great philosophic faith of his race, should come and go almost unrecognised except in this semi-private way ? Why should not these lectures have been delivered, say, in Westminster Abbey, not, of course, under the auspices of the Church, but of the nation as such ? Would not such an event assure India that we in the West have real sympathy with her highest spiritual aspirations and prove more efficacious in drawing closer the imperial ties that unite us than any material benefits, however great, it is in our power to confer ?

The late Lord Haldane, in an article published in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* only a few weeks before his death last year, dwelt on this theme in words that have been widely circulated in India and will be long remembered. After a luminous comparison of the religious philosophies of the East and of the West, which reveals a deep identity, he concludes as follows—the last public utterance of a great statesman and a profound philosopher :—

“The purpose of what I have written . . . is to draw attention to the fact that under wholly divergent forms the great religions of the East and of the West have more of a common substratum than we here

suppose . . . East is not so dis severed from West as we are apt to assume in our practice. That assumption once got rid of a new task is opened up, the task of learning to govern India through a mutual understanding and sympathy which may carry us a long way towards the solution of a problem which seems insoluble only because we have made it so.”¹

But we want national recognition of religion for a further reason, namely, that our people may be taught to view it from the stand-point of science as also the immanent creative principle in all high poetry, music, and art. In other words, we want the scholar, the scientist and the thinker as well as the ecclesiastic within the walls of the sanctuary ; and with religion thus broadly recognised as an essential universal element of our nature, there need assuredly be no fear that we shall ever become a godless nation.

We conclude, then, there is no need for us to disestablish religion. But shall we disestablish the Church ? We see no real need for this, either. Much of course, if not everything, will depend on the Church herself ; but there is no necessity. The Catholic worship in our national religious history was followed by worship as prescribed in The Prayer Book, but there was no actual breach in the continuity of the nation's spiritual life. Our church fabrics have been constructed, of course, for Christian worship, and there is still a devoted minority whose spiritual needs the worship of The Prayer Book meets. Moreover, are there not some of us who, though no longer Christian by faith, are none the less religious, who would feel drawn, through instinctive memories of a venerable past, occasionally at all events to join in the old ancestral forms ? Human nature is naturally conservative, and in nothing more so than in religion. But the Church, as we have seen, is now demanding complete spiritual autonomy, the right, that is to say, of determining for herself what her creed, her forms of worship and her liturgy shall be. Can such a demand be made with justice or granted with safety whilst she still remains the State Church ? An affirmative answer to this question obviously will depend on two conditions, namely, that by *autonomy* shall not be meant *heteronomy* ; in other words, the Church, whilst remaining the national Church, shall not be at liberty to make overtures with a view to submission to the Ultramontane spiritual authority of the Papal Chair, nor, by any exclusive claims of

¹ *East and West*, HIBBERT JOURNAL, July, 1928.

her own, stand athwart the nation's path in the further evolution of its religious life.

Once more; we are living in a nerve-racking age, when there is urgent need for times of retirement, with a view to quiet meditation and mental rest. In the stillness of our ancient churches and cathedrals has not the nation already at its disposal places suitable for silent thought and prayer, where wearied hearts may be encouraged to seek and to find that inward restorative calm, impossible in the oft-times overcrowded home? And further in the silence of the sanctuary, and more especially of those ancient sanctuaries which have come down to us suffused, as it were, with the religious aspirations and trust of bygone ages, might not meditative souls find opportunity to explore the deeper meaning of the old psalmist's words, "Be still and know that I am God," and discover, maybe, in all that is good and beautiful and true a revelation of the Eternal One ?

J. H. TUCKWELL.

STROUD.

THE ORIGINALITY OF JESUS.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

THE subject is presumptuous ; it is also threadbare. Yet I would venture upon a few observations from a perhaps slightly novel point of view. The originality of Jesus is inconveniently mixed up with critical considerations. For if Jesus said and did everything which all the four Gospels report that he said and did, it is obvious that his originality would be very different from what it would be assessed at if you take the other extreme and hold that he said and did nothing of all that is in Gospel four, and not so very much of what is in Gospels one, two, and three.

I propose to adopt a compromise : I shall put the Fourth Gospel wholly aside, but for such portions of the first three Gospels as I shall deal with I shall ignore any questions of authenticity. For, using those portions of the Gospels as we find them, we may, I think, fitly ask whether, or to what degree, the life, the character and the teaching depicted therein are stamped with originality. Even if we get from them a picture and not a photograph, one can deal with the picture as if it were a photograph.

Then there is exegesis. That remains an obstacle which cannot easily be overcome. Thus, for my special purpose, it would be of great value if I could know for sure what the original meaning of the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard actually was. Even if I choose not to bother whether the famous "Father, forgive them" be authentic or no, it does make a good deal of difference whether Harnack is right or wrong in his interpretation of the pronoun. Are the forgiven only the Roman soldiers and executioners, or are they also the Jews ? And there are several such cases.

If I need not venture to define originality, I must, at any rate, speak about its range. Originality, one may ask, as compared with what ? Is it to be absolute originality or relative originality ? As regards the teaching, for instance.

Is the originality of Jesus to be considered in relation to what was ever said by anybody in any nation of the world up to A.D. 1, or even afterwards, if there was no influence or borrowing? That would, I suppose, be absolute originality. I cannot attempt any such universal survey. Greeks and Buddhists I shall neglect. For me the originality of Jesus must mean only relative originality: his originality in comparison with the ideals and the teaching of his own people—the Jews.

And at this point I must mention another limitation of a very different kind, or, perhaps I should rather say, a distinction. I limit myself to Jews, but I do not closely limit myself as to date. Assume that for a given saying or doctrine of Jesus there are no Rabbinic parallels before A.D. 200. As regards that saying or doctrine Jesus must undoubtedly be credited with originality. But *this* sort of originality is not for me of the deepest interest. For if the later Rabbinic parallels are native developments, and if they were not borrowed from, or in any way due to, the Gospels, then the originality of Jesus in relation to this particular matter, though not to be neglected, is yet, to my mind, a secondary, and comparatively unimportant, originality. A good deal, moreover, depends upon the question whether a doctrine is central and essential for Jesus, but unusual or exceptional for the Rabbis or in the O.T. If the latter, then a high degree of originality belongs to Jesus, even though one or two good parallels can be adduced. Hence it is that, in relation to the religious teachings of the Rabbis, the question of the originality of Jesus needs so many qualities not often combined in a single person's head: knowledge, impartiality, tact, flair.

It is, indeed, in the last resort, a question which I am inclined to think that no Jew and no Christian is really capable of deciding. Perhaps we must wait for the learned Buddhist of the future. Our Jewish and Christian prepossessions are, I fear, too strong for us. Even ex-Christians either keep their old prepossessions, or, as with a man like Robertson, merely appear to exchange one prepossession for another. And if I see the motes very vividly in the eyes of almost all the Christians and Jews, and ex-Christians and ex-Jews, whose books I read, be sure that I am no less convinced that there are many motes, not to say beams, in my own.

"An ideal," said Jowett, "necessarily mingles with all conceptions of Christ"—that is to say, with all conceptions

of the Christian believer. That is why the conception of Christ's character and teaching has, to some extent, varied from age to age. Jesus partly determines the ideal of the believer, and is partly determined or delineated by it. The Jewish critic, on the other hand, is inclined to discover either a faulty or an unoriginal character and life, or a mixture of both. Another sort of error may find its way in, even when one tries to avoid these tendencies. The effort at impartiality may lead to fresh blunders.

To Christian believers the life and character and teaching of Jesus form a whole, and in any estimate of his originality they would affirm that it is this whole which must be considered and appraised. Yet I find myself almost bound to dissociate the teaching from the life, and largely to concentrate upon the teaching, estimating the character more parenthetically than directly or in detail. For I cannot help remembering that to ninety-nine out of every hundred readers of this article, if I have so many, the life and character of Jesus are not merely adorable, but also sacred. Moreover, even to seem to cheapen or criticise any sacred object, or, at all events, an object which has been and is sacred or even dear to a huge number of civilised human beings, is a disagreeable and repellent proceeding, whether the object be Jesus or Mahommed or Buddha, or even an object which is not a man at all. Yet the outsider, and still more the Jew, is bound to be critical in his appraisal of the life of Jesus. He cannot help recalling how very little is known of that life, and for how short a time, how uncertain that little is, and how entirely all that we do know is written by those who revered, adored and nearly worshipped their hero, even though you may argue that they did not completely understand him. The Jew would not for a moment deny the heroic or the historic character of the end of that life—of the voluntary martyr's death with which on earth it closed. For Jesus is a worthy representative of the martyr race, which, in proportion to its numbers, and perhaps even absolutely, has the largest roll of martyrs to boast of of any people in the world—of the race whose secular martyrdom is even yet by no means over.

But if I may distinguish between the life and the character, and speak a little of the latter though not of the former, I would venture to suggest that, through the Gospel mists and miracles, a character seems to emerge in many respects unlike that of *any* O.T. or Rabbinic hero, teacher, or saint. It is true that, already in 1912, Loisy said that

“Jesus, in so far as he is recognizable, was a grand and simple soul, but not altogether beyond the greatest. Prophetism produced similar characters. Some appear to be less eminent, because we do not idealise them to the same extent ; others, Jeremiah, for instance, because we see them more clearly. In his age Jesus incarnated and renewed the spirit of the Prophets, the best of Judaism ; there we have his grandeur. He did not, however, create the ideal which he represented. His death, and also the singular chance that this death was the means whereby he became the divinity of a new religion, have raised him above his fore-runners.”

But here the ex-Christian Loisy seems to me to show the prejudices of the ex-Christian. There are combinations in the picture of Jesus which, as a picture, at any rate, seem to me unique, and which I am inclined to think are not merely picture, but portrait. I mean such combinations as his humility and his sense of authority ; his sternness and his gentleness ; his great pity and his great purity ; his tinge of asceticism and his lack of asceticism ; his constant living with God and his compassionate forthcomingness towards many sinners ; his hatred of sin and his active friendliness and sympathy for the outcast and the “lost.” I mention these combinations quite curtly, partly because they are so familiar, partly because of limits of space ; obviously they could easily be drawn out at length. Now I would not deduce from these combinations that Jesus was therefore more humble, or loved God more ardently, or felt God more near to him, than any Rabbi. That is where I part company with the Christian believer, but I do deduce from them that Jesus was original—original in his character as also in his way of life : a new phenomenon among the Jews, which has scarcely been repeated.

At this point I have to make a further limitation. I mentioned the ‘sense of authority’ which we recognise in Jesus. But this sense of authority, about which I shall and can say nothing here, I have to interpret very widely. It must include for me the ‘Messianic consciousness of Jesus,’ his power and prerogative to forgive sin, the whole conception of his ‘Messianic’ office and mission, and of his peculiar and divine Sonship ; it must include the doctrines of the Ransom (Mark x. 45), and of the vicarious and redemptive sacrifice upon the cross ; it must include also that part of his conception of his office which prompted or enabled him

to say, 'This is my body; this is my blood of the covenant which is shed for many.' All these inclusions I must exclude; for to have included them would be impossible within my limits, mainly because the subjects named are so full of controversy, difficulty and doubt. Yet to exclude them is, I admit, for the Christian believer almost an absurdity. The whole question of originality is thereby (he would urge) distorted and looked at from a wrong angle. To him the originality of Jesus largely consists in his unique consciousness of his divine office as the redeemer and saviour of the world. Perhaps the greatest of the words of Jesus (for the Christian believer) are those contained in Matthew xi. 25-30; yet I am unable to consider them.

"When he was come unto Jerusalem, all the city was excited, saying, Who is this? And the crowds said, This is the prophet Jesus from Nazareth in Galilee."

"The prophet Jesus." Perhaps he was not original in being a prophet. Other prophets arose. But surely he was original in the *sort* of prophet he was—original in being a sort of new Hosea or Isaiah. To be a prophet of the eighth century B.C. type in the first century A.D. was no small achievement. For the Law and the Sacred Canon of Scripture had come in between; and especially the Law. I doubt whether Jesus stood so independently, and with such vivid self-consciousness of independence and authority, over against the Law and the Scriptures generally as some Christian theologians would like to make out. And, therefore, I think that he was not entirely consistent—not so consistent as the Rabbis. But that does not matter. You can be both inconsistent *and* original, and this is what Jesus actually was. Moreover, his inconsistency looked forward. It pointed forward to a far-distant enfranchisement from the bondage of the letter, an enfranchisement which the theologians in question have achieved for quite three-quarters of their own Sacred Scriptures, but perhaps scarcely for the whole. It was a fine, a prophetic inconsistency. Here, again, I have to content myself with a bare statement. Criticism and exegesis combined would make it easy to devote a long essay to the subject of "The Attitude of Jesus towards the Pentateuchal and the Oral Law." And at the end of it one would have to confess that many uncertainties remain over: the last word, *e.g.* about the great seventh chapter of Mark,¹ has,

¹ Mark vii. 15: "There is nothing from without the man that, going into him, can defile him," etc. (R.V.). The editorial, "This he said,

even yet, by no means been spoken. As regards the ceremonial laws of the Pentateuch, the teaching of Jesus practically came to this: never let ceremonial law stand in the way of an immediate fulfilment of the moral law, when an opportunity for, or a summons to, such fulfilment presents itself: when the former, however, does not stand in the way of the latter, observe it. I doubt whether Jesus ever in his life ate a hare and a lobster, and I doubt whether he would have recommended his disciples to eat them. I doubt this, in spite of the great Logion, the greatness of which, by the way, is wholly independent of its authenticity, but the authenticity of which I for one would accept, in spite of the very great exegetical difficulties of the matter which surrounds it.

Now this prophetic, Hosea-like attitude towards the ceremonial law, including the law of the Sabbath and its developments, seems to indicate a high degree of originality. It has been suggested that it was something of both a moral and an intellectual fault on the part of the Rabbis that they did not appreciate and sympathise with Jesus' point of view about the Sabbath directly it was clearly explained to them. I can hardly agree with this suggestion. The Rabbis were, in truth, more consistent than Jesus, and if you take the Law at its face value, as the perfect will of God, there is a great deal to be said for the Rabbinic view as to how conflicts between Sabbath law and moral law are to be decided. The conception of the Law and of Scripture, to which the attitude of Jesus points forward, was not theoretically reached till modern times. One could hardly expect the Rabbis to be 1900 years before their time, and if the suggestion were right, the high originality of Jesus and of his glorious inconsistency would, perhaps, even be diminished. It may be noticed that Jesus does not appear to argue that healing is *not* "labour." He appears to accept the view that healing is "work," but his line seems to be that to do good comes before the Sabbath; he does not argue whether life is in peril or not, whether the healing could easily be put off twenty-four hours or not; he brushes such casuistry—I use the word in a good sense—entirely aside, and in the spirit of Hosea, and of "I desire love, and not sacrifice," he heals at once, Sabbath or no Sabbath. That was daring and original.

making all meats clean" (19, R.V.), is accurate in its interpretation of the wider or ultimate bearing and scope of the great saying, but not accurate as to its immediate intention. Jesus did not deliberately intend to teach his disciples that the Pentateuchal dietary laws need no longer be obeyed.

Now before I come to certain particular features of the teaching in which originality may, more or less convincingly, be found, let me make a few observations about it as a whole. Jewish critics have not sufficiently regarded it as a whole; they have not remembered that it is a body of more or less consistent doctrine, all spoken by, or at least put into the mouth of, one man. They have not estimated sufficiently what is its worth as a whole, and what is the spirit of the whole. Nor have they appreciated adequately what it does *not* say and include as well as what it does. Its prophetic character is revealed in its spirit, in its totality, as well as in its parts. And, as a whole, we may legitimately call it original, even though there were Rabbinic and O.T. parallels for every individual teaching. On the other hand, if we are to consider the teaching of Jesus as a whole, there is a certain, though a much more limited, justification for speaking of Rabbinic teaching as a whole. I am thus entitled to say when a given utterance by Jesus is on, or is off, the Rabbinic line—when it is a legitimate extension of Rabbinic doctrine, or when it appears to be, not an extension, but, in the etymological sense of the word, an aberration. Here I need hardly waste time in dealing with, and disposing of, certain old oppositions such as that to the Rabbis God is a King, to Jesus He is a Father, that the Rabbis fear God, Jesus loves Him, that to the Rabbis God is far, to Jesus He is near, that the Rabbinic religion is one of vengeance and severity, the Gospel religion one of love and pity, and so on. Serious students have happily advanced beyond such crude and sweeping contrasts. On the other hand, it is apparently a fact that Jesus thought of God as his (and our) Father, and used the term Father for God more habitually and constantly than is the case with any one Rabbi of whom we know. And this regular conception of God as Father, in proportion to the intensity and vividness of the feeling which suggested it, was something which may fitly be called original.

In my enumeration of particular doctrines I must just allude to some which, by implication, have been touched on before. Thus I have already referred to the prophetic teaching of Jesus, how he takes up again the message of the older prophets and applies it to the needs of his own time. The great Logion of Mark vii. is quite on the lines of Isaiah and Hosea, but is a new development relative to the new developments of the ceremonial law. The conceptions of service and of seeking out and healing the morally sick are a

fresh application and a fresh development of seeds and germs which we may find in Ezekiel. For Ezekiel was, to some extent, a pastor as well as a prophet, and the famous verse in which Ezekiel describes the coming action of God is the pattern, and perhaps partially the inspiration, for the conduct and the teaching of Jesus.

“I will seek that which is lost ; I will bring again that which is driven away ; I will bind up that which is broken ; I will strengthen that which is sick.”

It was left for Jesus to turn this picture of divine activity into an ideal of human activity, and it is amazing to think what marvellous and fruitful results have followed from the dozen or score of verses in which this ideal is set forth and driven home. With this teaching of service may be associated in close connection the doctrine of the hard life, and of deliberate self-sacrifice. “If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily and follow me.” Here we have not only teaching of the highest originality, but also pregnant with the most astonishing issues. I do not develop the subject, for it is needless. It is customary, and especially customary with certain semi-Christian philosophers, to fasten upon the verse which, in all the three Synoptics, follows the one I have quoted, and to find in it, not only profound originality, but also the most distinctive note of Christianity. I suppose they fasten upon it thus because, as they interpret it, it suits and fits in with their philosophy, and because it has nothing to do with any tiresome and intractable miracle. But I very much doubt whether losing life to save it, and saving life to lose it, meant to Jesus anything more than : “Secure eternal beatitude by a willingness to think little of, and give up, the brief life of earth.” “Buy terms divine in selling hours of dross.” Shakespeare knew what Jesus meant better than the philosophers, who do not much like this clear-cut contrast between earth and heaven. Now though the words, as thus interpreted, are exquisitely phrased and chosen, they are not deeply original like those which precede them. The Rabbis believed the same ; indeed, they always said that that was precisely why the Jews had such a bad time of it upon earth, and should not mind having it, in order that they might win through to and inherit the glories of “the world to come.” “If thy hand cause thee to stumble, cut it off.” The newness here is rather in the trenchant absoluteness of the bidding than in the general tendency, and the motive is

the same as before: to avoid the flames of hell and to acquire the felicities of heaven. About all such matters, heaven and hell, eternal joy and eternal perdition, there is little to choose between the Rabbis and their great antagonist.

I shall have to speak about the trenchant absoluteness, the uncompromisingness of the teaching of Jesus again. In some examples of it Jesus seems to be original, in that he tends to go off the Jewish line, and not merely to develop Jewish teaching or to "fulfil" it. Rabbinic doctrine, as regards what may roughly be called asceticism, is balanced. On the one hand, you have passages like—

"A morsel of bread with salt thou must eat, and water with measure must thou drink, thou must sleep upon the ground, and live a life of pain, the while thou toilest in the Torah."

On the other hand, you have such teaching as that to avoid an innocent pleasure which is within one's grasp is not right, but wrong. But for Jesus the time was short, the end was nigh. The wind blew strongly, and only in one direction. There was hardly any time left for earthly enjoyment—at least for those who would be disciples in the best and fullest sense. Hence, perhaps, the not infrequent touch of sexual and family asceticism which, in spite of Deuteronomy xxxiii. 9 ("who said of his father and of his mother, I have not seen them, neither did he acknowledge his brothers, nor knew he his own children"), is off the Jewish and Rabbinic line. Hans Windisch, who is a first-rate scholar, and by no means extreme or fanatic, has lately said that it is not improbable that the famous cunuch verse in Matthew xix. 12 may have been literally meant, and that Origen was not so far wrong after all. In any case, that verse and other verses about father and mother and wife (Luke xviii. 29 *versus* Mark x. 29) are both original and off the Rabbinic line. Of their immense historic consequences this is not the place to speak. Again, the extremeness and absoluteness of the teaching is illustrated by "sell all that thou hast." It may be that the advice was relative to the particular individual, or to the particular hour and place when it was uttered, or to the conviction that the end of the Age was at hand. It may be that, in other moods, and on other occasions, and for those who were not to be of the innermost ring, or in the fullest sense, his disciples, Jesus spoke differently. Yet one must not ignore the definiteness and urgency of the command. Kirsopp Lake, a fine scholar, and very independent, holds that Jesus meant what he said.

"I think Jesus clearly taught that riches ought to be rejected and given to the poor. He not only said so quite definitely to the rich man who asked his advice, but he denied the possibility (apart from the special act of God) that rich men can enter the Kingdom of Heaven. I have not the smallest doubt but that Jesus said this and meant it. I do not believe that he meant it as exceptional teaching. Poverty was his rule of life."

Such teaching would be original and off the Rabbinic line. Original does not in every case necessarily mean excellent. As further examples of "extreme" doctrine, I ought now to deal in some detail with the paradoxes of the Sermon on the Mount, and especially with "Resist not wickedness," and "Love your enemies." But I have no space adequately to assess their degree of originality. That they do possess a degree of originality, and also (here I differ from current Jewish criticism) a degree of excellence, I am convinced.

Two other doctrines must also be summarily mentioned, wherein we may, I think, also find originality. The one is the doctrine of divorce. However exegesis may settle (if it ever does) what Jesus exactly meant in this matter, and giving full credit to Shammai, I am yet inclined to believe that Jesus went beyond Shammai, and that he may even have deliberately wished to put woman on a footing of greater equality with man. But, here again, the subject is so intricate, and the critical and exegetical questions involved are so puzzling, that it is impossible to deal with it. The other doctrine concerns retribution and requital (tit for tat and measure for measure), both as regards God and man. So far as man is concerned, Jesus speaks with no uncertain voice in his strong opposition to any tit for tat ethic. "Overcome evil with good" is spoken in his spirit. Yet here it may not unjustly be said that he follows the best Jewish teaching, both of the O.T. and of the Rabbis; follows it and deepens it by his categorical and unqualified injunctions. As regards God, while, on the one hand, we have "with what measure ye mete" and "He shall render unto every man according to his deeds," on the other hand, we have the Labourers in the Vineyard and that passage in Luke xvii. 7-10, which the A.V. describes as "How we are bound to God and not He to us." Nevertheless, immensely as we may value and admire these passages in Matthew and in Luke, one has to admit two things: first, that their meaning is not entirely beyond dispute; secondly, that the Rabbinic

parallels are here very close and forcible. I wish I had space in which to quote them, for they are not well known. Yet one may, perhaps, go so far as to say that the doctrine of the two parables is more central in the teaching of Jesus than it is among the Rabbis.

There are many doctrines in the Gospels which an ordinary Christian commentary would speak of as highly original, but which I either cannot admit to be so, or which I could only admit to be so with tedious qualifications. Such would be the combination of love for God and love of man in Mark xii. 30, 31, the denial of the doctrine that suffering betokens sin, the positive form of the Golden Rule, a deliberate universalism, and faith. Omitting the first and third of these five, I would observe as to the second that the Tower of Siloam passage in Luke can only be interpreted to mean that Jesus denied the sequence of sin and suffering by making the words bear more than they legitimately can. Here, as so often in New Testament exegesis, the current interpretation is a child of desire. In Mark ii. 5-11 Jesus shows no opposition to the old hypothesis. On the other hand, I feel convinced that Jesus would have repudiated that definite allocation of certain punishments for certain sins in which many of the Rabbis so foolishly indulged; I am sure he would have indignantly repudiated the odious passage, which is still allowed to disfigure the orthodox Jewish prayer-book, about women who die in child-birth and the reasons for their death. As to the fourth doctrine, while I would predicate not merely nobility and beauty, but also originality, of the parable of the Good Samaritan, it is going much too far to say that Jesus deliberately and consciously "freed the conception of neighbour from its Jewish limitations." If he had wished to effect such enfranchisement, he had every opportunity and temptation to do so in the Sermon on the Mount, but no word is there uttered to the effect that neighbour and enemy include the Gentile. If it be true that to a Jew of the first century A.D. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" meant only "Thou shalt love thy fellow Jew and the proselyte," and if it be true that the "enemy" of whom Jesus was thinking was, or included, the Gentile, why did he not say "I tell you to love all men, whether Jews or Gentiles; I tell you to love all your enemies, whether Gentiles or Jews"? Such lucidity and definiteness were, *ex hypothesi*, badly needed, but they are entirely wanting. As regards the fifth doctrine, faith, the matter is very complicated, and I am compelled to leave the question of originality in suspense.

Even with these limitations, hesitations and reservations,

I do not see how it can be illegitimate to credit the teaching of Jesus with a high degree of originality. We have to remember, and to bring together into our minds, both the general points which I mentioned in the beginning—the comparatively homogeneous body of doctrine, all attributed to one man, the unity of spirit, the beauty of form, what Jesus does not say as well as what he does, the passion and intensity of the whole—and then the particular points which I have since enumerated. If we combine the general and the particular, the total impression of originality seems great. Such an impression is no mirage. I would like to illustrate my meaning by a short reference to the Beatitudes, especially as we find them in Matthew, without considering whether they are more or less authentic in Matthew than in Luke. The Beatitudes as a whole seem more than each one taken separately. There is a certain glow and intensity about them which seems new and distinctive. We can find Rabbinic parallels to each of them, but as a whole they seem original. If I be asked, “In what does the impression left by the Beatitudes in Matthew seem to you peculiar and original?”, I find it very hard to put that impression into words. Perhaps it is a feeling as if all religion were concentrated and expressed in a certain condition of soul, which manifests itself in gentleness and pity and love and the patient endurance of wrong; in a certain peacefulness, which is also capable of utmost heroism and sacrifice, in a certain glow and enthusiasm, which produce a peculiar and indomitable happiness. Before the ideal of this religion all else appears to fade away; all that is external and institutional; all that is civic and political; all that has to do with beauty and knowledge; all that makes for the careful and orderly and gradual removal of evils by intelligent forethought or wise legislation; all conceptions of progress. All these things are good and are necessary, and yet the Beatitudes seem to teach the one thing needful which is more needful than any of them, and which goes both before them and after them. The Beatitudes seem to illustrate the unqualified absoluteness of the teaching of Jesus on which, as my last point, I would like for a few moments to dwell. In doing so I would like to call attention to a remarkable book of the younger Kittel—Gerhard Kittel, now Professor in Tübingen—published in 1926, and called *The Problems of Late Palestinian Judaism and of Earliest Christianity* (*Die Probleme des palästinensischen Spätjudentums und das Urchristentum*). Kittel is, I should imagine, a very fairly orthodox Lutheran, and he has learnt a great

deal of Rabbinic literature. He tries hard to be fair, and if he does not always appreciate the full and true nature of Rabbinic religion, one has to remember how especially difficult it is just for a Lutheran to do so. That he still cannot avoid some sweeping contrasts to the disadvantage and detraction of the Rabbis only shows how hard it is to get rid of a false methodology. But Kittel points out how, in an earlier book, he had tried to show the peculiarity (and therefore to him the superiority) of the religion of Jesus in certain special teachings and sayings. He has now, however, come to the conclusion that he was on a wrong track. If you take, he says, each ethical utterance of Jesus separately, there is hardly one to which you cannot find a Jewish or Rabbinic analogue, or of which you can say that such an analogue it would be impossible for unadulterated Judaism to have produced. He then goes on to give his own explanation of wherein the immense greatness and the complete originality of the teaching of Jesus consist. I shall not attempt to transcribe his explanation, but it lies partly in the intensity, the absoluteness, and the unqualifiedness of the religious demand—that religious demand which embraces the ethical demand and substantiates it. And here, I think, at least as regards the distinctiveness of the teaching—I am not out to assess comparative merits—he is not far wrong. The absoluteness of the demand looks away from, and gives no heed to, difficulties and problems of circumstance; it is not relative at all. That the demand is of this kind is, Kittel thinks, due to the other element in the high originality of Jesus, his sense of authority, his consciousness of sonship, his central and unique position and the conviction thereof, as embodying in himself the very actuality and presence of the Kingdom of God, what Origen called the *αὐτοβασιλεία*. And this, too, may be, at least partially, true. Hence, says Kittel, the religious demand of Jesus is not, as it were, limited to earth. This world, this æon, is not its veritable sphere. Its true place is the sphere into which the consciousness of Jesus lifts him up. The demand is eschatological; that is, it is always thinking of the other, the second æon, which was so soon to be revealed. And this, too, may be not inaccurate. But if so, and if these characteristics do largely make and mark the originality of Jesus, then the ethical and religious demands of the teacher from Nazareth leave a place for the ethical and religious demands of the Rabbis. For this æon, too, has its claims, its duties and its problems; this world, too, has its true joys, its true beatitudes, and even its true prosperities. The more I study the religious and

ethical teaching of the Rabbis and of Jesus, the more I realise that the originalities and peculiarities of the one are complementary to the originalities and peculiarities of the other. There is a place, *e.g.*, for the absoluteness of "sell all that thou hast"; there is also a place for the careful injunctions of the Rabbis, which consider circumstance and occasion, the results of the action upon others as well as its fitness or urgency for the soul of the doer. There is a place for the unqualified demand of Jesus; there is a place also for the many-detailed delicacies of the Rabbis. There is a place for principles; there is a place also for their applications and for laws. He who only knows, cares for and appreciates the teaching of either Jesus or of the Rabbis is certainly poorer than he who knows, cares for and appreciates both.

It may even be that the invectives and fierce denunciations of Jesus are the humanly necessary counterpart of his unqualified urgencies. I sometimes think that if Jesus had given a little of the gentleness and love which he displayed for the tax-collectors and the outcast to his Rabbinic antagonists, some of them might have been won over to his cause. And, after all, they too were human beings, and they, too, from his point of view, were sinners; they, too, had souls to save. I remember that somewhere in the introduction to his commentary on Ezra iv., Gunkel, who is, I should think, a fairly orthodox Christian, remarks that "pity for sinners who remain sinners to the end is foreign to strong, ethical religions, and, therefore, foreign also to the Gospel." Thus it is, I suppose, foreign to Jesus. Such religions and their teachers, I suppose, do ethically commit Hell's destined to Hell without shrinking or compunction. I conclude, therefore, that I must take my "vipers," my "children of hell," my "accursed" and my "everlasting fire," as the Germans would say, "mit im Kauf." They are the price which I must pay for the undoubted fact that no one would ever think of accusing the hero of the Gospels of flabby sentimentality. His love and his demand for love, his love of many human beings and his love of God, were the love of the strong man, the hero. The hero, humble and self-sacrificing, tender and severe, with a convinced consciousness of inspiration and of mission, the servant and helper of his brethren, but always also the leader and the lord; it is a fine and original personality.

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HISTORY AND DOGMA IN JOHN.

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GEOGRAPHY and chronology form the backbone of history, and for completeness, definiteness, and even (so far as the available data enable us to judge) for reliability, in general outline of place and time, the Fourth Gospel surpasses all others.

Mark has almost nothing of either, and is not bettered by Matthew. Luke makes a desperate effort to link the story up with contemporary history, and give it something like geographical outline; but with meagre success. With that minimum of historical knowledge to be expected of the least informed he fixes the crucifixion and resurrection as occurring in the sixteenth year of Tiberius (A.D. 29-30), but when he dates the nativity "about thirty years" earlier (iii. 23) he contradicts his own sources as well as every other implication of the New Testament. Moreover, the dating betrays a suspicious resemblance to Ez. i. 1, a passage regarded by Jerome as prophetically foreshadowing the event described. Luke himself in i. 5 agrees with Matthew in implying that the nativity was *at least* thirty-four years earlier; Acts vii. 30, 37, probably implies that it was forty; "the Elders," quoted by Irenæus in his *Hæreses*, Bk. II., xxii. 5, declare that it was between forty and fifty. Many modern scholars feel driven, with Sir W. M. Ramsay, to adopt a date of 6-8 B.C. Some fall back on Tertullian's reckoning (based on unknown sources) which places the nativity under Sentius Saturninus (!), consul in 19-18 B.C., governor of Syria ten years later. Two passages in the Fourth Gospel, John ii. 20 and viii. 57, unless both ancient and modern interpreters have misunderstood their bearing, date the nativity in the *consulship* of Sentius Saturninus, coincidently with the beginning of Herod's reconstruction of the temple. "John" thus makes Jesus complete in the *two* years of his public ministry a full Jubilee year of 49 years (7×7). For in

all cases, of course, the starting point is the "Taking up" (*ἀναλήψις*) in the "year of the two Gemini," A.D. 29 according to Roman reckoning, 30 according to Syrian. Astronomically the only admissible year is A.D. 30. Other disagreements between Lukan and Johannine chronology are discussed in my article under this title in *The Expositor* for March, 1907 (Seventh Series, No. 15, pp. 206-220).

In respect to geography also Luke makes a poor showing in his attempt to improve upon Mark. Fundamentally Synoptic tradition rests upon a twofold division of the ministry, Galilean and Judean. This appears as early as Peter's summary before Cornelius (Acts x. 36-42), and continues through the whole sequence of Gospels. Luke, however, cancels Mark's period of Exile (vi. 45-viii. 26), finding room instead for a third division by expanding Mark's reference to the journey from Galilee "into the borders of Judæa and beyond Jordan" (Mark x. 1), into a sort of "travel document" sufficient to contain the great mass of Q material inserted in his so-called "great interpolation" (Luke ix. 51-xviii. 12). But the "journey" through "Samaria" (!) is notoriously artificial and without other value than as a literary framework for loose and disconnected fragments. Comparison with the map shows hopeless confusion.

The division adopted by the fourth evangelist is again threefold, but after a totally different plan. Luke had prefixed to the Galilean ministry two so-called Infancy Chapters (i. 5-ii. 52) for the purpose, it would seem, of placing in true perspective by angelic revelation the respective ministries of John and Jesus. Our fourth evangelist meets the same object by prefixing an entire pre-Galilean ministry, carried on while "John was not yet cast into prison" (iii. 24). Jesus and his disciples baptise in Judea (iii. 22), John and his disciples baptise first in "Bethany beyond Jordan" (i. 28; x. 40), later in "Ænon near to Salim" (iii. 23). This pre-Galilean ministry of Jesus is concerned with a baptism practised by his disciples rather than himself, but with an effect so great as to provoke the jealousy of John's disciples. In fact the fourth evangelist, speaking later of Jesus' disciples in Judea (vii. 3), seems to imply that the bulk of them, even after the close of the Galilean ministry, are in Judea, not in Galilee. The pre-Galilean ministry comes to a very definitely marked conclusion in iv. 42. John the Baptist, who even in Bethany beyond Jordan had dismissed his disciples to Jesus, as the Lamb of God alone able to "take up the burden of

sins," alone employing a "baptism of the Spirit," dismisses even more explicitly those who in Ænon near to Salim manifest jealousy on his account. Nothing can be more self-eliminating than the discourse in which John takes his leave from the pages of this Gospel, declaring: "He must increase but I must decrease." The story concludes with a ministry of Jesus in *Samaria* so abundantly fruitful in numbers as to call forth the congratulations of Jesus to his disciples in words of surprising intensity (iv. 35-38), and so deep in effect as to lead to a confession on the Samaritans' part exceeding anything to be found elsewhere in the Gospel (iv. 39-42). *Samaria* at least receives far greater consideration than in Luke.

K. Kundsinn, in his *Topologische Ueberlieferungsstoffe im Johannesevangelium* (1925), has taught us to find the motive for these geographical data anent the Baptist's earlier and later ministry not so much in any antiquarian interest in the Baptist himself as in present contacts with the *disciples* of the Baptist, who in the evangelist's day were chiefly to be found in the two localities mentioned. If so, "Bethany beyond Jordan" must be regarded as principal seat of those "Mazbotheans" or "Baptisers" who displayed greater affinity with Essenism, and were principally located in Transjordan in the time of their leader Elxai (A.D. 101). "Ænon near to Salim," on the other hand, is now clearly identified by archæological research as Ainun, six miles from Salim, near the ancient Shechem, by the perennial watercourse of the Wady Farah. This will have been the seat of the more Hellenistic type of "disciples of John." For our heresiologues thus connect both Simon of Gitta and his predecessor Dositheus with the Baptist. According to the *Clementine Homilies* (c. 200) both were disciples of John. Simon's more celebrated successor, Menander of Capparatea (*Samaria*), carried the rite of baptism (interpreted after his Gnostic system), northward to Antioch.

However this may be, and whatever the motive for the change of outline, there can be no question of the remarkable departure of the Fourth Gospel from Synoptic tradition in prefixing to the known story of Jesus' public work a new, unknown, pre-Galilean, or Samaritan ministry, which in apologetic value corresponds to the prefixed Infancy chapters of Luke. It effects adjustment between Christians and "disciples of John." Interrupted only by the journey to Jerusalem of ii. 12—iii. 21, this continuation of "the Witness of John" (i. 19 ff.) in a parallel ministry of Jesus and John in

Judea and Samaria (iii. 22—iv. 42) forms a new division to the old outline. Is it history or fable ?

There are considerations to be urged in its favour. The opening of Petrine story in Mark is too abrupt. Men cannot have left their livelihood thus to follow an utter stranger. Synoptic tradition also has reference to unexplained disciples in Samaria and Judea. It places in Jesus' mouth references to other visits than the recorded Passover journey to Jerusalem. Its concentration of his whole ministry on a single year will hardly suffice for the lasting effect of his teaching ; it seems more like a result of adjustment to the cycle of catechetical teaching. Moreover, the Markan record itself betrays the passage of the seasons. A harvest season is near when the twelve make their way through the ripe grain (Mark ii. 23) ; another is just past, or just to come, when Jesus gives his parting banquet to Galilean followers sitting on the " green " grass in Mark vi. 39.

Thus the familiar arguments of the harmonisers. They have long since been rejected as insufficient ; yet not wholly silenced. And behind them is the plain, undeniable fact that the fourth evangelist at least *thinks* he is giving historical data. The attempt to find symbolic meanings for names and dates like these has long since broken down. To allegorise " Bethany beyond Jordan," or " Cana," or " Nathaniel," or " Ænon near to Salim " awakens only ridicule. Our fourth evangelist certainly *believes* in his strange new tradition. He thinks there was a Nathaniel of Cana. He holds that there really was a " disciple whom Jesus loved," and that the outline which he sketches in such bold conflict with the traditional story of Peter, rests upon that mysterious disciple's testimony—yes, even his written testimony.

The fourth evangelist—or, as we might better say, his guarantor in xxi. 24 f.—may be in error. Doubtless he is, if we insist on pressing his sweeping claims to the last drop of possible apologetic meaning. But the words of xxi. 24 f. are manifestly not meant to be so pressed. True, the Appendix is no part of the Gospel as originally composed. But for any inquiry into its origin, the Appendix must be our guide ; for its author at least stood nearer than we and furnishes our only line of approach to the truth. This guarantor is in earnest. He expects to be believed when he says, however enigmatically :

" This ' Beloved disciple,' this John, son of Zebedee, left traditions when he died. We of the Ephesian Church

are not repeating mere old wives' fables when we tell of such things as a pre-Galilean ministry, before John was put in prison. We know it to have been a fact, because we have these traditions on the assurance—yes, the written assurance—of a primitive witness."

Exaggeration is indeed stamped on the very face of John xxi. 25. The verse obviously imitates xx. 30 f., the true ending of the book. But there is no deliberate falsehood in it. And at least the basis of time and place, the backbone of history, is clear, complete and positive in the Fourth Gospel as in no other. Typical is "John's" pre-Galilean ministry, the outstanding contradiction of Synoptic story, which harmonists like Irenæus found so hard to reconcile that they at last gave up the attempt, abandoning the long-established idea of the one-year ministry. But the pre-Galilean ministry does not stand alone. There is the sojourn in the "city called Ephraim" (again in Samaria) before the end; and there is the hopeless contradiction of Synoptic tradition as respects the day of the Preparation of Passover on which Jesus died. Thus Johannine chronology is at least bold, and sincere, and independent. The evangelist at least *thinks* he is speaking on good authority. But the very fact that he aims to correct his predecessors; and that he does so not baldly but cautiously, subtly, tacitly; shows that his tradition is not early. He shows the same caution in claiming the son of Zebedee as his authority. An earlier Ephesian book which had boldly announced "I, John, am he that heard and saw these things," had met furious contradiction. Our evangelist's guarantor veils his informant behind an ambiguity, leaving the reader responsible for unsafe inferences. This goes equally to show that the claimed authority is remote. The tradition of the red and white martyrdom, the twofold commission and promise of Jesus interpreted in different senses (xxi. 15-23) was already ancient when the Appendix was attached to a Gospel made up of "things new and old." But is the pre-Galilean ministry a pure figment of anti-Gnostic apologetic? If so, Gnostic opponents were merciful.

II.

The basic outline of place and time in the Fourth Gospel, the element most conspicuous to ancient objectors to its admission to equal standing with Petrine story, offers a bold, definite, independent, intentional correction of tradition

which since Mark appeared had become almost axiomatic. But the fourth evangelist had something to say which to him was more important than history. He had to introduce interpretative Dogma, and he chooses for the purpose the vehicle of dialogue, consecrated since Plato's day for just such use, a vehicle destined to serve a like end for Justin, for the writer of the *Clementina*, for dozens of later Christian apologists. "John's" theme is the Incarnation of the divine Logos; he uses the inevitable "I am" style. If, then, Jesus comes to announce himself as the Christ, the supreme Messenger (*Ἀπόστολος*) to Israel, the ultimate "Redeemer of the world," his announcement could hardly be supposed to take place elsewhere than at Jerusalem, fatal goal of all the prophets. His denunciatory dialogues with "the Jews" must, at least for the most part, be placed there. Only that reported by the Synoptists as in Capernaum could not be removed. So far as the other great "I am" discourses are concerned, another scheme of things better adapted to "John's" dogmatic purpose must supervene.

We have no difficulty in determining its nature. Five great discourses, each prefaced by its appropriate "sign," are as distinctively characteristic of "John" as the five discourses of "Matthew," similarly prefaced each with its group of "signs" in our First Gospel. John's subdivisions consist of successive visits to Jerusalem at each of the five great feasts of the two-year period covered by the ministry. Only that Passover which Synoptic tradition had unalterably connected with the Farewell to Galilee remains in its fixed place. The other feasts are interjected (with a sovereign disregard for context or historic probability) in the setting required by the scheme: Passover at Jerusalem (ii. 12—iii. 21); Pentecost (the name cancelled to avoid obvious conflict with vi. 3, but the subject adapted to this feast of the Giving of the Law), again at Jerusalem (Chapter V.); Passover (Unleavened Bread) with discourse on Bread from Heaven (Chapter VI.); Tabernacles (celebrated by illuminations) with discourse on the Light of the World (vii. 1—x. 21); Dedication (Feast of Resurrection, or Lives Given for the Nation) with discourse on The Resurrection and the Life (x. 23—xi. 53). The last great Jewish feast is *not* celebrated by Jesus in Jerusalem according to the fourth Gospel. He celebrates the final Passover "new" in the Jubilee year of release at the messianic banquet of the Heavenly Jerusalem.

The five festal dialogues, or discourses of the fourth Gospel make hardly a pretence otherwise of being adjusted to

its historical framework. As little do they pretend to report actual logia, or sayings of Jesus. The evangelist speaks almost defiantly in his own style and from his own contemporary standpoint. Jesus is made to say, "We speak that we do know," "I sent you to reap" just as if the intention were to make it plain that this is not history, but dogma. The evangelist frankly sets forth his own religious conviction and that of his fellow-churchmen. This produces an extraordinary disjoining of the story—and the compiler is little concerned. He expects the reader to see that he is writing after the manner of contemporary dialogue. He is not prepared to meet the matter-of-fact Western mind intolerant of midrashic poetry, the historico-critical mind which asks only, Did Jesus say these words, or did he not? Was he at this time in just this place?

History and dogma. It is the vain attempt to blend these diverse elements which makes havoc of the Fourth Gospel conceived as a continuous story. The attempt was not new. It was part of the problem of the first writers of gospels, and continues so down to the period of the constructors of Lives of Christ from equal parts of Synoptic narrative and Johannine theology. Matthew and Luke attempted it (each in his own way, but with equally disappointing results), by seeking to blend "Q" material with Mark. John makes a similar attempt, with still less of success from the standpoint of the historical critic; because by his time the narrative had become more complicated and unreliable, and the dogma more theosophically developed. History, or what now passes for history in the sifted mass of report (John xx. 30—xxi. 25), and dogma, of the Hellenistic, anti-Gnostic type—these are the two strands of our late Fourth Gospel. Each will prove invaluable as a check on its own side of the development, studied separately. In combination they produce a bewildering labyrinth of conflicts and contradictions.

The Prologue (John i. 1–18) shows the same extraordinary blend as the rest of the Gospel, though in different proportion. Nothing can be more sublime than the Wisdom hymn of verses 1–5, 9–13 and 14, 16–18, its three strophes depicting the eternal Logos as (1) Creative, (2) Revealing, (3) Redemptive. The Stoic Logos doctrine might use the terms *ἐνδιάθετος*, *προφορικός*, *ἐνσάρκος*. Nothing could furnish a better key to the Dogma of the writing. The inserted references to John the Baptist in verses 6–8 and 15 (to which we should probably add the mistakenly explanatory gloss "even to

them that believe on his name" in verse 12) fit this context "as the fist the eye." Verses 6 f. and 15 are indispensable to the story of John's baptism in 19 ff., and the story itself, however mingled with Synoptic elements and late tradition, might prove to contain important historical checks on the meagre and distorted report of Mark. But *standing where they do* verses 6 f. and 15 are intolerable. Attached to the first strophe of the Wisdom hymn verse 6 f. sends John the Baptist "drifting into eternity." Verse 15 breaks in between 14 and 16 to destroy the connection between "full of grace and truth," and its continuation: "For of his fulness we all received, one charisma supplementing another."

The interruptions of the Prologue are no worse than those which result from the interweaving of the Signs and Discourses of the succeeding story. After Jesus' disciples have been won from John in Bethany beyond Jordan and securely attached to his person by the Miracle at Cana (i. 19—ii. 11), the story of "the Witness of John" continues with perfect logical sequence in iii. 22—iv. 45. Jesus and his disciples "came into the land of Judæa; and there he tarried with them and baptised. And John also was baptising in Æenon near to Salim, because there was much water there." This gave rise to jealousies which John rebuked, again declaring it his mission only to make Jesus known and then withdraw (iii. 22—30). Jesus on his part, hearing of the controversy, withdrew from Judea, seeking the obscurity of Galilee; but on the road came into unsought prominence in Samaria, thus in effect displacing the work of John's disciples (iv. 1—45). This new explanation of the early relations of Jesus and John, supplanting the Synoptic account of how "*after John was cast into prison*" Jesus began his work in Galilee, forms a perfectly logical sequel to The Witness of John beyond Jordan (i. 19—34), and Winning of the Disciples (i. 35—ii. 11). The only incongruous element is a supplement in iii. 31—36 to the self-renouncing discourse of the Baptist (iii. 27—30). The supplement is obviously editorial, a brief paragraph which combines the themes of the Nicodemus dialogue (iii. 5—21) with the utterance of John.

What then shall we say to the Sign of the Purging of the Temple and Dialogue with Nicodemus (ii. 12—iii. 21) which intervene upon this sequence like snow in August? The Synoptic account of Jesus' journey at Passover from Capernaum to Jerusalem is attached willy-nilly in ii. 12 to the Miracle at Cana and followed by a Dialogue with a "teacher of the Jews" briefly expounding the theology of the Epistle

to the Romans in place of Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (ii. 18—iii. 21). Nicodemus unexpectedly disappears, and we are back at the point where "Jesus and his disciples came—from *Cana of Galilee*—into the land of Judea," etc. It is hardly necessary to point out that the condition of things represented in the support of multitudes in Jerusalem won by "the signs which Jesus did" against a hostile hierocracy, a hostility which compels Nicodemus to come by night, is not that of the beginnings of Jesus' success told in the following context (iv. 54). It is true that iv. 45 again adverts to the signs and wonders done at the feast in Jerusalem. But this verse also, patently in conflict with its context, is editorial. The Sign and Discourse of ii. 12—iii. 21 are both far in advance of the historical situation.

The same incongruity reappears at the next interjected festival journey with its Sign and Discourse. Jesus has just begun his work in Galilee with a "second sign," the "Q" story of the healing of the Centurion's Son. We expect its effects to be related next—as they actually are in vi. 1 ff., not in v. 1 ff. No; in v. 1 ff. occurs the inevitable "feast of the Jews." Once more "Jesus went up to Jerusalem." The "sign" is the Making the Lame to Walk of Mark ii. 1-12, while the controversial dialogue is that of the same Markan context demonstrating Jesus' Authority as Son of Man and Superiority to the Sabbath. A recent article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October, 1926 (Vol. XXV., 1) has shown the "Sources and Method" of the evangelist in this composition. However, he did not himself construct it for the place; for part of it has spilled over, as critics long ago recognised, and appears as verses 15-24 of Chapter VII. When we resume the thread of the narrative at vi. 1 ff. the same carelessness of geography appears as before. Jesus "went away (from Jerusalem!) to the other side of the Sea of Galilee," just as in iii. 22 he went (from Jerusalem!) "into the land of Judea."

Again we are on the track of history. Chapter VI. relates the close of the Galilean ministry with such reminiscences of Synoptic story as were exhibited previously in the Call of the First Disciples (i. 35-51; cf. Mark i. 16-20; viii. 29-33; ix. 1 and parallels). This is Passover, or the Feast of Unleavened Bread; the sign is the Feeding of the Multitude and the discourse is on the Bread of Heaven. But Jesus this time does not "go up to Jerusalem" because Synoptic tradition had already located sign and theme alike near Capernaum. In this case we escape, therefore, the usual geographical dislocation.

We do not, however, escape the confusion. Synoptic story tells at this point of a withdrawal of Jesus from Galilee occasioned by threats against his life (Mark vi. 14-16 ; Luke xiii. 31 ff.). He secretly returns to Capernaum from the tetrarchy of Philip whither he had fled, gathers the twelve about him and takes the road to Jerusalem, the Via Crucis (Mark ix. 30-x. 1). For John's Gospel this has to be readjusted, because Galilee is friendly (iv. 45), the enemy is in Jerusalem (v. 16-18). Consequently vii. 1 has to be introduced, regardless of the fact that Jesus *is* in Galilee according to the context, and just about to leave it for Judea. As a source of confusion the editorial comment of vii. 1 makes a good mate to that of iv. 45. Jesus' brethren do not deserve the imputation it puts upon their counsel in verses 3-5.

The third journey to Jerusalem, at the *fourth* festival, now coincides with the Via Crucis of the Synoptists. The secrecy, and the questions raised concerning safety mark it as the same ; although now to fit the Johannine scheme of the five feasts it is not a Passover, but Tabernacles ! In this Gospel room is thus found for an additional ministry prefixed to the Judean, just as a Samaritan ministry was prefixed to the Galilean of the Synoptists. No less than two festal journeys, each with its sign and its dialogue, intervene before the final Passover ! Can this have a historical basis ? Did Jesus spend three months before the end in Bethany beyond Jordan and in a Samaritan city called Ephraim (x. 40 ; xi. 54) ? At least John is comparatively definite as to time and place, whereas Synoptic tradition is vague on both points. On the other hand Mark's Exile Journey (Mark vi. 53-viii. 26) is certainly not historical. Is our fourth evangelist making his scheme of festival journeys take the place of information, or has he remnants of real tradition ? At least he *thinks* he has good authority, or he would hardly venture on such bold innovations. Late as his representations are and dominated by a dogmatic purpose and an artificial scheme, we have not such a superabundance of information on what happened after Jesus left Galilee, and before he and his disciples took the road to Jerusalem with the Passover pilgrims, that we can afford to disregard John's assertions.

Tabernacles, a Feast of Lights, has (like the other feasts in John) its appropriate sign and discourse. Jesus restores sight to the blind, as in the Synoptic story connected in Q with the denunciation of spiritual blindness (Mark viii. 22-26, 11-13 ; cf. Matt. xii. 22 f. ; 38 f. = Luke xi. 14, 29-36). He uses the occasion for a long discourse, employing the same

Synoptic theme, even including the touch concerning unforgivable sin (ix. 40 f.), while the Jews insist that he is possessed of a devil (x. 20 f. ; cf. Matt. xii. 25 = Luke xi. 14 ff., 29-36). Only in John the story is dislocated by adaptation to the scene of Jerusalem at Tabernacles. The addition in vii. 37-44 relating to the rite of water-pouring "on the last day, the great day of the feast" falls completely out of the picture. Not only has it a wholly different subject from the main theme, the Light of the World, but it flagrantly interrupts the context, destroying the continuity of the narrative. In vii. 32 the chief priests and Pharisees had "sent officers to take him." The result of introducing vii. 37-44 is that the officers wait until after the end of the feast before reporting! Still worse is the effect on viii. 12-ix. 41. All this long discourse beginning, "Again Jesus spake unto them saying I am the Light of the World," together with the healing of the blind man and the controversy which ensues, must be placed in the brief time remaining after the closing ceremony "on the last day of the feast!" The supplement is another proof that our evangelist did not compose his discourse sections, but found them ready made, and fitted them in—with amputations or supplements.

Editorial supplementation occurs at the close. In x. 1-18 it has twisted into an almost hopeless tangle a "parable" of the Door of the Sheep (hardly an original part of the discourse on Spiritual Blindness) and a Parable of the Good Shepherd who lays down his life for the Sheep. The latter should certainly be connected with the next festival discourse, the Feast of Dedication, whose theme was Resurrection of Martyrs. I have shown this in my article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for January, 1917 (Vol. XV., 2). So intolerable is the confusion in x. 7 that the Sahidic version actually changes "door" to "shepherd." But violence like this only evidences, it does not undo the mischief.

The series of festival signs and discourses naturally culminates with the fifth, and last, Dedication. Jesus returns from Bethany beyond Jordan to Bethany on the Mount of Olives at the summons of friendship to raise from the dead Lazarus, brother of Mary and Martha. The personal names are those of Lukan tradition, and the whole dogmatic section has every characteristic of the kind of fiction typical of Jewish midrash, including the interspersed features of Synoptic story and the doctrinal expository dialogue. The exaggeration of the instance of "the dead are raised up," overtopping even Luke's story of the Widow of Nain and her

Son, is no greater than that which stretches the Paralytic made to Walk of v. 1 ff. beyond Mark ii. 1-12, or the Blind made to See of ix. 1 ff. beyond Mark viii. 22-26. No church teacher of A.D. 100, surrounded by the mass of legend referred to in xx. 30 f., could be expected to exercise any more critical sifting *for dogmatic instruction* (technically *haggada*) than is here exhibited.

It is otherwise with the narrative framework. No doctrinal interest whatever was served by this evangelist's departure from the received Synoptic tradition of a fairly direct journey from Capernaum to Jerusalem down the Jordan Valley. The scheme of festival journeys to Jerusalem *may* be a mere literary device; but again the question must be raised, Are we so sure of the Synoptic outline of time and place as to be able to assume that the Hellenistic evangelist had *no* grounds beyond the convenience of this literary form for this radical departure? Once again, his champions, who defend his reliability in the Appendix (xxi. 24 f.), are convinced that "his witness is true." They probably have principally in mind the statements as to time and place which are actually made a ground of objection in later controversy because of their contradiction of the already canonised Synoptic narrative outline. The dogmatic sections are less likely to have given offence. These nameless champions of the defunct evangelist identify the "disciple whom Jesus loved" with John the son of Zebedee, though with a purposed ambiguity which suggests reluctance to be held strictly to account for it. They probably do not mean by the expression "testified these things and wrote these things" anything more than "transmitted this tradition (partly) in written form." Modern critics may feel obliged to take at its minimum of implication this ardent apologetic, but of its sincerity there should be no doubt. Neither should there be any undervaluation of this early narrative tradition, this scheme of festival journeys, in comparison with Synoptic History. It has been made the vehicle for Dogma expressed with the poetic freedom of contemporary method, the *midrash*, whose rule is, in Pauline phrase, "All things for edification." But even an artificial scheme of time and place may be framed on sound tradition at the core.

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THE FOURTH GOSPEL AND ITS CRITICS¹

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GREAT interest is being taken in the problem—or rather the series of problems—of the Gospel of St John. I use that term because there is hardly a single aspect of the subject on which general agreement has been arrived at. At the same time, so much has been gained by recent investigation that a fair amount of certainty is reasonable in regard to some of the more important points of controversy. There will no doubt continue to be a fringe of extremists on either flank, but in most cases their arguments show the presence of prejudice or a strange lack of literary instinct. Instances of each of these factors will occur as we proceed; but it is only fair to say that, on the whole, the criticism which is being directed upon the Gospel is inspired by the honest desire to reach the truth.

The special character of the Gospel itself is a primary cause of the different views which are formed of its contents. A view of the universe which excludes the action of the “supernatural” from the domain of a narrative that professes to be historical will be tempted to ride rough-shod over many an incident and expression which bears all the marks of authentic history. To this cause is to be attributed an unfortunate animus which seems to inspire a certain section of critical opinion and to warp its judgment. Nor must the effect of a fixed theological standpoint be minimized. There is no doubt that the Fourth Gospel presents a formidable obstacle to a Christology which is content with anything short of the full Catholic belief.²

¹ A paper read before the Beckenham and Bromley Clerical Society.

² “The Gospel of John throws insurmountable obstacles in the way of describing a purely human life of Jesus.” F. Loofs, *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* p. 98.

All these various considerations have to be reckoned with when we come to deal with the effect of recent criticism upon the interpretation of the Gospel.

Our necessarily brief inquiry falls into three divisions : I. Authorship and date ; in other words, the formation of the Gospel. II. The historical value of its narrative. III. The authenticity of our Lord's discourses as therein reported.

I.

It is common knowledge that on the first of these questions considerable movement of opinion has occurred during the last twenty years. Many people had been content to abide by the conviction so strongly held by the Cambridge triumvirate—Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort—that the author was the younger son of Zebedee, “ the disciple whom Jesus loved,” the Apostle John. Nor has anything of the nature of a fresh discovery of relevant data appeared since the time of those great scholars to upset the deliberate conclusions which they had formed. Of literary analogies and of psychological probabilities for or against their decision there has been abundance, but nothing to make it untenable. This is a fact to be carefully borne in mind. Nor, in this connection, should the name of the veteran Th. Zahn, of Erlangen, be omitted, a scholar whose range of New Testament learning is unequalled in the present day. But, apart from the authority of these great names, a more significant fact is that their arguments for the traditional authorship *have never been successfully met*. New theories have been started, but the arguments have been unaffected.

Most people would admit that the question of authorship is secondary. It is the Gospel itself, not the hand that wrote it, which mainly concerns us. Yet in estimating the historical value of a book, and of a book so vital as this, authorship and date become deeply significant ; while not a few would feel that the reasons to be alleged against the almost universal opinion of the early Church must be cogent indeed if they are allowed to prevail. In all fairness the burden of proof lies upon those who reject the Apostolic authorship, not upon its defenders.

Before the close of the second century the Gospel, which had long been classed with the other three as documents of paramount authority in the Church,¹ was assigned in every

¹ *Vide The Fourth Evangelist* (Murray), 1925, pp. 48 f., by the present writer.

quarter of Christendom to the younger son of Zebedee.¹ Now for a remarkable piece of criticism: "Until the time of Origen, or thereabouts, we are ignorant of Christian opinion about the authorship of the Fourth Gospel by the son of Zebedee."² Is it reasonable to imagine that the opinion universally held in the last quarter of the second century—and therefore long before Origen began his great commentary on the Gospel³—came up like a mushroom in the night, with no connection with preceding thought and with no knowledge of the unbroken chain of tradition in the Churches of Asia that linked Irenæus through Polycarp with the Apostle himself?

In this, as in so many literary questions, authorship and date are very closely connected. You have only, like F. Baur, to move the date of the book lower down the second century to make the Apostolic authorship impossible. It is, of course, generally held that the thing cannot be done. The Gospel was written about the turn of the centuries (A.D. 95–110⁴). Yet in a review by Professor Margoliouth, on the strength of a supposed indebtedness of the writer of the Gospel to the second century version of the LXX. (c. 150) by Theodotion, the Professor asserts that the Gospel "could not be earlier than that date."⁵ In reply to the linguistic argument it may suffice to quote Dr Charles, who says: "The author of the Fourth Gospel never agrees exclusively

¹ The John to whom it was assigned by Apollinaris of Hierapolis (c. 170), Theophilus of Antioch (c. 180), Irenæus (c. 180–185), the Muratorian Canon (c. 170) and Clement of Alexandria (c. 190–200), was the Apostle. Eusebius, writing rather more than one hundred years later, with full knowledge of primitive thought and of books that have not survived to our time, is in full agreement with those I have named as to the identity of the Evangelist and the Apostle. But there is an earlier writer who made much use of the Fourth Gospel, and whose reference to its authorship is not to be mistaken. Justin Martyr, writing c. A.D. 155, speaks of the Gospels as ἀπομνημονεύματα, "memoirs, written by the Apostles and those who followed them" (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, p. 199b)—an expression ("the Apostles") which could only refer to the First and the Fourth Gospels. Justin is thus a direct witness to the belief in his day in the Apostolic (Johannine) authorship of our Gospel. *Vide* below, p. 128, n. 2; *cf.* J. H. Bernard, *The Gospel of St John*, i., p. xlv.: "There is no doubt as to the belief of the second century . . . that John the Apostle was the *author* of the Fourth Gospel, at any rate that his Apostolic witness was behind it."

² Professor A. E. Brooke in *Journ. of Theol. Studies*, 1926, p. 298, and in *Theology*, March, 1926.

³ Origen only began his *Commentary on St John* c. A.D. 220, on his return from Cæsarea to Alexandria.

⁴ C. F. Burney thinks it may have been as early as A.D. 80.

⁵ In *The Church of England Newspaper*, July 28, 1926.

with the version of Theodotion . . . and only a few times literally with the LXX." ¹ And he adds: "We must assume . . . that side by side with the LXX. . . . there existed a rival Greek version in pre-Christian times." ² In view of the eminence of Dr Margoliouth as an Orientalist, I want to lay stress on the great divergence of his opinion from that of the most recent and authoritative scholarship. Harnack had long ago said that the Gospel "could not have been written later than A.D. 110." F. Torm, the Danish theologian, in 1923, says that its composition can in no case be set later than the earliest years of the second century; while Dr Streeter writes: "It cannot be later than A.D. 100 and may quite possibly be as early as 90." ³ This view may, I think, be now regarded as one of "the assured results of recent criticism."

But if within a few years we can be certain of the date, what, in face of the present movements of thought, are we to say about the person of the writer? The plea that, on the strength of two late (fifth and ninth centuries) references to a work of Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis about A.D. 100-130, fragments of which have been preserved by Eusebius, the Apostle John, like his brother James, suffered martyrdom before A.D. 70 at the hands of the Jews, although thought by some to be supported by a Syriac Church calendar of the fifth century, ⁴ is disproved by two considerations which cannot be gainsaid: (1) St John lived till the time of Trajan. ⁵

¹ *The Revelation of St John*, i., p. lxvii., n. 2.

² *Ib.* So Salmon, *Introduction to the New Testament*, p. 587; Swete, "Introduction to the LXX.," p. 48.

³ "The Four Gospels," p. 17. F. Loofs agrees with Harnack. Zahn thinks it was written and circulated before A.D. 100. *Vide The Rise of the Christian Religion*, p. 28, n. 1. "The Epistles of St Ignatius (martyred not later than A.D. 117) (c. 110) are full of Johannine theology" (Burney). The Gospel and the Epistles were already written. "Oral influence does not account for the parallelisms." "The date has been forced back to the end of the first century or the opening years of the second" (Vincent Taylor in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, 1927, p. 726). The fact that the Gospel was not only written and published, but had attained canonical status, by c. A.D. 175 is proved by the existence at that date of a commentary upon it, which was the work of Heracleon, a Gnostic of the school of Valentinus, and was used by Origen in his own commentary (*vide Orig.*, ed. Bened., vol. iv., p. 66, and elsewhere). Earlier still Basileides, the Alexandrian Gnostic (c. A.D. 125-140), is said by Hippolytus (*Refut. Hæres.* vii. 22) to have quoted John i. 9. As Harnack says, Irenæus found the Fourfold Gospels in Asia by c. A.D. 155 (*Chronologie*, i., p. 682).

⁴ But see J. H. Bernard in the *Irish Church Quarterly* for January, 1908.

⁵ *Iren.*, *Adv. Hæc.* ii. 22, 5; iii. 3, 4 (i.e., A.D. 98). *Vide* C. Harris in *4 New Commentary*, III., p. 274A.

The Appendix (chap. xxi.) of the Gospel implies the long life of the "beloved disciple," whom it identifies with the Evangelist. (2) It is unbelievable that the Church, at a time when martyrdom was held in highest honour, should rob the martyr of his crown, as it must have done if the story of martyrdom were changed into the record of a peaceful old age at Ephesus. Moreover, too little heed has been given to the fact that Justin Martyr, who was living at Ephesus in A.D. 135, directly assigns the Apocalypse to St John and thereby is a guarantee for the presence of the Apostle in the province of Asia, while his works contain frequent references to the Gospel, which admittedly was composed there.¹ Nor should it be forgotten that, so far as we know, in all the struggles of the Church of the second century with Docetic and other forms of Gnostic heresy, the Johannine authorship was not disputed.² It was known to friend and foe alike to whom the Gospel was due.

But something must be said about the psychological objections which are being urged against the traditional authorship. Psychology, it must be remembered, has not attained, nor is it likely to attain, the status of an exact science. It deals with probabilities, not with certainties. Its subject-matter is the working of the human mind. But minds differ. No two are alike. Who can say how such a person will act in such and such circumstances? When, therefore, we are told that the Fourth Gospel could not have been written by one who styled himself "the loved disciple," or that it is far above the capacity of a Galilean fisherman, or that one of the social position of the son of Zebedee was quite unlikely to have had access to the palace of the High Priest, we are asked to surrender definite historical data at the bidding of mere supposition and hypothetical likelihood. To all this kind of argument it has been aptly replied: "As soon as the improbables and impossibles are examined by some one else they have a way of passing into the possible and the probable."³

A famous fragment of Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis, is

¹ "I will not dispute the fact that Justin held the Fourth Gospel to be Apostolic and Johannine; his testimony as to the assignment of the Apocalypse to John the Apostle appears to me to be equally valid for the Gospel" (Harnack, *D. Chronologie*, i., p. 674).

² Except by the absurd ascription of the Gospel to Cerinthus by an anti-Montanist sect called by Epiphanius (*Adv. Hær.* li. 3) the "Alogi."

³ *Expos. Times*, August, 1915, p. 482. *Vide The Rise of the Christian Religion* (Macmillan), by the present writer, p. 27.

through presents us with a "John the Elder" other than the Apostle. Who could have written the Gospel.¹ But it has been shown by John that that passage speaks of one John the Apostle—first calling him, along with Andrew, a disciple of the Lord and again John the Elder. In the appendix, which, though an appendix to the Gospel, has always from the first circulated as a part of it, states that the author was "the loved disciple." That disciple must have been an Apostle. For at the Last Supper none of the Apostles were present,² and among them was "the loved disciple." The substitution of an otherwise unknown "John the Elder" for the Apostle as eye-witness and Evangelist accordingly breaks down. History has no record of such a person. Yet Harnack, although he thinks that the Apostle was in Asia at the time, attributes the Gospel, the three Epistles and the Apocalypse in its present form to "John the Elder," whom he distinguishes from the Apostle.³ But he makes a remarkable admission, which has received much less notice than it deserves: "That in some way John, son of Zebedee, stands behind the Fourth Gospel, cannot be denied, and accordingly it would have to be considered as a Gospel of John the Elder according to John the son of Zebedee."⁴ Dom Chapman remarks: "The Apostle has been expelled with a pitchfork, *tamen usque recurret*. . . . Harnack's view is bound to come round to the traditional one, if it is logically carried out."⁵

¹ In Euseb., *H.E.* iii. 39.

² Bousset admits that Papias and Irenæus knew of only one John of Ephesus, but argues against his identity with the Apostle.

³ This is evident from St Luke xxii. 14: "He sat down, and the apostles with Him"; verses 29 and 30, "That ye may . . . sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." There is no room here for a young John of Jerusalem as "the loved disciple"—the theory of the Lutheran pastor H. Delff, of Husum, so warmly welcomed by certain writers.

⁴ *Chronologie*, p. 675, n. 1.

⁵ *Chronologie*, i., p. 677. With this compare the view of Dr Bernard: "The Gospel according to St John may be unhesitatingly accepted in the sense that John was behind it and that it represents faithfully his picture of Christ and reproduces His teaching" (*op. cit.*, p. lxxiii.). While Harnack attributes all the Johannine writings (*ib.*) to the same writer ("John the Elder"), it is significant that Bernard also sees no difficulty in assigning to the man who dictated to or, at least, instructed, the actual writer of the Gospel, the composition of the Apocalypse; while the three General Epistles are the work of the actual writer of the Gospel (*ib.*, p. lxxi.). Neither of these scholars finds any difficulty in a close connection of one and the same mind with two such different books as the Gospel (and First Epistle) and the Apocalypse.

⁶ *John the Presbyter*, pp. 74, 77.

To sum up this part of our subject. We have no historical figure to compete with the traditional author of the Gospel.¹ The difficulties which some are now finding are largely subjective. They deal with what appears to them as likely or unlikely. They have no basis in fact. The Churches of Asia must have known whether the John who passed his last years in communion with them was "the loved disciple," the last survivor of the original Apostolic band, or whether some other person of his name, unknown alike to succeeding history and tradition, has usurped his title and his place. Men in those days of peril to life, of stress and trial, were not so destitute of reason and common-sense as some appear to think.

II.

§ The historical value of the Gospel as a narrative. We are at once met by the problem of a reconciliation with the Synoptic record. If that gives, so far as it goes, a true portrait of Christ as He appeared among men, what are we to say of a picture so apparently diverse as that of the Fourth Evangelist? Let me say that there is nothing to be gained by minimizing the divergences. There they are on the surface. If we cannot fairly harmonize them, it is best to say so and to leave to future study and discovery a task that is beyond our powers.

That St John knew the earlier Gospels rests partly on his many points of agreement with them in subject and in language, partly on tradition.² "A literary connection between them must be acknowledged."³ Where they differ irreconcilably, we have to bear in mind that as regards narrative it is not a case of one witness against three; for St Mark is, as a rule, the foundation of the narrative portion of the Synoptic record. Moreover, he is not a direct witness, but, as Papias called him, "the interpreter of Peter." Nor does the use of, or agreement with, Mark by St John imply dependence on him—a theory which has been employed against the Apostolic authorship of the Fourth Gospel.

¹ Harnack remarks that "the Elder John" is wanting both in Polycrates (letter to Victor of Rome; *vide* Euseb., *H.E.* v. 24) and in Irenæus. Certainly, because there is no evidence that such a person other than the Apostle ever existed (*Chronologie*, i., p. 669. Cf. *ib.*, p. 673). *Vide The Fourth Evangelist*, p. 60, n. 1.

² Clem. Alex. in Euseb., *H.E.* vi. 14.

³ H. Wendt, *D. Evang. d. Joh.*, p. 47. But contact with St Matthew is less evident.

Again, it is hardly recognised, as it ought to be, that in the precious fragment of Papias (*flor.* A.D. 100–130) preserved by Eusebius,¹ on the ground that the only John of Ephesus of whom Papias speaks is the Apostle, we have an unique instance of the criticism of one Evangelist by another: “The Elder”—*i.e.*, St John—“said this: Mark, having been an interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately, yet not in order, what he remembered of what was said or done by Christ.”² Now, if there is one claim which St John makes in his Gospel, it is that he was an eye-witness of what he records.³ In this respect (if, as some do, we except St Matthew) he stands alone among the Evangelists, and, indeed, speaks with authority as one who has the right so to speak, although, by the time he wrote, the earlier Gospels were taking their place in what was soon to become the canon of a New Testament. He sets St Mark right with a stroke of his pen (iii. 24). He places the cleansing of the Temple at the outset instead of at the close of the Jerusalem ministry. He assigns the Crucifixion to the day whose sunset saw the eating of the Passover lamb and thus clears away the ambiguities of the Synoptic timing.⁴ And be it noticed that he does all this naturally and simply, without argument, as one who not only knows, but takes it for granted that his knowledge will be at once admitted by those for whom he writes.⁵ May I pause to say how entirely this attitude of the Evangelist, so self-assured, so independent, negatives the theory, which at the moment seems to be gaining ground, that a young “John of Jerusalem,” indeed, someone who as a boy of twelve (if we are to follow Dr Streeter⁶) may have been among the crowd at the Crucifixion, was the actual author of the Gospel, and in time became confused in men’s minds with “the loved disciple” and Apostle?

¹ *H.E.* iii. 39.

² Harnack cites the criticism as that of one Evangelist by another, but, in spite of what he has said elsewhere (*vide* above, p. 130), by “the Elder,” not the Apostle.

³ John xix. 35. Cf. xxi. 24; 1 John i. 3: “That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you.”

⁴ *Vide The Fourth Evangelist*, p. 118.

⁵ H. Windisch insists upon the Evangelist’s belief that his Gospel is of so sufficing and sovereign a character as to render the Gospels of his predecessors entirely negligible (*Johannes u. die Synoptiker*, 1926, p. 133 and *passim*).

⁶ *The Four Gospels*, pp. 418, 456, and in *The Primitive Church*, 1929, p. 91.

The difference between the two strains of Gospel narrative consists partly of additions, partly of omissions. While St John gives no account of the actual baptism of our Lord, or of His institution of the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, we owe to him much of the remarkable scene in which the Baptism figured and, what is of such vital moment for religion, the foundation-principles on which the Sacraments rest.¹ To some the circumstantial account of the raising of Lazarus, to which the Evangelist attributes so large a share in the causes that led to the Cross, presents a special difficulty. Not only is it absent from all the other Gospels, which give their own version of what brought about the trial and condemnation of our Lord, but the stupendous character of the miracle leads people to think that, had such an act been wrought, it *must* have found a place in the earlier Gospels. I would reply that we are not in a position to say what ought, or ought not, to come within the schemes which the Evangelists laid down for themselves. That of the Synoptists was—with the exception of the large interpolation of St Luke²—confined to the life in Galilee until the day of the triumphal entry. The scheme of St John, apart from incidents and teaching at Cana and Capernaum and in Samaria, was confined to Jerusalem. Moreover, the Lord of life had already, as the earlier Gospels tell us, asserted His conquest of death. The ground on which the drama of Lazarus was played out did not lie within the Marcan—or, indeed, the Synoptic—province. But it should be observed that every strain of Gospel history contains the record of the Saviour's power over the issues of life and death. In every case there was an element of mystery. A living spirit was called back to inhabit again a lifeless form. Perhaps this is one of those questions the answer to which must depend upon our own outlook on reality—on the estimate we have been led to form of the Person of Him Who, standing at the opened grave, said the words “Lazarus, come forth,” and was obeyed; Who had already said³ of His own life, “I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again,” and was so soon to put His saying to the proof.

But criticism of a far more subtle and solvent nature is now being applied to the historical character of this Gospel. We all admit that it was written for a purpose—with a tendency; and that in achieving the purpose it used events

¹ John i., iii., vi.

² Luke ix. 51—xix. 28.

³ John x. 18.

and scenes as symbols of wider and deeper truth than that which lay upon the surface of the story. From the level of the actual and the concrete it passes into the region of the universal. The Prologue, by identifying Jesus with the Eternal Logos Who "was with God and . . . was God," gives the keynote of that sublimation of the individual and the particular which we hear as it sounds throughout the Gospel. The miracle of the feeding of the multitude furnishes the text for the discourse in Capernaum. The scene at Sychar gives rise to the teaching on the Water of Life. Always there is a spiritualising of fact and incident. But—and this is where mistake comes in—the fact and the incident remain. The allegory and the symbol do not obliterate the history. Some, like Loisy, have so far exaggerated the symbolic element as to discard the historical. And this, too, in a Gospel which, with its attendant First Epistle, was composed for the purpose of guarding the human nature of the Eternal Word from the attacks of those Docetic Gnostics whose theory of the evil of all material things compelled them to reject the belief that our Lord possessed a body of true flesh and blood. Dr Streeter has done good service in saying, "From the logic of his position John is bound to emphasise the idea that, because the Word became flesh, therefore these things *factually* occurred"; and again, "John could not, consistently with his purpose, have recorded as history any incident which he did not himself believe to have actually occurred."¹ As a proof of the intensely human and practical character of the narrative, we have only to think of the great emphasis which St John lays upon those marks of weariness and sorrow, of partiality in friendship,² which belong to one who is true man. Once "they founded Christianity on the Synoptists and Paul. The future belongs to John. For him history speaks. His Gospel is a faithful mirror of the time of Jesus."³ "It has created a portrait of the divine-human personality which has sunk deeply into the mind of the Church as the supremely true interpretation of Jesus Christ."⁴

¹ *The Four Gospels*, p. 388. A reply to such a statement as that of Professor Bacon, "We do injustice to this Gospel when we try to force it to our demand for the 'historical.'" (*The Fourth Gospel in Debate and Research*, p. 349).

² John iv. 6; xi. 35, 38; xiii. 23.

³ H. Delff, *Neue Beiträge*, p. 8.

⁴ Dr Inge in *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, p. 288. This suffices to refute "the relegation of the Fourth Gospel from the sphere of historical narrative to that of Christian apologetic, symbolism, allegory and mystical con-

III.

The authenticity of the sayings and discourses of our Lord. While the effect of criticism has been to deepen our conviction of the trustworthiness of his narrative of what actually occurred, the same cannot be said with regard to the *words* attributed by the Evangelist to Christ. Indeed, their treatment by writers of "modernist" tendency is one of the most significant features of the New Testament criticism of the present day. It turns the Fourth Gospel into a volume of early Church history—giving the religious outlook of the end of the first century—instead of a report of sayings actually spoken by our Lord. For instance: "Though the Fourth Gospel contains valuable historic material, yet what is its main treasure, the speeches of our Lord contained in it, belongs not to the lifetime of the Founder, but to the early experience of the Church."¹ "The prudent investigator will feel bound to employ the discourses and sayings only as sources for the religious and theological view of the author and of the community to which he belongs."² If this is the true state of the case, our estimate of the spiritual value of the Gospel would have to be entirely altered. Instead of listening to the voice of the Incarnate Word, we should be but hearing the views on the greatest of subjects of some pious member or members of the Church at Ephesus—a totally different thing with totally different results. It is true that the Gospel would still inspire and teach; for the sayings which are placed upon the lips of our Lord possess a verisimilitude and a compelling power of their own, which no question of source can destroy.³

templation." (Major, *English Modernism*, p. 134). Hans Windisch, who, in *Johannes u. die Synoptiker* and in *D. Absolutheit des Johannesevangeliums*, has brought forward the theory that it was the intention of the Evangelist to supplant and supersede the earlier Gospels, has strongly urged the inadequacy of *any* writing to set forth in all its fulness the Eternal Gospel: "None of our Gospels can present that—not even John. The Eternal Gospel remains unwritten. Gleams of it shine in every Gospel. It will first be revealed in the fulness of its truth in the future. That will be the time when the written Gospels will cease to be—John the last of all." (*ib.*, p. 186).

¹ P. Gardner, *The Ephesian Gospel*, p. 335.

² Heitmüller in *D. Schriften des N. T.*, ii., p. 702.

³ H. Windisch takes a similar view: "A great part of the words of Jesus would retain their power even though every connection with the historical authority ascribed to them by tradition were to fail" (*D. Absolutheit des Johannesevangeliums*, p. 49). But, as Dalman remarks, "we have security for the fact that the Gospels will be an essentially true

But they would not have the influence and the authority which they can command as the words of Christ Himself.

Against a view so destructive of security and confidence we can produce considerations of the weightiest kind. Speaking of recent Jewish comments upon the New Testament, the late I. Abrahams, Reader in the Talmud at Cambridge, says: "Most remarkable of all has been the cumulative strength of the arguments adduced by Jewish writers favourable to the authenticity of the discourses in the Fourth Gospel."¹ Dr Swete, speaking of the last discourse in the upper room, says: "Repeated study of these chapters (xiv.-xvii.) confirms my conviction that they approach as near to the words actually spoken by our Lord as the memory of one who heard them can bring us."² An interesting analogy is presented by the sayings of Socrates as he waited for the cup of hemlock. W. Pater remarks: "The *Phædo* of Plato has impressed most readers as a veritable record of those last discourses of Socrates."³

How then are we to reply if asked whether the Fourth Gospel gives us *ipsissima verba* of Christ? There is, of course, the fact that we do not possess the Aramaic version of the sayings as they were originally spoken. They are clothed in the dress of another language. They were spoken perhaps fifty years before they assumed their present form in the last of the Gospels. But it is highly probable that such a writer as St John, like St Matthew, would have taken notes about the time, or soon after the time, of their actual utterance.⁴ When we turn to the sayings, we find that they seem in one or two cases to glide almost insensibly into the meditation of the Evangelist. We cannot say for certain where the Saviour ceases to speak and the writer begins to interpret and reflect in St John iii. There is a certain sameness of idea and of style in sayings which the writer

reflection of the original thoughts of Jesus." (*Jesus-Jeschua*, 1922, p. 6). Cf. H. P. V. Nunn, *The Son of Zebedee*, 1927, p. 125.

¹ *Cambr. Biblical Essays*, p. 181.

² *The Last Discourse and Prayer of Our Lord*, p. x.

³ *Plato and Platonism*, p. 94. So, too, Professor J. Burnet held that the doctrines attributed to Socrates in the Platonic dialogues are not Plato's doctrines put into Socrates' mouth, but the actual theories of the historical Socrates. *Vide The Times*, May 28, 1928. In the *Theætetus* of Plato, p. 143, Euclides says: "I made notes of the sayings of Socrates at once on going home and afterwards at my leisure wrote them out as I remembered them." With this compare Papius' account of Matthew's compilation of the Logia in Euseb., *H.E.* iii. 89.

⁴ *Vide The Rise of the Christian Religion*, p. 22.

attribute; to other speakers and in those which he assigns to Christ. Indeed, all through the Gospel there is a monotony of tone and language which, psychologically interpreted, seems to point to the effect of an overmastering personality on a mind that at the time was young, receptive, eager; an effect that endured to the close of a long life and found expression in the Gospel. Over and over again St John must have told those sayings in the gatherings of the Church of Ephesus. They moulded his style; they formed the staple of his theology. In him, more than in any other of the Apostolic band, the promise was made good, "The Comforter, the Holy Ghost, . . . shall teach you all things and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you."¹

To sum up the conclusions to which I feel compelled to come. The difficulties felt by some in assigning the Gospel to the son of Zebedee are largely psychological and, as I have shown, are estimated differently by different people: whereas the rejection of his authorship raises difficulties which admit of no reasonable solution.² As to the trustworthiness and the historical character of the narrative, it is freely recognised that the writer possessed the means of knowing what occurred during the course of Christ's ministry, and that his right to supplement and to correct what was lacking or what was mistaken in the earlier Gospels was admitted by those among whom the Gospel circulated. The chief treasure of the Gospel—the discourses and sayings of our Lord—is still the subject of keen and unsparing criticism. With all allowance for their translation into another language, and for possible modification in form and style as they passed from the lips of the speaker, through written notes or by constant repetition in oral teaching, until they found their place in the last of the Gospels, the sayings themselves are their own best proof that they came from Him to Whom the writer assigns them, and from no one else.

¹ John xiv. 26. Vide C. F. Burney, *The Poetry of Our Lord*, p. 184.

² Cf. C. Harris in *A New Commentary*, III., p. 276; Bishop C. Gore, *ib.*, p. 278.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE EUROPEAN MINORITIES

DON LUIGI STURZO

1. THERE is no racial and religious minority in Europe to-day which does not possess its share of disorders and difficulties, and which does not nurse grievances created by the War and by post-war policy. Even Alsace is unsettled, and no solution has yet been found for the linguistic and administrative problems of Belgian Flanders.

For over a century the problems of oppressed nationalities and of minorities (problems which are often confused) have been a ferment in Europe, and the avowed motive of many European wars ; nor up to the present has the international *régime*, inaugurated by the Peace Treaties, been able to bring them to a satisfactory settlement.

The existing *régime* is based on the treaty for the protection of minorities concluded between the Entente and Poland on June 28, 1919, and applied through subsequent treaties and declarations to fifteen States, besides Danzig and Memel. Turkey and Armenia alone have not applied the treaty of August 10, 1920, this having been invalidated by the Treaty of Lausanne, of July 24, 1923. In the *régime* referred to above the States have pledged themselves to recognise the traditional rights of minorities in respect of language, culture, religion and citizenship ; the fulfilment of these pledges is placed under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The charge generally made is that the minorities are not sufficiently guaranteed, either by the separate States or by the timid and faltering supervision of the League of Nations. This charge reaches those States also which, like France and Italy, are not bound by special treaties, but have pledged their honour to respect the rights of the minorities in the territories recently acquired as a result of the Peace Treaties.

2. The political treatment of minorities, since the treaties

and conventions between different countries made it a matter of international law, is based on the legal equality of all citizens, whether of native or alien birth ; in other words, it presupposes an *état de droit*, and all modern States regard themselves as such.

The principle of legal equality is not denied to-day by any State ; yet in practice it is continually violated, either in the purely political field or by legislative and administrative measures. An example of this is to be found in the educational legislation of Hungary, where it has been enacted by law that only 6 per cent. of all students admitted to the Universities may be Jews. This figure is fixed for the University of Budapest and is taken as an average in the others. The reason alleged is that in Hungary the Jews number only 6 per cent. of the total population ; this argument is brought forward to prove that it is an equalising law, whereas in reality it is a restrictive law made by the State to protect itself from the influx of a more highly cultured race.

Similar cases are not rare ; there is much scope for oppression and inequality of treatment in countries where there is a language problem. Even the Polish Treaty, which may be regarded as the basic treaty, merely indicates certain facilities to be granted in the law courts to natives speaking another language (Art. 7). The administrative and political bodies are not included in the treaty obligations ; moreover, the word " facilities " is very elastic and leaves ample opportunities for the worst possible treatment.

An incident has recently been related by a Parisian review (*Le Mouvement*, November, 1928, No. 62 concerning the Archbishop of Tarragona (Spain). The Government wished to prevent him from ordering the priests of his diocese to preach in Catalan for the Catalans, and therefore surrounded the episcopal palace with a cordon of police, and searched the offices. Now, indeed, all preaching in Catalan has been forbidden by the Government. Again, the case of the Germans of South Tyrol, under Italian rule, is now well known and recorded. The teaching of German is not allowed even in private schools.

The educational problem is the foremost and the gravest of those which are constantly simmering among the oppressed minorities. It is hoped to achieve assimilation through the teaching of the language of the dominant race, and the neglect of the language of the minorities.

Assimilation has been the aim of all States which have minorities in their midst. It was, and is still, believed that

racial homogeneity and uniformity of language are the essentials for the security of a State, and for its highest development. To this ideal the principles of justice and humanity have often been sacrificed, and to this end whole nations have been downtrodden and oppressed. But, through a natural reaction and an instinct of self-preservation, the more the minority feels its rights assailed, the more deeply it entrenches itself, developing its national and racial character through the sacrifices of many generations of victims and heroes. Naturally the richer the personality of a people, that is to say, the more it has become attached to its religious traditions, institutions, language and culture, the more it resists attempts at assimilation. Nothing then remains but endurance of the yoke, to spoliation and exile. Even quite lately there have been cases of the mass deportation of unassimilable minorities, under the hypocritical designation of voluntary exchange of populations, such as took place between Greeks and Bulgarians, or of compulsory exchange, as between Turks and Greeks.

One of the most determined efforts, was the attempted assimilation of Prussian Poland, but it was also one of the most conspicuous failures, just as in the past the assimilation of Ireland had been a failure, despite the fact that the English Government had succeeded in substituting the English language for the Gaelic among the greater part of the population.

These attempts at assimilation and subjugation were combined in the past (recent or remote) with confiscation of estates or curtailment of property rights, with the enforced colonisation of nationals among the minority populations, with oppressive taxation, and sometimes with the worst forms of persecution, even in the nineteenth century, such as the Armenian massacres and *pogroms* against the Jews.

This lamentable history of bloodshed goes to prove that attempts at assimilation made by a State, whether civilised or uncivilised, are vain, since they give birth to prolonged struggles, and end either in defeat or in the actual extermination of the minorities.

3. Assimilation being impracticable, history presents two types of political methods in modern States: (a) the political inferiority of the minorities, maintained by administrative and police restrictions, modified with small concessions; or (b) complete parity, autonomy and liberty, with the removal of all differences between the dominant and the dominated nations. The first type was chosen by the

Austro-Hungarian Empire after the Constitution of 1867, and the second type by the Swiss Confederation.

The first method results in a strong development of national or local feeling, racial consciousness tending to become political consciousness, and religious differences to identify themselves with the national consciousness, and become political problems. The second method weakens the reasons for political differentiation, and strengthens those for unity of sentiments and interests among the different peoples forming one State. If the different nations comprising the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire had enjoyed complete recognition of their rights and the independence which they demanded, and had there been real union of interests and feeling in a single political unit of the federal type, the Empire would never have broken up, even after a defeat, to which the minorities themselves contributed in their desire to free themselves from the Austro-Magyar hegemony. The centripetal force of the Empire was its policy of espionage and militarism, and the centrifugal forces were divergent needs of the various races.

The case of Alsace is growing serious owing to the policy of centralisation and reprisals pursued by the French Government in respect of that province, which, in its turn, demands the recognition of its individuality and its traditions. Autonomism is an indication of this. The French nationalists see in the Alsatian autonomist movement only Germany and treachery, and favour repressive measures instead of following the Swiss method of respect for liberty.

What is lacking to-day, even in States, like France, which call themselves democratic, is confidence in the method of liberty as the most likely to lead to moral and political solidarity within a nation. There is more confidence in repression, in the use of force, and in a system of espionage and reaction. The Swiss method—let us call it that, since here is the most interesting and constant example in Europe of political unity achieved by peoples of different race, language, and religion—can only be based on real equality in law and in fact, on liberty and autonomy. The problem of racial and linguistic minorities in modern States can only be solved on a similar basis, adapted to meet special cases.

4. Three fundamental elements are necessary to the success of this method : (a) a convergence of the material interests of the minority with those of the other peoples in the same State; (b) the organisation of the State in a con-

stitutional democratic form based on the method of liberty ; (c) a real loyalty on the part of the minority towards the State and of the State towards the minority and towards its rights. The lack of any one of these three elements makes it impossible to apply the Swiss method in its entirety, and creates those disorders, temporary or permanent, which complicate the policy of countries with a mixed population.

The first element, the convergence of interests, may at first sight appear superfluous, but it is not so. Many political differences arise from economic difficulties and a clash of interests, more or less apparent ; and when such interests are irreconcilable, it is hard to find the way to peaceful co-existence on a basis of equality. The gravitation of interests towards foreign centres of commerce and industry is in some cases stronger than racial consciousness. Many of the Balkan problems are fundamentally economic. In rich countries economic interests may, on the contrary, help to bind together two or more peoples, as, in time, will be the case in Silesia if the policy of Poland does not hinder the natural amalgamation of these peoples.

The second element, constitutional form and the method of liberty, is indispensable if the reciprocal interests of the different groups of populations comprising one State are to be safeguarded, and a natural outlet provided for the discontent and grievances inevitable among heterogeneous peoples, as indeed among the different classes and conditions of a homogeneous people. On the day when, by means of international agreements, the religious, linguistic and administrative rights of minorities were recognised the foundations of their political rights were laid. In our day these rights are only denied by those States which deny political rights and legal equality to all their citizens. But those very States, by so doing, make the problems of their minorities more acute ; witness Spain and Catalonia, Jugoslavia and Croatia, Italy and South Tyrol and Istria, and so on.

If the first two elements are lacking, it is impossible to have the third, loyalty of the minority to the State, and of the State to the minority, because, on the one hand, the trend of economic interests would be centrifugal and not centripetal, and, on the other hand, there would be no public consciousness of loyalty, for to-day this can only be produced under a representative and responsible political system. When these two elements are present, loyalty may be expected on both sides ; it is the real and spontaneous bond of union between the various races in the formation of a

political State, which may even be called a nation, as in the case of the Swiss and their Confederation.

5. The question of the loyalty of the minority to the State of which it is a part merits closer examination, for it is open to misunderstandings, and affords a pretext for drastic persecutions.

Loyalty means, first and foremost, economic and political co-operation in one State, which is regarded, not as the State of another people, but as a State common to all. Such a condition of harmony cannot be imposed, but is born and develops with time ; it follows as a natural consequence if the minority has not been oppressed, and if its union with the State is of voluntary origin, or at least based on common sympathy and interests.

For this reason it is of considerable importance that unions brought about by war or other violent causes should be sanctioned by popular plebiscites. If the union depends upon the right of conquest alone, and is made against the will of the peoples concerned, then it is more difficult for the spirit of co-operation to develop, unless other favourable causes relieve the original tension between conquerors and conquered, and create new moral and material interests which may lead to loyal co-operation.

From the standpoint of international law the plebiscite is regarded by many jurists as an institution purely political and never juridical, and in the various cases dealt with by the Peace Treaty the plebiscite was not always adopted, in spite of the fact that President Wilson had laid down as one of his fourteen points "the self-determination of peoples."

But if it is an error not to recognise the right of peoples to self-determination, it is quite impossible to leave it out of account when permanent sources of unrest and dissension are springing up in Europe. There is no feeling more fundamentally opposed to co-operation among the nations than that of having suffered an act of violence, or of having undergone a violation of those rights on which the political position of a minority depends. The ordinary jurist says that to introduce the right of self-determination is to limit the rights of the State and to reduce those of the conqueror to nought ; but from these premises the ordinary jurist should conclude that his juridical system is leading him to the subjugation of all minorities, and not to their collaboration with the State to which they are united. At bottom the people have a sense of justice ; the original law which binds

the fate of one people to another is an argument, *cæteris paribus*, of decisive force.

The long and friendly co-existence of different races, the formation of common interests and common defence against the attacks of a third, in the long run remedy the original defect arising from lack of free adherence and develop what is called a sense of loyalty to the State. Yet it is worthy of note that, from the psychological and moral point of view, the stronger deserves the loyalty of the weaker only if in the first place the stronger has effectively demonstrated loyalty towards the weaker. To appeal to the loyalty of the minority as a condition which should precede the possession of its liberty and the recognition of its rights, as politicians and jurists are wont to do, is to reverse the natural order and to ignore the psychological value of mass sentiment.

Only too often, rightly or wrongly, the positions are reversed. Minorities are driven to oppose the State, because Governments do not keep faith with them, and do not meet them on a footing of perfect equality and freedom. The conflict once begun, the minority no longer feels any obligation to be loyal to the State. If time does not mend matters, the condition becomes chronic.

There are to-day in Europe two typical examples of minorities which have no reason for disloyalty towards the State, yet which have been, and are, in conflict with the respective majorities: the examples of Alsace in France and Flanders in Belgium. France refuses to consider Alsace as a minority; and certain members of the Government would go so far as to do away with the name of Alsace in official documents, and to replace it by the French names of Upper and Lower Rhine. Italy had previously done the same thing for South Tyrol, giving it the name of Alto-Adige. The people of Alsace are a racial minority, with their own language, customs, traditions, history and institutions. They are a frontier population, composed of mixed races, living in the fertile valley of the Rhine, with the typical characteristics of that practical and at the same mystically inclined people. Alsace may be regarded as a small, well-defined unit. If it were situated in a country such as Switzerland, it would form a political and administrative unit like a canton; if it had been free to make its own choice, it would possibly have preferred to be, like its neighbours Belgium and Luxembourg, a buffer-State in the sphere of French influence; to-day it only claims recognition of its historical and legal personality, on a local basis, within the

French State. But the French State is too much attached to the principles of uniformity and centralisation to tolerate such a federal conception, and does not realise that its first duty is to display loyalty to Alsace, which is not lacking in loyalty to France, even in vindicating its rights as a minority.

The other example is that of the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium ; here it is not a case of numerical minority, for the Flemish are more numerous than the Walloons, but the question of nationality is to be regarded as a question of a minority not completely pacified. The friction is due to differences in culture and economy. The questions in themselves are not serious, but they are complicated by the spirit of mutual misunderstanding and by the aftermath of disputes which arose during the War and as a result of post-war policy. Here also it is the spirit of uniformity and centralisation which adds to the difficulty of solving quite elementary problems in the organisation of different races united together in one State ; no one can accuse the other section of failing in loyalty towards the Belgian State, when it is the Government, with its Walloon majority, which has up till now refused to consider the rightful demands of the Flemish party. Only to-day has the process of pacification begun and an amnesty been granted. The longer this was delayed, the more the tension increased, as was seen in the election of the leader of the " Activists," Borms, as member of Parliament, despite his ineligibility.

6. There are, however, other conditions of a national and racial character in which it is impossible to demand absolute loyalty on the part of the minority in the sense of sacrifice of its national aspirations, and in which only relative loyalty can be expected, that is to say loyalty which seeks the realisation of such aspirations only by open and legal means. Such cases are to-day regarded as not legitimate and contrary to international peace, and they are only too likely to serve as a pretext for the oppression of minorities, and also to supply a motive for revolutions in the future.

All the new nationalities created in the last century were, in fact, minorities in the centre of existing States. Their birth was consecrated by the principle of nationality, a principle which was not always applied in its entirety, owing to the force of circumstance ; but in its name was accomplished the liberation of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, Albania and Montenegro, gradually withdrawn from the Turkish Empire ; Belgium was detached from the Netherlands, Italy freed her provinces from Austrian domination

and achieved her unity, and so on until the post-war period saw Poland reborn, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States constituted as republics, and Ireland as a free State.

What has held good in the past will also hold good in the future ; if one of the minorities of to-day, through some economic and political process, becomes comparatively self-sufficient, with its own culture and activities, if it feels the need of asserting its independence, then it will have acquired its right to nationality. In this case there are only two solutions : either free and peaceful co-existence on the Swiss model or separation, whether achieved through war, rebellion or compromise. The case of Croatia in the Yugoslav State is one of these examples. In time the Ukraine may develop its own economic and political personality, and will desire to be an independent nation. But leaving the future out of account, what is certain to-day is that in Europe the agitation for national unity has not died out, and the present status of the minorities cannot be regarded as final.

The problem of irredentism, which the Peace Treaties have raised throughout Europe, may appear even more serious. By irredentism we mean the feeling of frontier minorities towards the State of their own race to which they wish to be reunited. To-day the chief irredentism is that of Germany : there are over seven million Germans separated from their mother-country. Another characteristic example of irredentism is Austria. The *anschluss* is due to economic and political reasons, Austria having been reduced to the position of a minor State which cannot live in isolation, and which, in order to live, has no way open but to form a confederation with the other States on the Danube or to unite itself with Germany.

All irredentism is fed by a home policy of repression and misunderstanding ; but it has also its independent existence and can only be overcome by time and by a policy of common interests and liberty. The German Swiss do not dream of union with the Reich, or the inhabitants of the Tessin with Italy. This attachment to the new country may in time develop among the people of South Tyrol, or the Slavs of Istria towards Italy, if they feel their national entity intact within the bounds of the State ; but any cause of friction is a cause of irredentism. A high-handed policy merely intensifies it ; attempts at assimilation cannot succeed ; hence it is that in certain cases irredentism becomes the heel of Achilles for States which were looked upon as strong, and for international situations regarded as stable.

7. The problem, it is clear, opens out an international vista. The question of minorities has always been of international interest, but is more so than ever to-day, for since the Peace Treaties there is a hotbed of irredentism in the centre of Europe, in a strong and populous nation like Germany. The Paris Conference aimed at making a final settlement of European boundaries. But can there ever be in the life of the peoples a final settlement? Even had the Paris Conference satisfactorily and completely solved all the problems of the present day, it could not prevent many others from arising in the future which will necessitate readjustments. And we are far from regarding the work of the Peace Conference as perfect.

The policy of every State always has two planes: to consolidate present advantages and to lay the foundations for future advantages. But this second object also embraces the policy of not imperilling the future, even as regards such remote gains as exceptional circumstances might bring. The minorities which are conscious of themselves and of their own future live in the same sphere of forethought and hope. Among these must be reckoned, of course, the German and Austrian minorities.

The international problem has the same characteristics as the problem of the home policy of each State. Which is the better method, the method of liberty or that of coercion? We repeat that the method of liberty is the better adapted to overcome psychological difficulties, which are the most serious difficulties. As long as Austria is prevented by the threat of war from allying herself with Germany two disastrous effects will result: the *anschluss* will be still further developed, and minds prepared for war, whether soon or late. The same thing occurs if the frontier minorities are oppressed and harshly treated: irredentism becomes confirmed and invincible.

The method of liberty is not the unchaining of all the forces of disorder and the continual disturbing of international equilibrium, but it is a useful method in a well-established juridical and political system. Thus, we may speak of the method of liberty in the international field now that there exists an international system centred in the League of Nations. There are two safety valves for the problems of the minorities: (a) the right of appeal to the League of Nations and (b) revision of the treaties. The first is part of the right of control which the League exercises over fifteen States to ensure the observance of the obligations

assumed in regard to the government of minorities; the second is part of the general policy of the League as an arbiter between countries. The fundamental problem is whether or not the League is in a position to make prompt and effective use of these two safety valves. Certain States offer marked resistance to the work of the League. On the other hand, fear of disturbing the present European balance is a well-founded apprehension, which effectively hampers all initiative; and to speak to-day of revision of the treaties would be premature and dangerous.

It is clearly of paramount importance to wipe out the war mentality; and to this end the fundamental policy is on the one hand that of Locarno, on the other the policy of recognition of the rights of minorities. But such a policy can only be a step towards a higher and more concrete ideal, that of the "United States of Europe." In the frame of a wide confederation, not only large single States like France and Italy and small composite States like Belgium and Switzerland, but also independent minorities, even if united to the respective States, as, for instance, Alsace, South Tyrol and Croatia, will be able to have their own existence.

The "United States of Europe" is not a Utopia, but only an ideal, slow of development, with varying stages and many difficulties. The first essential is financial recovery, attained through the final systemisation of all war debts and the stabilisation of the different currencies; in the second place, there must be a revision of the customs, preparatory to a standardisation which will gradually develop until it is possible to eliminate internal barriers. The rest will follow in time. It is not to be hoped that this should be simultaneously accepted by the whole of Europe, but the central nucleus of the problem lies in the two antagonistic States, France and Germany; an understanding between these two, with the assent of Great Britain, is the condition, *sine quâ non*, of the solution of the European problem, within which are necessarily included all the more or less urgent problems of the various minorities.

It is clear that we are working towards international co-operation, in which the United States can also play its part. The Kellogg Pact is of great value, supplying a moral link between the United States and Europe. The solution of Europe's economic problems cannot be attained without the intervention of the United States. The American attitude in international law has a great influence on the old European conceptions. The first steps towards disarmament could be

taken if the true freedom of the seas could be secured, and this depends on the United States and Great Britain.

This policy of co-operation between Europe and America, while making the danger of war increasingly remote, will help to give an international turn to all questions of nationality and minorities, and to create everywhere a foundation of international solidarity. In this atmosphere the United States of Europe will have its birth.

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THE question of Church Union, if it is to be rightly considered, must be related to the general principles of the existence of a Church and also to the history of the efforts made to preserve its unity from the earliest times to the present day. Unless some such attempt is made no true perspective can be attained, and not only will every concrete proposal be wrongly judged but every practical effort runs the risk of failing in its ultimate object.

THE IDEAL.

That the Church of Christ is one is the consistent teaching of Holy Scripture. There is no need to do more than refer to the Prayer of Our Lord in St John's Gospel—an utterance which, whatever opinion we may hold concerning the actual historicity of all His sayings as recorded in that Gospel, leaves no doubt in our minds as to the eternal truth conveyed to us in the record.

But the ideal embodied in that and similar utterances still leaves open at least the possibility that the union spoken of may be a spiritual unity, not necessarily expressed in an actual corporate union but attained by a common purpose animating separated groups, or it may even be a future ideal only to be attained in "another world." St Paul's teaching in the Epistles to the Ephesians, the Colossians and the Corinthians certainly shows that he at least did not share the vagueness of view suggested above. He works out in considerable detail the figure of the Church as the Body of Christ, whose life is the Spirit of God. The body is essentially one : it is the means whereby God works out His purposes : this working of the Church is watched by heavenly beings, who thus learn more of God's plan : God's plan (the

mystery) includes various spheres of work, St Paul's own part being the Mission to the Gentiles : the various parts of the body figure different functions in the Church and division of function and of capacity is the rule of the Church, as it is of the human body. The whole purpose is that, united together by the life and power which every joint supplies, the body should work in unity till it attains to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ : that through the Church the life of God should permeate every human activity. The Church is thus the Incarnation of the Spirit of God : it is one : its work is definite and its goal is clear.

There is no room here for the conception of a number of disintegrated bodies working in more or less rivalry or harmony : nor is there any justification for that idea in the history of any organisation in the world. Let us turn to the history of the Church and we shall see the actual ideal of corporate unity which the Church has endeavoured to attain.

THE JEWISH ATTEMPT.

The first attempt to preserve the unity of the Church was that of the Judaisers, who desired that circumcision and the law of Moses should be imposed on every Christian. This proposal was a total misconception of the teaching of the prophets and of Our Lord and was in reality a denial of the Mission of the Church in the world. It was definitely discarded by the Church leaders at Jerusalem. But its after effects remained, and St Paul taught the Churches affected by the Judaising heresy the principle of their ideal unity in Christ and their practical union based on their loyalty to himself as their apostle and to their local leaders. The Christian Church was not to be bound to a code of rules, even though that code were the law of Moses. It was a life centred in Christ and mediated in the Church, through the many ministers whom Christ had given when He ascended on high.

PRACTICAL LESSONS IN UNION.

Communities grew up in many centres, and Ignatius tried wherever he saw disunion to unite them around the local "bishop." Altar was not to be set against altar. All were to rally round the one local head. And so the principle which has persisted ever since was formulated. The local Church leader was the centre of unity.

GROWTH OF THE MINISTERIAL PRINCIPLE OF UNITY.

As time went on the bishop with his presbyters was the bond of union in every Church and with other Churches in different parts. The unity of the faith was secured by the unbroken tradition of teaching handed on from leader to leader, unity of organisation by confining ordination to the bishops and presbyters, unity with neighbouring Churches by the rule that at least three bishops should consecrate a bishop.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

From this to the organisation of groups under Metropolitans, Archbishops and Patriarchs was an inevitable step. And while the unity of organisation was thus secured, unity of faith was secured by "councils" œcumenical or provincial, as circumstances made possible. Unity of life was secured by a common standard of life in Christ.

ELIMINATION OF THE PROPHETIC MINISTRY.

The prophetic ministries, for which a place has never yet been really found in any organisation, were gradually squeezed out by the more professional ministry. The struggle with the Montanists was the main effort made by the Church to find a place for them in the general polity, and when that failed the "prophets" found a sphere for themselves as lonely hermits, or as bands of monks and later as members of one or other of the great orders. But the question has never been settled, and the prophetic ministry is as great a problem to day as it ever was.

EASTERN CHURCH AND WESTERN.

We must hasten on to the end of our historical survey. Politics played an important part in the struggle for unity, and the struggle was intensified by racial differences. The Greeks, more interested in theology than in organisation, kept to the older system of groups of bishops, autonomous in their own sphere whether as bishop or patriarch, and acting together in Council when larger questions arose.

The Romans, true to their genius for law, found a bond of union in a more and more centralised authority. The Bishop of Rome had acquired a tremendous influence, first as bishop

of the Imperial city and later as the chief of the central city of the West, and he more and more consolidated the power of the Church in his own person. This process was a natural growth quite as much or even more than it was the result of design. But the jealousy it aroused in the Greek world led inevitably to the split between the Eastern and Western Churches and the unity of the Church was destroyed after 1,000 years of its existence.

NATIONAL CHURCHES.

We need not follow the matter further in detail. We are familiar with the circumstances which led to the break up of the Western Church into national Churches in the sixteenth century. It was then that the doctrine of the one invisible Church found favour, a somewhat pathetic attempt to justify the rents in the Body of Christ. The doctrine *Cujus regio, ejus religio* at first dominated the reformed Churches, but it could not be maintained in the face of the facts of individual conscience in the "region" or of immigrations of the persecuted from other regions. It is a matter of experience that those Churches which retained episcopacy, and as much as they could of the older organisation, retained more of their own internal unity than those which adopted a more democratic form.

THE ENGLISH ESTABLISHED CHURCH.

But in England, at any rate, the results of the expedient adopted were curious. For England, by the simple expedient of making the king the substitute for the Pope as Supreme Head of the Church (the actual phrase varied at different times) and establishing a National Church with a local central authority, evolved an almost unique type. This fact explains the violence of the feeling against both Puritans and Roman Catholics, whose loyalty to the Sovereign was always in doubt because they were not members of the King's Church. It explains the fact that when the King was attacked the Church was attacked; and when the King was restored the Church was again supreme. It explains also the fact that as the power of the King was "constitutionalised" the Church came under the authority of Parliament; it explains the situation created by the Prayer-Book Measure. And finally, as toleration increased and Independent and Roman Catholic were recognised as possibly loyal to their Sovereign and were

allowed to worship according to their conscience, we find the anomaly of a National Church which does not include the Nation and an established Church which co-exists with twenty or more "free" Churches. What we do not find is either unity of Christ's Body or unity in a National Church. Nor do we find that any one's conscience is stirred particularly by our utter failure to attain the ideal of Christ—that they may be one. We accept this membership of fragmentary Churches as placidly as we accept the dictum that every child is born a little Liberal or else a little Conservative, or whatever the labels of the day may be, and it causes us as little concern.

THE MISSION CHURCHES AND UNITY.

But what may be accepted with the happy illogicality of a Britisher in England assumes a different aspect when it is transferred to a foreign country. If the nineteenth century opened with a tremendous revival of Missionary enthusiasm, the twentieth century has opened with the conviction that Church union must be accomplished in the Mission fields or catastrophe will follow. And the area of the negotiations for Union in South India may be for us an example of the working out of a problem which is universal and pressing.

SOUTH INDIA.

By South India we mean the Madras Presidency, including the Nizam's State of Hyderabad, the kingdoms of Mysore, of Travancore and of Cochin, and several minor States. It comprises some forty-eight million people, exclusive of the population of the States mentioned above. The people are Dravidian in the main : the languages are Telugu, Tamil, Canarese and Malayali : all these are allied Dravidian languages with a strong importation of Sanskrit in their vocabulary. It is the home of orthodox Hinduism, and Sankaracharya, the great Monist philosopher, lived and died here. It is also the home of an elaborate system of Nature worship, of magnificent temples, of primitive superstitions and of a caste system more rigid than anything seen in the North. The country is varied, the land fertile, the climate equable and, on the whole, healthy. Its agricultural wealth is very great, its cotton has a world wide reputation, its forests are extensive ; its spices are famous and have been the staple of a trade with Europe which flourished greatly in the time

of Nero and has never ceased. Its tea and its coffee are famous the world over and its rubber industry is growing. In addition, it has flourishing gold mines and its coal at least pays for the working. The people are energetic and are great colonisers, travelling all over India, to Burma, the Malay States, to Mauritius and to Africa.

CHRISTIANITY IN SOUTH INDIA.

And they have the distinction of being the pioneers of Christianity in India. Whether St Thomas himself ever worked in South India is still a matter of dispute, but there is no inherent difficulty in the tradition. Twice a year ships could have taken him to Kranganur in Cochin, whither they were carrying on their regular trade from Red Sea ports in the reign of Nero. However that may be, the Nestorians established a Church in the South which, in the seventh century, was able to make favourable terms with the rulers of Travancore and Cochin. The Portuguese brought their religion to East and West Coast, and St Xavier, whose body lies at Goa, established churches all round the coast, whose worshippers have never gone back to their old religion, and the Roman Church now claims half the Christians of South India and is doing a magnificent educational work. The Danes sent their Missionaries to Tranquebar on the East and Ziegenbalg and Plutenschau established Churches on the East Coast which are vigorous to day. The Dutch effort survives only in some ancient churches. Their "Government" system died with their domination. The S.P.C.K. sent many famous men, chief of them Frederick Swartz of Tanjore, and the C.M.S. and the S.P.G. succeeded to their work. The London Mission has large Churches in the south and centre of the area, while the American Board (Congregational) has a great work to its credit in Madura and in Arcot. The Swedish and German Lutherans have a large area in the East and the Basel Mission in the West. To sum up, the Christian Churches in South India have reached a stage in self-government and self-support at least a generation ahead of anything which has been attained in North India; and the members of the Church are being added to yearly by the large mass movements which have brought in more than 100,000 Christians in the last decade.

That is the area in which the problem of unity is urgent, and if it is not solved by the Churches it will be solved by the people themselves in view of the practical needs.

CONFUSION.

The situation created by the sending of innumerable missions with no common plan is intolerable. All the divisions of the West are being planted in the East, without even their historical justification. Roman Catholic, Anglican, Baptist, Congregationalist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Seventh Day Adventist—to mention only some of them—are all setting up their Churches, their schools, their codes. The convert, brought in by the attraction of some Missionary's personality, finds himself in a ring fence, divided for no reason that he can understand from his fellow Christians, perhaps of his own family. The separation sits loosely on his conscience: the danger is that it may soon become a matter of conscience, and that, *e.g.* the Indian-American Lutheran may conscientiously object to fellowship with the London Mission Indian or the Canadian Baptist Indian; and the English Established Church Christian Indian may refuse to recognise the American Episcopal Methodist Indian; and so on. The Roman Catholic Indian is already so separated that he may not join in prayer in the Indian Christian Association meetings, and he is being taught that a marriage celebrated in a non-Roman Church is null and void for any Roman Catholic.

CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES.

The situation would be grotesque were it not a tragic sin. And the remedy can only be found if the facts are resolutely faced, as they must be faced, in the Mission field.

The Christian community is a tiny minority of five million in a population of 320 million. Self-preservation demands that they shall act together.

The Mission to evangelise the world, and the ever-opening doors for expansion, show the futility of internecine competition. The imported differences between the Missions make no appeal to the Indian conscience, and if the situation is not faced there will be spasmodic unions based on local and temporary considerations. There is a real danger in a caste-ridden country of the development of caste Churches.

And so in the last thirty years there have been many movements to undo the lesser evils of our divided state. Councils of representatives of Missions and Churches have agreed upon rules of co-operation in work and have parcelled out areas. Union institutions, educational and medical, have sprung up, and a common policy of work has been agreed

upon. Going further, there have been unions of Churches with similar organisations. The Presbyterian Churches have amalgamated ; unions of Presbyterian and Congregationalist have appeared ; and, what is more significant still, there is a growing determination that the groups of indigenous Christians who had been reckoned as congregations attached to the Missions shall have their full and rightful share in the organisation of the Church in their own land.

In South India the South Indian United Church has gathered into a complete organisation Congregational Missions, American and English, a Presbyterian Mission, and the Basel Evangelical Mission on the West Coast. It is divided into a number of more or less autonomous districts (or Dioceses), with a Central Assembly linking all together. Its organisation is established with local parishes, and groups of parishes, and it has a regular ministry (on a Presbyterian basis), and a Directory of worship.

The Wesleyan Church already has in its organisation a method of Church Government very similar ; and both these are extremely similar to the traditional organisation of the Episcopal Churches.

The proposal that the S.I.U.C., the Wesleyans and the Anglicans should unite is being worked out by official delegations of the three Churches, and it is found to present little difficulty as far as the framework of the bodies is concerned. And in other matters, too, there is more agreement than disagreement. All accept the Faith and are content to have it expressed in the traditional terms of the Nicene and Apostles' Creed ; all look to the Bible as the standard of doctrine and the revelation of God's dealings with men. All accept and use the sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Communion. And for the sake of union all are willing to accept the historic and constitutional Episcopacy. On this foundation a union is being fashioned. As is usual in all such negotiations it is the practical questions which cause most difficulty. Such a question is that of the present ministry and of the new Missionaries. It has been agreed by all that a Union which compelled a man or a Church to deny the grace plainly given through a non-episcopal ministry is impossible. The present ministers must all be accepted as ministers of a united Church. But consciences must not be forced, and they will minister only where their ministrations can be accepted without any doubtfulness of mind by all to whom they minister. Bishops must be consecrated and all future ordinations must be by Bishops. And this is to pledge

no one to any particular theory of the nature of the Episcopate; it is designed to secure a universally recognised ministry. In a caste-ridden country the danger of caste ministries must be met by securing a definite method of recognising the ministers called by God and commissioned by His Church.

As regards new Missionaries coming to the country a transitional period must ensue while the many practical points are being solved, and for thirty years they will have the status of those who first entered the Union. In a generation the Church would thus secure its common ministry and be ready to solve its own problems.

There is no need to speak of the many other problems which are now occupying the attention of the Churches. In the one body there will be much variety of practice and of thought. Rigid uniformity is neither desirable nor attainable. Let us close by considering some of the gains which union will bring. First, there is the witness of a united Church to the one Christ and the one God. The reproach of a divided Church will be taken away. Then there will be an immense addition to the strength of the Church. Competing clergy, competing congregations, duplicate schools, duplicate officials, duplicate expenditure on organisation will disappear. Again, the forces released will be available for fresh endeavour and for further advance. A united Church will greatly strengthen the forces of life which flow through the Churches and which are now so choked and weak.

And what of the reflex influence on the Churches which send the Missions? Can England, so pathetically content with its divided Church and competing Churches, stand still while its daughter Churches are leading the way to Union? Union in South India is not simply an experiment, forced by local difficulties upon reluctant Churches. It is the beginning of a return to the eternal purpose of Christ that His Church should be the incarnate Body of the One Spirit of God to reveal Him in every land.

HARRY MADRAS.

MADRAS, INDIA.

THE DEATH OF PLATO.

G. M. SARGEAUNT, M.A.

THE fine weather came very early that year, and a long succession of clear, sunny days, broken occasionally by refreshing showers, prolonged the charm of spring into what was ordinarily the dry, dusty summer. Apart from a sense of bodily weakness, natural enough in one over eighty years of age, and chiefly manifest in a disinclination to make the effort of formal lectures, Plato felt the season to be more than usually propitious for thought and writing; there seemed to be a tonic power in the fresh, serene air of that spring which renewed in a way he had never expected to experience again the vigour and creative power of his mind. Day after day he worked easily and devotedly at his *Laws*, sifting and arranging his varied experiences in order to leave to future generations in one comprehensive book the results of his meditations upon human nature and the meaning of life; less preoccupied now than he had once been with the graces of writing, and finding apparently without effort a mellow fullness of style which harmonised perfectly with the tranquil glow of his aged vision; sometimes lingering at almost too great length upon his favourite thoughts or returning again and again to those vital matters on which he had always felt so passionately, as though he could not bear to feel that he had now spoken out his mind on them for the last time, and realising, like a general after addressing his troops before a critical battle, that he had still not said or not made clear enough the most necessary and important things.

Sometimes he would call together his disciples either in his own lecture room or in a sheltered spot in the garden and would read to them one of these brief sermons on the different occasions of life, which he placed afterwards as preludes to the enactments of particular laws, upon the revision of which he was then principally engaged. And afterwards he would

listen in silence to the discussion, watching with contentment and affection first one and then another disciple, as the enthusiasm of the argument lit up their faces, while he followed back in thought the long succession of generations who had listened to him there and had then gone out into the world of action. How little it seemed that he had been able to do for them ; much less than he had received from Socrates ! And he saw himself again as little more than a boy and then as a young man eagerly looking for Socrates in the streets of Athens, hearing him arguing with others and with himself too, not in the calm seclusion of the Academy, but in the noisy, crowded public places of Athens or in a gymnasium against a background of youthful bodies resting, or straining at their exercises in the sunlight. Was that, perhaps, the better way of teaching, to be always at the centre of the people's activity, to share in it oneself, to catch men as they came and went on the ordinary business of life ? . . .

And then the silence which fell on his disciples, when they saw that he was no longer listening to them, would recall him from the past, and feeling that the spell of recollection, its mingled joys and regrets, had broken for the moment his sense of union with the present, he would dismiss them gently and would himself wander away to an unfrequented shady grove in those ample gardens, respected long after his death as the place of Plato's midday rest.

“ Holy ground is this, thick set
With olive, laurel, vine, in whose deep shade
The frequent nightingales make melody.”¹

How often, as he approached this favourite spot, those lines of Sophocles came to his mind, and others too from that last play of his, so full of the mysterious wisdom that may come by God's dispensation to those for whom he cares, when the time of their departure is at hand.

Often he did not sleep during the early afternoon hours ; often he could hardly tell whether he had been awake or not, so far had he wandered away on the light wings of memory into the past. As he lay there in the shade, resting against the broad stem of a tree, he could see through the sprays of olive foliage the Acropolis rising high above the houses of Athens, crowned with those splendid portals and the temples beyond. The Acropolis seemed the only thing that had not changed or vanished from the Athens which he had known

¹ Whitelaw.

as a young man. Only on that hill, and especially before the Propylæa and the temple of Athena, did he still find the noble discipline and order and grace and harmony which had once been, he believed, the inspiration of the Athenians in their struggle for freedom against the barbarians ; or had it really only existed in the souls of great men, Pericles, for instance, who had died the year he was born, or in his master Socrates, and in a few others of an earlier generation ? And as he looked at those marble walls and façades reflecting the sunlight, while the hours moved towards the evening, there floated through his mind words which he had written only a year or two before, describing the nature of the good for man's consciousness :

“ Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere by word of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions nor yet the second, but that in measure and the mean and the suitable and the like, the eternal nature has been found. . . . In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient and all which are of that family. . . . And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom you will not be far wrong.”

And again from another place,

“ Whereas the high and low are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principle aforesaid—the participation of the finite—introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music ? ” ¹

How perfectly those words described the essential goodness or beauty of those buildings ! Might not they be considered as a form of musical composition able to penetrate through the eyes into the soul as profoundly as music ? . . .

Dimly across the wide gulf of time there came to him memories of his life and friends in Athens during the last years of the Great War, the collapse of their city and the wild period that culminated for himself in the death of Socrates. How long ago that day seemed, more than fifty years now, on which he had heard of his last conversation and death ! His figure and expression, his gestures and walk, remained as vivid as when he daily witnessed them ; the tone of his voice at the different stages of an argument, the piercing look of

¹ The translations are taken from Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*, 8rd ed., 1898.

his eyes, which always seemed to be searching beyond the physical beauty of form or face for the fairness of the soul's visage. Yet when he now tried to recall what Socrates had said or taught about any particular subject, he found it impossible to disentangle it from his own thoughts, his own expressions. Had Socrates really held those views about love and beauty which illumined so passionately the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*? Had he really been so eloquent? Or had he not himself rather divined or perhaps imagined such thoughts in Socrates' mind as the theme of those silent hours of motionless meditation in the camp at Potidæa or on the way to Agathon's banquet? Did not that glow of language represent rather his own personal tribute to the power of beauty, which still held him after his conversion to the service of spiritual beauty and philosophy? The *Symposium* had always been his favourite work; there he had come nearest to expressing the beatific vision. Yet he had often regretted that he had committed those thoughts to writing, or at least had let them go forth into the world. They had been misunderstood and perverted, and used as an excuse for sensual passion, for admiration of artists who were "clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life." There had been difficulties and losses among his own followers in the Academy. Perhaps it was only by a "divine dispensation" that one could come without harm to the knowledge of true beauty and goodness. He recalled his own experiences; he saw the friends whom he had loved so passionately, their faces as they had been at particular moments, the living forms of Agathon and Aster and Dion. Would he see them again in the "place above the heaven" which he himself—or was it Phædrus?—had heard Socrates describe on a hot summer day, when they were resting under the plane tree after walking barefoot in the Ilissus? What a day that had been, and how perfectly concluded by the prayer which Socrates had taught him:

"Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man, and he only, can bear and carry."

It was for want of that harmony of "inward and outward" that Athens had fallen, so he thought, from her high position, and that all around he saw signs of degeneration,

the beauty of the creature, of the work of art, honoured more than the soul. More and more he had come to feel amid the extravagancies or weak sentiment of recent art the dangerous power of beauty to enthral by passion or to waste in profitless contemplation. It was better to temper men's souls with the beauty of science and mathematics, and to wed art with religion in the service of God and man. Nothing pleased him more in the book which he was just finishing than some passages on art as a function of the common social life.

On the day when he wrote the last page of that book he felt that his life was finished. He suddenly saw and enjoyed it as the harmony of a finished building—an Ionic temple of the spirit—where youth and age, love and wisdom, sense and reason, body and soul, were combined into an ordered whole. Above all, he counted himself happy to have been able to speak out his mind so calmly and fully in old age, to renounce or to correct, where he could, faults and delusions of earlier judgment. Soon the silence that overtakes all would overtake him. He had no fear of death; he rarely thought about death or about the survival of his soul. Had he really ever believed in a personal immortality? Encompassed by a serene, vivifying sunlight, satisfied with the completion of his work, it was the greatness and wonder of the universal life rather than the negation of a particular form of it which filled his thoughts; life stretching out infinitely on all sides of him, continuing eternally into the future. Among the infinite generations to come there would surely be many who would desire "to behold the pattern of the perfect city laid up in heaven and beholding, set their own house in order." For fifty short years he had watched material power passing from one city to another in Greece, from Athens to Sparta, from Sparta to Thebes, and now it seemed to be moving northwards out of Greece. Ominous changes and events were so often being announced from Macedonia—when or where would the saving of society begin? And how? If only cities would take the education of their peoples more seriously! How little they really valued or even thought about education! If they could be brought to see that happiness depends on the will, on the goodness of the social heart, rather than on material riches or political power!

He recalled the attempt he had made with his friend Dion to educate Dionysius into the pattern of a prince. With what high hopes he had started on that voyage to Sicily, and had watched, while the ship was approaching Syracuse, the lovely coast grow clearer and clearer beneath the great snow-

capped cone of Mount Etna ! He remembered vividly the sharp depression that had fallen upon him as he passed from the bright air of the sea into the gloomy fortifications of the palace, full of mercenaries. After a few weeks of battling against suspicion and intrigue, vice and extravagance, he had abandoned the project. From that time the conviction had begun to grow in him that states must be regenerated by a force working upwards within all classes, and not only by imposing upon them a wise ruler. There must be co-operation, a general conversion of heart and mind. Men must learn to welcome and obey the rule of reason and law as part of their own nature, and not an arbitrarily enforced ordinance. What might not be accomplished if all the influences to which the human spirit responds, religion, all forms of art, especially music and song and dance, could be united and focussed upon the souls not of one class, but of all ? That would be an education worthy of the philosopher's state. There would be one common foundation and bond of union for all, while each, according to his particular gifts and powers, would be trained to render his proper service to his fellow-men. Perhaps at some far-off date this dream might be realised, a new form of state transcending the narrow limits of Athens or Sparta or Hellas, the society of good men united in righteousness, " handing on the torch of life from one generation to another and worshipping the gods according to law for ever."

One evening when the summer heat had come at last, and he had been much fatigued by attending the long-postponed marriage feast of a friend, they found him apparently asleep in his usual place in the garden. But when they came close to wake him, they saw it was not necessary. His soul had passed from its body to take its place once more in the great procession of the gods to see " the blessed sights in the inner heaven." For a while they stood in silence, and then one of them quietly repeated the master's lines on his friend Aster, written long ago, but which seemed to them now to describe so perfectly the steady light of his revelation, illumining the things of this life and of the next :

" Thou wert the morning star among the living
Ere thy fair light had fled ;
Now, having died, thou art as Hesperus giving
New splendour to the dead."

(Shelley's trans.)

G. M. SARGEAUNT.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

BY PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS, F.B.A.

THE loss of Professor Burnet has been quickly followed by that of another great classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy, Mr R. D. Hicks, of Trinity College, Cambridge, who died on March 8th at the age of seventy-eight. Mr R. D. Hicks was College lecturer in Classics from 1884 to 1900; and, at the close of this period, he was afflicted with one of the greatest calamities that can befall a student—loss of eyesight. Yet his courage and cheerfulness never forsook him; with the help of his wife and several devoted friends he kept himself abreast of classical learning, and in 1907 published his masterly edition of Aristotle's *De Anima*, now recognised by scholars everywhere as the standard edition. It was, under the circumstances, an amazing production, containing not only an elaborate and lucidly written introduction and the Greek text with translation on the opposite page, but also a minute commentary, which, with appendix and index of Greek words, runs to nearly 450 pages. Then in 1910 there appeared from his pen a small but very suggestive volume on the Stoics and Epicureans, and likewise a brilliant account of Greek Philosophy for the *Companion to Greek Studies*. Only a few years ago, in 1925, we noted in these pages his scholarly text and translation of Diogenes Laertius in the Loeb Classical Library, a piece of work which had long been a desideratum. Indeed, as early as 1894 Mr Hicks had already enriched Aristotelian literature by an edition of Susemihl's *Politics of Aristotle*. This was not merely a translation from the German; it was a revision, undertaken with the help of Susemihl himself, and a large amount of original matter was added. It is, however, not only a great scholar, but a striking and lovable personality whose loss we have to mourn.—The death of Professor John MacCunn on March 24th, at the advanced age of eighty-two years, removes from our midst a man who played no insignificant part in the philosophical world of his time. After graduation in Oxford, he taught there for five years, and was then elected to the chair of Philosophy in University College, Liverpool, upon the founding of that seat of learning, continuing to hold the post in the University of Liverpool until his retirement in 1910. He was eminently fitted to be a teacher of philosophy in a new educational centre; he had wide social interests, and took an active part in the administrative affairs of the College and the University. His published work is all

concerned with problems of ethics and political philosophy. The volume entitled *The Making of Character*, published in 1900, is full of shrewd, original reflection, written in a delightfully fresh and stimulating manner. Other books of his are *The Ethics of Citizenship* and *Six Radical Thinkers*, in both of which the independence of his thought is amply exemplified. Professor MacCunn's home at Tarbet, on Loch Lomond, used to be a meeting-place of many well-known philosophers who tell of the charm and vigour of their host.—We have also to record the death on March 29th of Professor R. M. Wenley, at the age of sixty-seven. Professor Wenley was a native of Edinburgh and a graduate of the Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. He became Professor and head of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Michigan in 1896, and from that date until his death was continuously active there, with the exception of the years 1925-1927, during which he was director of the British division of the American University Union in London. He was a voluminous writer. His first work, *Socrates and Christ*, was published in 1889, and was followed by *Aspects of Pessimism* in 1894, *Contemporary Theology and Theism* in 1897, the Baldwin Lectures on *Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief* in 1909, and numerous other writings on philosophical, theological and biographical subjects.

Among the serial philosophical publications in Germany Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* continues easily to hold the foremost place. The ninth volume (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1928) lies before us, and it contains three elaborate pieces of work, each of which is a real contribution to philosophical literature. Professor Heidegger (Husserl's successor in Freiburg) gives us the substance of some extremely valuable lectures of Husserl delivered in Göttingen many years ago on the "Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins." The main theme of this piece of investigation is the temporal constitution of a pure sense-datum and the independent character of the "phenomenological time" which lies at the basis of that constitution. A distinctive feature of the analysis is the bringing to light of the "intentional" character of the consciousness of time and the way in which the notion of "intentionality" comes thereby increasingly into prominence. This conception of the "intentionality" of consciousness is one of the basal principles of Husserl's phenomenological school. The nature of consciousness is always, so it is maintained, to refer to, or to be directed upon, something that is objective. An active self-direction is involved, so to speak, in the very being of consciousness. And Husserl's contention is that this reference is found not only in perceiving physical things, or in discerning truths, or in appreciating beauty, and so on. The very structure of consciousness itself is intentional. In introspection, for example, the object is no longer an object transcendent to consciousness, it is an "object in consciousness," an object as we are conscious of it. So, too, if the so-called "external object" is withdrawn, the act of consciousness will still remain intentional. We get, then, a relation between "noesis" and "noema," the former an act

of intending something and the latter that which is intended. And it is one of the aims of phenomenological investigation to discriminate the plurality of noetic and corresponding noematic "moments" out of which the "object in consciousness" is constructed. Full of suggestive material is Ludwig Landgrebe's exposition and discussion of "Wilhelm Dilthey's Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften." The author, by an extraordinarily careful and painstaking analysis of Dilthey's work, tries to show that, in laying bare the fundamental facts of the spiritual life, Dilthey was preparing the way for a more thorough phenomenological treatment on the lines indicated by Husserl. The first essay in the volume is an interesting account by Fritz Kaufmann of "Die Philosophie des Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg,"—a little recognised thinker (who was born in 1835 and died in 1897), but of whom Dilthey had a very high opinion. Following closely on this volume of the *Jahrbuch* comes a supplementary volume, a *Festschrift* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1929), on the occasion of Husserl's seventieth birthday. It is ushered in with the memorable words of the *Sophistes*: "The philosopher, ever holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine." It contains twelve essays of Husserl's former pupils. Philosophical students will naturally turn first to Professor Heidegger's weighty contribution, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," which reaches the conclusion that the *Geburtsort* of this principle lies in the region of the transcendental. Freedom is the ground of grounds. Roman Ingarden's "Bemerkungen zum Problem 'Idealismus—Realismus'" is a thoughtful piece of work, handling the question of the existence of the real from the ontological, the metaphysical and the epistemological point of view. Alexandre Koyré (of Paris) writes on "Die Gotteslehre Jakob Boehmes," and Fräulein Edith Stein on "Husserl's Phänomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas v. Aquino." Altogether we have ample evidence here of a very living school of thought, which is drawing to itself most of the younger philosophical minds of Germany, and which is clearly deserving of more attention than it has yet received from students of philosophy in England.

We heartily welcome the first complete translation of *Hegel's Science of Logic* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 2 vols., 1929, 32s. net) made by two former pupils of McTaggart, Mr W. H. Johnston and Mr L. G. Struthers. As long ago as 1865 Hutchison Stirling in his *Secret of Hegel* translated the whole of the first section on Quality, and in 1874 William Wallace brought out an excellent translation of the "lesser Logic," as it is called, of the *Encyclopædia*, but up till now there has been no English version of the "larger Logic" as a whole, which was first published at Nuremberg in three parts in the years 1812, 1818 and 1816. It is needless to say that it is a work of primary importance for the study of the Hegelian philosophy, indeed, it is, in more senses than one, the avenue of approach to that philosophy. It is, in fact, an attempt to disentangle the rational principles which, as Hegel conceived, form the basis of intelligible reality.

and is thus, to all intents and purposes, a metaphysical system. The translators have used the fourth edition of the German text, issued in 1928 by Dr Georg Lasson; the work of translation has been remarkably well done, considering the many obstacles which Hegel's roughness and obscurity of style occasion. As the translators point out, McTaggart's *Commentary* may be advantageously used in direct connection with the text. It ought to be mentioned that Professor H. S. Macran, of Dublin, has published almost simultaneously, under the title of *Hegel's Logic of World and Idea* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929, 12s. 6d. net), a translation of the second and third sections of the third Division of the Logic ("Subjective Logic," as it is named), as a sequel to his translation of the first section which appeared in 1912. This translation, too, is extremely well done, and in many ways will be a useful companion to that of Johnston and Struthers. It contains an interesting and suggestive introduction by Professor Macran on "Idealism, Limited and Absolute." He shows very clearly the difficulties of the notion of "finality" as it was left in the Kantian doctrine.

In view of many current problems, Mr R. Ainscough's article on "Relations and Universals" (*Mind*, April 1929), written, he tells us, where big game are more numerous than books, is of special interest. As regards relations, he propounds what he calls a non-existential theory: things are related, but relations do not exist. The fact that two things are related consists of their being related and is not explained by the existence of a relation between them. Since relations are not observable things, and since the assumption of their existence does not explain anything, they should by Occam's razor be removed from the list of realities. As regards universals, he holds a modified theory of nominalism, what he calls a relational theory of likeness. There is not just one relation of resemblance holding between all the different things that are alike; there are as many different relations of similarity as there are universals necessitated by the ordinary theory of universals. A contrary view to that of Mr Ainscough is maintained by Dr J. E. Salomaa in a thoughtful little volume on *The Category of Relation* (Helsinki: Suomal & Co., 1929). He insists that relations are as much actual facts as the existence of objects. They are not created by our thought, nor are they merely forms of thought; they express something given. If this were not the case, if relations were only intellectual constructions, it would have to be admitted that the objects of knowledge are single, isolated points, completely independent of each other. Reality and relation belong intimately together. To assert that an entity is real means, in the final instance, to set forth its relations to other entities whose mutual relational connection has been previously established. An altogether different view from either of those just referred to is advocated by Professor H. Wildon Carr in an article on "Real and Ideal Relations" (*Phil. R.*, Jan. 1929). Holding that the reals which compose the universe are individual subjects of experience, he insists that the only relations possible between such reals must be ideal.

On the other hand, real relations are the order which the individual subject of activity introduces into its perceptions in the interest of its actions.

In a short paper on "Philosophy and Art" (*J. of Ph. Studies*, April 1929), Professor S. Alexander tries to indicate the kind of questions about art which the philosopher asks in order that those whose concern is with art may co-operate with philosophers in seeking to answer them. The proper business of the philosophy of art comes out in asking such questions as (a) what art does, and (b) what it says or conveys to us? Or, put in other words: What are the criteria of beauty? What makes the difference between good and bad in art? For when we say that a work is bad or imperfect, we imply that it lacks some of the character which art seeks to create, or which it seeks to convey to our minds. In answering the first of these questions, the approach is made from the side of psychology: what kind of satisfaction is it which art produces in us? Does the artist produce in order to express his feeling or personality, or does he produce in order to excite in others the same feeling as he himself felt? And the artist could help the philosopher in determining how far he thinks of communicating his experience to others, and is consciously guided by such a thought, or whether he is absorbed in creation, and to that end thinks of nothing else. In *Mind* (April 1929), writing on "The Field of Æsthetics," Mr A. C. A. Rainer criticises Professor Alexander's views on the nature of art and beauty. As against Alexander, he maintains the three following propositions: (a) The artist *creates* a work of art. Though in doing so he may be said to express his emotions, emotional expression is the "spring" and not the "motive" of artistic production. (b) The spectator *discovers* the beauty of a work of art or natural object. Though he may have to "impute" illusory elements to a physical reality in order to contemplate an æsthetic object, the beauty of this object is not essentially an effect of his "imputation." (c) The field of æsthetics is the nature of beauty and ugliness, considered as characters belonging to objects independent of a creative or appreciative mind.

Professor A. S. Eddington's Swarthmore Lecture on *Science and the Unseen World* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1929) will have undoubtedly a wide circle of readers. Professor Eddington is wholly opposed to any attempt to base religion on scientific discovery. The exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to concrete reality but to a "world of symbols," beneath which these methods cannot penetrate. But, returning to the starting point in human consciousness, we find other stirrings, other revelations (true or false) than those conditioned by the world of symbols. Whether these are of significance only conviction can determine, not reasoning. Reasoning proceeds from premises, and it cannot start without premises. Ultimately the premises for our reasoning about the visible universe, no less than for our reasoning about the unseen world, are in the self-knowledge of the mind. It is, he maintains, of the very essence of the unseen world that the conception of personality

should dominate it. We have to build the spiritual world out of symbols taken from our own personality, as we build the scientific world out of the symbols of the mathematician. In a lecture on "The Unity of Modern Problems" (*J. of Ph. Studies*, April 1929), Professor John Macmurray also emphasises the importance of the conception of personality. The chief problem of the present age is, he urges, that of discovering or constructing a new scheme of the self, which shall transcend both the mechanical and the organic schemata; and which will enable us to construct, consciously and deliberately, a civilisation whose mechanical and organic structures will be at the service of a personal life, whose meaning and essence is friendship. In this connection, mention should be made of Dr C. S. Myers' Herbert Spencer Lecture on *Psychological Conceptions in Other Sciences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929, 1s. net). Psychology, he holds, has long, from its own point of view, insisted on the relativity of space, time, movement, weight, etc. And, now, physical theory is fast abandoning its former notions of substance and absoluteness; it is becoming occupied rather in the study of the geometrical structure and mathematical relations of certain entities which are themselves unknowable and unimaginable. The once striking characteristics of matter as distinguished from mind are rapidly fading. Mind appears to be no more "unsubstantial" than matter; matter to be no more "predictable" than mind. To account for the evolution of the universe, or of any organised individual within the universe, not only mechanical principles but a certain adapting, selecting, guiding activity must ultimately be included among the first principles of science.

A new edition of Professor John Dewey's elaborate work, *Experience and Nature* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1929, 12s. 6d. net) has to be chronicled. He has completely rewritten the first chapter, in which he deals with the question of method, and points to faith in experience as, when intelligently used, a means of disclosing the realities of nature. "Experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature." Professor Dewey has also inserted a preface, giving a summary of the thought of the book in the order of its development. Mention must also be made of a volume, *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1929, 7s. 6d. net), by Professor A. N. Whitehead. The ten essays included in it have all appeared in other forms, but it is a distinct advantage to have them collected together in one book. One main idea runs, we are told, through the whole. It is that students are alive, and the purpose of education is to stimulate and guide their self-development. It follows that teachers should also be alive with living thoughts. The entire book is a protest against dead knowledge, against inert ideas. Two of the essays were published originally in this JOURNAL.

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REVIEWS.

The Sciences and Philosophy. Gifford Lectures, Glasgow, 1927 and 1928. By J. S. Haldane, L.H., M.D., F.R.S., Fellow of New College, Oxford.—London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929. Pp. x, 344.—15s. net.

PROFESSOR J. S. Haldane's Gifford Lectures take rank at once with the weightiest utterances which have come from holders of that chair. They have an added interest from the touch of autobiography which he gives us in the Preface. He was in 1883 a medical student in Edinburgh, having just taken an Arts course in which, under the influence of his brother, Lord Haldane, his chief interest had been in philosophy. Lord Haldane was his senior by four years and they both contributed in that year an essay to a volume called *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, edited by Andrew Seth, afterwards Professor A. S. Pringle Pattison, and R. B. Haldane. The keynote of the book was the need of distinguishing the fundamental concepts of different branches of knowledge. This keynote remains in these Gifford Lectures, made clearer and harmonised by forty-five years of research and reflexion. The book is thus "une pensée de jeunesse exécutée dans l'âge mûre."

Another point of special interest lies in the fact that the present volume of Gifford Lectures follows so closely on that of Professor Eddington, reviewed in the last number of this JOURNAL. Happily we have the views of the two professors expressed independently of one another, for though Haldane refers to Eddington, he states that his book was completed before the other appeared. We can thus compare the philosophic outlook of the most brilliant of our contemporary physicists with the mature mind of a veteran physiologist who, so far from excluding philosophical considerations from his work, has pursued his researches with constant reference to their bearing on general issues. It must not be supposed, and cannot be objected to Professor Haldane, that his science is vitiated by a philosophical preconception. His researches, especially on respiration, stand on their own merit and are contained in many scientific papers and a book published in 1922. But it is true—and the fact distinguishes him sharply from Professor Eddington—that he draws from them on the way conclusions consonant with the general attitude from which he started. One feels, therefore, at the end the pleasure and the confidence, though not the prejudice, engendered by consistency.

It is no doubt due to this life-long habit, or rather a part of it, the other side of the medal, that Professor Haldane's view of the spiritual is more closely integrated with the actual data of science than is that

of Professor Eddington. The difference in the general conclusion corresponds with the difference in daily practice and habit. Thus the spiritual of Haldane is the binding link and *raison d'être* of the whole. How he arrives at this will be explained in a moment. Yet Eddington, after taking us breathless through the kaleidoscope of modern physical theories, stops on the threshold of the spiritual. There is another world, of which we gain mysterious and fascinating inklings. But as to the meaning of the physical we cannot so far say; we must await the unravelling of the increasingly intricate tangle of theory.

The secret of the difference between the two thinkers lies in the simple fact that Professor Haldane, while adhering to the principles laid down in the volume of 1883, viz. the distinction of the fundamental conceptions applied in different branches of knowledge, has always added the philosophic desire to connect them together and see them as a whole. "Philosophy," he tells us, "is the attempt to take into consideration the whole of our experience." Unification without confusion is thus the leading idea of the book, and it brings the author, as we shall see, to the system which he describes as Spiritual Realism. He begins with a reference to the Newtonian synthesis of the physical world. He alludes to, but does not discuss, the modifications introduced into this system in recent years and which form the bulk of Professor Eddington's lectures. The Newtonian system was in the language of those days "philosophical," and this description of it no doubt contributed to the mistaken and mischievous attempts to extend it on the same lines to the phenomena of living organisms, of which the work of Descartes is the classical example. It is here that Haldane takes his most decided and decisive stand. The Newtonian conception of the visible world is useful in a thousand ways, but if we accept it as final or all-comprehensive we are at once confronted by insuperable difficulties. For Newton the visible world consists of "bodies," existing independently of one another in an independent space, subject to changes following outside one another in steadily flowing time. But, as soon as we turn to living beings, we meet with another principle, or form, of action which cannot be explained in terms of the physical and chemical laws which constitute the mechanistic system derived from Galileo and Newton. It is to this point that our author refers most frequently, and it is in fact the corner-stone of his argument. The characteristic of the living organism is its power of co-ordination by which the stability of form and composition is maintained in continuous activity. The co-ordination and activity are of such a kind that, though the material of the organism is constantly changing, the specific form and composition are on the whole maintained. On the basis of this doctrine, which Professor Haldane enforces with a detailed account of his own experiments on respiration and acclimatisation, he is often claimed by the vitalists as one of themselves. This he repudiates, though one is bound to think that his repudiation applies with more force to the older doctrine of "vitalism" than to its later exponents. Haldane will have nothing to do with the "vitalism"

which sets up another source of activity, acting within the living being, and independently of the physical and chemical laws to which it is subject so far as it is matter, in common with all other material things. Such a doctrine, he holds, only fortifies the mistaken idea of a Newtonian world of matter operating in absolute time and space; and clearly this is obsolete from reasons of relativity, if for no other. But Haldane provides another line of attack by his insistence, from the biological point of view, on continuity between the living organism and its environment. We must regard the environment as part of the living thing. "There is no spatial demarcation between what is living and not living. The environment is not outside of life."

Yet in spite of this, and of his own emphatic repudiation of the title, is Professor Haldane really justified in dissociating himself from the contemporary school of vitalists? Both he and they agree in claiming for the living organism *something* which cannot be explained by the known laws of physics and chemistry, nor, in their view, is ever likely, or even possible, to be so explained. How we describe this something is surely a subordinate question to the recognition of it. On this Haldane and the neo-vitalists are at one, and he might with justice be said to be more vitalist than the vitalists, for the new something becomes in his view the leading actor in the drama which co-ordinates, and in this sense, explains the lower happenings, and appears in a still more general and higher form in psychology, the laws of the spirit which are the supreme reality. The new something in life is in this book most frequently referred to as the power of co-ordinating and maintaining the specific form and qualities of the living being. Elsewhere he describes it as the power of integration. It has obvious points of contact with General Smuts' idea of Holism, which is discussed by Haldane in several appreciative and suggestive pages. While recognising the general kinship and importance of Smuts' view, he discovers one serious difference which is, in fact, linked up with the next step in the development of his own philosophy. To this therefore we will now turn.

Just as he finds between the physical and biological spheres a sharp demarcation in the fact of this self-contained and self-maintaining co-ordination, so between the purely biological and the psychological, or spiritual, spheres—spheres of scientific thought, it should be added, not spheres of being, for all being is one—we find another new element. In biology we are treating the co-ordination observed without reference to consciousness. In conscious behaviour, the sphere of the spiritual, we add the element of order in time as well as in space. This involves a wholeness, including both retrospection and anticipation. And just as the actual spatial environment of every living thing stretches out into the universe, and cannot in the philosophic view be considered outside life, so as soon as we advance into the spiritual sphere or aspect of being, another whole appears, leaving nothing outside itself, and impossible of interpretation as mere individual existence with its here and now. This is the point on which Spiritual Realism finds Smuts' Holism insufficient. For to Smuts,

while the spiritual or psychical fact is a real element in the universe, it is a comparatively recent arrival in the evolutionary order; the universe existed untold millions of years before its arrival. Professor Haldane proclaims, therefore, a "spiritual holism of conscious behaviour," including time-relations as well as space-relations. The generation of conscious behaviour out of something not regarded as having the specific characters of conscious behaviour is not a coherent conception. It stands, at that level of thought, on the same basis of philosophical insufficiency and instability as the mechanistic conception—on the lower level—which regarded living organisms as arising out of lifeless material. So, by recognising these fundamental distinctions between the ideas appropriate to different orders of scientific thought, we may actually advance, in the end, to a truer, more philosophic and permanent unification. It is the longer and more arduous way, but the only sound one.

Such is the gist of a noble and most impressive book. It must suffice in conclusion to add two critical considerations on which any reader of a philosophic turn, especially one interested in the development of philosophic thought, would desire further enlightenment if, as one hopes, Professor Haldane decides to elaborate his thesis in other writings.

The first point is one that will appeal to any one familiar with the general outlines of Comte's philosophy. The resemblances at every turn are so striking that, if the author of this book had not invoked the names of Kant and Hegel and omitted that of Comte, it would undoubtedly have been thought that there was a more direct affiliation. Precisely in the same way as in this book the author of the *Positive Philosophy* lays down the necessity of distinguishing, especially at the two great turning points, the main conceptions which govern different orders of scientific facts. He, too, finds in living things a new principle, though, in the same way, he would discard the notion of a mysterious new entity such as postulated by the older vitalists. Then, at the next great leap to phenomena of consciousness, Comte also introduces another principle, again closely akin to that of Professor Haldane. Thus, where Haldane claims for consciousness the special characteristics of retrospection and anticipation, integrating time-relations as biology integrates those of space, Comte uses the term "filiation" to describe the new method necessary in the social sciences as compared with those of biology in general. And in the master-conception which is to co-ordinate the whole, where Haldane speaks of the Supreme Spiritual Reality which is God, Comte gives the place to his *Grand Être*, which is Humanity. No one would wish to suggest a crude identification of the two conceptions, but the analogy makes one desire a careful examination of the parallel development of the two ideas, especially directed to finding out what elements, if any, are contained in the one that are not present in the other.

This is rather a historical question: the other point is one of a more general philosophical interest. Professor Haldane tells us that

it is only when we attain the psychological level, that the co-ordination of time relations becomes essential. Biology, as such, is concerned with co-ordination in space. But can this distinction be validly maintained? Is not the time-factor just as essential in the physiological as in the psychological treatment of the living organism? If this is granted, which would certainly be claimed by any biologist, the distinction of his highest order of facts must be reduced, not to the integration of time-relations, but to the consciousness of doing it. Consciousness, in fact, is the characteristic of the highest reality known to us, and, in the last analysis, our own individual consciousness. We end where Descartes began.

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Philosophical Theology. By F. R. Tennant, D.D., B.Sc., Fellow of Trinity College and Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Vol. I., *The Soul and its Faculties*.—Cambridge: University Press, 1928.—Pp. xvi + 477.—21s. net.

DR TENNANT'S work when it is complete will certainly be one of immense service not only to theologians, but to students of the philosophy of religion generally. It is to consist of two volumes, the first of which has now been published. This first volume is not theological, but philosophical; it is concerned with problems the consideration of which is requisite for any serious treatment of the question as to the knowability of God, and for any reliable estimate of the intellectual grounds on which theology rests. The second volume is to be devoted to a discussion of the theistic interpretation of the world, in the light of the principles here set forth and with the aid of the results which have here been reached.

The present volume is occupied first of all with a psychological inspection of the mental life and its processes, particularly with the nature of the self and personality. Then valuation and the theory of ethical values are handled. Proceeding to a consideration of the functions of thought and reason, the author differentiates the fundamental categories involved in knowledge, and discusses them in detail. There follows a critical examination of various theories of knowledge, under the heads of rationalism and empiricism, realism, idealism and phenomenalism respectively. And, finally, three chapters are devoted to the logic of induction, and the nature of knowledge and belief, from which advance is made to an estimate of the claims of religious experience and of scientific knowledge as furnishing an adequate account of the world of Nature. Altogether a vast field is covered; and no discerning reader can fail to be impressed by the wide range of learning, the keenness of speculative insight, and the critical acuteness which is throughout displayed.

Dr Tennant insists, at the outset, that philosophy should begin not with what is logically prior, because that is only knowable from the logically posterior, but with ordinary common-sense knowledge, knowledge of "so-called actuality by so-called persons," whatever

knowledge, actuality and persons may subsequently, as an outcome of critical scrutiny, turn out to be. Philosophy, he urges, can only profitably proceed by first of all provisionally accepting ideas, admittedly obscure, which have been shaped by mankind for practical purposes, and by refining them into tools for theoretical use. The method of pursuing the inquiry will, therefore, be empirical, but the empiricism will have nothing in common with the sensationism ordinarily associated with empiricism. Dr Tennant has a rooted aversion to what he calls "rationalism"—the method of philosophising pursued by such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, not to mention Hegel. Plato, in taking mathematics to be the paradigm of knowledge of actuality, was guilty of bringing about "philosophy's catastrophic fall from pristine innocence," of "the original sin which infected modern philosophy also from its birth" (p. 6). Rationalism is accused of turning a blind eye to the perceptual, and of "assuming the rationality—in its own sense—of the world, for no other reason than that the assumption was to be desired to make it wise—again in its own sense: which suggests cold wisdom waiting on superfluous folly" (p. 196). This is certainly a sweeping indictment; far more sweeping than any, I think, Dr Tennant will wish to retain in future editions. For, after all, no one of the philosophers in question ever ignored the facts of sense-perception; and, if they claimed to have discovered certain *a priori* truths, it was as a result of investigating the contents of experience. But to return to the empirical method. It is only, it is contended, by actually tracing the development of the knowing process that we can ascertain the nature, scope and limitations of the knowledge we may be said to have attained. The *ordo cognoscendi* is the sole route that may possibly lead to a known *ordo essendi*. Psychology is, accordingly, the fundamental science, the first propædæutic to philosophy, not a science to be placed somewhere between chemistry and history. To set out, then, from the "forthcomingness" of common-sense knowledge, to determine psychologically the way in which such knowledge has been acquired and the elements of which it consists, to construct a theory of knowledge on the basis of psychology and a theory of reality on the basis of epistemology—such is the formula of the method which is consistently followed in the volume before us.

I am entirely at one with Dr Tennant in laying the emphasis he does upon the necessity, in any attempt to unfold the nature of knowledge and the connecting links of the reality known, of turning rather to concrete experience itself than to the abstract thoughts by which that experience has sometimes been interpreted. I am no less at one with him in recognising psychology as an essential part of the whole sphere of investigation which by long tradition and common consent is designated philosophical. But I think there are strong grounds for rejecting the view that psychology occupies the propædæutic position which he assigns to it. The question is not, of course, as to the temporal order in which the different branches of philosophy may best be approached by the student, but as to the systematic

order in which they are related to each other. And, so far as the systematic order is concerned, it seems to me that the propædæutic philosophical discipline must be that which involves the relatively less complex conceptions and which handles what the other branches of philosophy necessarily imply. Now, psychology has not only, as Dr Tennant amply allows, all the marks of a highly concrete study, but it is impossible to represent its business as consisting merely in taking note of facts directly offered to observation. Not only are the facts excessively complicated, but the psychologist is compelled to bring to his analysis and rendering of them notions and ways of thinking which need critical scrutiny before he can usefully enter upon his field of inquiry. A theory of knowledge, *in this sense*, is, I should say, not a deduction from psychological facts, but an independent and more fundamental department of philosophy.

In the psychological chapters, which occupy most of the first half of the volume, the author follows very largely the teaching of James Ward, whose *Psychological Principles* he regards as "the greatest single work, of any age, on the human mind." But he deviates from Ward's view that feeling and attention are known only inferentially through their effects in the presentational continuum; and, unlike Ward, he takes conation to be as fundamental and irreducible in the mental life as feeling or attention. I doubt, too, whether Ward would have accepted Dr Tennant's analysis of sensation; at all events, in one of his latest papers, he insisted that sensa are not "affections of the mind"; and, in the *Principles*, he strongly protests against the psychophysical "bias" involved in speaking of them as "mental impressions." I think Ward came to regard sensa as appearances to a percipient of existent entities, and that he would have refused to describe them as "due to stimuli."

With much of what is said in the chapters on the Self and Personality I am in close agreement. Like Dr Tennant, I can see no possibility of accounting for the characteristics of conscious experience on the hypothesis that the mind consists of a series of discrete events. As I think he succeeds in showing the unity and temporal continuity of the mental life, the facts of retentiveness and memory, are inexplicable in terms of the serial theory.¹ We are entitled, he holds, to lay down a number of propositions as to the nature of the conscious subject, *e.g.* that it is simple, as not being made up of parts, that it is individual, in the sense that it alone can have and experience *its*

¹ I notice that Dr Broad is inclined to concede that such arguments as Dr Tennant uses render it unlikely that the facts can be explained by assuming a set of mental events interconnected by any relation or relations which are to be met with elsewhere in the world, but he thinks it is possible that they may be explained by assuming a set of mental events interconnected by a unique relation. It is difficult to know how to come to close quarters with the assumption of a unique relation of which nothing further can be said. But I imagine that if, in this case, the question were pressed as to what such a "unique relation" implies, it would be found to involve just that unity and continuity of the conscious subject that it is called in to avoid.

states, that it is not exclusively cognitive, but in virtue of the capacity of feeling is conative and self-determining. But when so much has been admitted, I fail to see why a distinction between the "pure ego" and the "empirical self" is still retained. Dr Tennant does not mean by the former term a single entity extraneous to the plurality of mental states, nor by the latter term a series of mental states externally related to each other. As I understand him, the so-called "pure self" is not to be conceived as standing to its states and processes in a relation similar to that in which a proton may be conceived to stand to the electrons in an atom; its states or processes (the so-called "empirical self") are phases of its own being. Why, then, perpetuate an antithesis which has had in philosophical reflection an unfortunate history, and which most psychologists have found to be an insuperable difficulty in Ward's work?

The portion of our author's theory of knowledge that will occasion the greatest misgiving in the minds of his readers will be, I imagine, the attempt he makes to pass from what he regards as the private world of each individual percipient to the public world of common-sense and science. A distinction, he argues, requires to be recognised between three senses of the term "object"—between the perceptual datum apprehended in the sense-knowledge of individual experience (*o*), the conceptual "thing" of collective or common experience (*O*), and the noumenal Reality behind both (*ω*). Each of us starts with the first of these, with percepts that are *idia*, private to our own sphere of apprehension; and (with the exception of the self) these *idia* continue to be the only entities of which we can ever be directly aware. How, then, is the transition to be effected from them to the common world of ordinary experience and of science? The reply is, through intersubjective intercourse, through the establishment of relations between the percepts of a plurality of individuals. When A and B gaze at the sun, each sees a different object. But "A can indicate—by gestures before language supervenes—that his sun is like, say, 'that sunflower' and gather that such resemblance exists between B's object—sun and flower—if B gesticulates 'same here'" (pp. 163-4). It is, of course, unfair to summarise the theory in this meagre fashion; but I am bound to confess that, in spite of all that Dr Tennant advances in its support, it seems to me to be eminently untenable. It assumes that in being aware of other selves the individual has somehow already got beyond his private world in a way in which in the case of physical things he cannot do, and it assumes further that, although for these selves there can be no common objects, there can be common relations which are known by each of the percipients in question to be common—assumptions, both of them, which presuppose the very transcendence which they are called in to explain. Moreover, the manner in which the world of physical objects is contrasted with the world of things *per se* is excessively hard to understand. The physical object may be regarded, we are told, as a hybrid between a thing *per se* and an *idion*; it is, in fact, not an existent but a conceptual construct, the

conceptual form that is given to perceptual data by the socialised mind. Accordingly, physical objects can certainly not be the causes or sources of perceptual data. Nevertheless, a perceptual datum would be ultimately inexplicable unless it were constituted by *rappor*t between the individual mind and a thing *per se* of some kind, and a theory which leaves out the latter is no theory of *knowledge*, whatever else it may be (p. 244). Yes; but the difficulty is to see why physical objects should not be things *per se* of this nature. The real conditions to which we appeal as giving rise to bodily stimulation are not noumena, in the Kantian sense, but the things of ordinary experience, as the scientist has been able to determine them. Light-waves, atoms, electrons, and so on, are certainly not for the physicist merely "conceptual elaborations," but actually existent entities, operating in the natural world; and, so far as I can discover, Dr Tennant has produced no valid reason for taking them to be anything else.

I can only touch in the briefest fashion upon what forms the matter of the concluding chapters, constituting what is, in many respects, the richest and most valuable section of the work. Dr Tennant holds that the results of scientific induction can never be more than problematic; and that they cannot reach even a high degree of probability unless certain fundamental premisses concerning Nature, other than such as can be furnished empirically (as, for example, that the variety of its ultimate constituents is limited), be granted. These postulates are neither self-evident nor can they be logically certified; but, on the other hand, it does not follow that they are deserving of cold suspicion. As presuppositions of inductive science, they have an overwhelming measure of practical certainty, and the man of science would regard them as so "likely to be true" that he would stake his life-work on them. Their probability is, however, of a different type from that attaching to ordinary scientific generalisations; it is not a relation between propositions, it is psychological in character, and due to the fact that the postulates in question are capable of evoking sanguine *trust* from human subjects. Science, then, walks by faith and cannot give a "rational," but only a "reasonable," ground of the hope that is in it. The significance of this conclusion for Dr Tennant's further advance is obvious. If the belief that underlies science is the outcome of faith, there can be nothing unscientific in recognising that theology rests on a like foundation. Ultimately, or apart from comparative verifiability, natural science and theology are of the same epistemological status; the one interprets, in one fashion, a relatively narrow, the other, after another fashion, a relatively more extensive sphere of observable fact; they are complementary and not mutually exclusive or needful of any "reconciliation."

But our author is far too astute a thinker to be unaware of the danger that lurks in this position. Reasonable religious belief is one thing, credulity and superstition another; and a theology that would eschew connection with metaphysics removes itself *ipso facto*

from possible contact with reality. In an admirable chapter on religious experience, he brings to light the sort of illusions to which in this regard popular thinking is liable. Even Otto's contention that we immediately apprehend a numinous object seems to him to be exposed to the objection that the immediateness may simply mean that the conscious subject is unaware of its actual mediatedness, as disclosed to reflection and analysis. We have, he argues, no psychological mandate for supposing a unique mental faculty which apprehends, with immediacy, objects of another genus than the sensory and what is derived therefrom. With respect to "mystical experience," he has some severe things to say, but they certainly need saying. The alleged "ineffable deliverances" in a state of rapture, because occult in character, cannot significantly be called "truth"; they vouch for nothing beyond their own occurrence; and, although it cannot be proved that they have no relation to ultimate reality, it can be shown that there is no good reason for asserting that they have that relation which the mystic claims, until theism is established. And as regards the "great achievement," as William James called it, of mysticism, its doctrine of having overcome all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute, it is manifestly ridiculous, and the critic will do well "to call nonsense by its name." For the mystic cannot have it both ways. "If he knows the Absolute as an Other, he cannot be It; if he becomes It, *he* cannot know it, as *he* has ceased to be" (p. 320).

Despite the facts that religion and science proceed from a common root and resemble one another in certain features, there are, it is pointed out, important differences between them. Unlike the data of scientific knowledge, the data of religious experience require to be shown to be other than imaginary or ideal. To show this is the task of Dr Tennant's second volume. It is a huge undertaking; and students of philosophy no less than of theology will look forward with eagerness to what is yet in store for them.

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Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Teil v. Die Philosophie des Auslandes von Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, Herausgegeben von T. K. Oesterreich, Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Tübingen.—Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1928.—Pp. xxxix + 431.—16 M.

THE completion of the twelfth edition of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy with this fifth part, essentially a new piece of work, containing a comprehensive survey of the progress of philosophy from the beginning of the last century up to the present time throughout the world, wherever philosophical activity exists, will be a very welcome event to students of philosophy. In an interesting introduction the Editor emphasises the special significance of this period in the history of thought in Europe and America. Philosophy, in his view, may be seen to take on a national character in certain respects. In

view of the constantly growing facilities for the interchange of thought to such a degree that of every well-known thinker it is coming to be true that he has thinking mankind for his audience, in days when philosophical arguments may be broadcasted, and the eagerness of philosophers to understand each other is manifested in International Congresses, and the welcome given in almost all countries to foreign thinkers, this may seem a paradox. Apart from such favourable conditions of the age, is it not the inherent tendency of philosophy to transcend the bounds set up by distinctions of peoples and States? Yet reflection on the developments of philosophical activity here surveyed will confirm on the whole the truth of Professor Oesterreich's dictum in relation, at least, to recent movements. On the one hand, it is seen that philosophy resembles art and literature in this respect, that it is not wholly independent of historical conditions, and the crises which profoundly affect national life. On the other, that with the growth of national self-consciousness, the need to express a *Weltanschauung* which, if not individual and peculiar, must be at least in some measure independent and creative, is felt and may at times become even the greatest necessity for the higher life. This aspect of the history of philosophy is less obvious in the case of British thought, because of the continuity of historic development not characterised by violent breaks with the past. It is exhibited in France in what is termed by the author of the French section the double reaction at the beginning of the nineteenth century shown in opposition to the political philosophy of the Revolution, as also to sensualistic and materialistic thinking, and in the advance of Positivism, and new social speculation. All these movements were characterised by the standpoint that the past is completely shut off and the Revolution has given the signal for a new era. By contrast, in 1848, on the return to Imperialism there followed disenchantment, and eclecticism in philosophy. By the historian of Italian philosophy, Senator Credaro, we are reminded that the counter-reformation after Galileo had resulted in the silence of philosophy for almost 200 years, only broken by Vico. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century a "philosophical content for patriotism" was sought first in Italian Ontologism (Rosmini and others), then in the Idealism of Hegel. But after the unity of Italy was perfected, no longer Italian nationality, but human and universal truth was the aim, and the spiritual nourishment needed was found in neo-Kantianism. Yet the way was being prepared for a distinctively Italian philosophy, which soon appeared in the original forms given to Absolute Idealism by Croce and Gentile. Again in Norway, in Professor Aall's interpretation, during the struggles for political independence in the 'seventies and 'eighties, the leaders were driven to seek for a new spiritual content to give to the people. This they found in the sciences of Nature, and the chief impulse to the experiential philosophy was felt in Christiania towards the end of the century. Turning to the Slav peoples, philosophy could not develop amongst the Czechs during the three centuries of religious conflict. At the beginning of

the nineteenth century there was a rebirth, and the first scientific philosophers were also leaders and teachers of the people. The idea that there must be a national Czechisch philosophy especially inspired Storch.

The most remarkable illustration of the influence of national character and historic conditions upon the outlook of a people, expressed in a kind of national philosophy, appears to be that of Polish Messianism. An interesting and full account of this movement is given by Professor Lutoslawski, collaborating with Professor L. Puciata. Poets as well as thinkers have contributed to this, and its wide adoption seems to show that it is in essential harmony with Polish aspirations. The leading idea is that of the group constituting the true nation, as formed of individuals whose bond is rather likeness of mind and sense of a common mission than sameness of race. The best means to the regeneration of the world is the extension of the true national consciousness amongst all peoples until the whole of humanity organises itself in a small number of genuine nations. The idea of Poland, as in a special sense the Messiah nation, seems to have been stimulated by the long endured sufferings of the people in their national consciousness. Individuals, according to Professor Lutoslawski, become capable of sharing in the national mission through their independent discovery of the eternity of the soul. He attributes to Wronski, in 1827, the first use of the word *Messianismus*, by which the national *Weltanschauung* has been understood in Poland, but regards the work of Mukiewicz, Towianski and others as of still greater importance to the movement. Whether this is a philosophy in the strict sense may be open to question, but it gives the materials out of which philosophy arises, manifesting a national state of mind and speculative interest which is favourable to the development of philosophical activity. It is also, at least, a remarkable social philosophy.

The tragedy of Russia is perhaps nowhere more profoundly revealed than in the sphere of philosophy. The conditions for the higher cultural life on which philosophy rests have been destroyed, at the very time when an independent and specifically Russian philosophy had begun to show itself, and promised to contribute new ideas to the development of the European mind. The fact that no speculation not based on materialism now appears in Russia is, of course, not due to any natural development. It was Lenin who decided that a radical materialism was alone suited to the aims of the revolution. He dreaded even the new standpoint of Physics, in so far as it might seem to throw doubt on the objective reality of the material world.

In North America philosophy has only become independent in the last generation, and only since 1900 has it begun to have influence in Europe. Professor Croftcell gives 1870 as the date when America entered into world-history, and from that time it is possible to speak of an American philosophy. This philosophy became possible after the American people had steeped itself in European thought. Emerson

expressed Platonism, German Idealism and Romanticism in an American form. W. T. Harris conceived the discipline in German Idealism as means to an end, the attainment of independence by philosophy in America, and the act, so to speak, of philosophical independence, involved, in consistency with the outlook of a people absorbed in creating a highly efficient type of civilisation, the downfall of intellectualism. The first blows to Absolutism were struck by William James, the original creative force in the modern practical and empirical movements.

In another aspect, not so obviously connected with historic factors, the philosophies surveyed may seem to reveal in some degree the character of the peoples among whom they arise. Thus there is a type of individualistic thinking, distinct from the British, and of peculiar interest, expressed in Danish and Norwegian thought. For many of us it is probably best represented by Ibsen. It was Niels Jreschow, the Norwegian thinker, much of whose activity took place in Denmark, who prepared the way for Individualism in both countries. The highest point in this northern individualism was reached by the Dane, Søren Kierkegaard, whom Professor Aall characterises as one of the most remarkable personalities of the nineteenth century, though his philosophy took no systematic form. In opposition to the Hegelians, under whose influence he had earlier come, he conceived of philosophy as an inner experience, this experience revealing oppositions which are ultimately irreconcilable. Like Ibsen, he dreaded the influence of the herd, as despiritualising for the individual. In the intensity of this conception there is something more anti-social than in the English individualism.

Turning to the more purely philosophical conditions of the progress of philosophy, the most potent single factor till very recent times lies in the effect of the German speculative movement, from Kant to Hegel, and after, taking different forms in accordance with the special philosophical genius of each country. As the editor, however, points out, during the second half of the nineteenth century international influences proceeded more from England and France than from Germany. The effect of the supremacy of German philosophy at the outset of the nineteenth century has not entirely ceased up to the present, though from the middle of the century the whole of Europe was under the influence of the new scientific developments, especially in biology, and the changes in life brought about by technical industry; hence "inner-worldliness" and materialism, a reaction against which has however set in, in the last generation. The survey of philosophy in France during the whole period gives a remarkable impression of the versatility of the French genius in this sphere. The absolutest philosophy has not had a large following, but great names have distinguished the Neo-critical movement, especially that of Renouvier, whose system was the most important of those that proceeded from Kant, whilst in his doctrine of personality he forestalled some of the later personalists. The last thirty years of the century were characterised by an intensive effort to give a

critical basis to science, of which Poincaré was the most brilliant representative. The anti-intellectualistic reaction, of which M. Bergson has always been the greatest exponent, showed analogies with Anglo-American Pragmatism. In psychological sociology, Durkheim and Lévy Bruhl were developing highly original theories, whilst modern French psychology was founded by Ribot. Amongst other currents of thought, especially cultivated in France, there was the religious philosophy of Sabatier, also Modernism and Neo-scholasticism. We might have expected some reference to the work of Etienne Gilson in the present century. It is in Italy that the German influence appears to have been greatest, and from the beginning of the nineteenth century in Sweden, where in previous centuries the greatest foreign influences had been French (after the death of Descartes at Stockholm) and English thought, especially Locke, Shaftesbury and Hume. In Boström, however, appeared a thinker who, in spite of Hegelian influences, expressed national originality in a personal idealism. Finland, as we are told by Professor Grotenfelt, had produced an independent thinker in Gabriel Hartman (1776 1809), whose system tended to a Critical Realism and Voluntarism. But Hegelianism dominated during a great part of the century, and the doctrine of objective mind was conceived as a force in the national aspirations. In Professor Westermarck, of Helsingfors, and London, Finland possesses a thinker of wide fame in the sphere of sociology. The comprehensive survey of British philosophy by Professor Dawes Hicks should be of great interest to Continental, as also, of course, to English readers, and shows unmistakably the increasing catholicity of philosophic activity in modern England. Especially to be noted in the account of the earlier nineteenth century work is the full statement of the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, also of Mansel, in days when these independent thinkers are somewhat neglected. With Mansel's line of thought Professor Hicks connects that of Lord Balfour. The Associationist and Utilitarian philosophies, so wholly unaffected by external influence, Darwinism and the Spencerian Evolutionism, with its repercussions in sociology, pragmatism, and the philosophy of emergence, and on the other hand the critical idealism, in which a great type of thought grown on a foreign soil became naturalised and at home with the English mind, are treated as though from the inner side. Critical realism in all its phases is, as we should expect, not less sympathetically presented, and the special developments of mathematical philosophy, by Russell and Whitehead.

The entry of the new world into a share in the progress of philosophy is, as the editor regards it, a significant fact for the history of thought. Exactly what form its most original contribution is to take may be still a matter of doubt. Josiah Royce's personalistic absolutism remains the most important metaphysical work America has yet produced, but a very different current is now in full tide. Professor Crofcell hardly notices that manifestation of futurism in philosophy or psychology, known as Behaviourism. He gives chief

attention to the Pragmatism of James and Dewey, the radical empiricism of James, and the Neo-realism of the present time. "Personalism," first presented in its American form by Bowne, is more dominant in the Universities of the Pacific side. In spite of the great interest of these and other movements the student may feel that American philosophy has not yet fully arrived, and when it comes may possibly give expression to a spirit which at present "dwelleth in the innermost" of a nation growing to complete self-consciousness.

Consideration of the notable survey of modern philosophy in this volume, to which, of course, has to be added the previous account of philosophy in Germany, will probably incline us to agree with the editor's view of the satisfactory position of philosophy at the present time. The ground seems prepared for the emergence of greater systems, though it may be that the heroic ages of system-making in philosophy are over. In conclusion, appreciation should be expressed of the work of the various scholars who have severally described the philosophical situation in their own countries, in such a manner as to suggest that it has been in each case a labour of love.

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Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution. By William McDougall, M.B., F.R.S., Professor of Psychology in Duke University. London: Methuen & Co., 1929.—Pp. xi + 295.—7s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR McDOUGALL believes that contemporary thought concerning life and mind is dominated by the theory of mechanistic causation. This theory is, in his view, not only incompatible with the evidence, its practical consequences for morality and religion are deplorable; and he applies himself very vigorously to its refutation. He aims at showing that men of science have offered no ground for rejecting the presence of teleological or purposive action throughout the organic and mental realms.

The book takes the form of six chapters, followed by long notes in smaller print, which cover almost as many pages as the main text. This arrangement is disturbing to the reader, for the notes argue several points stated briefly and positively in the main part.

In the course of the discussion, the author relies chiefly on the following arguments. In physics, mechanism of the cruder sort has been abandoned, but biology has retained it. Mechanism may be defined comprehensively to mean any explanation of processes which excludes teleology; and teleology is to be interpreted in the light of our own experience of purposive endeavour. The issue lies with an independent and unprejudiced psychology. Idealist philosophy cannot answer the materialist creed; for supposing brains were peculiar functions of matter, the idealist argument is just the kind of argument which such brains would adduce. Intelligent behaviour is, however, guided, not by any complex of sensations, but by the apprehension of certain abstract relations. Further, our own actions seem to

ourselves to be the expressions of foresight and desire, and observation of the behaviour of animals and men display marks, such as adaptation, persistence, satisfaction, which correspond well with our own experience. This experience of effective willing is the source of our belief in causation in the external world. Purpose and intelligence are correlative aspects of action. But it is on the belief in causation that the mechanistic theory is based. "When then modern Materialism seeks to explain all purposive action mechanistically, it is repudiating its own foundation, the very ground of our belief in causation or causal efficacy of any kind" (p. 70).

Moreover, mechanistic causation derives its plausibility from the assumption of discrete units inter-acting causally; but even modern physics suggests that organisation precedes and governs material units. And, when we consider the disposition of parts of the living organism, we are obliged to admit that "its organisation cannot be completely described in terms of material structure" (p. 107). The co-operation of the past in the guidance of action—what may broadly be termed memory—is not to be accounted for materially. It is selective. Mental organisation, individual or inherited, is not spatial. There are no precise relations between the pattern parts of the germ cell and the developed organism; nor between sections of the brain and bodily functioning. There are evidences, too, from psychical research which indicate that this vital or mental organisation can function apart from material structure.

In the latter portion of the book Professor McDougall criticises Emergent Evolution. He thinks that evolution is confined to the world of life; there is no evolution, and so no emergence in the physical world. The reason is that development implies memory, and there is none in the realm of matter. Mind did not emerge from matter. The elementary stages postulated by the emergent writers, sentience, primitive reference and the like, are abstractions. These philosophers are charged also with neglecting conation and pleasure and pain. In conclusion, Professor McDougall suggests that the processes of our bodies are teleological.

Defenders of thorough dualism will find some weapons in this book. For the writer is an advocate of purpose who will hear of no compromise. We are faced with a dichotomy. An organism must either determine its behaviour for itself by ends which are foreseen, or be determined mechanically. All instances of teleological causation are of the same kind as human purposive experience. The weight of biological authority certainly seems to be against Professor McDougall in this matter. The psycho-biological school which he cites gives ambiguous support. And elsewhere he deals only with psychologists of the extreme camp, or with philosophers, who touch very generally on the evidence.

The author makes an effective reply to sensationalism, when quoting Whitehead (not Kant) he points to the presence of universal relations in all perception and thought, however primitive. Yet the theory that the category of causation is derived from our experience

of voluntary action demands more proof than the brief statement in the text. If it is meant that intelligent purpose presupposes the causal principle, the point seems valid. But the contrary is doubtful. And, in any case, the application of the principle—for example, to many human processes—is not thereby in the least prejudiced.

The argument that the non-spatial organisation into which modern physics has resolved matter tends towards a teleological interpretation of things does not appear to be well founded. Mathematical complexity, which is presumably what organisation means, is not a whit less deterministic, nor more comforting than materialism. The reader is given some facts which are not "consistent with the view that the organisation of living things consists merely in special arrangements of matter" (p. 88). But he desires clearer and more detailed discussion of the *differentiæ* between physical "organisation" and biological "organisation."

The chapters on Emergent Evolution are equally tantalising at crucial points. For at these points the author assumes knowledge of controversies which have appeared elsewhere. The reader must search the notes for fairer dealing. These notes, fourteen in number, alone give the book value, in spite of their position. In them Professor McDougall defines his relation to much recent psychology and philosophy. They comprise criticisms of many celebrated writers, especially of Dr Lloyd Morgan and Dr Rignano.

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Christian Unity: Its History and Challenge. By the Rev. G. J. Slosser, B.A., Ph.D.—Pp. xx. + 425. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1929.—21s. net.

THE Introductions provided by the Archbishop of York and Dr A. E. Garvie to this work give testimony to its importance. The former writes of it as a survey in its own field with which no other study "can compare in thoroughness and completeness." Without doubt such a survey serves an invaluable purpose. Yet a careful reading is calculated to produce a sense of bewilderment. So meticulous are the records concerning everything in Christian history bearing on its subject, and especially when the period following the Protestant Reformation is reached, that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees. Not that there is much repetition. Some there is of necessity, where the record is of many movements that seek to arrive at the same goal. The bewilderment, however, comes from the sense of energies given increasingly to the exploration of avenues which may lead to somewhere, but never to the goal which is intended and desired.

Perhaps the correct description of this book would be an interim report on an endeavour which the essential qualities of Christianity ought to make speedily successful, but concerning the success of which there is no sign either of speedy or remote accomplishment. Apart from cirenical resolutions passed in an atmosphere of fellow-

ship and yet guarded by reservations, nothing of a practical character has been accomplished for unity on a universal scale. Mutual understandings have been reached and acknowledgments made of the will to be courteous; some methods of co-operation on mission-fields have been hammered out—these generally because of the compulsion of local circumstances; some unions in national areas or in dominions have been consummated; while others wait for the prompting spirit before fusion is achieved. Yet Christian Unity remains a dream and a hope. At the Lausanne Conference of 1927 the desire to initiate “a cautious and thoroughly wise move towards the spirit of Cope and Stockholm with practically the same credal and polity basis as that suggested in the famous Lambeth Quadrilateral” was met with violent opposition by some prominent Anglican and other “Catholics.” The opposition was small. Yet this represented the real issue. If the proposal had been carried through in its original form this would not have carried the assent of evangelical Churches generally.

Mr Slosser appears to cherish the faith that if this modern method of fellowship in Conferences and the more intimate manifestations of the Conference spirit in various federations “could be combined and extended throughout the earth,” then “the Church of Christ will be multiplied many times in its power and usefulness as a means for the extension of the Kingdom of God.” Without doubt this is true, yet it does not solve the problem which the title of his book sets forth. Within Christendom to-day there are “two nations,” and the one has no will to fraternise with the other. The sacerdotalists who hold that episcopacy is of the *esse* of the Church, and who cling to tradition as the repository of revealed truth, cannot, even if they would, give way for a moment to those who regard the Church as an instrument for proclaiming the Evangel and gathering the nations for God and who have small concern for matters of organisation. For the latter episcopacy may be acknowledged to be of the *bene esse* of the Church; this, however, is but matter of policy. They have had experience of the working of God’s spirit apart from episcopacy. If it came to deliberate choice they would deny episcopacy rather than deny what experience has made real. There is sense of this here: “From the standpoint of faith and order, the great Lausanne Conference revealed a most surprising and encouraging amount of agreement. But there was also revealed both then and since, the fact that as between Evangelicals and the extreme Sacerdotalists there is a wide gulf fixed, which not even the most astute, viewing it from the human angle, see a means of bridging. From the standpoint of unity, based on creed and polity, there has been, and will continue to be, much progress among the Evangelicals and among the extreme Sacerdotalists, but the gulf between the two groups never presented a more sharply divisive aspect than at present.” Mr Slosser is alive to the fact that any movement which leaves the Roman Catholic Church outside its sweep can never reach Christian Union, whatever else it may accomplish. And for the present Roman Catholicism

holds itself severely aloof, it is dogmatic, intransigent. Its only policy of reunion is unconditional surrender.

Any attempt to review the contents of this volume in detail would result in a mere catalogue. All efforts "for either the maintenance or attainment of the visible unity of Christendom" are considered. The Council of Jerusalem commences the record. Then the seven Œcumenical Councils from Nicæa, A.D. 325, to that held in the same place A.D. 787, are considered. From then on to the eighteenth century the story of the division between East and West, that of the Protestant Reformation, and various political efforts to achieve unity between Church and State in Europe, occupy the forefront of discussion. With the eighteenth century modern missionary enterprise and its urge to unity, together with its repercussions in demands for unity at the home bases, are more prominent. The story of efforts to reach understanding between the Roman, Anglican, and Eastern Churches is told, and, more fully, that of the new impetus given to home re-union by the Lambeth Conference of 1920, and the impasse to which conversations between the Churches has led. Record also is made of schemes of co-operation and of actual union which have been successfully initiated in various parts of the world.

It is a bewildering, often depressing, though sometimes inspiring record. The early Councils where the purpose was to maintain unity bear witness to a spirit widely separated from that of New Testament Christianity—even when the misunderstandings and jealousies of partisans of various leaders in the Apostolic age are kept in view. Wonder grows, as the reports of the early Councils are read, as to what all this bickering on points of doctrine, in which the disputes were often evoked and decisions arrived at for political rather than religious reasons, had to do with the spiritual life and witness of the common people. A like wonder persists to the end of the story, so far as the present times record any end. It is around points of doctrine that the fight for the maintenance of division still wages. There may not be so much of dust and heat. Yet still it must strike the observer that the desire for victory in controversy is at least equal to love of truth. Ecclesiasticism is put up as a barrier against the rising tide of religion. The blame for this is not always easy to apportion.

Christian unity can only be achieved by means of a revival of the Christian spirit. It will be a development from within, not something organised and manipulated by the means of ecclesiastical machinery. Mr Slosser writes optimistically: "We beheld, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most highly and deeply divided Christendom of any period since the Apostolic days. Then we noted the rise of modern union movements. Each year they have increased in numbers and importance. In the Apostolic Church, we had the thesis; in the Reformation Church, we had the antithesis. Now we are seemingly on the threshold of the synthesis of Christendom." This is too clear-cut to be incontestably true. What is true is that Christianity must achieve unity for the complete fulfilment of

its mission. As for synthesis, valuable as this detailed record of gestures towards union is, Mr Slosser would confer further benefit on those whose desires march with his optimism if the implications of these records were gathered and brought into a synthesis. His present task has some reward in having gained for him the London University Doctorate of Philosophy.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

LONDON.

Christianity as Truth. By Edward Grubb, M.A.—London: The Swarthmore Press, 1928.—Pp. 224.—7s. 6d. net.

HAVING dealt in a previous volume with *Christianity as Life*, Mr Grubb realised that there was "wrapped up in it a new outlook on the universe," and the question remained to be asked, whether that new outlook would bear examination in the light of history and of known facts. Hence this further study of *Christianity as Truth*, which is marked as a second volume of his work on *The Nature of Christianity*. In vindication of the truth of essential Christianity, of its "experience of God and the life of love," questions of the world-problem of pain and sin, of evolution and redemption, of prayer and providence are dealt with, and the argument includes consideration of the "Divinehumanity of Christ" and the right conception of "the Spirit," and the doctrine of the Trinity. It is a study of deep interest by one who is well versed in New Testament lore, in the literature of Christian experience, and, in an eminent degree, in the actual experience of religious life in the spiritual fellowship of the Society of Friends.

The vital question throughout is concerning truth, of the actual significance of the spiritual experience of God, in past generations and in the present, and especially of the Self-revelation of God in Christ. What is the true interpretation of the experience on which that conception rests? It is there that critical judgment may challenge some of Mr Grubb's conclusions. His position is clearly stated. The "Word of God," the substance of revelation, is not in the Bible, it is Christ Himself. We look for revelation in persons and their religious experience, and "the highest revelation will be found in the Person whose religious experience is most intense, profound and wide-reaching. In Jesus Christ we see perfect devotion to the will of God associated with the most serene and absolute confidence in His Fatherly care and purpose. . . . In him the Divine and the human meet. If from one side he is man in perfect relation to God, from the other he is God expressing Himself, as completely as this is possible, in man" (p. 87).

That is where question comes in. Mr Grubb is surely right when he says that Christianity is "not a creed, but a life; not an institution, but an inspiration." It is life in which men are aware of the presence of God in the deep places of their own being, the Eternal Spirit bearing witness with their spirit, enfolding, sustaining, quickening, the Light of life, the Love eternal. That is the life which Christianity essentially

is. How is it to be understood? Apologists for the doctrine of God to be thought of "in terms of Christ," of whom Mr Grubb is one, speak of the self-limitation of God in creation and in the human life of Jesus. Christ, it is affirmed, is "God under human limitations." But is there actual meaning in such words? Are they not rather a veil to cover ignorance, or an attempt to solve a metaphysical puzzle, which has no relation to reality in the realm of spiritual experience? It would seem nearer the truth to say that the being of God is enriched, not limited, by the fulness of creation and by the communion of all living souls in Him. How can the Infinite in any sense become finite? Mr Grubb confesses to an "ineradicable tendency, the unavoidable necessity, that man should picture God in his own image—rising from the demand of man's religious life for a God that he can approach, and who can and will approach him, as man has intercourse with man." Thus, in his view, we have in the Divine humanity of Christ "the revelation of God in terms that we can understand," which gives "legitimate and final satisfaction." And thus the exaltation of Jesus, as the risen and glorified Christ, to the throne of heaven is justified, and the whole process of theological development, culminating in the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.

But is this supposed necessity that man should "picture God" the right way of spiritual apprehension? It is difficult to reconcile with the Johannine way: "No man hath beheld God at any time: if we love one another, God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us." That is the way of inward conviction and enlightenment, realising the glory of life, which can be only in God, the Eternal, all-pervading Spirit, kindling in the heart and so in human faces, and supremely in the face of Jesus. So the glory of God shines out for us, and with Jesus we enter into our inheritance of life. The deifying tendency is in marked contrast to the inward realising of the Divine enfolding presence of the Spirit and the sense of entire dependence and the hidden communion of sonship, to which in our measure we are brought, in companionship with Jesus. Mr Grubb twice in the course of his argument speaks of "bare Theism," among the Jewish contemporaries of Jesus, and in our own day, in contrast with the Christianity "which with its Logos and Spirit does profess to give us a God immanent in the world and in humanity." But is it *bare* Theism that finds expression in the 23rd and 139th Psalm, and, must we not ask also, in the religion of Jesus himself? The same questions were raised by the Dean of St Paul's article on "Harnack and Liberal Protestantism" in the July number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL. There we were reminded that "the Christ with whom the Christian believes that he has communion is not precisely Jesus of Nazareth, but the spiritual Christ . . . who was incarnated in Jesus," and some doubt was expressed as to how far we are justified in "identifying our highest and deepest thoughts with the influence of the Spirit of Jesus." That is the point at which the test must be applied, in this whole matter of Christianity as Truth. The immanent Spirit of the Eternal, in our own deeper life, is it "the indwelling life of the Risen Christ,"

or is it God, the Father of Jesus and of all His brethren of mankind ? And in the revealing of Divine truth in Christianity, is it in the ultimate fact of spiritual apprehension and conviction Jesus who reveals God to us, or God who reveals Jesus, and the glory of life to which with him we are called ?

V. D. DAVIS.

BOURNEMOUTH.

Judaism in the New Testament Period. By R. Travers Herford, B.A.—The Lindsey Press, London, W.C. 2, 1928.—Pp. viii + 256.—4s. 6d. net.

THE title of this little book well describes its object and purpose, which is to make plain, so far as the author understands it, what was the condition of Judaism—its beliefs and practice—in the period dealt with by the New Testament. With this subject the author is particularly well qualified to deal, having already written such works as *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, *The Legacy of Israel*, and others, treating, under various aspects, of the Pharisees and their teaching. It is obvious that in the New Testament Judaism is regarded entirely from the Christian point of view, and this is all that is known by most Christian readers ; here we have a book which presents the subject from the point of view of Judaism itself, and this is specially interesting to non-Jewish readers because, as the author says in his preface, it brings “ to the notice of many readers a view of the subject which is not the usual one, but which may be deserving of serious consideration.”

Within the compass of a short notice it is impossible to do more than direct the reader's attention to some salient points which may assist him to form an opinion, and, better still, induce him to go to the book itself for further enlightenment.

If we are to gain a clear idea of what Judaism was in the period of the New Testament we must know something of the manner in which it had become what it was then, and accordingly the author deals first with Judaism before that period ; he describes the work of Ezra and his successors, which had found its impetus in the publication of the completed Pentateuch, in the emphasising of individualism—a process which had been practically inaugurated by Ezekiel—and in the raising of the “ Torah ” to be the unerring, because revealed, guide to life and conduct. “ Torah ” is explained as never meaning Law, the word by which it is persistently, and wrongly, translated into English, and, says our author, “ the example of Paul, who did most to perpetuate the mischievous error, does not justify either himself or those who have imitated him.”

What Mr Herford is at pains to emphasise is this : That the Pentateuch in its entirety is the “ Torah,” which means Teaching, *i.e.* Religion generally, all that God's revelation was intended to convey in precept and in narrative. This led to two differing views as to the way in which the Torah was to be received, one party holding that it was to be explained from time to time as necessity arose by

the verdict of living exponents, the other holding that it was to be taken exactly as it stood : under the one aspect Judaism could develop as a living religion, under the other it would wither and die ; these two opposing views found their exponents in those who became respectively known as the Pharisees and the Sadducees. A full account of these and of the other sects into which Judaism was divided in New Testament times, such as the Essenes and the Zealots, is given in succeeding chapters.

We can only note a curious point in regard to the Pharisees : in their interpretation of the Torah they followed two main lines, according as it was applied to the preceptive or to the non-preceptive parts of the written text ; the first was called *Halachah*, the Way, from *halach*, to walk ; the other was *Haggadah*, and included all that in other religions would be called doctrinal and moral theology.

Coming to the relationship between our Lord and the Pharisees we find that his opposition to them was confined entirely to the *Halachah*, called in the New Testament "the tradition of the elders" ; intended originally to be the means of keeping religion alive, it had produced only deadness and tended to make hypocrites ; against the *Haggadah*, the explanations, often parabolic, of the narratives (cf. Gal. iv. 21-28) Jesus had no quarrel ; here is to be found the "common ground" which has made some scholars say that Jesus borrowed from the Pharisees, others that the Pharisees borrowed from him, whereas there was no borrowing in either case ; Jesus was one of the *Am-ha-aretz*, one of the common people, and he uttered from his own experience and in his own way much that he had heard over and over again in the synagogues.

In Galilee Jesus came up against the Pharisees ; in Jerusalem his opponents were chiefly Sadducees ; these had charge of the Temple and its services, because the Chief Priests, *i.e.* the High Priest at the time and those who had been such, and the priests for the most part belonged to that sect. Their opposition was more political than religious, and it was they who procured the destruction of Jesus as a traitor to Cæsar. This is, of course, common knowledge, but it is all placed in a new setting when viewed from the angle of Judaism.


The origin and development of the Synagogue and its entire independence of the Temple are well described ; the Temple disappeared with the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, but the synagogue survived and has been, and is, a continuing power in Judaism.

The two most interesting chapters are the final ones on the impact of Christianity on Judaism and the separation of Christianity from Judaism ; to these we would specially direct the reader's attention, but our space forbids more.

H. J. D. ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL



THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL.

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Philosophy of Religion.

THE title of this article is perhaps old-fashioned, since every dabbler in psychology has now learned to pour scorn on the conception of the soul, and even though he may have the vaguest notion of what the term has meant, he is quite sure that the modern world has left it behind. We will not quarrel about words, and I will say quite simply, that I understand the title to mean the probable future, if any, of the personal experience which we now enjoy, its survival of physical death, and the doctrine that it is indestructible. It will at least be admitted that there is such a thing as personal consciousness, and there is a question whether this personal consciousness is capable of persisting after the dissolution of the bodily organism ; and if so, there is the further question in what conditions it may be supposed to exist.

The questions which I have briefly indicated have been keenly debated since the war, though indeed they are never far from men's thoughts, and it is sufficiently obvious that all our thinking and acting will be profoundly affected by the answers which we give to them.

The debate has proceeded with surprising animation and with a somewhat depressing lack of conclusiveness. We seem to be unable even to get the problems clearly defined, and too often the disputants appear to be like men fighting with shadows or talking at cross purposes. The reason for this is surely not hard to discover. They proceed from different presuppositions. They assume, tacitly or explicitly, divergent conceptions of the nature of reality and the general structure of the universe, and if they fail to reach a common goal it is because they had no common starting-point.

This matter of the presuppositions with which we approach the hope of immortality is profoundly important. I will express my own conviction that on certain assumptions, those of materialism or naturalism for example, there is very little evidence and no line of abstract reasoning which could be considered as of any great value on this subject. If a man is persuaded that reality is material, or that the real world is a machine and nothing more, he has cut off the root of any philosophical argument for the survival of the soul, and has committed himself in advance to the view that any alleged proof from observed facts is capable of another explanation. This remark is of course self-evident when we are concerned with general reasoning from the nature of things. It might seem perhaps that the position is somewhat different when we are concerned with so-called empirical evidence. It might be thought that philosophers who pride themselves on keeping close to scientific method would be prepared to estimate facts without bias from their philosophical opinions. But even here the influence of the presuppositions is overwhelming. The majority of such thinkers dismiss the vast mass of material, ancient and contemporary, which exists *primâ facie* in support of man's persistent belief that death is not the ultimate and necessary destiny of the personality, as if it were unworthy of their attention. One distinguished philosopher, indeed, of this school is an exception to this generalisation. Dr Broad, in his book, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, has been sufficiently impressed by the super-normal phenomena which have been collected by psychical research to admit that they must be taken into account by any theory of the mind which honestly looks at the available evidence. Nor does he find any way of denying that these phenomena suggest some kind of survival. But here the force of his presuppositions comes into play. It would be repugnant to a naturalist philosopher to suppose that a personal life in its full meaning could possess a permanence comparable with

that of the natural order. He conjectures, therefore, that some abstraction which he calls "the psychic factor" may continue after the disintegration of the complex of elements which constitute personal existence. We may safely say that here philosophical presuppositions have inhibited the hypothesis, that of personal survival, which is the most obvious explanation of the alleged facts.

It would not be true to say that a completely theistic view of the universe is the necessary presupposition for a reasonable belief in immortality. Numerous instances to the contrary in the history of thought would refute us. It is certainly possible to have a reasoned belief in the triumph of the soul over death without an explicit belief in God. But clearly one presupposition is necessary. The only view of the world on which survival or immortality is probable or even possible is one which holds the priority of mind over the material order, or at least its relative independence of the material order as we know it. I think we should add one further requisite element—the belief in the significance of values. Only a type of thought which attaches ontological importance to judgments of value is likely to have the basis for a serious argument in favour of the immortal hope. For any profound reason for a future or supernatural life must bring in the thought that the values which we find imperfectly manifested in this present order have some inherent right to persist, and that the conception of their evanescence is intolerable. Perhaps the point would be put more definitely if we said that the problem of the soul's destiny only becomes real and urgent for a philosophy which regards the universe as rational in the sense of having some reason for existing, and not simply in the sense that its parts or elements stand in some intelligible relation to one another. That distinguished thinker who has recently been taken from us, Dr McTaggart, maintained as a truth which could be established by metaphysical reasoning the immortality, or rather the eternity, of the self. But he was certainly no Theist, and his book, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, is one of the most drastic criticisms of belief in God which have appeared in recent times. He did not refuse the name of Atheist. Yet the curious form of idealism which he professed, with its conception of a social and yet timeless absolute, preserved just those elements of Theism which, as I have suggested, are the required presuppositions for any rational faith in immortality. The reality of spirit and the significance of value are central doctrines of his system.

It is, then, essential that any discussion of the destiny of the soul should set out with some definitely recognised postulates. We must begin somewhere and take something for granted. I propose to take a good deal for granted, and to ask what view may a modern Christian reasonably take on the question of immortality and the future life? Assuming that the general truth of Christianity, in its modern presentation, is accepted by us, on what seems to us to be adequate grounds, we may ask, what doctrine of the last things as they affect the individual is implied in our belief?

The older Christianity was, both in its Catholic and its Protestant forms, dominated by the dogma of an infallible book. To theologians of previous generations the Bible was, in every part, the revealed word of God, and its utterances the final authority on the destiny of the soul, as on every other matter. The inconveniences of a literal inspiration were sometimes mitigated by the expedient of allegorical interpretation, but among orthodox theologians there was no question that the final decision rested with the words of Scripture. Perhaps our subject was the topic of theology in which the progressive character of revelation was most obvious even in the period of literalism, for it is plain that the Old Testament is less explicit than the New on the future life, and it can scarcely be overlooked that in large parts of Old Testament religion the immortal hope for the individual has no place. Jesus Christ brings life and immortality to light.

I take it that the profoundest difference between the modern Christian and his predecessors lies in the conception of revelation. We have been led to take another view of the nature of revelation, and though the modern idea is not so clear-cut as the ancient, probably all would agree that revelation does not consist in the guaranteeing of certain propositions by divine authority, which authority is testified by miracle, but rather in the experience of God which has come to individuals and groups of men, the record of which we find in Scripture. But there is a plain consequence of this new conception which is relevant to our present subject. We shall have to admit that the forms of thought and the imagery which have been used to express the experience do not share necessarily the authority which we ascribe to the experience itself. They are derived from the environment and from the personal circumstances of the writers. No longer can we take all the imagery, even of the New Testament, as authoritative for our conception of the future life. In fact, that imagery is not itself consistent. In a memorable

essay, Baron von Hügel drew attention to the presence of two strains of thought on the life beyond within the New Testament, and observed truly that these two strains have persisted in the Christian church side by side, never completely mingling. There is, in fact, no coherent teaching on the future life in Christian tradition. These two strains are, of course, on the one hand, the eschatological, with its pictures of the judgment and the Kingdom of God to which the faithful dead shall rise, all projected into the future; and, on the other hand, the circle of ideas which centre upon the thought of eternal life, the unseen world which is more real than this present world into which the departed enter, the faithful without interval to be with Christ. The conception of judgment to come has never been fused completely with those other ideas of eternal life and the visions of heaven, purgatory and hell as presently-subsisting realities. Perhaps we shall agree that an attempt to clear up the essential message of the Gospel on the destiny of the soul is not an unnecessary essay in defining what is already clear.

The Christian Theist approaches this problem with two presuppositions which should determine his doctrine about the individual soul. In the first place, he finds God in Christ. His Theism is not an abstract philosophical theory, but one which is nourished and corrected by a supreme fact of experience. The nature of the "Determiner of Destiny" is manifested in the life and person of Jesus Christ; and therefore, for the Christian Theist, God is more than the Ground of the Universe, more even than creative will. He is Holy Love, and He manifests His holiness and His love in redemption. The second postulate is again a truth which rests in the last resort, not on reasoning, but on experience—the resurrection of Christ. I do not think that any particular view of the nature of the resurrection is of the essence of the Christian faith, nor that we are committed to any opinion on the trustworthiness of the narratives of the resurrection appearances; but the Christian Theist does hold that Christ did not suffer defeat on Calvary, and that He is alive for evermore. Who can deny that these are large affirmations? We are not concerned now with the grounds on which they may be held. They seem to me, however, to be the central affirmations of the Christian faith. I am concerned here with the Christian doctrine of the destiny of the soul, and I must take leave to assume that we are agreed on these postulates, and that anyone who denies them is not in the full sense Christian. The point which I wish to make is that these postulates are the

determining factors of our doctrine; they are the guiding thoughts, therefore, which we must keep steadily in view when we consider the Christian doctrine of the soul's destiny.

Is the immortality of the soul a Christian doctrine? In some sense undoubtedly the Gospel is a message of immortal hope; but we need to be clear about the very different conceptions which are included under this word. By immortality is often meant that the human soul or person is inherently and in its own right immortal. Such was the opinion of Plato, and the arguments which he employs are for the most part based upon the rational nature of man, and have no direct reference to the Theism which, at least for part of his life, was his doctrine. The Platonic doctrine of the inherent immortality of the soul has been adopted by Christian theology, but there is no necessary connection between the two. The Dean of St Paul's has often reminded us that Platonism is Christianity's loving nurse. Without questioning the services of the Platonists, I confess that I think, in this as in other respects, the time has come when the nurse might be dismissed. For in fact there is little in common between the Platonic metaphysic and the loving creative God of Hebrew and Christian faith. It is certainly true that the New Testament knows nothing either of the eternity or of the indestructibility of the soul. The passages which are sometimes quoted as hinting at the pre-existence of selves are really not relevant, and the *primâ facie* meaning of the salient utterances on the subject is that the soul may be destroyed and that eternal life is the gracious gift of God.

But I am not concerned with the exegesis of passages. I wish to ask what view is most in harmony with the postulates of Christian Theism. There can, I think, be no question that the doctrine of derived immortality is the one which we must choose. The view that individual selves are inherently indestructible is indeed scarcely compatible with Theism, for it would lead to a view of the place of the self in reality which would compromise the supremacy of God. The Christian Theist is committed to the belief that all things take their origin from and depend upon the creative will of God. The doctrine of the inherent indestructibility of the soul would seem, therefore, to be more in accordance with a pluralistic philosophy, such as that of Dr McTaggart, than with Christian Theism. We may perhaps add one confirmatory argument drawn from the progress of our knowledge of the human mind. The argument for the natural immortality of the soul which has had the greatest influence is that from

the soul's alleged simplicity. The soul, urged Plato, is not composite, therefore it cannot be disintegrated; and his reasoning has been repeated by Christian theologians, including our own Bishop Butler. But the simplicity which was so obvious to them is not obvious to us. On the contrary, we can see that the self is a highly complex system of elements which is capable even in experience of division. The unity of the self is an ideal which must be striven for, and we can find no difficulty in believing that its completed unification and its preservation as a unity are gifts rather than inherent properties.

The alternative view to the inherent immortality of the soul is some kind of conditional or conferred immortality. This view would appear to be most in harmony with the fundamental assumption of Theism, and as we shall see later, will probably best conform to what we may conceive to be the moral government of the universe. But the contrast usually drawn is that between immortality and the resurrection of the body. The latter doctrine, it has been frequently pointed out, is the characteristic feature of Christian teaching in the New Testament. The idea of resurrection is, of course, connected with the eschatological strain of thought which has contributed, as we have seen, part of the imagery of the New Testament concerning the future life. The Jewish apocalyptic writers not infrequently describe a future judgment at which the dead will be present, having been raised from the grave for that purpose. Doubtless this circle of images was present to the mind of the New Testament writers, and to some at least of them it was the natural way of conceiving the future life. It is equally evident that such imagery is totally foreign to our modern thinking. Does it follow, however, that the central idea in the resurrection of the body must be rejected? I suggest that, on the contrary, when the clothing which has come from a vanished age is stripped away, the essential thought remains the most reasonable conception of the future life. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain that the personal life and experience is something transacted, as it were, in association with the bodily frame, but having no necessary connection with it. The old problem of the relation of mind and body has not indeed been solved, but it becomes clear that the sharp antithesis between them is not tenable. This does not mean that we are being insensibly carried towards materialism. Perhaps the tendency is really in the other direction. It does mean, however, that we are discovering

that the distinction between mind and body is one which is made within the unity of the personal life and experience, which therefore includes what we mean by body as well as what we mean by mind. In any case, even if we adopt the common-sense idea that body and mind or soul are two distinct entities, the interaction between them is so constant and so intimate that it is very difficult to conceive of continued personal identity which was shorn entirely of the bodily sensations and reactions which have made up so great a part of our experience. We must remember, too, that the general vague sensation of our bodies is found by psychologists to enter very deeply into our feeling of individuality. These considerations must all be added to the general reflection which has always been valid, *i.e.* that it is not easy to see how any distinctness of selves can be supposed to continue unless they are clothed with some body. The body is both our instrument and our boundary. My distinctness from you and from all other finite minds depends to a large extent on the fact that we have, or inhabit, different bodies. I do not say that it is inconceivable there should be some principle of individuation which is not a kind of body, but I think we have no means within our experience of forming any conjecture of what that principle could be.

On these grounds, therefore, we are led to affirm the essential truth of the resurrection of the body. The fact that the doctrine has been presented in crude and even ridiculous forms need not deter us from affirming it in a rational form. And St Paul has given us a hint of a doctrine which can be presented without fear of the accusation of materialism. "It is raised a spiritual body," says the Apostle. In former times this notion might well have seemed mystical and remote. In the days when the body was supposed to consist of minute material particles, the idea of the collection of these particles at the resurrection caused discomposure in the minds of even the most determined theologians. But the physicists themselves have, if the phrase may be allowed, dissolved the materiality of matter. A body is, in the last resort, I suppose now regarded as a complex system of energy. We have moved some way towards a position in which there can be no theoretical objection to the hypothesis that the activity of the soul builds up a body which shall be hereafter the vehicle of its life, a body which differs indeed from the present body, but is nevertheless continuous without it. We may confidently expect to have more light on this subject. Few intelligent persons now dismiss altogether the

facts of spiritual and mental healing. We may expect a great advance in the practice of spiritual healing, and also a deeper understanding of the principles involved. This cannot fail to modify our views of the nature of the body and its susceptibility to spiritual influences, and I see no reason why the creation of the spiritual body should not ultimately become intelligible to us.

We shall perhaps agree that any detailed description of the future life is beyond the powers of men and beyond the purposes of revelation. But there are some quite definite affirmations and denials which follow directly from our postulates as Christian Theists. We may ask whether we can represent the future life as a sphere of rewards and punishments. Undoubtedly popular religion has seized upon this aspect of the Christian doctrine to the exclusion of most of the rest, and the preaching of heaven and hell has often been little better than a frank appeal to the simplest kind of self-interest. In contrast to this style of eschatology the disinterested pursuit of virtue as preached by Spinoza has seemed an infinitely higher doctrine. But the idea of reward is not necessarily immoral and unspiritual, nor need the God who rewards the righteous be regarded as a celestial school-master who hands out prizes at the end of the school year. The real ground for an objection to the idea of reward is that the prize is thought of as something of a different character from the achievement which earns it. If we are told to serve God for the sake of sensual happiness, the doctrine is plainly immoral, for it implies that sensual happiness is more valuable than virtue. Doubtless many who have represented the service of God as a good investment have really meant something like this. But not necessarily. The reward need not be in a different category from the activity which it crowns. The good man really loves goodness for its own sake, and his reward is the "wages of going on and not to die," the opportunity of proceeding further in the unending development of the possibilities of the soul. Let us not be frightened by the crudities of commercialised theology. The service of God really is a good investment, the only secure one. That is a truth which follows from our belief in God. Whether we interpret the truth in a spiritual or unspiritual way depends on the kind of dividends we expect to draw.

The question of reward carries with it the question of punishment. The doctrine of hell has, I am told, almost disappeared from our pulpits, and though there are many who regret the disappearance of fear from among the

motives to respectability, they have no suggestions to make as to how it can be revived. This change in popular religion has been accompanied by a change in theology. Many Christian thinkers agree with Aristotle that justice cannot be an attribute of God. Justice, and particularly retributive justice, we are told, is a purely human conception, and has no application outside the conditions of human society. I must take leave to say that I entirely disagree with this view. If we reflect upon it, we can easily see that it could be applied with equal logic to every other aspect of goodness, so that in the end we should be led to abandon our postulate of the holiness of God altogether. Love is known to us only in human relations and as subsisting between separate and finite persons. By the same reasoning, therefore, we must deny that God is really love. We must, I am persuaded, hold fast to the old *via eminentiae* if we are to avoid turning our thought of God into a bare abstraction. Justice, we must admit, as it exists in God, cannot be precisely the same as it is in men. But it is an aspect of the Divine Holiness, higher and more perfect than we can conceive, but not radically different. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" The expostulation of the hero of the old dispensation becomes the affirmation of the Christian believer. The Judge of all the earth shall do right, and the highest human justice is our surest guide to His dealing with men.

What consequences may we draw from this? One deduction we cannot draw. The idea that eternal punishment of the wicked is somehow implied in the belief in the divine justice seems to me one of the strangest aberrations of the human mind, and the idea of Calvin that hell shows forth the glory of God by showing His justice, no less than Heaven by showing His mercy, one of the most horrible. Nor does it seem to me that those who have repudiated this belief on the ground that the love of God overrides this justice have found the right reply. In the last resort we cannot admit that justice and love in God can be in conflict. Though in finite beings these two qualities may sometimes seem to lead to divergent actions, we cannot hold that the holiness of God is thus divided. Love and justice are two aspects of the divine holiness. The idea of justice cannot warrant the belief that God should hold in unending existence finite spirits simply for the sake of inflicting pain upon them, which pain is by hypothesis quite destitute of any purifying effect, or possibility of effect. Pain may indeed be present in the future life, but if our presuppositions are true, it must be

pain which can be transmuted into the means of spiritual progress.

Are we then led by our fundamental assumptions as Christian Theists to the conclusion of universalism? Must all souls in the end be saved? Many of us no doubt would rather err with Origen than be right with Augustine. But I do not think that either extreme is forced upon us by the thought of God on which we rest, indeed neither view seems to me to be really in harmony with it. The Creator, when He brought into existence spirits with the power of self-determination, brought into being a sphere in which real risk and possibilities of disaster were present. It would surely be a puerile conception of God which would regard Him as allowing the game of freedom to go on for a time and then, like a parent who has had enough of the confusion, bringing it to a stop, giving everyone a present. Life is no game, and freedom involves real decisions. We must therefore hold to the Apostolic doctrine that the wages of sin is death. But we shall be giving only a mythological version of the truth if we think of God as dealing out destruction from above upon incorrigible sinners. Just as the reward of goodness is the opportunity for further development along the same line, so the retribution of evil is the opportunity of further evil. "God gave them up to a reprobate mind," says the Apostle. He left them to themselves. Here, then, are the two ways: on the one hand, the response to the call of that ideal which is indeed beyond our petty selves, but the utterance at the same time of the deepest reality of the self: on the other, the assertion of the self and its immediate claims. Since the first is in harmony with the moral structure of the universe, it opens before the soul unending vistas of life, and since the other is in ultimate conflict with the nature of reality, it leads through self assertion to the destruction of the self.

This very imperfect survey of some problems of Christian eschatology has been confined to what we may call the proximate destiny of the soul. Even here we are compelled to speak largely in figures, interpreting our belief in terms of our present experience, but there is another question which arises behind these more immediate ones, the answer to which is still further beyond our powers of expression or imagination. May we conceive of some ultimate goal or destiny of the human spirit beyond these conditions of progress or decline? May we complete our doctrine of the last things by a vision of the soul at rest, no longer *in via* either here or elsewhere, but *in patria*? That some ultimate end

must be conceived seems a necessity of thought. Just as in social life our idea of progress implies that we have some notion of a goal of progress, though what that perfect society would be, we cannot tell in detail; so here the doctrine of indefinite progress for the soul implies that we have some doctrine of that state towards which, as its end and perfection, the finite spirit moves, though the details of that state must be beyond our knowledge or conjecture. "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." But in principle we know the answer to this question. The end of the soul is God. We cannot perhaps go beyond this simple affirmation. Some Christian thinkers in modern times have approved the idea that souls are absorbed into the divine life, and that the creation and final beatification of spirits proceeds without end, like the ebb and flow of an unresting tide. To me this conception appears more gnostic than Christian. The finite spirit is not, I would believe, created that it may lose its individuality once more in the abyss of Godhead. Even in the condition of perfection the individuality of the finite spirit remains, and there is nothing higher than the realised Kingdom of God. That communion with God which was here intermittent and obscure, is then continuous and unclouded. The activity of the finite spirit is no longer that of struggle and hard-won progress, but joyous contemplation and intercourse—the peace which is not immobility, but unimpeded activity. This is the thought which, in their various images, the saints and poets of Christianity have meant by the joys of heaven.

I am conscious that I have tried to cover a great deal of ground in a short space, and the effect, I fear, has been that of hurried dogmatism. I hope that the survey may have suggested some coherent doctrine, for I am sure that we who call ourselves modern Christians are in need of coherence and definiteness. Many are being attracted by the confident dogmatism of Rome, and still more by Agnosticism, because they can find no body of teaching which is grounded on reason and generally accepted. It is the thesis of this paper that there is no need for this. We have a doctrine of the destiny of the soul which is based not on the interpretation of doubtful texts of dubious authority, but on the fundamental conception of God on which we are agreed.

And I would urge it is important that this element of the Gospel should not fall into the background of our teaching. The Christian religion is incurably other-worldly. The Kingdom of God is not an earthly utopia. And the modern world

is becoming a little tired of the utopias which are presented to it, so conflicting and so remote. It is perhaps prepared for the message that the destiny of the soul lies in the unseen. But there is also urgency for the message. We are living in the midst of a moral crisis. The new morality and the old are fighting for possession of the next generation. The debate proceeds all around us. Do not Christians make the mistake too often of arguing on their opponents' premises? Long ago a wise man engaged in the discussion of the meaning of righteousness. When the man in the street, the smart journalist, and the clever debater, had had their say, he raised a previous question. What is man? Perhaps if we can answer that question we shall be able to discover what is the good for man. Was not Socrates right? In the last resort everything turns on the answer to that question. If man is just a clever animal, whose destiny is limited by the span of the present life, if his nature contains no element which has reference to the beyond and the unseen, then let us revise all the rules with the sole purpose of rendering his career, so brief and purposeless, as tolerable as possible. Let us above all expunge from our ideas of goodness and value all those relics of a former time when men believed that they were something more than clever animals. But if, on the other hand, man is a being whose nature is not wholly explicable in terms of biology and empirical psychology; if he has his origin in the transcendent order and can pursue ideal ends which point beyond the present world for their complete fulfilment; if he has the potentiality of an eternal destiny, let us proclaim that truth. For in the light of it our values are transformed and our estimate of good becomes quite different. We as Christians have chosen our side in this controversy. We follow One who claimed not that He would make the world more tolerable, but that He had overcome it.¹

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THE DIVISION OF THE SOUL.

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A PERIPATETIC writer ¹ attributes to Plato a division of the human soul into two parts : the rational and the irrational. Plato himself, in *Republic IV.*, gives a threefold division into the reflective, the passionate or spirited, and the appetitive parts. Both these divisions—the twofold and the threefold—may indeed be called Platonic, though neither, perhaps, is of Plato's own invention.² My purpose is to show how they were reached by different lines of approach, starting from different points of outlook upon human life, and leading to different ideals of perfection.

I will begin with the twofold division, probably the older of the two. If we ask how man came, in the first instance, to think of his soul as divided into parts, no one acquainted with the history of human thought will imagine that we have here a product of scientific observation. In the domain of psychology, reflection began long before the advent of methodical science. Reflection was first provoked by inward experience ; and experience does not make us reflect unless it is painful. Long before philosophers formulated the theory of a divided soul, more ordinary men had learnt by suffering to recognise a rending of man's inward state by a conflict of factions such as denies to him—and to him only—the single-minded tranquillity of the animal. In a word, the theory of the divided soul was preceded by the direct consciousness of the divided self.

Now when we speak of the divided self and the distress that attends it, we are thinking of an experience that falls within the moral field—the field of desires and emotions connected with conduct. So long as action presents no problem,

¹ *Magna Moralia*, I., i.

² See Hicks on *Ar. de anim.* 482 a 26, and Burnet on *Phædo* c.

we follow the ways that habit has made easy and go about our concerns troubled only by such anxieties as an animal may feel, though he is less far-seeing. But when we are distracted by the choice of two alternative actions, and are forced, because we cannot have the advantages of both, to sacrifice the attractions of the one to those of the other, then first arises that painful sense of indecision which compels us to acknowledge that our state is not single. In the typical case, the one course presents itself as pleasant, the other as right—sanctioned, that is to say, by the social instincts and by explicit moral and religious beliefs. The division of the self has its origin in the conflict of incompatible impulses and desires directed to different objects. And since there is a conflict, the alternatives appear as right and wrong, or good and evil. This moral division of the self is far older than philosophic speculation. It was first formulated in the sphere of religious doctrine and practice.

We shall not find it in the psychology of Homer. The contrast there is between the body with its vital powers, extinguished at death, and the powerless wraith—the *eidolon*-psyche—which leaves the dying body, but carries with it hardly the consciousness of its own shadowy existence. Whatever be the origin of this distinction, it does not arise from the sense of inward conflict; there is no antagonism between parts of the soul, or between soul and body. To find that, we must turn to the believers in transmigration, the Orphic and Pythagorean sects.

The sixth century B.C. saw the births of the Buddha and of Pythagoras, who gave to the Orphic religion its philosophic formulation. Whether there was any channel across Egypt or Asia Minor, through which a knowledge of Buddhism might have reached Pythagoras, is still disputed; but it is certain that both these religious philosophies taught transmigration. The belief, in more or less crude forms, exists among barbarous peoples; but its origin on the level of barbarism does not concern us. In Greece, at any rate, we have here an instance of a belief adopted from a lower stratum of culture by a certain section of a highly civilised people. In such a case the belief is cut loose from its original roots. Only that part of its primitive content is taken over, which responds to some unsatisfied need already felt by the people who adopt it; its previous history and associations are left behind. From such expressions of Orphic religion as we possess, it seems clear that the need which made the doctrine of transmigration welcome on Greek

soil was, precisely, the experience of the divided self—that inward conflict recorded in the Buddha's search for enlightenment, though in the legend of Pythagoras this feature has been lost.

The soul which migrates from one incarnation to another, unlike the Homeric *eidolon*, possesses powers of its own, superior to the bodily functions. It is called "divine" by origin and nature; and this means that it is of more enduring substance and of higher value than the body it inhabits for a time. It is a *daimon*, a spirit, endowed with supernormal powers of cognition in vision and ecstasy and with a moral nature intrinsically good. On the other hand, during its round of incarnations, it is called "impure," tainted with prenatal guilt, to be expiated by the sufferings of terrestrial life and of purgatory. Of the origin of this evil taint only a mythical account can be given, in the story of some primal sin. Considered as history, the account is unintelligible; the myth only projects into a distant past an existing state of conflict in which the evil antagonist of the divine Spirit figures as the lusts and passions of the flesh. Here, in the concept of a divine but impure Spirit, we have, not the old contrast of soul and body, but an opposition of higher and baser desires within the soul itself. The lower desires are rooted in the Flesh with its senses, its feelings of physical pleasure and pain, its hopes and fears, loves and hatreds. This cluster of functions we may call the animal soul, whose central aim is the preservation of the mortal life in a material world. So man conceives himself as a divine Spirit imprisoned in the Flesh—for we may adopt this religious name for the body with its animal soul.

This religious antithesis of the Spirit and the Flesh is perpetuated in the earlier of our two philosophic divisions of the soul—the twofold. We observe that the believers in transmigration are so deeply penetrated by the consciousness of this division that they carry the idea of separation to the furthest point. The Spirit and the Flesh may be called *parts* of our nature in the fullest sense. They are actually separated at death, when the Spirit passes into another form, while the animal soul is extinguished; and even during life they remain not only distinct but antagonistic. The Flesh is no more than an "alien garment,"¹ a "prison" or a "tomb."

When man thus divides his nature into a divine and an animal part, disowning the lower part as alien and hostile, it means that he identifies himself with the higher and con-

¹ Emped. 126.

siders this to be his "true self." That man's "true self" resides in the divine and immortal part is asserted by both Plato and Aristotle¹; but the nature and functions of this part are now differently conceived. In place of the supernatural, prophetic and ecstatic faculties of the *daímon*,² we find in the Socratics that the characteristic function of the Spirit is rational reflection; it is now called *Nous*, or the reflective part (λογιστικόν), or that which can "give an account of itself" in some conscious principle (λόγον ἔχον). Plato, in fact, has identified the divine and immortal *daímon* of religious belief with the "true self" as conceived by Socrates. The central Socratic doctrine that goodness lies in knowledge had implied a belief in a soul—the very core of our being—whose eye, when cleared of the mists of false opinion, can infallibly discern what is really good, and having discerned it, must inevitably desire it. The "true self," accordingly, possesses two faculties—moral insight (*φρόνησις*) and the accompanying form of desire, which the Socratics call "wish" (*βούλησις*). The emphasis falls on the cognitive, rather than on the volitional, aspect, and this Socratic self is commonly named the reasoning part. Plato himself further endows this Spirit with a knowledge of the Ideas acquired before birth, and so brings within its compass the whole domain of necessary and eternal truth. This means the addition of contemplative wisdom to the Socratic faculty of moral insight, whose proper object was the good attainable by action rather than the contents of a world beyond time and change, which no action can ever affect. As a consequence, the cognitive function is still further emphasised at the expense of desire or will; for the objects of theoretic knowledge, though they include the Ideas of "Justice, Temperance, and other things of value to the soul,"³ are not goods of the sort that man can attain and possess, otherwise than in the act of knowing them. When the endowment of the immortal Spirit is thus altered and enlarged, the Flesh becomes more than ever alien and hostile; its desires, centred on this mortal life, can be only a hindrance to the pursuit of speculative wisdom.

The tendency of this philosophy, as of the religion behind it, is (in the common phrase) pessimistic. It is in love with

¹ *Laws*, 959 B. *Eth. Nic.* 1178 a 2; and 1168 b 34. Cf. *Porph. de abst.* 1. 29.

² Though traces of these survive, *Timæus*, 71; Aristotle, *frag.* 10 (R), etc.

³ *Phædrus* 250 B.

death, and has accepted that reversal of current values expressed in Euripides's lines¹:

" Who knows if to be living be not death,
And death accounted life, in the world beneath ? "

Disowning the instincts which drive the animal soul to prolong and to enrich the body's life, the divine Spirit desires to escape from this life and shake off the bondage of the Flesh. This conflict of interests seems irreconcilable. While life lasts, the unwelcome task of the Spirit is to overmaster and enthrall its unruly associate ; the key-word of morality is self-mastery—the control of the lower by the " true " self.² The best hope of the Spirit is to withdraw from all contagion of the impure Flesh, and this hope can be perfectly realised only by the severance of the Spirit from the body in death.

This ascetic strain of morality was dominant in Plato's mind when he composed the *Phædo*. Dwelling in imagination on the last scene (which he had not witnessed) of his master's life, Plato now saw, in the delivery of Socrates from the Athenian prison-house by a self-chosen death, not merely a martyrdom, but a symbolic event—the release of the Spirit of man, purified by the ascetic passion for truth, from the prison of the Flesh. The opening discourse of Socrates is wholly upon this theme. It is a hymn to Death, as the triumphant close of the philosophic life, in which the Spirit has learnt to regain its self-possession by withdrawal from the senses and desires of the body to its own inward solitude.

Such is the view of life and death that follows upon the dual division of our nature. The contrast between the two parts is pushed to the furthest point, and they appear to be confronted in a hostility that cannot be reconciled. During this life the Spirit may achieve a precarious conquest of the Flesh, but its last hope is set upon flight.

We may now turn from this dual division to the triple scheme of the *Republic*. The *Phædo* was a meditation upon the meaning of life and death and the reversal of their values for the individual soul that is capable of philosophy. The very word " philosophy " recalls that the impulse which wings the Spirit for its flight from the Flesh is the passion for wisdom or truth—the desire for a good attainable only in contemplation, not by any form of action. But in the *Republic* the scene is changed : we are now concerned with the conduct of life in this world and in the setting of social institutions. The moral and political philosopher, surveying

¹ *Gorgias* 492 E.

² *Gorgias* 491 D.

the whole texture of social life and, bent upon practical reform, must bring into account every important group of impulses that shape the characters and destinies of men of every type ; and his task will be to discover (if he can) how to adjust their claims so as to produce the highest sum of human welfare in this world, where few are naturally equipped for the philosophic life. The Republic of Plato is not the City of God, nor a community of perfect sages ; it is a reformed city-state of the Hellenic pattern, whose composition must contain the iron and bronze as well as the silver and the gold, and afford a proper place for every existing type of human character. Beside the Spirit and the Flesh, whose conflict is so keenly felt within the individual soul, we have now to reckon more explicitly with the claims of the World—if we may use that term, like the other two, in its religious sense.

When we take a broad view of the ancient philosopher's attitude to the World, we find that the change it undergoes is marked out in three periods. The first ends with the appearance of Pythagoras ; the second contains the two centuries covered by the active lives of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle ; the third includes all the rest. At the beginning—in the sixth century—there is no contrast between the philosopher and the man of the world. Indeed, the name "wise" was eminently applied to men of outstanding practical ability, above all in statesmanship. In the third period, on the contrary, the contrast is complete ; ideally, the perfect sage has withdrawn from all commerce with the World ; he rejects all its standards, and denies any merit to a virtue that falls short of his own. Between the two lies the transitional period, significantly opened by Pythagoras's renunciation of the title of "wise man" as then understood, and his claim to be a lover of wisdom of another sort than the wisdom of the World—not *σοφός*, but *φιλόσοφος*. Here, as in other transitional periods, we can discern a tension between the two ideals.

On the one hand, the withdrawal from life means more than the shrinking of the Spirit from the contagion of the Flesh ; it points also to a flight from the World. It was an essential character of the Orphic and Pythagorean movements that these sects formed secret cult-societies, whose limits transcended and ignored the boundaries of the political community. The voluntary act of initiation into a monastic brotherhood implied the acceptance of some special standards of conduct and the consequent repudiation, in some degree,

of the standards current in the civic communities outside. On the other hand, although the seeker after wisdom might judge the interests and ambitions of worldly life by a higher rule, the Hellenic world, in these brilliant centuries from the victory over Persia to the conquests of Alexander, was not a thing to be abandoned as altogether desperate. Neither Pythagoras nor Plato was tempted to become a hermit. The philosopher still claims a place in the World; he believes that the World has need of his wisdom, and might be saved by his intervention. He will not, with the arrogance of the Stoic sage, refuse to see any difference between the sober and public-spirited man of affairs and the self-seeking money-maker and sensualist. The active life, whose chief provinces in the ancient world were war and politics, still holds some promise of noble achievement, which the philosopher cannot forgo without feeling that some not unworthy impulses in his own nature would be thwarted and starved. But, if he is to set foot upon the political scene, it cannot be as competitor in the race for social honours and success, but only as a reformer; and to the occupants of that scene he must present himself not as a colleague but as a king. The attempt to take the reformer's part in political life was made both by the Pythagorean communities of the fifth century and by Plato in the fourth. In each case the World refused to accept the philosopher upon his own terms. Plato, for his part, never acquiesced in this refusal. From his early manhood, when he was strongly tempted by powerful friends to enter public life, right on to the composition of the *Laos*, the need of society to be saved by the rule of Reason was constantly calling the philosopher back into the Cave. He was alternately attracted by the validity of the appeal and repelled by the mockery or indifference with which his response was met by society.

The situation I have just outlined entailed a distraction between the contemplative life of the philosopher and the active life of the statesman, traceable in Plato's career from the beginning to the end. This second conflict is of another kind than the conflict of the Spirit and the Flesh. It cannot be thought of as a warfare between good and evil elements in man's nature; it is rather a distraction between two possible uses to which the philosopher's gift of reason might be turned. Both uses are honourable, and in a radically reformed society they might be reconciled. The world could be saved if philosophers should become kings, or kings philosophers. But the world has never proved worthy of

its saviours ; not one of the four great philosophers of our middle period was called into his kingdom.

Our analysis has now led us to the standpoint from which the triple psychological scheme of the *Republic* becomes intelligible. The "spirited" or "passionate" element which now emerges between the two parts of the older division stands for that group of impulses and desires which find their normal satisfaction in the active life of citizenship—in war and politics. Its true nature does not come out clearly in the Fourth Book, where its existence is established by analysing a conflict between rational reflection and animal desire. The spirited element there figures only as an impulse of generous indignation, siding with Reason against Desire. But if we survey the part played by this element, throughout the *Republic*, both in the individual character and in the structure of the State, it becomes evident that the triple scheme is not really founded upon a psychological classification of distinct "parts" of the Soul. It is rather a classification of three main types of life between which a man may choose, and three types of human character which follow these several courses. They are the three lives that are compared, in the Pythagorean apologue, to the three kinds of visitors at the Great Games : some came to contemplate the spectacle ; some to win glory in the contests ; others to make profit. The first class correspond to Plato's lovers of wisdom, whose pleasure lies in the contemplation of reality. The third are his lovers of money (*φιλοχρήματοι*), whose ultimate end is bodily pleasure. The intermediate class he calls the lovers of honour and of power (*φιλότιμοι, φίλαρχοι*). In Aristotle's *Ethics* their life is called the political life, whose field is honourable action,¹ and it is observed that the end which its followers identify with happiness might better be described, not as "honour," but as "excellence" (*ἀρετή*) ; for excellence can rank with wisdom and pleasure as a good which the soul can possess, whether it be rewarded with social honour or not.² The three types are all designated as "lovers" ; the difference ultimately lies in the objects they severally desire—knowledge, honour or excellence, and gain with sensual enjoyment. This is not a division of "parts" of the Soul ; it is a list of objects towards any one of which a whole life, involving the exercise of all the human faculties, may be directed.

It is precisely on this ground that Aristotle, writing as a

¹ *Eud. Eth.* 1215 b 3.

² *E. N.* 1095 b 23 ; *E. E.* 1216 a 21.

systematic psychologist, criticises Plato's triple scheme.¹ As he rightly points out, that scheme, taken as a psychological classification of human faculties, is grossly defective; it ignores distinctions more important than those it recognises. In particular he objects that the faculty of desire will be split up and distributed among all the three parts. It figures in the reflective part as that rational "wish" for true goods which Aristotle himself, following Plato, calls βούλησις; in the middle part, as the impulse to courageous action (θυμός); in the lowest, as the appetite for pleasure (ἐπιθυμία). This criticism brings out the truth: that the triple scheme is really based on the distinction of three objects of desire, upon any or all of which the whole energy of the soul may be bent. Plato himself had said as much in a later book of the *Republic*: each of the three elements has its own desire and its own pleasure, and any one of them may govern the soul.²

If we now set this triple classification of human lives with their dominant motives beside the dual division of the divine Spirit and the Flesh or animal soul, it is evident that they cannot be satisfactorily fitted together. As we saw, the dual scheme can properly be described as a division of our nature into "parts" in the fullest sense: the divine spirit and the body with its animal desires are actually separated by death, and during life they remain distinct and antagonistic. If we now assign the contemplative life to the Spirit and the sensual life to the Flesh, no "part" of the soul is left for the third life of active citizenship. It cannot be fitted into the dual partition. Hence, where Plato and Aristotle are speaking in terms of "parts" of the soul, accounts of the nature of this third element are wavering and uncertain. In the chariot-myth of the *Phædrus* it appears as the nobler of two elements in the animal soul. Aristotle, who adopts the triple scheme in the *Ethics* as sufficient for his present purpose, hesitates whether to call it irrational or rational.³ Yet it is of central importance in his ethical theory; for the whole domain of specifically human virtue lies within its scope. The contemplative life is the life of a God; the sensual life is worthy only of the stall-fed beast; the activities of moral excellence in the life of war and politics are characteristically human.⁴ So, when we have begun by dividing man's nature into a divine part and a bestial, we end by finding that all the activities characteristic of humanity lie in a borderland

¹ *de anim.* 482 a 22 ff.

² *Rep.* ix, 580 D; 581 B.

³ *E. N.* 1102 b 18.

⁴ *E. N.* 1178 a 9.

between the two, for which no "part" of the soul can be provided.

It is clear, then, that Plato's triple scheme is not founded on a division of the soul into "parts," but on a classification of three principal objects of human desire. When any one of these three objects becomes the dominant motive, it shapes the whole of a man's character and determines the orientation of his whole life. But in every one of the three types of life every part of the soul—whether rational or irrational—is at work.

From this standpoint the problem of human virtue wears a different aspect from that which came before us in the *Phædo*. The conduct of life no longer presents itself as an ascetic meditation of death—a withdrawal of the Spirit into the solitude of rational contemplation, won by the denial or extinction of the desires of the World and the Flesh. The *Republic* acknowledges that the World, and even the Flesh, have legitimate claims. The virtue of the complete man is now to be conceived rather as a harmony of all the three forms of desire. Each is to remain distinct, doing its proper work, without thwarting or perverting the others (the principle of Justice), and all three are to be adjusted in harmony, like the distinct but consonant notes of an instrument in perfect tune (the principle of Sophrosyne). This may be called the ideal of human virtue. It is not a state of divine perfection; but it is the most stable and happy condition attainable by man.

Human virtue, then, being a harmony of natural desires, is attainable by the re-orientation of desire. The means to attainment are set forth in the *Symposium*. There, the theory of Eros abandons the conception of a soul divided into separate parts. The three groups of impulses are not ultimately distinct and irreducible elements, residing in different parts of a composite soul, or some in the soul, some in the body. They are manifestations of a single force or fund of energy, called Eros, which can be directed through different channels towards any of the diverse objects.

The discourse of Diotima in the *Symposium* opens with the observation that all desire is a mark of imperfection. If (as the earlier speakers had assumed) the object of Eros is beauty or goodness, desire implies a lack of these. But it does not follow that desire is in itself ugly or evil. It is, in fact, neither good nor bad, but neutral; it takes any value it may have from its object. Eros, moreover, is not to be defined in terms of any one of its possible objects. The name

"Eros" is commonly misappropriated to one species of love—desire for the enjoyment of physical beauty ; but properly it means "any and every desire for good things or for happiness." Then follows an allusion to the three lives. Men seek their happiness, some in money, some in athletic distinction, some in wisdom ; but all these objects of passion are only a variety of goals towards which one and the same energy may be directed. It appears, further, as if this fund of energy were limited in amount, so that the quantity turned into one direction is withdrawn from the others. This principle is expressly stated in the *Republic*, where Socrates describes the absorbing nature of the philosopher's passion for truth :

"When a person's desires set strongly in one quarter, we know that they flow in every other direction with corresponding feebleness, like a stream whose waters have been diverted into another channel. Accordingly, when the flow of desire has set towards knowledge in all its forms, a man's desire will be directed to the pleasures which the soul enjoys by itself, and will abandon the pleasures of the body, if his love of wisdom be not feigned." (485 D.)

This principle implies that every soul has so much inherent energy of desire. The definition of soul, given in the *Phædrus*, as the only thing which has the power of self-motion, suggests that the spontaneous energy of desire is the very principle of life. It is normally directed towards a diversity of ends, but in such a way that the current flowing in any one channel can be redirected into any other.

We can now conceive more clearly the process whereby human virtue, considered as the harmony of desires in our complex nature, is achieved. It is effected by the re-orientation of natural desires. During life on earth the energy must flow along all the channels, but with duly adjusted distribution. Some part must go to the preservation of animal life ; some must flow into the interests and duties of the active citizen ; some will be used in the exercise of wisdom. The ideal of human virtue lies in the perfect balance of all these claims.

Such is the conception of virtue that corresponds to the triple scheme. It may be called the ideal of human excellence for the soul immersed in earthly life and inevitably distracted among its divergent interests. But beyond this human ideal, the *Symposium* points to a further ideal which can be called divine perfection. In the latter part of her

discourse, Diotima outlines a theory of the sublimation of all Eros into its highest form. This carries us back from the triple scheme to the dual—the old contrast of the divine Spirit and the Flesh. If all desires are manifestations of a single energy, and that energy is the very essence of the self-moving soul, we can conceive its ultimate source as nothing but the divine and immortal Spirit. In our earlier analysis it appeared that the office of this “true self” was to dominate and control a lower self regarded as alien and hostile. But from the standpoint now reached, the lower self is no longer a distinct thing. It now consists merely of certain streams of desire temporarily diverted towards the necessary concerns of animal and worldly life. The energy that runs off into these channels may be recalled and gathered up into the main current, so that the whole force of desire will be bent upon a single object, and that the highest. This may be called the doctrine of sublimation.

It is introduced by the suggestion that the happiness which all men desire is not really to be found in the variety of temporal ends they consciously pursue. Beyond this variety lies a single object of desire, universally, though for the most part unconsciously, pursued by everyone. In the *Republic* it is described as

“that which every soul pursues as the end of all its actions, dimly divining its existence, though, being perplexed and unable to grasp clearly *what* it is, or to feel that steady confidence it has about other objects, it fails to gain even such profit as there may be in those other things.”

The desire for this object is called by Diotima “the passion to possess the good for ever,” and, alternatively, as “the passion for immortality,” *ἔρως ἀθανασίας*. The presence of this unconscious motive can be discerned in the two lower forms of desire. All the instincts of the animal soul can be seen as ultimately bent upon the only form of immortality possible to the mortal creature—the perpetuation of the race. In sexual love the conscious end may be the individual’s bodily pleasure, but beneath that is the unconscious impulse to leave in its offspring a new life to replace the old.¹ Similarly, the life of ambition seems, on the

¹ Similarly Aristotle (*de anim.* 416 b 23) recognises that the “primary” or minimum form of soul, common to all living things, with its faculties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, is *essentially* the reproductive, since its *end* is the production by the individual of another like itself. This function, he says, is the “most natural” of all; the end of all living things

surface, to be intent upon worldly advancement and success ; but we find the man of action willing to sacrifice life itself to an immortality of fame which he can never enjoy. Thus the desire which follows these lower channels still bears the stamp of its divine quality,¹ as if it were always capable of learning what is finally meant by " the possession of the good for ever."

In what this possession consists Diotima reveals in those greater mysteries of Eros which prescribe the path of sublimation. Goodness or Beauty is possessed by being known. When the knowledge is complete, the imperfection of desire is lost in the attainment of its goal ; but, if we can conceive that goal attained by a man, the living force of his soul would still remain as a radiant source of creative energy, begetting true excellences in other souls.²

The theory of sublimation we have just outlined is expressed in the *Republic* in terms of knowledge rather than of desire. Plato is true to the Socratic thesis that Virtue is Knowledge : a true insight into the value of things will carry desire in its train. So he speaks not so much of the re-orientation of desire as of the conversion of the eye of the soul from objects of lower worth to the highest object of knowledge (μέγιστον μάθημα). This circumstance tends to disguise the resemblance between the Platonic doctrine of sublimation and modern psychological theories initiated by the discoveries of Freud and developed by Adler and Jung. Plato's appetitive element is characterised by the typical desires for the pleasures of nutrition and sex ; and it is in this group of instincts that the school of Freud discover the fundamental phase of vital energy, which Freud named libido, though it might have been more prudent to call it Eros. Plato's " spirited " element, again, is characterised by the love of power (φιλαρχία). The " power-instinct " takes the most prominent place in the theory of Adler. There is also the mediating school, who would recognise both these groups of instincts as alternative channels through which, in varying proportions, the stream of vital energy may flow. The writings of Jung I find fascinating in their wealth of imaginative suggestion, but very hard to understand. He seems, however, to be the only one of the three modern psychologists to find a place in his scheme for some element

is to share, so far as they can, in the eternal and divine, for it is this that all things yearn after and that is the final cause of all their natural activity (*ibid.* 415 a 26).

¹ Mich. Eph. (on Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* 1169 a 17) speaks of an " irradiation of spirit " even in the irrational animals.

² *Symp.* 212A.

in our nature answering to the true self, or divine Spirit, of the Socratics.

There is always a certain danger in reading back into ancient philosophies the most recent discoveries of science. It is silly, for example, to say that Empedocles or Lucretius anticipated all the essentials of Darwinism. But in the present case we can see a reason why psychologists of this modern type have reached a theory resembling Plato's. They are the first psychologists since Plato to concentrate their attention on the soul in action. Starting from the practical treatment of neurotic disorders, and seeing in these the distraction of the soul unable to deal with the demands of life because its energy is exhausted by internal tension, what they looked for was precisely the factors at work in mental conflict, which are, of course, the same factors that operate in the normal functioning of the healthy mind, but are less easily detected when the flow runs smoothly. Hence their approach (unlike that of the older systematic psychologists who followed the path opened up by Aristotle) closely resembled Plato's, who also started from the phenomena of mental conflict and sought to disengage the forces at work in it. Hence it is not really surprising that a penetrating observation of life and experience should have led Plato (and perhaps Pythagoras before him) to an analogous grouping of the main forms of human desire and to a doctrine, in some respects similar, of the re-orientation and sublimation of Eros.

But such resemblance as exists between the Platonic and the modern doctrines of sublimation must not blind us to a fundamental difference of standpoint. Freud is a man of science bred in the atmosphere of Darwinian evolution, which tells of an ascent of man from the animal, and is disinclined to admit an unbridged gap where the highest developments of the animal end and a spiritual life of a different order and peculiar to humanity begins. For him the source of Eros springs up from the animal soul; and some at least of his followers tend to treat all the spiritual activities of man as somehow reducible to bestial rudiments. For Plato, on the contrary, the source of energy lies in the divine Spirit—the energy is imparted, as it were, from above, to the Flesh which the Spirit condescends for a time to irradiate with its presence. To Platonism and to the theology inspired by Platonism man is a fallen spirit, to science he is a risen animal; and though we hear much of a reconciliation of science and religion, this is a point on which agreement has not yet been reached.

THE FAITH OF THE FUTURE.

SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

THE faith of the future, like the faith of the present and the faith of the past, will in its essence be simple. It will be faith in the goodness of things—faith that the world is governed for good. Not all hold this faith now. Not all have held it in the past. And not all will hold it in the future. Always there have been, and always there will be, men who doubt the essential goodness of things—who doubt whether it really is true that the world is governed for good. Many in the future—as they do in the present and did in the past—will concentrate their attention on the palpable pain and evil in the world, and will argue that if there is so much suffering and so much wickedness it is impossible to believe that the world is governed for good: the ultimate power must be indifferent to either good or evil. And others, concentrating their attention on the physical world and its mechanism, will similarly argue that neither goodness nor badness has anything to do with the matter. They will conclude that the universe grinds on, a vast machine, wholly indifferent to good or evil, throwing up good and throwing up evil but utterly unmindful of which it turns out, and in the end spinning on without either good or evil, and without even a mind to know or care that goodness ever existed. There will always be those who take a delight in cherishing to themselves this gloomy view of things.

To me, as a traveller, the ground for faith in the goodness of things is so sure that it is incomprehensible to me how anyone, once he has been shown it, can possibly doubt that the world is governed for good. I well understand men doubting certain ecclesiastical doctrines in which they, whether they be Christians, Hindus or Moslems, are brought up. Many a doctrine gets outworn. But what I cannot understand is how anyone who looks out on the world as a

whole, in time and in space. and sees all the beauties of nature about him and the marvels of goodness and beauty men have already achieved, can doubt for an instant that a power of incalculable goodness must be at work in the heart of the universe to have produced such results. However, there is the fact that men do doubt. And we may presume that they will always doubt in the future. What, then, are the eternal grounds for faith in the goodness of things ?

As a preliminary, let us examine the doubts and see how they may be allayed. First, there is the old, old problem of evil. And this will be continually appearing in the future and, we may suppose, with even more pressing insistence than now. For as men become more sensitive of soul—as most assuredly they will—they must necessarily become more sensitive to pain and evil, and therefore more insistent in their questionings why such suffering and wickedness can be allowed if the world is governed for good. This obstinate questioning will perennially arise. And perennially it will have to be answered. For, conclusively as we may answer it now, our answer, however satisfying to ourselves, will not satisfy our descendants. They will have to solve the problem for themselves, generation after generation.

Yet we may fairly forecast what that answer will be, for we have our own experience to go upon. We may be sure that they, like we, who in the fulness of time have come to view our experience of life sanely and in its entirety, will come to see that if there were no possibility of evil there could be no good, nor any of the joy of achieving good. If no one could be anything but good all zest in life would depart. We would become mere vegetables—or even lower, mere machines. The whole joy in being good is that without deliberate effort to be good we might have been bad. And it is not a matter of being only good. We want to be better and to make things better. We are never content to remain at a dead-level of correctitude. We strive after higher and higher degrees of goodness. And unless there were the possibility of falling, all significance would be missing in the effort. The possibility of doing evil is a necessity for doing good.

And the same with pain. If there were no chance of suffering and hardship, and no risk of death, there would be no warning of danger, no incentive to high endeavour, and all the joy of great enterprise and high endeavour would be gone. The warning signals would be missing. The spice would be taken from life. Courage would be unnecessary. And once again man would become a machine.

I would not hold the theory that when we suffer pain it is administered to us by an invisible but omnipotent God in much the same way as a schoolmaster might whip a naughty boy, or a mother smack a recalcitrant child. But what does seem to me to be a necessity inherent in the very nature of things is that if there is to be any upward progress to a higher and better state of things there must be the possibility of evil and pain.

And if it be argued that a Creator with the power to do it should have created a world absolutely perfect from the start, I would, with my irrepressible optimism, reply that an absolutely perfect world would be imperfect from its very perfection. The truest perfection is the striving after a higher perfection. The perfection is in the striving. And it is this striving after a higher perfection that we find we do have. In ourselves, and in the world about us, there is an obvious striving after a better state of things than at present exists. Even the greatest masters are never content. Their greatest masterpieces they would like to make more perfect still. And that striving does imply lesser perfection or evil.

And if we ourselves were born perfect without any possibility of becoming in the slightest degree more perfect than we already were, and if everyone about us were equally without a hint or trace of evil, or even possibility of being wicked, and never had or could have the slightest twinge of pain, and could aspire to nothing better because he was already perfect—if we lived in such a state of immovable perfection, not only would life be dull beyond all endurance, not only would we lack all joy in existence, but we would have become—or rather be, for there would be no becoming—mere gramophones endlessly reeling out what was irrevocably imprinted on us at birth.

We may grieve over pain and evil. But we must recognise that they are the very means by which we can attain the higher good. They are the instruments by which good may be reached.

Thus the existence of pain and evil in the world need neither now nor in the future prevent our having faith in the goodness of things. But what positive grounds are there for that faith? Again, speaking as a traveller, I should say that those grounds were staring us in the face on every hand. The wonder is that all do not see them.

The traveller, as he wanders over many lands, in many climates, is impressed by the extraordinary variety of life.

The variety of human life alone is astonishing. Slender and excitable Italians are very different from solid and steady Scandinavians, and light-hearted Spaniards from the great-hearted but essentially melancholy Russians. We parvenu Europeans and Americans differ greatly from ancient Chinese and Indians, whose culture has in three and four thousand years penetrated to the very bone. Though they live within a few miles of one another, the highly intellectual Brahmin seems a different creature altogether from the nimble Bhaiga of the forest, who bravely contends with wild beasts and lives on forest produce. The experienced Europeans differ widely from the immature and impulsive Africans. In colour, in culture, in character, in maturity, the traveller observes extraordinary variety in the peoples of this earth. And so also is it with animal life. In our own island we see variety enough. But when we get out into tropical forests the variety is amazing. Apes and monkeys not so very far apart from the agile little forest men. Fierce tigers, timid deer, gigantic elephants, graceful antelopes, gorgeous birds and butterflies, insects of myriad forms. Fishes also, and many a creature which burrows in the ground. And these all forms of animal life only. In addition to them, the well-nigh infinite variety of plant life, from the giant trees of the forest to delicate primulas and dainty ferns and flowers of every hue and form.

As the traveller attempts to recall to his mind the forms, and the colour, and the character, habits and modes of motion of the birds, animals and insects, plants and trees which he has seen, there seems no end to the variety of life.

Yet, prodigious as is the variety, enormous as are the differences between the several types, he is also impressed with the fact that life in all its variety is yet one great life. A common life animates the whole. A common life and a common love. For the traveller observes that where there is life there is love. Only through love do men come into being—or the animals, or the birds, or the insects, or even the flowers. Without love there is no life. Young men and women make love. Animals, birds and insects mate. Flowers are fertilised. One life and one love running through all the variety. One great integrating factor keeping all the varieties together.

Further, the traveller observes that this one great life and love is inextricably bound up with physical nature. The bodies of men and animals and flowers are made up of the chemical elements of the soil. All breathe the air. And

all are ultimately dependent on the rays of light from the sun. Without light there could be no life and love.

How this great life urge, with its thousand million manifestations, arose on this planet, scientists cannot yet say. They assert with certainty that this planet came into being as a droplet from the sun—as a droplet of fiery mist originally, and not yet even liquid. But how life could have arisen on a tiny ball of fire which slowly cooled to an ash, with its big parent sphere of fire continuing to shine upon it 93 million miles away, scientific men do not yet undertake to say. Some conjecture that it was by pure chance that life arose. Amongst the innumerable collocations of the atoms, and groups of atoms, there just by chance happened to come about a combination which resulted in life; and life having once come into being, it of its own inherent impetus developed into all the wonders we see about us. This is the explanation some give; but it is not very convincing.

Perhaps we shall be wiser if, instead of thinking only of the sun and its droplet, our planet, we consider both planet and parent as but parts of one vast whole—the whole universe. We are told that the sun is only one of two or three million stars, which themselves—one and all—originated from a vast revolving nebula, and that this nebula is but one out of two or three million similar nebulae. And all are connected in that whole which we term the universe. And this whole scientific men now regard as an *organic* whole—that is, as a whole in which the parts are interconnected.

This is a point of capital importance, the true significance of which has not yet been generally grasped. Let us try to seize its full meaning. The universe is composed of countless units, whether planets, suns, solar systems, atoms, men, or communities of men. Each of these units—even an *atom*—is a most intricate and complicated *organism*, possessing inter-related parts and exhibiting functions and properties. And each of these units is in some measure affected by all the other units, and by the universe as a whole. And that being so, each unit, as Whitehead points out, is “a microcosm representing in itself the entire all-inclusive universe.” Therefore, as our solar system has manifested life, the universe must be a living thing. The solar system being a unit of that organic whole, the universe—being a microcosm representing in itself the universe—it follows that the universe must contain in its intrinsic nature at least as much as this planet displays. And if this planet displays life, then life must be intrinsic to the universe. In other words, as

life appears here, therefore the universe must be alive : life must have come to this planet out of the very heart of the universe. There must have been that in the universe as a whole to cause life to spring forth here as soon as the requisite physical conditions had been reached.

And this is surely a much more comprehensible and reasonable supposition than that so marvellous a thing as life appeared as a pure chance, or even as an outcome of a tendency. Is it likely that chance alone could have produced such a marvel as the very lowliest man ? Or could a mere tendency produce the wondrous flights of a poet ? Is it not much more probable—to put it at the lowest—that just as each Frenchman is a microcosm of France, and represents in himself France as a whole, and just as from even the humblest Frenchman we can deduce the intrinsic nature of France, and judge that she has life and mind and can love as well as inspire love in her constituent members, so also is our solar system a microcosm of the universe, and so is it that from it we can deduce the intrinsic nature of the universe, and conclude that as the solar system has produced life and mind and love, therefore the universe as a whole has life and mind and love and the power of inspiring love in its constituent members, and that it was from the universe at large that life came to our solar system and is displayed on our planet.

How life was conveyed to this planet from the universe at large—if it really did come from there—has not, so far as I know, been considered with any great care, the theory that it may have been conveyed on meteoric dust having been abandoned. But this we do know, that light is conveyed to us on waves of the ether, not only from the sun, but from nebulae so distant that, travelling at the rate of 186,000 miles a second, it takes 140 million years to reach us. We know, too, that the most delicate intonations of the voice, expressing the very soul of a man, are similarly carried on waves of the ether with like speed from end to end of this earth. And with these facts before us, it is not unreasonable to assume that life, like light and like sound, may be continually impinging upon us from outside this planet. In response to the rays of light impinging upon them, simple organisms gradually developed sensitive teguments, which in their turn developed into eyes. And perhaps it was due to rays of life from the universe at large impinging on complex chemical combinations that these, in response, developed into the simplest forms of life. Anyhow, it is a more

tenable conjecture than that these simplest forms arose by *chance*.

But, however life may have arisen, it is bound to come to an *end* on this planet, science says. It cannot last here for ever. The moon may crash back into the earth again. And, anyhow, the sun is steadily radiating away its heat, and the earth must become too cold to live on. Astronomers are generous with their supply of time. They allow that no such misfortune will happen for a long time yet. For another million million years this earth may be habitable. This much they give us to hope for—a period of time many hundreds of times longer than that during which it has already existed. Yet, however distant, the doom is certain. Life and love will cease on this earth.

Now if this were the end of all things as far as life is concerned—and astronomers are too apt to assume that it is—we should be unable to have faith in the essential goodness of things. If it really were the case that when life ceased on this planet it ceased in the universe, we could not believe that the universe was governed for good. Or even if we were to accept the additional crumb of comfort the astronomers give us that life may also exist *for a time* on other planets of other stars—that also would be of no avail if the astronomers with the same breath assure us that the whole universe is running down and must in the end radiate away in one vast death. If material conditions *ultimately* govern, *if* the last resort all depends upon temperature, we cannot *really* have confidence in the universe. And the fact that the temperature will last out at the right degree for millions of years yet does not give us any fundamental satisfaction.

If we are to assume, as many astronomers do, that when life has ceased here and in those few other planets scattered at rare intervals over the vast universe where it may also exist, it will come to an end in the whole universe, we cannot have faith that the universe is for good. We would have to believe that it was ultimately governed by the laws of physics without any consideration for either good or evil. And if we held that view as a settled conviction our outlook on life would fundamentally be depressing. It would ultimately be that of the man who was making the best of a bad job. In every effort for the good we would have a consciousness of working against the grain of things. Our attitude would be very different from that of the man who, in working to leave the world a better place than he found it, was sure that he was keeping in step with the march of things and had

the whole sweep of the universe behind him in his struggles towards the goal.

But are astronomers justified in expecting us to believe that when life has come to an end on this planet, and on those others in which it now exists, it will for ever have ceased to exist in the whole universe? Their argument is that, according to physical laws, the universe is running down. The stars are slowly but surely dissipating away their heat. Eventually all of it will have been radiated away, and there will be nothing left but lifeless energy. The universe, according to the latest conclusions of astronomers, is a running-down concern, and there is no sign of any winding up.

The flaw in this argument is this: it ignores the great fact that life has appeared. If the universe manifested nothing else but physical elements governed by physical laws, we might accept the conclusion that the universe was a running-down affair. But the obstinate fact that life has appeared here and has been working here for a thousand million years should give us pause before we accept the astronomers' conclusions.

If we accept the organic view of the universe—if we accept the view that each unit is a microcosm influenced by and influencing every other part and the whole—then, as we have seen, the universe must contain in its intrinsic nature at least as much as is brought into being on this planet. Even the very highest our highest men in their divinest moments have been able just dimly to descry **must** be **part** of the inmost nature of the universe, and operating throughout it. And therefore, because life has ceased here, it no more follows that life has ceased in the universe than it follows that because an autumn leaf falls from an oak that the whole oak is dead, or that because an oak tree has died that therefore life has come to an end on the earth.

It may very well be that when life ceases here it may be beginning on a planet of Sirius—just as when leaves are falling from the trees in North America they are just beginning to sprout in South America. It may very well be that **always** somewhere in the universe life may be waxing to its highest, and always somewhere it may be waning to extinction. Some may think an endless rhythm, wave upon wave, of crest and depression, without beginning and without end, is too deadly monotonous to contemplate with any satisfaction. They would prefer a definite beginning and a definite end. But there need not be, and there could not be, any monotony. Of necessity there would be variations, for no

two things in the universe are exactly alike. The main theme would be the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. But that does not imply monotony in expression. The theme of love is the same in all life. But have any two lovers loved in precisely the same way? And can the interest in the love theme ever be exhausted? Millions of poems and novels must have been written on it. Is there the slightest sign that it is regarded as monotonous? However many times the life and love theme may find expression in the universe, in every case the expression will differ and there need be no fear of monotony.

No man is justified in stating as a fact that the universe is running down, with no prospect of being wound up, and that life must eventually disappear, not only from this earth, but from off the universe. An astronomer, accustomed all his life to concentrating his attention upon the physical aspect of the universe, to calculating the distance and number of the stars and to estimating their constitution, may be inclined to look upon such occurrence as life on this planet as a very trumpery affair in comparison with the vast sweep of the heavens. But we who are not astronomers need not be over-impressed by this outlook. To us the astronomer himself, with his life, his mind, and his loves, is far more significant of the true nature of the universe than the whole of the stars, however numerous.

The astronomers' present surmises as to the ultimate fate of the universe are at best only temporary conclusions, and not established with the certainty that we regard the daily setting of the sun. We need not attach too great importance to them. They are not of sufficient surety to destroy our faith that the world is governed by, and for, good.

Neither of the two apparent obstacles in the way of our accepting the view that the world is governed for good can be regarded as an insurmountable objection. They both whittle away under examination. Neither the existence of pain and evil in the world, nor the fact that the physical universe is governed by physical law, need affright us. Pain and evil may be the very means of reaching a higher good. And if the physical universe is governed by physical law and is one vast and most delicate and intricate machine, there may yet be life and mind and spirit animating that machine, as life and mind and spirit animate each of those marvellously adjusted machines, our bodies. The objections to a faith in the goodness of the world are not valid. And now we have

to examine certain positive reasons for maintaining that faith.

Science and philosophy, as we have already noted, are coming more and more to regard the universe as an *organic* whole—that is, as a whole in which the parts are interdependent on one another. Each minute part of the universe affects, and is affected, by the whole; and every part—some more, some less—bears to some extent the impress of the whole. Each part is stamped with the mark of the whole. Each part is in some degree an image and superscription of the nature of the whole. Some parts will be a more perfect image. Some will manifest the nature in only a faint degree. But all will in some measure carry on them an indication of what the whole essentially is like. The soul of the whole will be manifest in every particular. Even an atom will afford some index of the nature of the universe.

If we take the smallest known particle of the universe—the electron of the atom—and consider what it can tell us of the nature of the universe, we find that even this minutest of all fractions of the universe speaks just as much of mind as of matter. It is not a hard, tangible bit of mindless material. It is quite intangible. It is a centre of energy. It is in incessant motion, and it moves this way and that of its own inner propulsion in response to attractions or repulsions from outside. It acts of its own accord, in fact—of its own accord according to the stimulus it receives from outside. Thus this particle of almost infinitesimal parvitude gives an indication of mind in the universe as a whole. It has been described as just as much a mindlet as a piece of material. And from it alone we should get an inkling of what the universe in its ultimate nature is.

But if we want to get the truest idea of what the universe really is, we would naturally look to its highest productions. We do not judge of a creative artist by his commonplace efforts: we judge of him by his masterpieces. And we do not judge of France by her meanest citizens: we judge of her by her poets and philosophers, her statesmen and soldiers. From a French railway porter we will get some idea of the nature of France. But a much fuller and truer conception we will get from Clemenceau or Foch, from Victor Hugo or Racine. So also with the universe: from a man we shall be able to judge the universe better than from an atom; and from the highest men we shall be able to judge it better than from the lowest.

Those highest men are the highest products of the universe we know. There may be higher still elsewhere in the universe, either inhabiting planets of remote stars, or, in some ethereal form, occupying inter-stellar space. But of these we know nothing for certain. We must, therefore, take these highest men as illustrating what the universe is really like. There must be in the universe as a whole that which can produce these highest products. If the universe produced nothing higher than rock we would—if we were some superior persons outside the universe and looking down upon it—assume that in its nature there was nothing higher than rock. If it produced nothing higher than cabbages we would assume that in its nature it was nothing higher than vegetable life. But if it produces men with capacity to think and to reason and to love, then we assume that in its nature must be the capacity for at least thought and love.

Now, if we take stock of men as we know them, we observe that all display evidence of thought and purpose. The members of a crowd in an Eastern bazaar appear to be wandering hither and thither aimlessly about. Nevertheless, even they have some slight purpose in their movements, and at least hunger or the need of sleep will sooner or later propel them in a definite direction. The same also is it with the animals, birds and insects. Everywhere among living things, and increasingly in men, are evidences of mind and purpose.

Everywhere also, among all living things, are evidences of love. In all races of men, the highest and the lowest, among the animals and birds, and even among fishes and insects, there is evidence of the attraction of mate for mate. Love is as universal as life. It springs from the very roots of life, and is its most perfect flower and adornment.

And if all living things and men in the highest degree display evidence of thought and purpose and love we may assume, if our arguments run correctly, that thought and purpose and love are part of the very nature of the universe.

We may go a step further. We have not yet considered the highest men. There have, for two or three thousand years past, arisen from time to time a few rare and precious souls who, to a peculiar degree, have a consciousness of the universe as a whole. We have seen that each unit of which the universe is composed is a microcosm representing in itself the essential features of the entire universe. And those units, whom we style the highest men, may be regarded

as microcosms who are *conscious* of their thus representing in themselves the essence and nature of the universe as a whole. They feel themselves imbued with the spirit of the world. Just as ordinary men are self-conscious, they are world-conscious.

An illustration will clear the point. A simple French countryman is quite conscious of himself, but is hardly conscious at all of France as a whole. A Joan of Arc, on the other hand, is overwhelmingly conscious of it. She is still conscious of her own self, but it is nothing in comparison with France. She is consumed with a love of France, and France loves her : there is reciprocity of love. Similarly has it been with those rare souls who are favoured with a consciousness of the universe. And it has been borne in upon these with overwhelming conviction that the world is governed by good. They have been filled with a mighty love for the whole world—their fellow-men and all that is. And they have felt themselves being loved. Such are the great prophets of the Hebrews, of Arabia, of Persia, and of India. To this day arise men who have enjoyed similar experiences. And if these highest products of the universe assure us with burning conviction that the world is governed for good, this is good evidence that it is.

To us Christians it appears that Christ had, in the highest degree, the consciousness of the whole. He is for us the supreme manifestation and embodiment of that Power which governs and directs the universe and whom we call God. He is made in the very image of God. He is in our eyes the highest product of the universe, and is therefore the surest indication we have of what the Power which drives the universe is like, and whither the universe is being driven. And when Christ assures us that the Power which drives the universe is the power of love and the goal is the Kingdom of God, we have the culminating justification for a faith in the goodness of things.

And the Faith of the Future would include faith *in* the future. We know from the evidence of our own practical experience that after death men do live on, and not merely as faint memories, but as active powers in the hearts of their dearest, and in the heart of their country. We know that Frenchmen live on in the soul of France. Foch will be an active power in the soul of France as long as France and Frenchmen exist. We know, further, that countries live on in the soul of Humanity. Ancient Greece is still a power in

the world. According to our lives before death we will live on in our country as a scarcely perceptible influence or as a potent force. And the same will it be with our country in the soul of Humanity.

Knowing this, and believing that when life eventually ceases to exist on this planet there will always be living beings elsewhere in the universe, we will have faith that the soul of Humanity will still be working in the souls of individuals and communities far spread over the universe. Even now our spiritual activities are, like light from the sun, or music from a radio station, being conveyed on waves of the ether over the universe, and, though they may be unaware of it, impinging upon living beings wherever they are. And after all life has ceased on this planet the soul of Humanity will be working on in the universe at large as the soul of Foch works on in France.

Ample grounds are there for faith in the goodness of things. And the human race is now only in its infancy—not even in its childhood. It has lived only one million years ; and it may live to be a million million, and give rise to an altogether higher order of beings than we can yet foresee. And as it grows up we may depend upon it that this faith that the world is governed for good will grow with it. We now have faith that the world is governed by Love. We may surmise that the Faith of the Future will be faith that the world is governed by a Holiness which, while it includes Love, includes also Beauty and Truth, yet transcends all three in a quality higher than any of these in separation.

Issuing from inmost recesses of the universe, yet dominating the whole, must be the will and the power to create a world in which Holiness in its highest perfection is the rule. Faith in the Reign of Holiness as the prime motive-power of the world will be the Faith of the Future. Faith is the essential holiness of things. Faith that the holiest our highest have ever conceived is but as the dawn to noon in telling what that Power is like which governs the world.

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IS RELIGION TO BE SPECIALISED ?

W. J. BLYTON.

I

IN this crowded century of social growth and ramifying knowledge, who has not at times had a misgiving about the remorseless move toward differentiation in minds and types and aims ? Is it going to make strangers of us all ? In science, industry and everything else, specialism is more and more imperative in practice—and more costly to the soul of the individual man. Still, it gets results, which the State and the world benefit by ; and indirectly some of those benefits come back to some of the individuals. It may well seem hopeless to question a tendency which seems inseparable from civilised development, which fills the larder, earns distinctions and degrees, and achieves an occasional fortune or peerage. Yet though to specialise may be an economic necessity and a neat intellectual device, it can stunt the spirit. By nature, before we have been “ got at,” the mind is as full of eyes as a fly’s body. Before long, “ wisdom at one entrance quite shut out ” is a mild description of some of us. We shed perforce some of our childhood’s faculties, adolescence’s gifts, and early manhood’s interests to become the official, the functionary and the ratepayer. The full mind we were born with is turned into one or two faculties, with a cutting edge to them : the soul may be narrowed into a pincer.

Let the slight exaggeration be pardoned : my aim is to sketch the danger and then suggest how to be on guard. True, to our particular “ senses ” most of us add a common sense which subconsciously corrects the worst excesses of one tiny reaction or trick of the mind. Reports of what others are doing float to us from fiction, film and newspaper, perhaps also from relatives in other “ lines.” Besides, someone will

urge that enforced specialism is calculated to bring a wholesome sense of ignorance and humility, which are moral compensations. It should : but does it always ? Only with the few who are naturally humble and can see wistfully over their pinfold. With many, proficiency in one small track of knowledge breeds something different. It breeds pride, and, singularly enough, a credulous submission to sweeping statement from some other specialist just over the hedge. A fairly general knowledge would save us from this acute impressibility at the hands of single-track experts who speak out of a very contracted store of knowledge and with a surprisingly modest logical or philosophic equipment.

Counsel for the defence says that specialising wins our daily bread and *kudos*—livelihood in short. The prosecution retorts : Livelihood, yes—but it truncates life and mind, or will do so unless measures are taken.

To-day the abler scientific specialists endeavour to keep contact with each other's main generalisations and results, increasingly hard though it be. Even so, there are still many "imperfect sympathies," blind spots, indifferences, between followers of the hundred branches of physical science alone. Toward philosophy many of them are even more distant and vague. And suppose you assay some of these concentrated workers on the mystical or æsthetic side ! You would find more partitions. Some of our most prominent figures oppose a blank *incuria* to theological search, to moral and philosophic cognition, having "no time" for them, in two senses. In extreme cases (Darwin confessed to his) the mind atrophies on the æsthetic, imaginative and other sides.

Artists are not noticeably freer from this astonishing partiality of view. Modesty is not the note of the claim that art is the most vital thing in life, is somehow life itself : their local vision is confused, by a few, with the Beatific Vision. Yet among themselves, poets, painters, musicians, sculptors, architects, thanks to modern experiment, there are so many idiosyncrasies and idioms that artists seem at times to talk in different languages. It is well enough to have a private world, but not to turn the key in the lock and lose the key.

Turn to the politicians, the sociologists and the philanthropists—three distinct species who know very little good of each other ! The first can make the most exaggerated claims for the virtues of legislation, and make very little of scientists (except possibly the medical), and less of artists, and of philosophers usually nothing. He sees the

universe as food for census ; " whate'er is most administered is best." There are enough philosophical exceptions, of course, to blunt satire's edge. But my generalisations may pass.

The modern school of psychologists is perhaps the most curiously specialised of all, and has little use for the contributions of old-time metaphysics or the sage monitions of theology. It has founded a microcosm and a terminology of its own.

Or take theological and religious thought. Unless the thinker have by nature a very catholic and hospitable mind, his attitude to the rest—saving, perhaps, poetry and philosophy of certain kinds—is one of caution or regret. One is not grieving at the *number* of these " worlds " ; the more, the merrier ; but rather at the superfluous divorce between them with which some are content.

Fortunately our better schools are making a stand against the philistine demand for too early vocational specialisation. May the ten years or so of youthful education continue to liberalise and enlarge by its general culture. If the clamour for merely technical instruction prevailed, we should produce not minds or men, but utilitarian cogs—" nuts " to earn " screws." It would leave us more than ever viewing others across a gulf of incomprehension, when even now each craft, profession, science and art tends to be an enclosed " mystery " to its adepts and a mystification to those outside. We should rather be encouraged and enabled more often to rise to a view of the whole.

One last instance, and the most significant. In any modern town there co-exist any number of opposed codes, traditions, values, moralities and religions ; to a degree no past civilisation ever knew. Yet this intimidating aggregate does keep together, roughly, as a working whole : how ? Partly by habit and stored idealism from other times ; partly by some new and fairly diffused hopes, the wish for peace and comfort ; by the hard pressure of sheer economic law ; by the need for tolerance in such a " mêlée of men," as Clough called it eighty years ago ; and, in the background, the sanction of force. Clough wondered who was friend and who was foeman ?

" Though I mistrust the marshal, I bow to the duty of order.

Let us get on as we can and do what we're meant for.

But where *is* the battle ?

Neither battle I see, nor arraying, nor King in Israel,

Only infinite jumble and mess and dislocation.

Backed by a solemn appeal, *For God's sake, do not stir, there !* "

A poet's way of saying there is no one "modern mind" but thousands.

Since unity of faith and purpose seems as distant in the future, humanly speaking, as it is distant in the past, the hope lies surely in encouraging all men to live more *in the round*, and less along one or two devious lines. At least let us set our sails consciously against these disintegrating currents. Let us not mistake division of labour for an end when it is only a means and a servant of Life. All the more, because reflective people were never so eager and hungry as to-day for some luminous generalisations to interpret this scene of swarming inventions and often unrelated enterprise, in terms of ideal meaning and value, and recover the vision that matters—the unity of Life.

II

Several writers lately have poured cold water on this ideal. Mr Aldous Huxley is for giving free rein to each insurgent impulse and mood as it rises : to be "in succession Voltaire and Pascal, Podsnap and Keats," not troubling to intelligise, relate or grade them. Life raw, in the crude, incongruous, seems the programme. And there is a colder, more argumentative writer (a Cambridge biochemist) who, far from regretting the disunity of our faculties as a disagreeable temporary necessity, exalts it as good in itself; or gives that impression. He will have it that these activities—religion, science, art, and so on—are, in some final but unexplained fashion, autonomous, and even "fundamentally antagonistic." Never the twain shall meet.

This is a new hobby-horse in the more speculative and articulate circles, and the indications are that it is going to be ridden hard in the near future. It suits the convenience of so many—in all circles. It is a little subtler than some previous fashions. There is no attempt to sap religion or undermine the æsthetic or other intuitions. These are admitted, as being natural as breathing or reasoning. But—they (and religion especially) are requested not to break bounds. The religious consciousness is "only one" mode of experience, and not necessarily "the most vital or deep." It is the new Monroe doctrine in the world of thought, and, I should fancy, a reflection from the outer world (as has often happened before)—a reproduction of nationalism, of the strong bias everywhere for living one's own life unhampered by cognate claims, without accountability elsewhere. Reli-

gion, the arts, the sciences (it seems) are to face each other, each jealous of its sovereign rights, each *sui generis*, on respectful but distant terms. The Good, the Beautiful and the True are not the abstract trinity we supposed, one gathers; hardly a league, with a bureau; but a triad of irreducible equals.

Mr Needham, of Cambridge, writing of Materialism and Religion recently, answers in a very individual fashion the question which has, he thinks, been very insufficiently considered in the past by religious people, namely, the difficulty of having a deeply-felt, much-costing religion, and at the same time preventing it from "running over and absorbing the whole of life"!

"It is an only too familiar piece of pastoral exhortation that religion should not be kept for Sundays, but that it should permeate and interpenetrate every action however secular. Brother Lawrence, with his practise of the presence of God in the convent kitchen, is a striking advocate of this point of view. Nevertheless, there is every reason for opposing such an extension of the domain of religion. In point of fact, it is most essential to regard religion as only one among the means man has of apprehending the real, the one in which he has God the eternal reality as the object not of his thought, but of his whole being."

A very unnecessarily narrowed idea of what religion is and can be is, I submit, at the bottom of this delimitation of its sphere. That idea is shared by too many religious people; and it naturally elicits the question whether it is "possible to nourish a complete personality on religious food alone." Most will agree that the "perfectly developed man ought to have the capacity for entering into and sharing each of man's noblest activities," but hardly for this reason, that science and religion "frankly do not fit, never have fitted and cannot fit," and the spiritual tension developed by their "antagonism" within the individual soul is "the most fructifying thing in the modern world." These distinctive worlds of art, science, philosophy and religion differ in *kind*; spring from different mental acts, issue in incommensurable views of the universe, and are "uncongenial to one another." Yet in the business of living they have to be taken together and incorporated in any large and harmonious character.

Very well. But before the coming generation is drenched in more of these brilliant distinctions, let us be beforehand

with the mild observation that the harmonising of these modes of vision in one soul *is precisely Religion* in the fuller, finer sense—as distinct from devout denominationalism or any other helpful second-best. Were new vistas and kingdoms of reality opened up to-morrow by a science or an art not yet conceived, the fresh data would be immediately eligible for the brooding activity of the religious soul. Quaintly—as quaintly as some pious writers of the past—we are tending to forget that the object of faith is the infinite, while that of science is the finite. All that is in the intellect's sphere falls easily and necessarily within faith's : the part slips into the whole, the item into the universal. There never can be clash or friction ; only mutual necessity.

As R. G. Collingwood in another context put it :

“The infinite is not another *thing* which is best grasped by sweeping the finite out of the way ; the infinite is nothing but the unity or, as we sometimes say, the ‘meaning’ of finite things in their diversity and their mutual connections. To look for the infinite by throwing away the finite would be very much like making the players stop playing in order to hear the symphony.”

The heresy of the mystic is to fancy that all is mind. It is no strange misfortune that man has to pass through this eventful stage of training amid matter, body, finite things, contrasted activities and the most variegated moods, using very diverse methods. The training and tempering is *through* them ; they are the means of awakening a fully self-conscious spirituality both by instruction and suggestion and inspiration, and by driving us through effort and recoil to find and value our deeper spirit-nature.

Critics wax caustic with a religious person who selects a number of single facts from the whole, and warns reason off them. It is equally unwarranted in the critic to warn the religious consciousness off what he delightfully calls the “spheres” of science, art, policy, or any human experience. Theology indeed has a distinct, defined field : Religion is unconfined, its range is the sum of all other ranges. Let us beware of obscurantism—even from laboratories or the studio. A social vision passing freely and greatly between one manner of knowing and another : that is Religion's right. Those ways of knowing are only different at all because our finite apparatus has to change gear to cope with diverse

aspects of reality. Let us not make a fetish of our littleness and its necessities. In the name of common sense let us keep recalling that these activities, to which we give sonorous subjective titles (Will, Emotion, Intellect, Memory) and impressive objective titles (Morals, Religion, Science, Art) are quite simply all alike activities of *one* human mind (to begin with); secondly, in practice, each may and does stipulate and edify the others, diverse as they are—and refreshing in that very diversity; thirdly, all find their pasture in the same creation or universe, and their lives pass at last invisibly into the Unity at the fountain of things.

Too much, therefore, has been made of the distinctness of these modes of seeing; sometimes the insistence has come from the side of the religious philosopher, sometimes from the empiric, and sometimes from the æsthete. Each has made of his angle of vision *a* religion; but Religion in the full sense is the embraced meaning of *all*, in their unity. Thus, if I have not been arguing amiss, you will never make a true view of existence or an inclusive religion out of art, of philanthropy, of physical or psychological science, of conceptual philosophic systems—simply because they each miss out so much. And equally, you will only make an *incomplete* religion—however vivid, however true so far as it goes, however saving to the individual spirit—out of the limited material (august as that is) which many noble men and women choose to consider the only stuff of faith.

The religious spirit, excepting always the seers, has been altogether too modest in railing off a sphere apart and contenting itself with that; when it should inhabit the universe as a palace and a home. I think Mr Needham praises amiss, therefore, a famous theologian for speaking of the “necessary limitation of religion,” when its true place is precisely the illimitable and its sustenance is the divine and infinite element in those other interests of man—music, art, speech, inquiry, human relations, government, thought. The same writer blames that theologian for “reserving the place of honour for religion as the deepest and most vital part of human experience,” because “this will never be admitted by the scientific man and the philosopher”—nor, presumably, by the artist! Then one can only murmur that such æsthetic or scientific men are not vividly enough aware of the ultimate (religious) significance of the stuff they are working in. No science, no art, no form of vision lives to itself alone; they are broken lights indeed except as members one of another, “toils co-operant to one End”; at their fullest and richest,

they prophesy and point beyond to the inexpressible which is Religion's field, and Religion in turn is cutting off her own patrimony when refusing to expatiate upon these riches raised by the mind's other faculties.

Not only do we believe goodness, beauty and truth—religion, art and all knowledge—to be finally one ; that is a poor and abstract way of putting it. Really it is *personality*—personality *inspired by these*—that is our supreme and characteristic object of value and love. This means incidentally, whether we like the claim or not, that religious experience at its truest *is* by its nature greater than scientific or artistic or social, as being more directly centred upon That which is creative of our personality, but is personal in a form free from the limits we recognise in ourselves.

III

Religious minds (in the specialised sense) have, however, in the past made the error—and caused others to repeat it—of missing the spiritual contributions of the other—not *obviously* religious—activities. If the religious consciousness withdraws from poetry, painting, politics, play, science, philosophy, and the rest—they will set up for themselves, even forming “churches,” and it will not be long before schismatic missiles will be aimed unfilially but effectively at theology, and religion suffer with it. If these are exiled instead of interpreted and redeemed, what is there for religion to act and feed upon, to irradiate and offer ? The old-time sage knew better than this when he called upon “all that was within him” to witness to the Creator. He had a *sense of completeness* which prevented him from withholding any available means of fruition or tribute. What was the later parable of the Talents but Divine irony against the timid man's short cut to safety ; the suppression of gifts because they do not advertise themselves superficially as religious, because they are open to abuse, because they are a responsibility, and sometimes a problem to their possessor which he would sooner shirk than solve ? The heroes, saints and geniuses whom we in fact admire most in history are not those who are one thing, and nothing more ; they are those in whom many contrasted elements mixed and interplayed, mutually heightening and fertilising ; robust, high-tempered and many-gifted natures orientated in the noblest direction by one commanding aim. They are creatures of unexpected contrarieties with the courage of their own mental idiom ;

"characters," and their lives thus yield history, humour and anecdote. They do not cauterise any living part of their genius or richer individuality ; and if there is any renunciation, it is of that farseeing kind which intends some richer realisation. Fear of life is not their mark. Whatever their theories, with a singular unanimity their practice has been to exploit the powers of their natures to the utmost compatible with a master-aim, to the embarrassment often of the conventionally or conservatively good among their contemporaries and the misunderstanding of the worthy official classes.

Man should strive indeed for unity ; but not a premature one. Unity, certainly ; but the question is, a unity of how many things and how rich ? A unity is a very different phenomenon from a mere unit. No harmony can be made out of a single unilinear series of notes. If the Creator has determined that it takes all sorts of things—a hierarchy of energies and plans—to make a universe, it is clear that it takes diversity and a union of opposites to constitute the full man. The mind richest in faculties and in interests *can* be most religious of any ; he has most to be religious *with*, can direct and offer the most. He is the man of ten talents ; and, to do him justice, he usually trades with them with a spendthrift royalty that turns out to be shrewd business for everybody. It is commonly enough the meanly endowed who are the most inhibitive, dualistic, and suspicious of prolific activities.

"Man, [said von Hugel] if he belongs to our time and western race, and is determined fully to utilise our special circumstances, lights and trials, as so many means towards his own spiritualisation, will have carefully to keep in touch with the thing-world, the impersonal element, physical science and determinist law. He will have to pass and repass between those Caudine Forks, to plunge and replunge in and through this fiery torrent."

There are some, doubtless, who are born to a special vocation ; but for the bulk of us, the task is well and truly indicated in those words.

If a man seek first the things of God and His justice, it is said that all these other things will be added to him. Exactly ; he possesses them anew, innocently, in their proper setting and therefore safely. That is a vastly different thing from simply condemning them ; literature, nature,

music, humour, friendship, science, government, thought, art, work. He may have "renounced" them—put them in a secondary place—till he shall have found God their Key; but, having hold of that Key, they are restored to him. That is paradox; but it is experience. They are thrown back into play—with the mortal sting removed. Augustine's words were so wise that they would suit well the New Testament: "Love God, and you may do what you will." This explains the lightheartedness, the range and freedom of the great regenerate minds of history; they do not fearfully cast about for textual justification for what they are about; where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty and an inner law-making power, which, however, never trespasses nor offends others, but all the same keeps its own spontaneity, swing and gait. This religious genius is capable, true, of making great sacrifices, of cutting away an eye or a hand that offends, if it is impossible otherwise to enter into the kingdom of heaven. But it does not maim except for that central object; there must be good reason for the surgeon's knife, and what it cuts away must be ascertained to be unsound and incapable of inclusion in a whole and saved being.

The vigorous religious spirit ought not to fear that art, research, and all forms of culture and action are not "safe" till each has a moral promptly tagged to it, till every mental enterprise can instantly justify itself as "improving," in the copy-book sense. This tethers life to a stake; it cramps spontaneity. It spoils great art without enlarging religion! It is just another form of the narrowness which, in the physical scientist, asks that everything shall go into a metrical formula; in the artist, that everything shall be resolved into feeling; in the practical worldling, that everything shall yield him profit; in the system maker, that whatever facts do not fit his Procrustes bed should not be dwelt upon.

But if the Creator has given us minds of many facets, with a noble world to live in and worlds on worlds beyond that, why not behave accordingly? The universe *as given* is in conspiracy to prevent us being creatures of one plane, one reaction. We are "that great amphibian," as Browne said; not spirits, but incarnate and living under a revelation of Incarnation, with many incarnational truths implied. If what is presented to mind and sense is insurgent stuff, mingled yarn, incongruous even, we have no right to hide away big tracts of it and magnify only that which will make a theory. Must we stop the ear to Pan's pipes—"the hooves

of many horses beating the wide pastures in alarm ; the song of hurrying rivers ; the colour of clear skies, the voice of things, and their significant look and the renovating influence they breathe forth . . . a shaggy world," full of drama, mystery, salt and savour.

Not only religion, but science, art and politics as practised to-day by millions need liberalising, catholicising and ventilating. They should be "good mixers" without forfeiting any of their distinctiveness of type and terms. Of music, poetry, humane letters, pictures, sculpture, physical sciences, the modern Catholic poet's words were true :

"Eye her not askance if she seldom sing directly of religion ; the bird gives glory to God though it sings only of its innocent loves. Suspicion creates its own cause ; distrust begets the reason for distrust. This beautiful, wild feline poetry, wild because left to range the wilds, restore to the hearth of your charity, shelter under the rafter of your faith."

We might then see less religion which is unbeautiful and unscientific and unphilosophical ; and less art, science and philosophy which are unbaptised.

IV

One of the most genuinely moral things we can do is to refuse to "moralise" everything. Many of the universe's spectacles refuse to yield a tag or even a "lesson." What do the Brandenburg concerts or the Fifth Symphony teach ? Chiefly to quieten our clamour for theory, submit to the music, and let it deepen us. What moral have the illations of mind in Shakespeare, Keats, Milton, Wordsworth, Shelley, Blake ? This : to be still and let them expand our natures. And what obvious "lesson" for conduct is taught by the Himalayas, by a stormy sunset, the sound of rain falling over the wide forest, the other-worldly stillness of evening on the marshes or the moors ? None. All they teach the mystic, the seer, the poet and the thinker is never to visit these shrines of the Eternal in the company of a moralist ! He would spoil all, because he belittles the general, ineffable disclosure in its virgin unity. And yet the overwhelming impression from the pageantry of earth and sky and the seasons is *religious* ; it did not need the Christian philosopher, Illingworth, in his great chapter in *Divine Immanence* to teach us that. In its presence, as in

the presence of moral beauty like our Lord's, or facing love, or death, or heroism, man rises above moralising to Adoration, the most moral attitude of all: "pious above the meaning of his thought, devout beyond the intention of his will."

In this time of compartmented research and almost jealous specialisation of faculty, is it too much to hope—for the good of science, art, religion and man himself—that we shall outgrow these violent antitheses between one beam from the central Sun, and another? Is it permissible to nurse the hope that the clearer minds, in the intervals of their intense specialisation, will come to the view that, just as all forms of speech, seeing, and art tend—in proportion to their ideal purity—to the state of music, so they all (music included) tend to the state of what we call faith and religion, that is love and adoration?

It might be said that the creative Spirit of God gets His best work done through men when at the practical moment they forget themselves, and even Him, in the work and the object. A poet like Milton assumes at the outset the favouring of the heavenly muse, and then immerses himself in the great "argument." Before or after a long flight of speculation, Kepler or Newton—a Linnæus or Pasteur—formally remember their God, and then, being finite workmen, promptly "forget" Him so as to do His work and benefit the race. Who will be so hardy as to get up and tell us that they were less "religious" when they went all out upon their task than when they were saying their prayers? The blunt truth is that *without* those prolonged spells of immersion in the task and its conditions, their piety would have been empty of content and their loyalty a poor and verbal and formal thing. Man has to bring a concrete contribution to the altar; very well, but that gift has first to be earned, and earned probably by long, tedious and absorbing labour that will jealously disallow any wandering of the thoughts from itself.

It is a profoundly wholesome dispensation that enforces this alternation in man's interests. It invades his little life with successive calls, with rhythmic change, with the enrichment of variety. Religious minds must correct the temptation—call it the infirmity—to wish the End to be always equally clear and present to the view; to wish the sacrifice to be unintermittent; to be always at the altar; and to forget the scores of contributory acts of the temple precincts where "all service ranks the same with God."

He who is "over all, through all and in all" is no mere lord of a province or a sphere ; no, not though you call it a religious or sacred province. The assumption that there *are* these alleged "provinces" at all is a purely human convenience. His province is the whole, and He is the unifying power through the most contrasted areas of existence.

W. J. BLYTON.

LONDON.

A JEWISH CHRISTIAN SYMPOSIUM.

I

JEWISH CONCEPTIONS OF CHRISTIANITY.¹

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

I WAS asked in the first instance to speak on "The Jewish Conception of Christianity." But this I refused to do. I requested that the article should be dropped, and that the letter "s" should be added to the word "conception." Thus it is not the Jewish conception of Christianity that I am going to speak about, but, at the best or the worst, only Jewish conceptions in the plural. For that there is any *one* Jewish conception I must deny. I am not sure that I should not have asked for yet another plural, only it would have sounded so very odd. Could one say "Jewish conceptions of Christianities"? I do not think that this title would be as silly as it sounds. For is there such a thing, or has there ever been such a thing, as Judaism or as Christianity? There have been, and there are, many Judaisms and many Christianities, but where is, and wherever has there been, that elusive, gossamer, ethereal thing which we could call Judaism or Christianity, pure and simple, in the singular?

Again, if I had been allowed to pick out one particular Christianity out of the many existing Christianities, which one should I have chosen? Or ought I to construct a greatest common measure Christianity and talk about *that*? But I should then be talking of a Christianity which has never existed—a mere abstraction.

But that is what, I fear, some Jews and some Christians

¹ This and the article which follows were read by their respective authors at a Conference of the Society of Jews and Christians held at the City Temple, London, on November 27, 1929.—EDITOR.

have often done. They have made up a greatest common measure Christianity or Judaism, and have dressed it up^{*} finely, and stuck it upon a pillar, and shot at it, and knocked it down. Yes, down it fell, and what a proud boy was the shooter! But, after all, it was only a lifeless doll which tumbled down so quickly. It is a fairly easy recipe. Take a few doctrines or conceptions, exaggerate them, pay no regard to the use which is actually made of them, forget the happy inconsistencies of living religion—religion as it lives both in average men and in men above the average—serve up hot and strong, with seasoning to taste, and say: “What a nasty dish is this!” And yet how can we help ourselves? How can I know Christianity, how can even a great Christian scholar know Judaism, from within? One might think that the best critic of Christianity would be the convert to Judaism. But in the act of leaving one religion for another the understanding of the old religion is withdrawn.

In some ways the Christian is better off than the Jew for judging his neighbour’s religion rightly. For the sacred book of the Jew is also, in some measure, the sacred book of the Christian, and in *some* matters we may say, roughly and inaccurately, that Christianity equals Judaism plus X. In some ways, on the other hand, a Jew might to-day be supposed to be better off than the Christian. For he lives in a Christian country, he is surrounded with Christian products in art and literature, he has easy opportunities to hear Christian preachers and to read Christian books, he has probably many Christian friends. For a hundred Jews who have, and can have, these advantages, there could not be one Christian.

Nevertheless, it has been hard, and it is still hard, for a Jew to assess Christianity fairly, or even to understand it, and so too it is hard for a Christian to assess rightly, and even to understand, Judaism. To Christian eyes, Judaism seems, in many ways, not so much wrong as incomplete; a one-sided, lop-sided, broken off, sterile and fossilised sort of religion. And, for the Protestant, there is always the stumbling block of the Law. To Jewish eyes, Christianity has often appeared a religion which is not only false, but also fraudulent; the religion of love which has greatly hated, the religion of forgiveness which has never forgiven. And just because Christianity has given itself such tremendous airs, as the absolute religion, the perfect religion, and so on, Judaism has tended to dislike and depreciate the very features which Christians have pointed to with pride as the special glories

and beauties of Christianity. And what Christians have declared to be a weakness in Judaism, the Jews have exalted as a strength. Judaism *has*, I fear, tended to become, in some quarters, a somewhat one-sided religion because of its opposition to Christianity.

Both the ordinary Christian critic of Judaism and the ordinary Jewish critic of Christianity seem to take up the position that there is no good feature in the other religion which is not found in a yet better form in their own ; that there is no specific doctrine in the other religion which contains even a small aspect of truth not as fully, or more purely, expressed in their own. The Jewish doctrine of X seems false to the Christian ; the Christian doctrine of Y seems false to the Jew. Very proper. But it does not merely seem false as a whole : it is not allowed to contain *within* its falsity any aspect of truth which, in the opposing religion, may perchance be inadequately represented or insufficiently stressed.

That has for long seemed to me an improbable opinion. Jones may be a much finer fellow than Smith. I, at least, think so. Smith may be a much finer fellow than Jones. You, at least, think so. But do we, therefore, hold that Smith may not have some *little* grace or charm which Jones has not, or Jones some *tiny* excellence that is less conspicuous in Smith ? Has Christianity no little point of value which it could with advantage learn from Judaism, and is Judaism wanting in no trace or touch of perfection that it could borrow from Christianity ?

For example. Judaism and Christianity both believe in the Divine Unity. But Judaism holds that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with a proper conception of the Unity of God ; to Judaism the doctrine of the Trinity is false. Christianity holds that the Jewish conception of the divine Unity is a poor, inadequate, and even false, representation of the Unity of God, and that this Unity is only truly, accurately and adequately represented by the doctrine of the Trinity. Very good. But might not Christians allow, though Christian Trinitarianism is true, and Jewish Unitarianism is false, that there is a valuable, and even a true, element in Jewish Unitarianism which is often neglected by, or inadequately expressed in, Christian Trinitarianism ? *Could* a Christian say this, or would the *Church Times*, or its Nonconformist equivalent, jump upon him too severely ? I dare say it would, because, when I tried, *mutatis mutandis*, to say something of the sort from my side

about this very point, I was rather sharply attacked by the highest official representative of orthodox Judaism.

If Jewish and Christian apologists were willing to allow that the other man's religion contained a few conceptions of value which are less prominently emphasised by, or less clearly brought out in, their own, how much more convincing they would both of them be ! I have no doubt myself that the Englishman, take him for all in all, beats creation ; but there may, nevertheless, be a thing or two in which the German, the Frenchman, the American or the Swede can have a look in.

A most interesting book could be written which, with adequate learning and detachment, would give a full history of Jewish conceptions of Christianity from the close of the first century to the present day. We should then observe how the criticisms and the points of attack have changed through the ages. Moreover, the criticisms would be not only different in different centuries, but, probably, also in different places. Even at the present day, the average Jewish conception of Christianity in Germany would, I imagine, differ from the average Jewish conception of it in Greece.

It is clear that nothing of the kind can be attempted here : knowledge and time alike are wanting. My own feeling, but a feeling unsupported by adequate knowledge, is that Jewish criticisms of Christianity have largely increased in modern times, say within the last sixty or seventy years.

If one reads the Acts, the sole difference between Jews and Christians seems to be : was Jesus the Messiah ? That great question doubtless involves or includes questions such as " did he rise miraculously out of the grave ? " But the fundamental issue is the plain and straightforward one : was he, or was he not, the Messiah ? The Jews said that he was not. And this is still the opinion of Jews to-day. The modern educated Jew to-day would no longer hold that Jesus was a deliberate deceiver, but only that, if he claimed to be Messiah, he was as self-deceived as many other false Messiahs, from his time onwards. He did not " rise " miraculously out of the tomb ; he was not miraculously born. He was just a man. As to his teaching, some Jews would say that it was fine and noble ; perhaps even that Jesus attained the level of Amos in inspiration and originality, but the majority of educated Jews would, I think, deny this, and insist that his teaching, where good, was not original, and where original was not Jewish or good.

As to the nature of God, all Jews maintain that the

doctrines of the divinity of Christ, of the Trinity, of the Eternal Son, of the personality of the Holy Spirit, are infractions of the divine Unity, and false. I do not notice that much attention is paid to the more philosophic interpretations of the Trinity. Jews hold that God's unity is so perfect and complete that any attempt to pry into the recesses and mysteries of the divine nature is perilous, objectionable and needless. Above all, there are no divisions or oppositions in that nature. God's justice is one with His love: His love with His justice. We men divide God's attributes, but in Him they form an *indivisible* harmony. Christians say that God, to the Jews, is remote, transcendent, unapproachable; Jews smile, and retort in kind. They say that, to the Christian, God the Father is, indeed, far: it is only the Son who is near. Only to the Jew is God near in His fullness and simplicity. No mediation is necessary between God and man. No mediator intervenes or introduces. This doctrine—very possibly in opposition to Christian teaching—is also emphasised in the Rabbinical literature. Before an earthly monarch one may not come without many a go-between; to God, man can draw near direct, for He can hear everybody at once, and is “near with every kind of nearness.” And it is one and the same God who does the big things and the small. He tells the number of the stars: He hearkens to the humblest of His human children. The one God punishes; the one God rewards; the one God forgives; the one God loves the penitent sinner. And so on. The Jews say that in Christianity the Father is made cruel so that the Son may be forgiving. To the Jew, God is one, and whatever He does is done by Him in the fullness of His Unity. Christianity, because it deified a man, has made concessions to heathenism and idolatry. It has allowed artists to make representations of God the Father as an old gentleman with flowing white hair; of the Holy Spirit as a bird, hovering between Father and Son; it has put the image of a man into its sacred places, and suffered men to worship and bow down before it. To every Jew all such images, pictures and symbols are blasphemous and abhorrent.

Judaism is a much simpler, less systematic, less precise religion than Christianity. Its definitions, its scholasticisms, its elaborations, have to do with actions and laws rather than with dogmas and doctrines. So the relations between God and man are much simpler, less rigorous. The story of the Fall never played much part in Judaism, and for a long while now the whole tale has been completely ignored. There was

no general condemnation of man by God ; no inherited weight of sin which required a special divine death and a special divine redemption ; God was ever the same ; always forgiving : always making due allowance for the frailty of human nature. Paul sets up imaginary ninepins in order to knock them down. The conception of God and of the Law which he puts forward was and is unknown to Judaism. The vast majority of Jews do not fully observe the Law. Conceded. But what of that ? God has, so to speak, arranged for this fact justly and mercifully in one. He pardons ; He has given us the Day of Atonement on which we may repent. He makes endless allowances. After death we may, indeed, be punished, but the punishment will be remedial ; it will only be for our own good. We are under no iron system, no grim necessity. To whom have we to render an account ? To a living and loving Father, who longs to pardon the repentant sinner. What, then, have we to fear ? *Wozu der Lärm ?* That is the modern Jewish position in a nutshell. That is the teaching of modern Rabbis. And, to a very large extent, it has been the teaching of Judaism through the ages. Modern Jews reject hell ; they reject eternal punishment : they teach, we might say, a mild edition of purgatory. For the Pauline doctrine of redemption and reconciliation they would declare that they have no place and no need.

As the theory of a Fall and the story of Adam are little used in the Rabbinical, and also, I believe, in mediæval Jewish literature, the whole Christian doctrine which depends upon that theory and that story is rejected by Judaism. If we take this rejection in connection with the rejection of Paul's conception of the Law, very important consequences follow. Any antithesis or opposition between Law and Grace, Faith and Works, is condemned. Judaism knows nothing of it. Everything in Judaism is much more fluid and unsystematic. There is no fear of inconsistencies ; no attempt to solve puzzles which must always remain puzzles. God requites everyone according to his works. But also He does *not*. He deals with man far more mercifully than man deserves ; He rewards human virtue divinely, that is, unequally ; He punishes human wickedness—unless it be very malignant, defiant, unrepentant—unequally (*i.e.* mercifully) too. Yet man's full responsibility for his actions remains. There is no compulsion in him to sin. His will is free. His nature is not *so* corrupt that, without a sudden, fresh, divine action he must needs sin, or be incapable of righteousness.

A theoretic consistency in these high matters was as little attained by Rabbinic as it has been attained by modern Judaism. Let me quote from an authoritative and important book just produced by a company of the best German Rabbis and Jewish scholars, and called *Die Lehren des Judentums nach den Quellen* (Part V., p. 121) :

“ Judaism does not deny that man brings with him, so to say, a certain inclination or tendency towards sin, and later on does actually, as life proceeds, burden himself with sin (*und such später mit Sünde belastet*). But every human soul is originally pure : for it is created by God, the perfect and eternally pure. If this purity is denied, then the ethical element in man (*das Ethische im Menschen*) is, in the last resort, condemned to impotency (*Ohnmacht*).”

The contradiction seems to me apparent. Man's soul is pure, and yet every man has a tendency to sin. Nevertheless, inconsistent as the teaching is, and unharmonised as is the “pure soul” with the “evil tendency,” the doctrine, as a whole, works. For practical purposes it works as well as the Christian doctrine to which it is opposed. In a later chapter we are told : “In Judaism the doctrine of the unlimited freedom of the will, and of the unlimited freedom of the sinner to repent, has continued dominating and unquestioned.” The theoretical, and even the actual, difficulties of such a doctrine are apparently ignored. Not a word is said of them. Yet, odd and unsatisfactory as this is, the Jewish doctrine is, for practical purposes, sound and healthy. “I ought, and therefore I can.” “It is never too late to mend.” In these two brief sentences deep convictions of Judaism are contained. God who has given us His Law has also given us the power to fulfil it. Nevertheless, Judaism recognises that man never does *completely* fulfil it, that all of us need the Day of Atonement and the divine forgiveness, and, lastly, that we all need, and all justly pray for, the direct help of God in our earthly lives in order that we may do the right. “Create in me a clean heart.” “Teach me to do Thy will.” Jewish prayers both of them, and their truth no less believed in than “I ought, therefore I can.” Judaism holds on to both ends of the stick ; but it has, we must admit, achieved no harmony between them. If I were to suggest that both in the Jewish and Christian doctrine of these puzzling subjects there lies some peculiar and special truth, as well as some peculiar and special inadequacy, I

suppose that all the Jewish and all the Christian pundits of the world would alike laugh me to scorn. They appear to believe that all the right is on one side, and all the wrong is on the other.

In accordance with its more fluid and unsystematic teaching, modern Judaism rejects any hard and fast division of mankind into accepted and rejected, or into saved and lost, or into once born and twice born, or into those who believe and those who do not believe. To modern Judaism, God, the universal Father, cares little for mere "belief"; He cares only for righteousness, and those who act up to their lights, and are righteous according to their conceptions of righteousness, are all equal in His eyes. The Jew imagines—with doubtful justice—that all Christians would reject these Jewish teachings. Therefore, for their Christian opposites, as he constructs them, he often expresses considerable contempt, and when Christians speak of Christian universalism, he holds that the universalistic boot should be put upon the other foot. Clearly—at least, *I* should venture to say, clearly!—the Jewish doctrine and the Jewish criticism are one-sided. If God, the supremely wise, cares so little about belief, why bother about right and wrong belief at all? And what would it matter had mankind all remained heathen? Again, is there no relation between belief and action? Is not human character a unity? And does not Jewish criticism largely fail to understand and realise the difference between mere *belief* and *faith* in the Pauline and Christian sense of the word? The answers to all these questions seem to me obvious, but none the less obvious are the wholesomeness and toleration of the Jewish doctrine. The pitfall of right belief conjoined to immoral life is entirely avoided. Another writer in the same German book says: "Faith in God is not demanded in Judaism; it is presupposed." What *is* demanded, Jews assert, is religious and moral action. God did not demand faith from Abraham. He demanded justice and right-doing. Only through his conduct is man justified, if indeed before the all-wise and the all-merciful God "justified" be the right word. In modern Judaism, it might be added, the word is scarcely known: in one sense, man is never justified before God; in another sense he is never unjustified—at least there is no such thing as fixed or eternal reprobation. It might be noted that the Talmudic and Rabbinic doctrine in these matters is less definite than in modern Judaism: and there is less conscious opposition to Christianity. Still, though among the Rabbis faith is by

no means neglected or unpraised, it is much less central than in orthodox Christianity, and plays a far less important part. Moreover, the Rabbinic *emunah*, which we translate "faith," like the usage of the same word in the Bible, means not so much "belief" as "trust." It is in some respects narrower than the Pauline *pistis*; in some respects wider. That the Jewish and Christian doctrine of faith and works might conceivably be complementary to each other, or might, at least, suggest points to a Theistic philosopher for a more comprehensive and adequate theory, is an idea perhaps less foolish than most Jewish and Christian teachers would allow.

Passing from these more strictly theological subjects, we might now ask how far Christian ethics are criticised or accepted by Jewish writers. There is obviously a very considerable measure of agreement in matters ethical between the two religions. How could there fail to be, considering that the roots of Christianity lie deep down and firmly planted in Judaism. Are there any virtues taught and praised by Jewish prophets and sages which have been rejected by Christianity? Yet it would be argued by Christians that to them all Christianity has added love, and that in love all the others are transcended and transfigured. To this Christian claim modern Jews reply in two ways. First, they assert that Judaism knows love as well as Christianity. They show how the Biblical word *chesed*, so inadequately and inaccurately rendered by "mercy" in the A.V., really means "love," or, at any rate, means something which contains all that is practically valuable in "love" without its taint of sentimentalism. Or, again, they say that the love of God and the love of neighbour and the love of the stranger commanded by the Law were always recognised from the earliest Rabbinic period down to the present day as the most fundamental religious demands in Judaism. This line of defence, then, admits the greatness of love, and would even perhaps allow that Paul's famous adage, and his still more famous hymn of praise concerning Love, have something to be said in their favour. Another line of defence is quite different, and consists in depreciating love in favour of justice. So far as I know, this line is modern; it fits in very pat with certain democratic and socialistic views of to-day, and is therefore fairly popular. It is curious to observe how the late Dr Kohler's standard work on Jewish theology (to the complete unconsciousness of the learned author) wobbles, with doubtful consistency, between these two lines of defence.

It is commonly taught by modern Jewish scholars that Christianity depreciates the joys and the labours, the ties and the quests, of earthly life, and finds all its satisfactions and its yearnings only in the life beyond the grave. Judaism, on the contrary, accepts and recognises the value of earthly excellences. It seeks to sanction them, but it does not deny them or despise them. Earthly prosperity, the conquest of poverty, family life, marriage, patriotism, peace, social well-being : all these things it values ; its ideal is an active and strenuous life. Suffering must be uncomplainingly and bravely borne : it is not sought ; on the contrary, the Jewish aim is to minimise suffering and to remove it. Christianity, it is alleged, glorifies suffering ; its suffering Messiah is the ideal of piety ; it preaches renunciation, flight from the world, asceticism ; its piety is passive ; celibacy is higher than marriage ; the monastery superior to the family. Wherever Christianity seeks to establish the Kingdom of God upon earth, and does not look for it only in heaven, or after the second coming of Christ, it is untrue to its own origins and is drawing nearer to Judaism. "Es bedeutet einen Bruch mit der Grundanschauung des Christentums und eine Annäherung an die jüdische Weltbejahung" (Rabbi Lewkowitz, *ib.*, p. 173). One sees the elements of truth in this criticism, but also the element of exaggeration. There is a good deal in the Rabbinical literature which might be quoted in support of this view of the nature of Judaism, but also a fair amount which is opposed to it. On the whole, it is a healthy exaggeration. To associate religion with all efforts for human improvement is good.

But there has been a certain tendency in modern Judaism to concentrate upon earth a bit too much, and to ignore and neglect the other life in an insistence upon the claims and the merits of this life. This life and that life, said the old Rabbi, are like vestibule and hall : "prepare thyself in the vestibule that thou mayest enter into the hall." That is both true Jewish and true Christian doctrine : in modern Judaism it is, I think, if we are to believe in the future life at all, a little slurred over. The old Rabbi, maybe, preserved the right balance towards the two lives by his strange paradox : "Better is one hour of repentance and good deeds in this world than the whole life of the world to come ; but better is one hour of blissfulness of spirit in the world to come than the whole life of this world." Again, to possess eternal life here and now by the soul's possession and contemplation of spiritual realities—the realities of beauty, knowledge and

righteousness—may have little meaning for many, and may be contrasted too much with a depreciated ideal of human progress upon earth. But so far as it *has* meaning, validity and worth, it is surely no less Jewish than Christian, and it would be a great mistake to impoverish Judaism by limiting it to one way only of looking at life, and calling all forms and phases of the other way Christian and un-Jewish. Attachment to the world and detachment from it ; this life and the next life ; the depreciation of things material and their appreciation and sanctification ; earthly treasures and heavenly treasures ; readiness to live, readiness to die ; a due valuation of sorrow and a due valuation of joy ; we need them all : Judaism can have them all ; Christianity can have them all ; it is a criticism fraught with much danger which would regard all the one set as Jewish, and all the other set as Christian. But that is not to say that, historically regarded, the one set may not be more characteristic of the one religion than of the other, or that certain special excellences and details of the one set may not have been more beautifully exemplified in Judaism, and certain excellences of the other set in Christianity. Each religion may have something to teach the other.

In conformity with the view that passivity, resignation, and the glorification of suffering are essential features of Christianity, to which Judaism is opposed, the injunction “resist not evil” is also commonly criticised by Jewish teachers. The command, says Rabbi Lewkowitz, is a denial of the principle and of the worth of justice ; in German this denial is even more important than in English, for *das Recht* in German has a wider connotation than justice for us. Breaches of justice, violations of the law, whether they affect the sufferer, or any other individual, or society at large, must be attacked : the wrong-doer must not be suffered to offend against *das Recht* with impunity. Hence it is that the judge, or the office of judge, has always been regarded by Judaism with such profound respect and veneration. With a touch surely of the German as well as of the Jew, the Rabbi adds : “Für Recht und Ehre zu kämpfen gehört zum Wesen des Judentums.” Justice, together with truth and peace, constitutes one of the three things on which, as it says in the Talmud, the continuance of the world depends. Once again we see how the two religions may be complementary to one another, or how stress and development can be given by the one to doctrines which are not unknown to the other. For the Old Testament, too, made

some advances in the ethical criticism of tit for tat. The Sermon on the Mount follows up the attack, emphasises it and develops it. Retaliation is commonly supposed by Christians to be a fundamental principle of Judaism. That is an exaggeration. But the opposition to "resist not evil"—just because it is peculiar to the New Testament, and what is peculiar to the New Testament cannot be good—has prevented modern Jewish critics from seeing the elements of value in the Gospel teaching, and has thereby also prevented them from working out the limits of retaliation, and even the limits of justice, and of "*das Recht*," as clearly as they might otherwise have done. For it might be said that "resist not evil" represents a sort of religionised equity, that admirable virtue which is so beautifully described by Aristotle (of all people in the world) in his "*Rhetoric*."

Connected with the Jewish opposition to "resist not evil" is Jewish opposition to "love your enemies," though there it is a passivity, here an activity, which is criticised. This is the point where Jewish critics seem to be at their weakest. It is said that something is here commanded which is against human nature, and absolutely impossible of achievement—that you cannot love your enemy as you love your friend, your wife, your child, your benefactor; and that, consequently, there is no command in the New Testament which has been more conspicuously disobeyed by Christians than the very command which we are constantly told is the sovereign glory of Christianity. But the criticism is of little value. If "love your enemies" means "be generous to them," "return good for evil," "pray for them," "do not hate them in your heart," and so on, then the injunction can be, and often has been, obeyed. Love your enemies, as interpreted in the very Gospels themselves, is an order of which Christians may justly boast, and which Judaism can legitimately adopt. It is in line with the best Jewish teaching, sums it up, and extends it. Surely, I feel inclined to say to my Jewish friends, Judaism has enough excellences to its credit; you need not grudge *one* to another faith, and all the less seeing that the author of this excellence was himself a Jew.

It is a curious thing how the same Gospel saying can be glorified by Christians, and depreciated by Jews. Jesus is reported to have said, "Whoever would save his life shall lose it, and whoever shall lose his life for my sake shall save it. What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his soul?" And in the Fourth

Gospel we have the famous saying about the grain of wheat, which only through death "brings forth much fruit." The doctrine of "die to live" has been spiritually interpreted and developed to any extent, and it has been regarded as the essential teaching, almost as the life-nerve, of Christianity. I do not remember reading any Jewish criticism of the doctrine in its more modern spiritual interpretation. It is noteworthy that the important German book from which I have quoted is entirely silent about it, as it is also about the love of enemies, the searching out of the lost, and of self-sacrifice. But in its probably oldest signification, namely, that earthly life must be readily sacrificed in order to win eternal life, the life of the resurrection, the life beyond the grave, it is often used by Jews as a sort of proof that Christianity lays all stress upon the salvation of the soul. "What shall *I* do to be saved?" "How can *I* escape hell and get to heaven?" Christianity is, therefore, considered a selfishly individualistic religion, and monks, hermits, anchorites, are regarded as its true developments. It is an anti-social religion. It is obvious how certain forms of early and mediæval Christian piety, and certain phases of Protestant Christianity, can be justly cited in illustration of this Jewish criticism. Judaism, it is said, partly because it has little truck with hell, is essentially social. It says, "Don't think about your soul. Do your duty to your fellow-men. He who does not seek happiness shall find it; he who does not worry about salvation will attain salvation." Both the criticism and the supposed Jewish doctrine (it is entirely modern) have obviously their elements of truth, but it is singular how other, no less significant, features of Christianity are ignored. For, to begin with, does not Jesus preach the doctrine of self-sacrifice and self-denial, not only for the sake of one's own salvation, but, quite as much and more, for the sake of others, for the saving of the outcast, the sinner and the lost? It is folly not to appreciate the fact that social service is as much a feature of Christianity as of Judaism. We might, indeed, if we push the subject home, discover that certain forms of social service are more characteristically Jewish, and others, such as the redemption of the fallen and the outcast, more characteristically Christian. Father Damien and his living successors did not go, and do not go, out to live among the lepers, and become leprous, in order to save their souls, but in order to help the lepers. When Jews do likewise, let them criticise. And when Jews cavil at Christian missions they should, at all events, remem-

ber that all this ardour and self-sacrifice and enthusiasm are for the sake of others, and not for the salvation of the missionaries' own souls. They may have depended far too much upon the narrow and mistaken doctrine, to which modern Jews rightly object, that salvation is only obtained by belief, and, moreover, only by one set of beliefs, namely, by Christianity—a narrow and mistaken doctrine to which they justifiably oppose the Talmudic, and by Jews now universally accepted, saying that “the righteous of all nations shall have a share in the world to come”—but, at any rate, there is nothing selfish about this ardour and self-sacrifice; on the contrary, they show a passionate interest in, and caring for, the supreme welfare of others. A further criticism by Jews of Christian social service in olden days may be more justified. It is that, in accordance with the doctrine of a somewhat sloppy and sentimental love, this service was too often not according to knowledge. This criticism may be connected with the further criticism, again one-sided, but not wholly without its partial justification, that Christianity, in its laudation of simplicity and childlikeness, has gone too far. The famous saying about the wise and the babes in Matthew does not ring a Jewish note. The first petition in the oldest, fixed, liturgical, Jewish prayer is for knowledge, and even for the secular knowledge of gentiles Jews are enjoined to thank God, and to say, “Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who hast given of Thy wisdom to flesh and blood.” Is not all this a very different type of doctrine, Jews urge, from the spirit of the teaching that “the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God”?

In spite of all these and other criticisms of Christianity, Jews do not deny either its claim to be a great religion, or its function and purpose in the world. In that respect they are more generous to Christianity than Christians are to Judaism. For Christians, to put it bluntly, almost always seem to hold that Judaism's work was done when it gave birth to Christianity. It is now only an anachronistic survival, and has nothing more to do in the religious development of the world. The Jewish view, on the other hand, started, I believe, by Maimonides, in the twelfth century, is that Christianity's function is to be a sort of half-way house between heathenism and Judaism. From the worship of many gods the nations are to pass through Christian Trinitarianism to the pure Jewish doctrine of the stainless unity of God. The difficulties of this theory,

both in relation to Mahommedanism, which is also supposed by Maimonides to be such a Tennysonian stepping-stone to higher things, and in relation to Christian Unitarianism, are obvious, but it is rather amusing to find that each religion holds that the purpose of the other lies in close connection with itself. The purpose of Judaism was to produce Christianity ; the purpose of Christianity is to produce more Judaism. Thus do men argue : shall we, perhaps, rather say that how *God* meant and means it all is hidden from our eyes ?

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II.

WHAT CHRISTIANS THINK OF JEWS.

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MY task in following my friend Mr Montefiore is somewhat different from his. "What Christians think of Jews" is indeed almost as vague a theme as Mr Montefiore's, but for somewhat different reasons. First of all let me point out what a vague word "Christians" is. Perhaps the chief difference between Christians to-day and the Christians we read about in the New Testament and very early Church history is that they are now the majority. It makes a great difference, and indeed for Christians a great problem. The Christian Religion, as I see it, has never quite succeeded in expressing itself in majoritarian terms. From beginning to end the New Testament is a collection of writings written for an insignificant minority. This minority is conscious of being "elect," "converted," "called to be saints," "lights shining in a dark world"; but they are "a little flock," a minority even compared with the unbelieving Jews, and a mere drop in the ocean as compared with the Gentiles around them. The nominal Christians are now the immense majority, in Europe at least, and it is quite evident that some of the New Testament phrases are inappropriate, if applied to all Christians indiscriminately.

Let me point out that this is a real problem for Christian thought, for Christian theory, apart from questions of heresy or schism or Christian ideas about the members of other religions. It is not a problem about the next world, but about this world. The next world, like the morrow, can take care for itself. But the question does arise here and now, who ought to be included in the term "Christians"? It surely

is not quite synonymous with "Gentiles." On the other hand, to limit "Christian" to Christian saint or Christian theologian is obviously too narrow.

What I suppose the organisers of the joint meeting of Jews and Christians had in view for their lecturer to express was the opinion that an "ordinary Christian" has of the ordinary religion of Jews. The trouble is that an "ordinary Christian" is very difficult to define. The Christians in the New Testament were none of them ordinary, inasmuch as they belonged to a small minority and all were converts. Further, the best of them had so exalted an idea of the holiness of God, of His love for them and their personal unworthiness of such favour, that they were afraid not only of sin, but of self-complacency. The paradox in the Gospel about the complacent ritualist and the contrite tax-gatherer became to them a commonplace. Augustine, Bunyan, and many another Christian saint, peer into their own hearts; they see the presence there of the evil disposition, the *יצר הרע*, and its possibilities for evil and rebellion against God. They are quite sincere, and it may be a good and salutary exercise for a serious man from time to time to look into his own heart and disposition; very likely he too, like Augustine and Bunyan, if he be honest with himself, will come to the conclusion that he is no better than he should be. But when he has to legislate for others, in a state where all or most are nominally Christians, he must not consider the outstanding saints alone. He is bound to consider the minimum standard consistent with the Christian name. It is one thing to call yourself a miserable sinner, and quite another to call other people miserable sinners.

That is why it is so difficult to define an ordinary Christian. I don't know that I have expressed myself clearly, but I want to convey to my Jewish readers that "Christians" are a somewhat indefinite body. There is a smaller nucleus inside, which is really Christian, whose opinions have some right to be called Christian opinion; and there is a large surrounding nebula which is not non-Christian, but its thoughts and prejudices are not genuine representatives of Christian ideas.

Perhaps it may lighten the tedium of theological discussion if I give a notable example of what was thought of Jews in the past by more and less enlightened Christians. My quotation is from a letter of Pope Gregory the Great to Januarius Bishop of Cagliari in Sardinia (Greg. *Epp.* ix. 6) written a little before A.D. 600. He writes :

“Gregory to Januarius, Bishop of Cagliari. Jews who have come hither (to Rome) from your city have complained to us that Peter, who by the will of God has been brought from their superstition to the worship of the Christian faith, having taken with him certain disorderly persons, on the day after his baptism, that is on the Lord’s Day of the very Paschal festival, with grave scandal and without your consent, had taken possession of their synagogue in Cagliari, and placed there the image of the Mother of our God and Lord, the venerable Cross, and the white vestment (*birrum*) with which he, Peter, had been clothed when he rose from the font. Concerning which thing the honourable and pious Commandant and the Governor of your town concur in attesting the same. And they add also that this had been foreseen by you, and that the aforesaid Peter had been prohibited from venturing on it. On learning this we altogether commended you, since as became a truly good priest you wished nothing to be done whence just blame might arise. But since by not having at all mixed yourself up in these wrong doings you show that what was done displeases you, we, considering the bent of your will in this matter and still more your judgment, hereby exhort you that, having removed thence with fitting reverence the image and the cross, you should restore what has been violently taken away; seeing that as legal enactment does not suffer Jews to erect new synagogues so also it allows them to keep their old ones without disturbance. Lest then the above-named Peter, or others who have afforded him assistance or connivance in the wrongfulness of this disorderly proceeding, should reply that they had done it in zeal for the Faith, in order that a necessity of being converted might thereby be imposed on the Jews, they should be admonished and ought to know that moderation should rather be used towards them, that so the will not to resist might be elicited from them and not that they should be brought in against their will: for it is written *I will sacrifice to Thee willingly* (Ps. liii. 8 = E. liv. 6) and *Of my own will I will confess to Him* (Ps. xxvii. 7 = E. xxviii. 7 end).”

In this letter we have, I think, a characteristic picture of “what Christians thought of Jews.” There is the fanatic, in this case a ’vert, who has lost all sense of justice and

proportion. On the other hand, there is the wise Pope, fully convinced of the truth of Christianity and desiring the sincere conversion of Jews, but at the same time recognising their right, both legal and moral, to remain Jews, and he is fully determined to uphold those rights. And then there is Bishop Januarius, a rather poor figure but very interesting at this moment to us, for I'm afraid that he represents the "ordinary Christian" that we were looking for. He evidently had not approved of this Peter going so far, and told him so, but at the same time had taken no active steps to prevent him. He, Januarius, had not complained to Gregory. The deed was done, and the holy symbols had been put into the Synagogue, and who was he to outrage popular Christian sentiment by taking them away? In the end, as you have heard, he had to do this, and be politely but firmly rapped on the knuckles by Gregory.

There is one respect in which Januarius is certainly a more typical representative of the ordinary Christian than the fanatical Peter. Peter, the *Mesummad*, had some knowledge of the religion of the Synagogue: Januarius doubtless had none. It is, I think, not unimportant in this connection to lay stress on the profound ignorance of most Christians, even now, about the Rabbinical religion.

If you want to know, from an academical point of view, what Christian knowledge of Judaism has been and on what sources it has been based, you cannot do better than study the pamphlet by Professor George Foot Moore of Harvard called *Christian Writers on Judaism*.¹ In this admirably written treatise we may read about the *Pugio Fidei* by Raymundus Martini the Dominican, about Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judenthum*, about modern books such as those of Bousset and Schürer and Weber. But I venture to think it may be more amusing if I illustrate my point by my own experience. Up to now I have always been very kindly treated by Jews, and it began at a preparatory school in London, when a school-fellow of my own age—about thirteen—taught me the Hebrew alphabet. His name was Cohen, Cohen Secundus. It is more than fifty years now since I saw him, but if he be still alive and should read these lines, I should like him to know how grateful I still feel. At the time I felt I had been initiated into the innermost mysteries, as of the Kabbala itself. But I am sorry to say my Hebrew education stopped there, and when I was at

¹ *Harvard Theological Review* (for July, 1921), vol. xiv., pp. 197-254.

Harrow the only use I made of my alphabetical lore was to employ it as a secret script for school notes in English.

Later on I learned Biblical Hebrew properly—I was the first pupil of my very dear friend and present colleague, Professor Kennett—but I learned no Rabbinic, and though I met Dr Schiller-Szinessy several times and enjoyed his extraordinary flow of learned talk, my interests did not include Jewish religion. I cannot remember when I first heard of Johanan ben Zakkai, but I know that I was a Professor of Divinity before I had come to realise to myself his historical importance. This simple confession will show how little fairly-well equipped Christians know, as a rule, about the religion of Jews.

A new era, from the scientific point of view, may be said to have begun in 1892. In that year appeared two works, one in Germany and one in England, which put in a new light the nature of early Christianity on the one hand, and the Rabbinical religion on the other. The German work was the first edition of Johannes Weiss's *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, a little pamphlet of sixty-seven pages: this was the first clear recognition by a modern critical theologian that the Gospel phrases about the near approaching catastrophic coming of the Kingdom of God cannot be explained away, but were an integral part of the message of Jesus. The importance of Weiss's pamphlet was emphasised a little later by Albert Schweitzer in his well-known book, the English title of which is *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*: this appeared in 1906, and so it may be said that during the greater part of this present century the intensely Apocalyptic character of the earliest Christianity, the impulse of a Hope that after all was not fulfilled, at least in the way so confidently anticipated, has been set before the consciousness of all thoughtful Christians.

The other book, published in 1892, to which I refer, is Mr Montefiore's *Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Jews*. These Lectures, so far as concerned the Old Testament period, were marked by a full knowledge and acceptance of the best modern criticism, but what was new in them, at least to Christian scholars, was the spirited *Apologia* for the Rabbinical religion, the religion of the Talmud. Not only did Mr Montefiore protest, and protest very effectively, against the caricature of Talmudic religion made by most modern non-Jewish scholars. He went further, and claimed that in certain respects Talmudic religion was a more spiritual and disinterested idea of religion than what is

found in the Old Testament. We are not yet considering modern times and conditions. The differences between the modern liberal Jew and his orthodox brother are not here in question : what Montefiore had in mind was the religion of Johanan ben Zakkai and of Akiba and of Rab.

What is the connection between these two things, the Apocalyptic, "eschatological," view of the Gospel and the spiritual view of Talmudic Judaism ? Why do I bring them together here ? I am perhaps looking at things from a rather peculiar angle, but I hope I may be able to explain what I mean, and why I see a parallel between contemporary Jewish and Christian efforts, whether called "Liberal" or "Modernist" or not, to express the religion of our fathers in terms that suit the changed world in which we all find ourselves.

Let us take the Christian side first. The Christians, as I read the New Testament, started with an intense belief in the nearness of a great Event for all the world, Jew and Gentile, a final judgment which would set all wrongs right. This final Judgment, in the form expected, or indeed in any recognisable form, did not arrive, yet somehow Christianity did not wither but survived, and it attained a relatively stable constitution, a view of the Universe which came to classical expression in such theological works as the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas and such word-pictures as Dante's great poem. Since then conditions have changed, and, so far as the old theory of Christianity is concerned, changed for the worse. The shape of the world has changed, our ideas about its physical origin, and about the origin and early history of man, have changed. We know a great deal more, and the new knowledge does not fit easily—to say the least—into the framework of the old religion. Moreover, this new state of things, these new conditions, have now become evident not only to philosophers and theologians, but also to an increasing number of ordinary men and women. We hear on all sides of "the decay of organised religion," and similar phrases : the latest episcopal pronouncement, the recently-published charge of the Bishop of Southwark, has been courageous enough to declare that the main cause is intellectual, intellectual dissatisfaction with the old formulation of Christianity. Yet Christians do not altogether despair ; and there are some, mostly called by some name which means "Modernists," who still believe that a way will be found along which the proved treasures of the Old Faith may be carried without essential damage into the new world of to-day and to-morrow.

Now as to Judaism, or rather the Rabbinical religion. There is a difference, but the difference seems to me more at the beginning than at the end. Rabbinical Judaism, which started with Johanan b. Zakkai and the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, very soon attained a stable constitution comparable to Catholicism, and it has lasted to the present day. We may, in general terms, compare Maimonides (1135-1204) with his almost contemporary Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274) as the philosophers of their respective religions; about the same time, too, the actual liturgical services of the two religions became more or less fixed in their classical forms. And now the hitherto stable constitutions of the two religions are menaced in something the same way by the alien atmosphere of their present environment.

At the beginning, however, the similarity of condition between Christianity and Rabbinical Judaism is not quite so obvious, but to a certain extent I believe it exists. If you ask me what I think of the religion of Jews, I should begin by replying that it is not the Old-Jewish religion itself, but one of its two daughters, the other being Christianity. If you go on to ask me what became of the Old-Jewish religion, I should reply that it died in 70 C.E. of a violent death. Strictly speaking, a more accurate reply would be that it almost was killed in 70, but that it was finally battered to death in 135, in the times of Hadrian and Bar Cochba, in the horrors of the second Jewish War, when Akiba was martyred. But the first reply is true enough in essentials.

The Old-Jewish religion, the religion which animated the Maccabæan rebellion and perished in the war with Rome, seems to me sufficiently different from the Rabbinical religion to be thus described. And if my Jewish readers now are wishing to protest against my presentation, may I remind them that even before the destruction of Jerusalem the Christians had begun to make a more radical claim and to describe themselves as the true Israel, the true and only heir to the promises? This, indeed, is the official Christian traditional claim to the present day.

It seems to me more just to describe both Christianity and the Rabbinical religion alike as daughters of the Old-Jewish religion, the religion of the Old Testament, the religion of the Maccabees and their followers. For the moment at least, we will leave out questions of legitimacy on either side. But just as I am sure my Jewish readers would protest against the Christian claim to be the true Israel, so also I do feel that the Rabbinical religion, the religion of Johanan b.

Zakkai and his followers, is not exactly a continuation of the Old-Judaism, but rather is a new development. The Old-Judaism was embodied in a State : it was not merely racial, but national. It had a national centre, and at that national centre stood the Temple, where alone the sacrifices were offered and the national feasts fully celebrated, where "they made intercession for the sins of Israel." The Temple services were conducted by an hereditary priesthood, the members of which alone could offer the sacrifices which, according to ancient ideas, were of the essentials of worship. Then came the war with Rome ; all these things came to an end. "We have gone forth from our land, and Sion has been taken from us, and we have nothing now save the Almighty and His Law" : so laments the writer of the Apocalypse of Baruch (lxxxv. 3), writing in the bitterness of his heart, before it was found out by experience that Talmudic Judaism had power to endure in an alien world.

I have published elsewhere a fanciful picture of the kind of difference I see between the Judaism of before and after the destruction of Jerusalem, but it may not be out of place to quote it here.¹ Suppose the Church of England disestablished by a hostile State, with all the cathedrals and churches and funds confiscated. Suppose, further, all the bishops killed or imprisoned till they died, with many of the other clergy, so that the apostolic succession was quite cut off and no valid absolution or Holy Communion could be given any more. Suppose, nevertheless, that after seventy years of catastrophe congregations of High Anglicans were still to be found, determined to be faithful, so far as in them lay, to the High Anglican ideal, and indeed persisting indefinitely—that is what, *mutatis mutandis*, actually befell the Jews between 70 and 135. But I went on to say that, if such things occurred to the Church of England, it is pretty certain that not all the priestless Anglicans would survive as Anglicans. Besides those killed or exiled by persecution, many would have gone over to Rome, or have lapsed from religion altogether.

"The faithful remnant would consist almost entirely of the sort of person for whom the restricted Anglicanism now possible for them had attractions : *they* would enjoy such rites and observances as were still open for them to practise."

¹ See *Speculum Religionis*, p. 11.

Just as such a restricted Anglicanism would be a new religion, different from the old religion of the Church of England (though its direct and legitimate descendant), so also Rabbinical Judaism is a new religion, and different from the Judaism of which we read in Josephus and the Gospels. The proportions were different, the emphasis was different. Moreover, the new was on the whole better than the old. In the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Jews experienced "a removing of those things that may be shaken, as being made things, that the things which cannot be shaken might remain." And, let me add, we Christians must acknowledge that Johanan b. Zakkai and the many generations of his disciples received also an unshakable kingdom—the yoke of *malkuth Shamaim*—whereby they could "serve God acceptably with reverence and awe."¹

But the point I want specially to make is that the two religions, Christianity and Rabbinical Judaism, had before them a problem of something of the same kind. They had to adapt the expression of their beliefs and aspirations to the conditions of a world in which at least one central feature of their several beliefs and aspirations remained unfulfilled. "The Romans will come and take away our place and nation": who can doubt that these words, put into the mouth of the Jewish leaders by the Gospel of John, were an appropriate expression for a complete collapse of Judaism as conceived before 70 by all but a very small minority of Jews? "Your expected Christ will not come, no, not for a thousand years and more, if then": if one had said this to any early Christian, even to St Paul, would it not have been regarded as a denial of the Christian faith and as a prognostication of its speedy extinction? Yet Christianity, as a matter of fact, has survived, and so has Judaism. They both adapted themselves to their environment and survived. It seems to me, I confess, in both cases strange, a matter for wonder and consideration and hope.

In the near future, now and in the coming century, we appear to be entering on another period of trial, of much the same general kind. How much of our inherited beliefs and customs and social rules, which as Christians or Jews we have inherited, can we maintain in this scientific, materialistic, archæological world? Who knows? This is not the place for "propaganda." But it is not out of place here to plead for some measure of what I would call sympathetic tolerance.

Tolerance is not always a "good" word, for in at least

¹ See Hebrews xii. 27, 28.

two cases out of three it is a synonym for indifference. The kind of tolerance I am thinking of is born of appreciation and sympathy, and is even compatible with proselytism. Moreover, there is not only a question of tolerance between Jews and Christians; sympathetic tolerance is needed between conservatives and progressists within both religions. But this state of mind cannot be reached without comprehension, without a comprehension of what the old orthodoxies were, how august, how venerable, how helpful, how attractive to those who saw them from within; and, on the other hand, how changed conditions are in modern times, how imperative seems the necessity of adaptation, of modification, even of the abandonment of this or that. And besides all this, both the conservative and the modernist need so sorely to have "a right judgment in all things," so as to discern wisely whether such-and-such a feature of the old religion is really essential, or is a feature which only *represents* something essential, such as were the Temple services in the one religion, or the belief in the near coming of Christ in the other.

In the matter of sympathy between Jews and Christians, there can be, I think, no doubt that what Christians need in the first place is greater knowledge of the actual aims and ideals of religious Jews, both "liberal" and "orthodox." We Christians, as I have explained, are still very ignorant in this respect, notwithstanding the *Jewish Encyclopædia* and Singer's *Jewish Prayer Book*. I am not thinking only of dogma or philosophy: I am thinking chiefly of aspiration and of the actual forms in which this aspiration is embodied in the worship of God.

And just as I would suggest this study to my fellow Christians, I would venture to ask for a similar sympathy from Jews, especially in what concerns the Divine Unity. "It is forbidden," says the now unpopular "Athanasian" creed, "to say *There be three Gods*." This is, and always has been, the Christian doctrine. What I ask is that you should not regard the Christian orthodox doctrine of the Trinity as a relapse into Polytheism. Possibly the doctrine is not perfectly expressed, possibly—nay certainly—it has often been misunderstood by imperfectly instructed Christians, but its intention is not polytheistic. It rather corresponds to those amazing speculations of our modern scientific guides who tell us to regard simple atoms as containing within themselves complexities comparable to the solar system. I am not going here inappropriately to expound

my possibly heretical view of a complicated controversial doctrine, more than to assert that the Christian formula is an attempt to co-ordinate the special Divine element in man and the special Divine element which Christians believe to have been in Jesus, with the mysterious Divine Reality which both Jews and Christians believe to govern all things. As I say, our Christian co-ordination may be incoherent, especially to outsiders, but its intention is, in the literal sense of the word, Unitarian; it attempts to gather together the various sides of Christian religious experience within the dogma, common to Jews and Christians, of the Unity of God.

My excuse for bringing in these strictly theological considerations is that there does seem to be a misconception about the matter, which goes back to the days when it was supposed that language was an adequate expression of ideas, and that true orthodoxy consisted in the accurate repetition of formulas rather than in an appreciation of the ideas which the formula attempts to express.

I should like to conclude on this note, but I feel impelled to go on and touch upon another aspect of what Christians think of Jews, which is not, strictly speaking, religious at all. But when a large number of Jews and Christians, all of them men and women of good will, are considering these questions together, it seems wrong not to touch upon it.

Various districts of London, of Manchester, and perhaps of other large English towns, are being colonised by Jews, and it seems to the Christians who remain in these districts that they are being colonised by aliens. I do not mean that the newcomers are immigrants from Poland or Rumania, or that they cannot talk English. But, perhaps not unnaturally, they stick together, they have entertainments together, they have few dealings with the Gentiles their neighbours. As I say, this is not a directly religious question. It is the same, very nearly, in districts where there is a large immigration of Roman Catholics, or even where they are many "Christian Scientists." It was the same, according to all indications, in districts where in the earliest centuries the Christians were multiplied. And why? Because they stuck together. It is natural in minorities, even praiseworthy. We hear of the earliest Christians that they were all with one accord in Solomon's Porch, but that of the rest no man durst join himself unto them.¹ The

¹ Acts v. 12, 13.

Christian historian adds that the people "magnified" them : I wonder ! I doubt if their popularity lasted long.

Nothing is further from my intention than to offer advice. The mere fact that a successful combined meeting of Jews and Christians can take place shows a desire to break down isolation, though it may be held, I suppose, that the self-centredness of which I have been speaking may, from the point of view of the Jewish community, be on the whole a good thing for them. But it does tend to produce unpopularity and resentment among outsiders : this feeling does, to some extent, exist, and I felt it my duty to call attention to it.

Blood relationship and common aims—these are the two chief things which hold men together. I do not mean that these things always make for peace : far from it, as in the obvious case of Irish terriers. But they are real bonds, which link men to one another, which make men take an interest in one another. If Jews and Christians are to live together in mutual respect and friendship they must have common aims. And in what concerns Religion I feel sure that a greater mutual knowledge of each other's religious ideals and aspirations, in addition to the common possession of the Old Testament, would show that both have more in common than is often supposed, even in cases where the traditional religious expression of ideals and aspirations seems far apart.

F. C. BURKITT.

CAMBRIDGE.

DARWINISM.

A REPLY TO THE BISHOP OF EXETER.

MAJOR LEONARD DARWIN.

THE Bishop of Exeter, in a thoughtful, temperate, and interesting article on Darwinism in the July issue of the HIBBERT JOURNAL, says that "no doubt Darwinian readers will have their explanations" of the difficulties raised by him "which allow them to be exact Darwinians, and at the same time democrats and believers in the preservation of the poor and feeble of all races"; and he hopes that "they will give these explanations" (p. 674). To reply as effectively as possible would demand a full training in both philosophy and biology, neither of which qualifications do I possess. I fear I can only claim to speak as a Darwinian on the principle of heredity.

The Darwinian believes that natural selection has been the main factor in evolution; and whether this be true or not need not here be discussed. This is so because the criticisms here to be considered may be described as being based on a provisional acceptance of this theory, and consequently none of them need to be answered if evolution has really been brought about in some other way. I am in full agreement with the Bishop in holding that very real dangers lie ahead of us and that these dangers may be greatly intensified by the acceptance of false theories concerning natural processes. And here I feel I must with due courtesy suggest that these dangers will only be intensified by painting Darwinism in colours so startling as to run the chance of giving rise to erroneous impressions. In the article with which I am attempting to deal, such expressions as "ruthless destruction" are constantly used, when the words "elimination from the race" would certainly give a more accurate idea of the opinions held by Darwinians. According to our

beliefs, the struggle for existence involves the elimination rather than "the destruction of those types which are less fitted to survive" (p. 666). The organisms which will survive in the evolutionary sense are those which produce the largest families, only those offspring being counted which succeed in reproducing their kind. Indeed, any animal type which did not normally have more than two offspring would be as effectively eliminated from the race as if its individual members were all being ruthlessly destroyed before mating, though no doubt the process would be slower. In fact, in evolutionary studies the size of the family is a consideration of even more importance than the death of the individual. We should note, moreover, that the death of an animal after it has reproduced its kind is a no less painful event than it would have been if it had occurred before parenthood; and as the mere selection for reproduction between different individuals does not increase the number of deaths, it cannot therefore be described as being the agency which has caused all that vast amount of suffering in the past which has accompanied the struggle for existence. This suffering must rather be attributed to the production of unnecessarily large families. It is true that we believe that the normal size of the family is in the long run regulated by natural selection, and that consequently to natural selection may after all be attributed all these useless deaths. Those who hold that the results of the evolutionary process have been evil in this respect ought at all events to be willing to advocate a drastic limitation of the sizes of families amongst human beings.

To put the matter in another light, those who refuse to believe that all we see around us is the result of blind chance must hold that the suffering which has been endured by countless millions of animals, for many millions of years before the appearance of man on earth, constitutes one of the greatest mysteries of the universe. And this mystery would not be lessened by the adoption of any theory of evolution other than that here under consideration. Indeed our difficulties in this respect would be increased if we had to believe in the separate creation, one after another, of all those innumerable species which have appeared on earth in the past, each one destined to extinction.

The main point which I wish here to urge is, however, that though we certainly believe that natural selection has been the main factor in moulding organisms into their existing forms, yet we do not hold that this belief can form the basis of any argument as to what man *ought* to be or to do.

If we wish to use the word "progress" in connection with evolution, we should first of all inquire what is the exact meaning which we intend to attach to that term. The change which natural selection tends to produce in the descendants of existing organisms is merely an increased power of survival, or rather of multiplication, when in competition with all the other organisms to be found in their neighbourhood, this being a process known as adaptation. If we were to accept adaptation as being the right criterion of progress, man might perhaps claim to stand first in the organic world, on the ground that he has become sufficiently well adapted to *all parts* of the surface of the earth to be able to survive therein in competition with other organisms. Innumerable organisms can, however, exist below the surface of the earth and in the sea, that is where man cannot continue to exist. The universal supremacy of man may be denied on this account, and indeed also because it may well be said that all organisms which have existed for long in any given environment are equally "fit" in that environment. A high degree of adaptation is no doubt a condition necessary for existence; but this is true as regards both what we call the highest and the lowest kinds of organisms. The word "progress" may be defined in many different ways; and all that I can here do is to ask each reader to frame his own definition and then to consider whether it is not something very different from mere adaptation. All will admit, I believe, on consideration that natural selection does not necessarily make for progress in their sense of the word; whilst science indicates that the changes thus produced have often been what we should describe as retrograde in character. Darwinism does not point the road to moral progress, though it indicates certain conditions necessary for that progress. Science puts tools in our hands, but does not tell us for what purpose they ought to be used.

A subtle argument which has sometimes been brought forward in favour of the view that a belief in evolution must be accompanied by moral dangers runs as follows: Darwinians hold that as the whole of every organism is the product of evolution, the brain of man must have been produced in the same way as the rest of his body. Conscience, being a mental process, they regard as being a development of the herd instinct, which makes the animal instinctively ready to sacrifice himself for the sake of his own kind. According to this view, human consciences *ought*, so the argument runs, to be evolved in the future so as to make men

realise more and more certainly that they *ought* to sacrifice themselves only in favour of their blood relations and to show consideration to those not related to them only when it would react favourably on themselves. But in this last stage the argument has become defective through the use of the word "ought" with two different meanings, neither of them relevant to the discussion ; that is, as indicating in the first instance merely a logical deduction, and, in the second instance, a sensation resulting from an inborn instinct. Pure unselfishness cannot, it is true, have been evolved by natural selection, except as an inexplicable by-product. Indeed, if we accept adaptation as being a true indication of moral purpose in the universe, the logical deduction seems to run further than this and to point to the conclusion that all must always be going on well in the world around us, and that all we have to do is to sit still whilst an improved future will inevitably unfold itself. We certainly see around us many mysteries that we cannot solve, and the best answer that we can give to all contentions of this kind is that no person whom we respect does really ever accept them for a moment. Natural selection gives us no guide as to the right direction for our moral aspirations or as to any ultimate purpose which may lie hidden behind the evolutionary process which no doubt has taken place.

Science may, on the other hand, prevent the adoption of erroneous ideals, that is of aims which are inconsistent with established facts. We were told that "the equality of men is a Christian ideal, but one which should prove subversive to all evolutionary development" (p. 670), though no explanation of what is meant by equality was indicated. If it is a question concerning the spiritual world, it has nothing to do with earthly evolution. By equality cannot be meant similarity here and now ; for we know that neither the physical nor the mental qualities of all men can be forced into the same mould. Equality between future generations and the men of to-day cannot even be desired, because it would put an end to all progress. Equality of opportunity should certainly be our aim, provided that it does not involve too great a waste of effort. It should be remembered, however, that improved methods in regard to training and education tend to increase the range of differences in human efficiency, because the naturally highest types always do take most advantage of the opportunities offered to them. It would be greater inequality of opportunity which would make for greater similarity in the adult human output. And

if the superior types were to be prevented from forging ahead, not only would they themselves be damaged, but their inferiors would thus be injured also ; for progress depends mainly on the initiative of the superior. No doubt democracy is right in aiming at a certain abstract ideal of equality in civil rights, and no doubt the Church may have been right to have "despised class" ; but nothing can justify the repudiation of natural inequality. Most important of all from our point of view is it that in view of the fact that parenthood is denied to the criminal, the insane, and the mentally defective, the possession of equal civil rights by all in this respect cannot be admitted ; whilst the moral condemnation of parenthood in cases of hereditary disease and great poverty rules out the idea of an equality of moral rights in regard to the production of a family. Taking all these facts into consideration, progress rather than equality must be our ultimate aim.

No one recognises more clearly than we do all the terrible amount of suffering which accompanies the process of natural selection in nature, and no one is more anxious than we are to see it alleviated. How this could be accomplished in the case of animals in the wild it is hard to see. As regards man, however, we believe that much could be done, for we do not hold that Darwinism tells us "to allow the struggle for life to take its course" (p. 673), but rather that the benefits resulting from that struggle could be obtained in great measure in the future without all the suffering thus caused in the past. This could best be accomplished by the gradual and painless elimination of those types with worst natural endowments, with a corresponding increase in the numbers of the better endowed ; a process which would certainly tend to increase in the generations of the future all the factors, including "mercy, love, gentleness, humanity," etc., which make a nation great (p. 673). And the science which teaches us how this can be accomplished is called eugenics.

When endeavouring to pursue this method of racial improvement, as in the case of all other important reforms, very difficult questions will certainly have to be answered. The Bishop of Exeter seems to regard the merits of a caste system as constituting one of the stumbling blocks in our path ; for if it is the system "most consonant with national advance" (p. 669), it ought, he holds, to be advocated by the Darwinian. Caste would have, it is true, certain advantages from the racial point of view, of which the most important is that it would prevent the transfer of selected individuals

from the inferior and more fertile strata into those which are both superior and less fertile, a process which may now be entailing disastrous consequences on our civilisation. Moreover, it is possible that if each rank of society were to be kept separate and only endowed with those inborn qualities most conducive to the performance of an allotted task, the nation might thus become more formidable both in peace and in war. This latter contention may, however, be denied because success in the future is likely to become more and more dependent on the possession of good general intelligence by all, thus making all more ready to meet the unexpected when it arises ; whilst in so far as caste lessened competition, it would increase the difficulty of distinguishing between the inferior and the superior, and, therefore, of taking any steps tending to promote racial progress. On balance, and giving full weight to the great immediate disadvantages of a caste system, it should stand condemned by the student of evolution as by all others, even if its introduction were a practical proposition which, with us, it certainly is not.

Questions connected with birth control and sterilisation will probably give rise to controversy for some time to come ; but concerning them I will only here say that they are primarily concerned with births and not with deaths. Of all the problems which will have to be faced in the future, in my opinion, the most difficult will be those concerning the treatment of the inferior races of mankind. The population of all countries will come to be more and more regulated in regard to numbers by the standard of civilisation which their inhabitants are determined to maintain ; and we ought to decide, in the first place, whether it would be preferable that there should be a larger number of persons at a lower level of civilisation or a smaller number at a higher stage of culture. There have always been at work certain factors tending to keep down the numbers of the people, most of them attended by a considerable amount of suffering, but really preventing the still greater suffering which would result from overpopulation. If we decide, as we ought to, for the higher culture and the smaller numbers, some pressure will always have to be maintained, and, if so, would it not be preferably applied to the naturally inferior types and races, so as gradually to reduce their relative numbers in the least painful manner possible ? As education spreads, and as the means of communication are improved, these inferior races will come to realise their inferiority more and more clearly, and a reduction in their relative numbers would, therefore, more

and more certainly tend to increase the sum total of the happiness of the world. In view of all this, we feel that we must hold that "it is cruel kindness to preserve the unfit races or the unfit classes" (p. 675) for all time in their present proportions. Most certainly we do not advocate the putting to death of a single human being, but merely a permission being given, as it were, to the superior races to expand very slowly so as to gradually occupy in the generations of the future the space now taken up by their inferiors. Eugenists have no doubt that this is, broadly speaking, the direction in which we should strive to advance; though as to myself, I am not yet prepared to state in detail the exact means by which this result could best be accomplished. The great difficulties to be overcome, however, must not be held to be an excuse for not continually endeavouring to mark out the road along which we ought to advance.

It may, however, yet be argued that the growing belief in the efficacy of natural selection as a factor in evolution actually has as a fact had a damaging effect on our moral ideals. For instance, it has been asserted that Darwinism in Germany has led to such beliefs as might "justify a conqueror like Genghis in enslaving nations so that his race might become rich and numerous at the expense of other races" (p. 674). The Bishop of Exeter does not himself mention Germany, and he would probably agree with me in preferring to leave to the Germans the statement of their own case. As to our own country, would it not be fair first of all to consider what were the deductions concerning our duties towards other human beings which were drawn from his own theories by the author of the *Origin of Species*? Certainly he did not believe that what he put forward represented "the whole truth," for no one was more ready than he was to confess ignorance. The following extract from the last chapter of the *Descent of Man* will, I believe, give the truest idea of what he actually did wish to inculcate.

"Man, like every other animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high condition through a struggle for existence consequent on his rapid multiplication; and if he is to advance still higher, it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would sink into indolence, and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase, though leading to many and obvious evils,

must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be open competition for all men ; and the most able should not be prevented by laws and customs from succeeding best and rearing the largest number of offspring."

Modern Eugenists certainly hold that any reduction in the fertility of the race would tend to diminish the rate at which racial progress might be made ; but what we have learnt in the intervening half century has made us believe that much could be done to promote progress by adjusting the relative sizes of the families of the more and the less fit, and thus artificially to lessen the necessity for the competitive struggle which the author of the *Descent of Man* feared must be maintained.

As to the ethical problems raised by the teaching of evolution, the following extract from the same paragraph is to the point.

"For the moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through natural selection ; though to this latter agency may be safely attributed the social instincts, which afford the basis for the development of the moral sense."

Whether this passage is strictly logical will not here be considered ; for it is only quoted in order to show that the great exponent of the theory of natural selection did not hold that it was " by evolutionary methods alone that we " should hope to improve human qualities and bring about the appearance of great men in the future. The trend of modern eugenic thought has indeed been to deprecate all such comparisons as that contained in the statement that " education is not of such vital importance as the size of families " (p. 671) ; because attention to both environment and heredity is now seen to be absolutely essential in order best to secure human progress, and also perhaps because of the impossibility of defining exactly what is meant by the relative importance of these two agencies.

The *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859 ; this was followed six years later by the first publication concerning Eugenics by Sir Francis Galton, he being the great pioneer in this subject ; and again six years later appeared the *Descent of Man*, from which extracts have just been given. The authors

of these works were cousins, each of them freely acknowledging his scientific indebtedness to the other, and I am certain that in all their writings, which continued to appear for over fifty years, no single word will be found which conveys any approval of the destruction of human beings of any kind. Indeed, all Eugenists agree that humanitarian ideals must be maintained unsullied if eugenics is to progress ; for if charity, in the best sense of the word, is not felt towards our neighbours, it will be useless to try to make it felt towards those who are to come after us, this being a necessity if their lot is to be improved by the exercise of forethought to-day. The following sentence taken from *Essays in Eugenics*, which were written by Galton when he was over eighty years of age, well illustrate the views which he and his followers wish to see widely accepted.

“Eugenic belief extends the function of philanthropy to future generations, it renders its action more pervading than hitherto, by dealing with families and societies in their entirety, and it enforces the importance of the marriage covenant by directing serious attention to the probable quality of the future offspring. It sternly forbids all forms of sentimental charity that are harmful to the race, while it eagerly seeks opportunity for acts of personal kindness, as some equivalent to the loss of what it forbids. It brings the tie of kinship into prominence and strongly encourages love and interest in family and race. In brief, eugenics is a virile creed, full of hopefulness, and appealing to many of the noblest feelings of our nature.”

It is to such ideas as these that Darwinism has led and will continue to lead.

LEONARD DARWIN.

FOREST ROW, SUSSEX.

THE REALITY OF BEAUTY.

THE BARON VON OPPELL.

"I am uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful, and another deformed; decide concerning truth and falsehood, reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed."—Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*.

WE are, I think, by our nature all inclined to believe that whatever beauty we are able to "see" really exists; that it is a "real" quality of the objects in which we perceive it—present like other qualities in some things and absent in others. Moreover, to some people beauty may give greater pleasure and awaken in them a stronger feeling of its reality than any other apprehension. But whatever the strength with which we may feel it, I think we all have a native conviction that the beauty we see is there before us.

Whether this primitive belief can be justified by reasoning depends on what we consider, in general, beauty and reality to be. A little philosophy will lead to a contrast with our natural conviction by proving that beauty cannot be a quality of anything, and by concluding therefrom that it does not objectively exist. Further reflection may in this—as it does in other problems—lead to conclusions which are, in the end, in harmony with consciousness; it may show us that we may be right in believing that beauty is real, even though its reality have another—possibly a deeper—foundation, than that of being a quality of the objects in which we perceive it.

But what is reality? If we try to make clear to ourselves exactly what we mean when we call a thing real, I think it will be found, however variously we may express it, that, what is at the back of our mind is an idea of something that exists *independently* of our seeing it—that would remain "what it is" unaffected by our presence or absence or that of any other observer. Hence, we certainly would *not* con-

sider real anything, in the world around us, which we recognised as originating from our own imagination or from any accidental circumstance affecting the veracity we claim, in general, for our powers of perception. So, if walking in the dusk in a lonely country I take a clipped willow tree for a dangerous ruffian, I will admit, as I come closer, that the ruffian never was "real"; and if I look at a snowy landscape through a red pane of glass, I will not, because the snow appears red, consider red to be the "real" colour of the snow.

If we pursue our thoughts on reality a little further, we may find, with the aid of some scientific knowledge, that even the white colour of the snow and some qualities of the "real" willow tree are but the work of our senses, and therefore not independently real, as existing only for an observer possessed of such senses and not without him; while yet further consideration may possibly lead us to abstract from ever more qualities, as contributed by our own modes of perception, till at last we may find that we can form no conception at all of what independent or absolute reality might be. We may then, if we wish to explain to ourselves how we distinguish what is real from what is not real in our surroundings, have to find another definition of reality than that independent existence which we are instinctively inclined to assume.

But, apart from such reflections and whatever qualities we may judge as belonging to the things in which we see them, it would be difficult, on the slightest consideration, to rank beauty amongst them. For, if we call an object beautiful (object denoting equally ideas or actions or anything to which the epithet beautiful can be applied), we are referring it to some notion in our own mind of what constitutes beauty—to a standard of our own which is not to be found in the object; it is only "measured" by this standard that the object becomes for us beautiful. It must therefore be admitted that beauty is only for a percipient and that independently of a percipient there can be no beauty. Possibly we may find that more is contributed by the percipient to make objects beautiful than is generally supposed. At any rate, most people will admit to having been disappointed sometimes that others failed to see beauty where they did. It might be, then, that it is our own imagination—of a different kind perhaps from that which sees robbers in the dark—but still our imagination only, that gives the colour of beauty to objects as the red glass

colours the snow—only that unfortunately there are no glasses available to enable those to see beauty who have *not* that imagination. Yet this would appear like asserting that beauty is mere individual fancy, and this no one, obeying his natural instinct, would, I think, be inclined to admit; even if we have to agree that it is invisible to many, we will rather look upon such people as in a way deficient—wanting in some sense, like colour-blind persons—and we will remain convinced that the beauty we see is there before us.

The German scientist G. Th. Fechner, who about the middle of last century made elaborate inquiries into the nature of beauty, possessed—in curious contrast to the character of these inquiries—a gift which would seem to be often strangely wanting in those who have philosophised on the problem of *Æsthetic*—he was apparently capable of feeling what beauty *is*. Fechner tells us ¹ how, after a long illness, during which he temporarily lost his eyesight, he goes out one June morning into the public gardens near his native town of Leipzig, and, seated on a bench (where his statue stands at present), he looks out, through an opening between trees around him, on a wide meadow still glistening with early dew; out of the grey-green grass, wildflowers of many colours raise their pretty heads and butterflies flutter over and between them; birds sing gaily from the trees above him their little triumphant song of love; and the spirit of a summer morning, with its lights and shadows, colours and sounds, enters into his soul. But suddenly he recollects that he is a man of science. Strange illusion, he cries, in *reality* everything before and around me is *darkness and silence*. The warmth and the light of the sun—the sparkling dewdrops—the colours of the flowers—the song of the birds, it is nothing but trickery of my senses—of certain centres in my brain, it is all a lie.

How do I come, he asks, on so desolate a thought? It is not my thought, it is the considered opinion of the whole thinking world; men of science and philosophers—idealists, materialists or whatever they be—however persistently they may quarrel about the nature or causes of this illusion, as to the *fact* of it they are at one: we can only ascribe objective reality to what is independent of our senses, to what we can measure or weigh. All this that appears to me as light, colour and sound, and thus as beauty, is nothing but dreary movements of atoms in space, endlessly continuing in darkness and silence. And, looking again into the summer

¹ G. T. Fechner: *Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht*, 1879.

morning, he revolts against this doctrine, which he prettily calls "the night-view of the world"—"Die Nachtansicht der Welt." Call it an illusion, he says, it is certain, that this illusion will never disappear. Can we say the same of the theories of science and philosophy? And he maintains the reality of the sunlit, coloured and sounding world before him; of the "day-view of life," and "God's view," whose seeing and hearing shines and resounds through the world, giving to it light, colour and sound, of which even the faint reflections and echos which alone we can see and hear are for us the *reality of joy and of beauty*.

Fechner has written more on the "day-view" of the world, and he has adduced philosophical arguments in its defence, but I think the conviction that lies in his words better than his arguments. It is the poet in him that triumphs over the abstract thinker, when he affirms the divine *reality of life itself* against theories which are inclined to disregard it.

Here you have the contrast I have spoken of between doctrines that a little philosophy will lead to proclaim with great assurance and convictions that our very nature would seem to tell us are true.

But deeper thought would seem to me to explain and, in the end perhaps, to remove this contrast.

It would show—to begin with further considering reality—that the vibrations of atoms or ether, or whatever conclusions science may arrive at, can no more claim to give us an independent existence than does the view of our senses; since they merely substitute a world dependent on our way of knowing for one that is determined by the nature of our organs of sense. If the human mind did not, as it does, know things only by comparing them, we might have no need to measure or calculate vibrations or anything else in order to distinguish with "objective certainty" one thing from the other; and if our senses registered singly so many billion vibrations of ether instead of synthesising them, say into red, we would ascribe as little independent reality to these as we now do to colours and sounds. And yet even then—or if, like Micromegas, inhabitant of one of the Sirian planets in Voltaire's delightful romance, we possessed a thousand senses and a mind to deal with their presentations—we would still only know a world dependent on whatever might be our faculties of knowledge; and existence in itself would remain as unknown and unknowable to us as it is at present. For all the reality we know is, and can only be,

relative, only an existence conditioned by our powers of perception. We may claim—and I think it is in our nature that we *must* claim—such a thing as independent or absolute reality, and in contradistinction to it call the world before us appearing or phenomenal; or we may say with Auguste Comte, “*Tout est relatif, voilà le seul principe absolu*”; even in the latter case we agree that what we know is only a conditioned or relative reality; even in the former we must admit—unless we be visionaries—that this is the only reality in *objects*, which we can or ever will *know*.

Thus, so far, all that philosophy does is to make us—as in other things—somewhat more diffident in asserting the independent reality—or the absolute truth—of anything we can see or know; be it colours or vibrations, be it the number of square inches of a picture or its beauty.

But the business of philosophy is not merely to show us the narrow limits of human knowledge, but also to find the principles we employ—generally unconsciously—in those conditions where we *can and do know*. This world—if it exist *in itself as we know it* or not—is in any case undoubtedly *real for us*; and we must be able to distinguish within it facts from fancies, or we might find it sometimes even unpleasantly real. If philosophy concludes that our facts are no more independently real than our fancies, it should tell us how else we can distinguish one from the other. We *have* such a criterion for what are facts within our experience, we possess what we call a standard of empiric reality; and it is expressed with admirable simplicity—one might almost say with a touch of humorous resignation—in the words of Aristotle:

“Ὅπᾳσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτο εἶναι ψάμεν.”

“What all men think, this we say *is*.”

Our modern scientific standard of reality is implicitly contained in these few words. Mere general agreement would not indeed be sufficient to prove the reality of anything; it might be a general illusion; but what all men “*think*” implies that this general opinion is, in each individual case, as solidly founded as human experience and thought can make it. It follows that we must know all that it is in our power to know about a thing in order to be certain of its reality; and that all this various knowledge of various individuals must be critically examined till it admits of agreement. Now the only way we can know things is by—be it consciously or unconsciously—comparing them. Our

knowledge of a thing could therefore theoretically only be called complete when we had compared, and as a result placed it in definite relations with, all other objects in our experience. Thus the modern scientific criterion of certainty becomes—to express it simply, if not completely—the fixed and necessary connection, by what we have recognised as unalterable laws, between all objects past and present, within our collective experience. Only when it is possible to assign a definite place to any new phenomenon within this entire framework of knowledge, which is for us the Universe, are we certain of its reality ; and as, incidentally, our knowledge of the world around us is notoriously incomplete and ever increasing with the progress of scientific inquiry, it has been well said that our standard of empiric reality never is, but is ever growing.¹

Now if it is the *entirety* of our experience that would constitute our standard of reality, it is evident that the information we get through our senses is as necessary a part of this reality as are the vibrations of ether or any other logical knowledge which we may at the time possess. Thus the colours and sounds, and any other qualities the senses present to us, make up not only our obvious and primitive reality, but are essential to its theoretic definition ; yet both only in so far as this sensory information helps us to distinguish and determine objects—*not* when, as in Fechner's meaning, we are thinking of a particular *effect* which these colours and sounds may produce on *ourselves* which we call beauty. We may, if we choose, continue to consider this beauty a quality of certain objects, but if we only admit, as I think it must be admitted, that we can neither define this quality nor obtain a general agreement as to its presence or absence, we cannot claim for it a place in that system of strictly connected and, in the end, interdependent facts which is the reality of experience.

And yet *without* beauty it would seem to me that this "reality"—this picture of a world the senses present to us and that is corrected and completed by the intellect—might be compared with a map ; good enough to find our way about ; even interesting to study for its own sake, and perhaps, as science does, to further elaborate—a map which registers colours and sounds, it is true, but not the *pleasure* they give us ; and that may be in a way as colourless, toneless and dreary as Fechner's night-view. Like such a map is all that we everyone at most times and some perhaps ever

. ¹ By the Danish philosopher, Harald Höfding.

know of the strange *real world* ^{*}*around us and to which we belong.*

Yet now and again we may pause to look at this our picture of a world—which, even should it be but a contour of reality, can yet be full of wonders—neither to use it to find our way to our needs or desires, nor even further to explore the vast and still unknown regions it indicates, but simply because it gives us pleasure—a curious pleasure that would seem to come from the mere fact of “*seeing*” and to be content with seeing; and whenever any “outlook” gives us this pleasure we call it beautiful.

It is evident, then, that at such times we perceive something more in the objects before us than when we regard them merely to know or to use them; and this something more, whatever it be, is *for us* undoubtedly *real*.

And yet we cannot bring this undefinable something into any definite relation with our other experience; it cannot be made to fit into our connected knowledge of *empiric* reality. Neither can—obviously on what has been said—this mysterious beauty be claimed as *absolutely* real, at any rate not in the sense of existing in itself *without* a percipient.

There would then appear to be no other way but to find a *wider* interpretation of reality than either of the generally recognised definitions which have been considered, if we are to justify our claim that beauty is real. It would seem to me that there might be such a wider reality; indeed, that for us the truest conception of reality should comprehend both our experience of this world as well as our notions of an absolute existence beyond human knowledge, and embrace above all *also ourselves* who experience or conceive these things. I think that such an idea of what might be for us, as human beings, complete reality would necessarily include beauty; indeed, that beauty might be regarded—perhaps fancifully, but not illogically—as its most perfect expression.

But before thus attempting to justify, by what will possibly appear as somewhat abstruse reflections, our conviction that beauty is *objectively real*, it will be essential first to consider more closely this conviction itself; to examine, I mean, the nature of this purely *subjective* feeling of certainty which can for some of us be so strong that the beauty we see in things would seem, at times, *alone* to give them a more immediate and vivid reality than all our objective knowledge of them—logical and sensory—can do. I think that if we could *satisfactorily account for this subjective conviction*, this might give the key to the problem, if or

if not there exist for this feeling any kind of objective foundation.

The first great thinker to treat the æsthetic problem from its *subjective* side alone was *Kant*, who, recognising the hopelessness of the attempts I have spoken of to find a significant general definition of beauty as a quality of *objects*, set out to investigate and unfold the state of mind of the *perceptant* who apprehends beauty, as distinguished from his mental attitude in every other kind of knowledge. Kant's theory would seem to me to permit, although it cannot be said directly to express, the explanation I propose to offer for our intuitive certainty that beauty is real. As, furthermore, this doctrine of Kant will be found, I think, to possess great charm of its own, it may here be briefly indicated :

The human mind possesses, according to Kant, three distinct faculties of knowledge, which, not being traceable to a common root in the mind, can be considered separately. It is the "Understanding" which, with the help of the senses, gives us what I have called empiric reality, makes us acquainted with this world ; which is therefore determined by the nature of the Understanding (and senses) and is thus a conditioned or phenomenal world. We can only connect our various impressions of this world, *i.e.* "understand" or "know it" by considering it as governed by unalterable laws—all particular revealing instances of the one fundamental law of cause and effect ; which law constrains us to assume a cause for everything we perceive, although we may not know *what* cause. The world we understand or know—in Kant's language "Nature"—is thus under the iron law of cause and effect, that is of Necessity.

The human mind is not satisfied with such a world. It claims, as we have seen before, something beyond it : something that is in itself, independently of our knowing it ; that is not the effect of any cause, but rather the ultimate cause of all effects. The faculty of "Reason" gives us this notion which shapes itself into the "ideas" of God, Freedom (from the law of necessity) and (thus also) Immortality. These ideas cannot, however, give us in the strict sense any knowledge. They cannot, like the concepts of the "Understanding," be demonstrated by pointing to things and events in "Nature" which correspond to them. But they are ineradicable, and they find an outlet by prescribing to man the law of duty, which is simply the law a being, possessing the ideas of God and Freedom, would dictate to himself. In so far we act and find that we can act according

to this self-imposed law, we are free—at least in our motives—from the necessity of Nature.

Yet in all else, where we are but spectators, there remains a contrast, a disharmony in the mind between the world of the "Understanding," under the law of necessity, and the world of the ideas of "Reason" where there is Freedom.

But there is a third faculty of knowledge, designated as "the Power of Judgment," which enables us to judge the finite and particular existence, we know by the "Understanding," as contained in the infinite totality of "Reason." We can thus consider "Nature" as adapted, not to the "Understanding" only, but to "Reason" as well. This "Power of Judgment"—one might, I think, call it the central self—allows us to see—to discover with the aid of our imagination—the idea of a suprasensuous reality, hidden beneath the sensuous phenomenal "Nature" before us. Whenever we are able to do this, the contrast between "Reason" and "Understanding" disappears. We can respond harmoniously to Nature with our *entire* mind, and this gives us a strange feeling of pleasure. This pleasure appears as inseparable from the object, the contemplation of which permits it, and we call the object beautiful.

Harmony of the mind with itself could then, on this theory, only be attained: gradually but over a whole life by acting or consistently striving to act, in this world of mechanical necessity, according to principles that are free from such necessity; or as simple spectators, immediately, for the moment, by discovering the "*idea*" from which these principles derive, as it were shining through the veil of this sensuous Nature, when we see its beauty.

If the æsthetic outlook could then be characterised as responding harmoniously with all our mental faculties to the world before us, this would, as I hope to show, explain at any rate our subjective feeling of the reality of beauty. But can æsthetic apprehension be so distinguished from all other cognition?

Kant's various faculties of knowledge are abstractions—particular aspects of the mental activities considered separately, for the purpose of better investigating the human mind which we only know as a whole. The first question then to consider would be: are they true aspects and can they be said to embrace all possible modes of knowledge? I think that Kant's main distinction, between a faculty that gives us a strict knowledge of facts—of existence as it is for us—and a power we have to form ideas of something beyond

this existence, may be admitted as rendering two very distinct aspects of the human mind which, even should it be considered unnecessary to claim them as separate faculties, would at any rate comprise together all that in the widest sense could be called "Our Knowing." But, are both these aspects or faculties, which I may for convenience now continue to designate as Understanding and Reason, really involved in æsthetic apprehension ; or rather are they more particularly involved than in any other experience ?

May it not be objected, and rightly objected, that, as we only know the human mind as a whole, we must respond with our whole mind to any cognition, or to any desire or feeling which it may arouse ?

Granted ; but I would ask : are the capabilities and the aspirations that make up this mind ever at the same time all actively present in consciousness—are we ever at any one moment our entire self ? I do not mean our highest spiritual self alone, which may at supreme moments be possible ; I mean our entire self, sensuous, human and yet spiritual ; that self which was to Shelley "a Power girt round with weakness."

Such complete self-realisation would lie, it is true, as Kant rightly holds, in a whole life of striving towards a noble aim ; but in the immediate present I think one can only speak of approaching this state, and that only at rare moments ; while at most times we are, I would contend, very far from realising our entire self. No doubt there are moments in practical life when we are intensely alive, as when approaching—at last after a hard fight—the realisation of a great passion, such as sexual love or ambition, or when suddenly confronted with a grave danger demanding instant decision. Yet if we should reflect later on these supreme moments I think it would be found that it was only *one* tendency which was *predominantly* aroused, forcing all others into the background ; tending rather to make us lose ourselves in one desire or thought than towards realising *all* this mind can hold.

But even if it be admitted that the entire mind—at any rate in Kant's meaning—is not *actively* involved, even in the intensest passions or the most stirring incidents of practical life, should this not be claimed for all our highest experiences ? May not religion, philosophy and possibly science, not only as giving high aims to strive for throughout life, but even at single moments involve the entire self—perhaps more perfectly, than the mere contemplation or even creation

of beauty ? I agree that such activities may give to man, even for the moment, his highest spiritual experience ; but I cannot admit that they would give the completest human experience—involve the entire self—except in so far as they tend towards becoming æsthetic ; not while they retain their own characteristic features.

Take the scientist ; he must, it is true, be convinced that there are laws of Nature or he would not search for them ; and this conviction may imply something like Kant's ideas of Reason. But once he begins his actual work as a scientist, while he is accumulating and examining facts of experience, later possibly to induct from them some new law of Nature, his Understanding alone is actively employed ; and any ideas of totality, or even any wider forgone conclusions, will be kept as far as possible away from his active thought.

The field of the philosopher is wider, it is not this or that part of existence, but existence as a whole. It comprises the territory of Reason as well as that of the Understanding. The true thinker must certainly then be able to find, even intensely, in himself ideas of something beyond—of the last mystery of existence. But his strict aim is not to pursue these ideas, or even to allow them to mingle with his thoughts, but critically to investigate their nature and what trust we can place in them (as in any other of our faculties of knowledge) ; in one word, he must try to understand them. Thus the philosopher will treat the conditions of all human knowledge as the scientist treats merely the facts it may give us, that is scientifically—indeed, it is to philosophy that science owes its method. In his search for truth, therefore, as far as we can know it, it is the critical Understanding alone in which the philosopher can place his trust.

Religion, in the widest sense, is the acceptance of, what are to Kant, the ideas of Reason (or of what they may lead to accept), without critical inquiry, as faith ; and I think prayer would be its intensest single moment and its most characteristic experience. But it would not be prayer prompted by fear or desire for the things of this world—perhaps not prayer of petition at all—but rather a communion with the Divinity ; prayer at its highest like that of saints and martyrs, when this sensuous Nature would seem to disappear so utterly, that even physical pain is no longer felt, and a longing for the world of Reason—of God and Immortality—alone fills the mind. . . .

But when the scientist pauses before the increasing wonder of experience that he may have further disclosed, as

in that fine passage, when Darwin, at the end of years of patient research, can say : " Thus, from the war of Nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, the production of the higher animals, directly follows,"¹ where language and thought alike rise to a high poetry : man standing before the ever inscrutable secret of Nature. When the philosopher faces the last problem of existence—which, though it inspired his thought, he has kept out of his mind the better to clear the road to it—and recognises that, and why it must remain unknowable ; and that the last word of philosophy can only be poetry—the poetry of existence—a poetry that can never be completely expressed, but of which we may find something in passages of Plato, Spinoza or Schopenhauer, and, through all his abstract dryness, in the very doctrine of Kant. When religious feeling finds expression in the mystic's view, the true mystic who merely *sees*—sees a God shining through this sensuous world and the same God in himself, till subject and object disappear, so that there can be no prayer, for all is one—the one and all—*ἐν καὶ πᾶν*.

Then can it truly be said that science, philosophy and religion involve alike, even for the moment, the entire self ; but only because all three have left their own more special fields simply to " see "—to become what may be the deepest æsthetic experience the human mind can know ;¹ although it may be, as with the philosopher, too vast ever to find a form in art ; or it may be, as the mystic's feeling, from its very nature inexpressible. Yet there is a curious connection (which may become more evident at the end of our reflections) between the mystic's feeling and the most purely æsthetic experience ; and, if the mystic, as such, is doomed to silence, every great artist would seem to have in him something of the mystic's view.

But not only the creation of great art, the humblest æsthetic pleasure, if it be truly æsthetic, would seem to me to involve the entire self more completely than any other immediate experience can do ; not necessarily indeed our highest thoughts, nor even our intensest feelings—although it may comprehend both—but our complete self as human beings, belonging to and knowing only, as Kant says, a sensuous world, yet possessing ideas beyond it. Nor need these ideas be pursued to their end—to a God or Totality ; it is simply the power to have them that is actively implicated in all æsthetic apprehension, showing itself in a tendency to

¹ *On the Origin of Species* (conclusion).

see something wider and vaster in the æsthetic object than what it immediately presents.

Take the simplest, and therefore the most purely, æsthetic experience that needs neither education nor connoisseurship, but only man's unspoilt nature to know it: when we see beauty, truly see it, in the physical world before us—in an every-day landscape. Is it not because we find in it something more than we can sense? Something that would make it fit into an undefinable naive image we have deep down in our mind—made up perhaps of the first impressions of childhood—of a total physical "world"—everchanging, glittering and darkening as the days and seasons pass over it. It is for this, I think, that anything which conveys physical distance, width of horizon, blue misty outlines, lights and shadows with their far-away origin; or, morning and evening, spring and autumn, as giving particularly the idea of change and passing time: all seem to arouse æsthetic feelings most easily. I think it can scarcely be denied that all true art gives us spiritually something of this distance. It may be wide vistas that seem to stretch on up to the last mystery of human life and the strangeness of its passing, as in the great passages of Shakespeare; or even, when the scene itself is petty and sordid, but the vastness of the background to all human things is felt, as in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*; or the outlook may extend merely to individual human lives—the curious interaction between character and fate (as the same passages and scenes can equally be read); or it may be one human passion, one aspect of life. Whatever it be, it will always convey something wider than its individual presentment; and that down to the lightest artistic productions—to curios or household furniture—that by their suggestive designs, or simply by recalling ages, we think of as devoted to gaiety and art, fill, as Walter Pater prettily expresses it, "the common ways of life with the reflection of some far-off brightness."

But it is not the ideas or tendencies of Reason alone that are actively present in æsthetic experience. All the beauty, we know, bears and must bear on it the stamp of this world, of the world we sense and *understand*. The most imaginative creation of art—and if it treat of a world beyond or of fairy-land—must conform not, indeed, to any actual nor necessarily to any probable or even possible, but always to a *thinkable* experience in this sensuous world. And so it is that our sensuous self and our power of knowing what the senses

présent to us, that the critical Understanding is always actively, even if not always consciously, present demanding satisfaction of its laws, whether we create works of art or simply enjoy their beauty, or that which we can find ourselves in Nature.

Then my conclusion would be that, while in all our immediate experience one tendency rules supreme—the entire self is more or less absorbed in this one tendency and lost, as it were, in its object—in æsthetic apprehension alone the mind responds harmoniously with *all* its aspirations, with *all* that makes up this human self. And this would account for the not often noticed but, I think, undeniable fact, that æsthetic pleasure is the only human pleasure which is content with the present and demands no future. For harmonious activity of all the mental faculties would need nothing beyond itself. It would be complete self-realisation as far as such realisation can be attained in what we call the present by beings who exist and are conscious only in time. But even any degree of self-realisation necessarily implies increased self-consciousness ; or rather, as we only know this self as conscious of something, increased consciousness of the reality of our own existence and that of the object of our knowledge. Both this self and the object become more vivid, more “ alive,” more actually present than in any other apprehension. And it is this heightened consciousness of existence that would explain to me our inward conviction that beauty is a very real thing.

This purely subjective feeling of reality would seem to me to be characteristic—in varying degrees of intensity—of all æsthetic experience from the simple enjoyment of beauty to the production of art. If I see beauty in the countryside, each single feature, cloud, tree, stretch of brown earth, meadow or water, seems to stand out, become more real, more actually there before me, than if I am looking at the same country to judge of the value of the soil or the timber that it bears. And it is this same feeling of reality rising till it becomes clear, intuitive knowledge by tending (like every impression) to spread over the whole mind, that, claiming to be perfected and possessed, is perhaps the most powerful and truest incentive to the artist’s complete vision as well as to its outward expression. At any rate it would seem to me that all great art gives us this curious sense of reality—a reality more direct, more immediate than “ actual existence ”—in whatever it presents to us ; and the degree in which any art conveys this particular impression of reality—utterly

distinct from so-called realism—is the surest standard by which to judge of its greatness.

Consider a play like *Antony and Cleopatra*—above all the last scenes—what strikes one is the reality of the thing, far removed from us outwardly as are the characters and circumstances. When Antony, in one of the finest passages in Shakespeare, decides to die, and, poet and true pagan as he is, sees himself by this decision as about to disappear forever, leaving no trace of his identity behind him ; no more than do the shapes of mountains and great animals that clouds and vapours can assume and “ mock our eyes with air,” till “ that which is now a horse even with a thought the rack dislimns and makes it indistinct as water is in water ” : the whole man rises, against this wonderful imagery, in this his last moment once more before you—with all his weakness and sensuality and the poetry withal and the grandeur of his nature—you see him, you know him ; he is more alive, more real, than many live people we may know, whose opinions and whole outlook, whose very innermost feelings, would seem often to be only second-hand.

So far we have been considering only the purely *subjective* conviction that beauty is real, which can at moments become so strong that art may appear to us in a way more real than many incidents in actual life, and the beauty we are able ourselves to find in the world, as its most real aspect ; and I have tried to account for this feeling by that heightened self-consciousness or rather consciousness of existence which would be implied by a harmonious activity of the entire mind, such as I am claiming for all æsthetic experience. But I have said nothing about the qualities the *object* should surely possess to arouse this harmonious activity. I have suggested that they are undefinable ; and this I maintain.

We can point to a thing and say, this is what I mean by beauty, but we cannot argue anyone into seeing what we mean, who is unable to do so. We cannot even—in place of a logical definition—assert that everyone else sees it, because we will often find that the great majority do *not* ; nay, even we ourselves may have experienced that we do not *always* see this beauty where we saw it before ; we may superficially think or say we do, but do we always, even when we would wish to, actually see and feel it ? Is it not rather, as if we wanted something like inspiration, which no one has equally at all times, even simply to enjoy beauty ?

No, certainly beauty is not in the object as such—not

even in the sense that every quality can be said to be which helps us to distinguish a thing ; and that is why it is undefinable as a quality of objects ; it is something that *we ourselves must read into the object*. Undoubtedly some things may make this easier—so easy that it may appear like seeing what is there—others make it more difficult, a few may not permit at all ; but it is always *we*, who with a lesser or greater, even if unconscious, effort, must *in the end conceive this beauty ourselves*. It is never forced on us by the object, like its roundness or squareness or a logical proof, not even by the greatest work of art.

Now seeing something more in a thing than can be proved to others, or seen equally by everybody for himself, is what we call imagination—anyway of a kind. And it is obviously only a question of degree and wideness of imagination if I see a quality in an object that is not “ in it,” or if I conjure up to my mind objects which are not before me, or have never been before me—in other words, if I see beauty or if I create works of art.

Thus all æsthetic apprehension, from simple enjoyment to creation of art, might be defined, not incorrectly, as is done by Benedetto Croce, “ as knowledge obtained through the imagination,” in distinction from our other “ knowledge obtained through the intellect ” ;¹ only that such a definition would need, as we will presently see, a very important qualification.

But, if I am admitting beauty to be but the offspring of the imagination, how can I claim for it any kind of objective or independent reality ? And this I do. And I would justify my insistence by certain reflections which, although they would have to be carried further than can here be done, to meet possible objections, may, I think, indicate generally at least a direction in which the *true* objective reality of beauty might be found.

I have admitted that it is only by our own imagination that we perceive the “ quality ” we call beautiful. And I cannot deny that *this same imagination is often the source of illusions* : it presents us with pictures of horror and death when prompted by fear, and it builds for us castles in Spain when at the service of our hopes and desires ; none of which things are real—no more are they beautiful. But even turned towards a noble aim, to the search for truth, we will find the imagination a treacherous guide, and men who allow

¹ *Æsthetic*, etc., by Benedetto Croce. Translation by Douglas Ainslie. Chapter I., beginning.

themselves to be led by it are compared by Hume "to those angels whom the Scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings."

But, used as an instrument, at the service and under control of the intellect, the imagination does not produce illusions, nor can it mislead us ; it is rather our most valuable helpmate for finding truth, by bringing before us a wide range of possibilities, and thus perchance also the one we can judge as true ; it is the finest instrument man possesses, and as much needed for the most abstract researches of science, for success in practical life, as for the poet's conception.

If then the products of the imagination may differ so greatly—from worthless illusions to scientific truth—it will appear too loose a definition to speak of beauty as seeing through the imagination in general. We would rather say : seeing through the *æsthetic* imagination, that is the imagination at the service, as the instrument of whatever be the *æsthetic* principle in the mind. Now this *æsthetic* principle—Kant's Power of Judgment—I have tried to show as being in practice the central self striving for immediate realisation, that is for harmonious activity of all its mental powers. The *æsthetic* imagination would therefore be inspired and determined solely by the demand for an object to which we could respond immediately, in the present, with all our aspirations.

The only object which could give us this of itself, without needing our contribution, might be whatever is for each of us the totality of things ; since the mind should be adapted not to any single thing alone, but to all things that we can know or think, or we could neither know nor think them. No one isolated object would seem to be able to satisfy us ; but only in so far as we can—consciously or unconsciously—bring it into connection with, or see in it something of that which—be it great or small—is the Universe for us. Even into objects of passion, entirely in themselves, as they may appear to absorb us for the moment, we bring, I think, this world of ours, if only to lose it, for the time, in one desire. It is curious to observe how all the efforts and inquiries we make in order to establish empiric reality are in the direction of getting ever further beyond the single object which from the beginning we can only know in its relations to other objects : What does science do when it is not content with our primitive view, but widen it ?—place, as we have seen, a thing in relation with ever more other things in order better to know it ; and no single phenomenon is considered scientific

cally proved till it has been brought into connection with all other phenomena, that is, with the empiric Universe.

Now the æsthetic imagination would appear to me to be striving towards the same end; not by letting us, as in passions, lose ourselves in the object, nor by losing the object to know it only by establishing methodically its relations to other objects, but by allowing us to see self-consciously and immediately something of all things in the individual thing before us. Nor is the æsthetic imagination satisfied with the empiric world we know; it would discover a trace—however slight or indistinct it may be—of the world of Reason, of that totality the mind demands, but cannot know, in the object of beauty.

It is as if the view of the senses and understanding, even when widened by scientific inquiry, were yet too short to satisfy the human mind; and it might be for this only, that we do not always see beauty and often even ugliness in the world before us. Let us consider such an outlook—literally a physical outlook; one of those, such as the progress of civilisation abundantly provides, where it is not easy to find any charm. How does the æsthetic imagination proceed?

It enables me to disregard, to put further back those features—generally contributed by man—which, conveying no idea beyond their immediate purpose, are unsatisfying to the mind, and thus without beauty, which loom large only because of my short view; and it gives prominence to such aspects—and there will always be some, and be it only the light over the scene—that point towards a wider world, than the tiny fragment of it I can see. It is as if the perspective were shifted, from the point of view which renders indifferently every particular thing that happens to be within its range, to the “distance” demanded by a mind that is not satisfied with accidental facts. That is all the æsthetic imagination does, and all it does—only over a wider area—even for the creative artist; enabling him to compose, not merely from what is physically before him, but out of his entire experience (of the world or of his own mind) new outlooks adapted to the width of his individual view.

But in thus widening the world the æsthetic imagination does not falsify it. It does not, like the uncontrolled fancy, produce illusions; for it has, as will be remembered, to obey the *whole* mind, also those faculties which give us this empiric nature and will not permit it to be distorted. We may, it is true, whether as artists or simply by seeing beauty,

create in a way a new world—a world invisible to those to whom all things are as the primrose was to Peter Bell ; but, in so far as it is a beautiful world, it must always, as Kant truly says, be built up out of the stuff presented by the sensuous nature we know.

Might not this new world of beauty, though it be in part of our own making, yet be in the truest sense the most real world ? Not more real, certainly, on either of the generally recognised standards we have considered. But—the question has been raised before—do these standards give us all the reality we are able to conceive ?

Let us examine again for a moment these standards ; how we arrive at them, and what might be wanting to make them complete : It lies in our nature to assume, as was remarked to begin with, that all our clear perceptions exist in themselves ; but we find that this assumption will not protect us with any certainty against ascribing such reality equally to mistaken perceptions ; we therefore gradually widen our outlook by making our perceptions dependent one on the other, till at last we arrive at empiric reality ; that is a coherent Universe which can stand any practical test, just as if it were independently real, as science therefore holds it to be. But critical philosophy would show us that this mighty and overwhelming Universe of science, compared to which outwardly man shrinks into nothing, is yet only a conditioned reality, dependent for its being, as we know it, on the miserable little spectator who perceives it. Such view need not, however, constitute this world unreal, as a, to my mind, false idealism believes it to be ; it merely implies that it is an incomplete reality, *requiring a subject—a percipient to make it real.*

Yet there is idealism in this view ; for it presupposes that the human mind possesses ideas of a reality that is *not* dependent on any percipient, and that would thus be in itself or absolute. True philosophy should allow, I think, that we have such ideas. But to admit these ideas does not mean claiming that they can give us any knowledge. Indeed, if we would pursue them, we find that they involve a contradiction in terms, since whatever we think becomes, by the very act of thinking it, dependent on the nature of our thought ; even in our ideas of a reality beyond human knowledge, we can no more than in our actual experience get rid of the thinker or percipient ; we cannot get out of our human skin. Thus, unknowable as it must ever remain, any idea of absolute reality *must equally*, in order not to be self-

contradictory, *include the thinker* ; that is to say, it can only be *Totality*. The mystic's feeling, when subject and object disappear and all is one, is the only consistent view of absolute reality ; but it is no longer thought.

Then, as long as we search with the aid of thought, be it for *complete reality* in the world we know or for *absolute reality* in the realm of our ideas, we must inevitably encounter self and something that is not self, subject and object, as the ultimate category of all thought—as the fundamental fact of all *thinkable* existence.

But if self and not self, subject and object are thus the last and one undeniable certainty of our existence, they must be adapted to each other ; we cannot assume existence itself as arising from disharmony. It should then be the *perfect* adaptation of self to not-self—what would make *them one* in the mystic's totality beyond thought—which would be the highest *thinkable* reality.

Also we see such perfect adaptation—over a more limited field—of the subject to its surroundings *in life itself* ; the failure to preserve it means death. But when life rises to a human mind, we can no longer find, as it were ready-made for us, this harmonious correspondence ; it is, as *if the outlook this mind is capable of were too large for its powers of vision*. For it would be to the entire not-self, to its whole complement of existence, that this self might be attuned ; whereas all our possible *knowledge* is only of parts. We can never reach that outlook on the whole that it would seem to be in our nature to demand, which might give us what is well named by Bradley “ the *one* absorbing experience,” and which alone would be *perfect reality* ; both for us as experiencing it, and also regarded—if we imagine another spectator—as constituting a whole, as being an aspect of totality.

It is this strange disparity of our faculties—our limited power of knowing against the infinite range of our ideas—which must remain as the ultimate riddle of human existence ; from it originate the imperfections and the ugliness we see in the world, because we cannot *see far enough to get at reality* ; it causes the rift which separates the world of facts from the region of ideas and the values we derive from them. And yet, just this disharmony, this rift in the mind (indicated on a lower level by the fact of our having needs and desires) would alone render possible all human will and human consciousness ; it alone might give a meaning to time. If our ideas and values (or needs) were identical with facts, there would be nothing to strive for, all would stand in perfection ; but

it would be a perfection not consciously experienced, it would be reality, but not human reality.

For it would seem to be our destiny *that we must make our own reality* ; and it might be reached in the very act of striving towards it. Thus our knowledge of this world, which constitutes empiric reality, is, as we have seen, never complete, but is ever growing ; while the ethical ideal would be realised by the *settled will* to make facts and values one, although it can never be accomplished.

Beauty also, if our reflections be accepted, could arise only from striving for it ; not, it is true, as in the pursuit of knowledge or of moral aims out of a conscious striving (although perhaps we may do much to consciously further it), but from a spontaneous effort of the mind to *get the horizon it wants*. Only here there are no outward obstacles to overcome ; *for we possess within ourselves, in our own imagination, an instrument which will give us of itself an outlook as wide as we each individually demand*. Thus beauty, in contrast to all practical aims, whose realisation would seem to be reached in striving, may appear like attainment, as the only joy that asks for no future. Yet we cannot get outside of time ; movement of the mind there is, but it is spontaneous, without *conscious* effort ; as long as we experience a beauty, it is ever increasing, and the greatness of it will depend on the varying width of horizon—and it may be endless—we each need to make the world real for us.

It would be then, on our theory, the desire for an object adapted to the whole mind, and thus the desire for reality, that is the driving force to the æsthetic imagination to widen our outlook, till we would seem to see in the little parts of existence which alone we can know, ever more distinctly the trace of a Whole ; and so to get at the real world in the same degree as we are able to see its beauty.

Fechner calls the world of beauty God's view. It may be but affirming the same thing, if our reflections permit the conclusion : Whenever by our own imagination we bring beauty into this world, we *create what is*.

VON OPPELL.

SCHLOSS WILSDRUFF,
BEI DRESDEN.

BEAUTY AND THE MACHINE.

ROBERT SWANN.

It is given to the present age to talk rather too freely of Beauty, so that the word has now a vulgar connotation. We apply it to what pleases or impresses us in our common experience. There is Beauty to-day in the bloom of a rose, in the surging of the sea, in the stroke of a bat ; but if we feel that these things are beautiful (it is not all of us who do), we love them for themselves, and do not trouble to inquire further why they seem beautiful to us. There is no such thing to the average Englishman as abstract Beauty ; one might almost say, it is no good talking to him of Beauty, he will be thinking all the time only of Black Beauty. We are not a people who can set our hearts upon an abstract expression. "O think you," says Diotima to Socrates,¹ "that it would be an ignoble life for a man to be ever contemplating with his proper faculty the absolute Beauty, and to be living in its presence ?" If an Englishman were asked this, is there any doubt what his reply would be ? "Beauty may be all right when applied to things, but abstract Beauty, what is the point of it ? What good does it do ? If you ask me what is wanted to-day, it is not this thing Beauty at all, it is efficiency."

And, so it may be said, answers not only the Englishman, but the whole modern world. Now efficiency cannot rightly be regarded as a virtue at all, because efficiency merely tends to endow man with the qualities of a machine. Before the Industrial Revolution the word was never used with regard to persons ; its modern meaning has, in fact, emerged with the machine and the organisation of commerce and industry which the machine has brought about.

Mr Hilaire Belloc once aptly remarked in the course of a

¹ Plato : *The Symposium*. (Translated by Robert Bridges.)

lecture that it is no good simply calling a man efficient : one must state what that man's efficiency enables him to do. "Efficiency," as the word is commonly used now, enables a man to clock in at 9 a.m. and lay down his tools when the hooter goes ; and that is all. Certainly the surgeon is efficient, and the barrister and sometimes the schoolmaster, each one at his special job. But these types of workers are the last to preach efficiency as it is preached by the house journals of large commercial firms. They take it for granted. They know what the directors of all reputable firms know but do not let out : that efficiency alone is of as little avail in this world as the infinite pains which do most certainly not make up the whole sum of genius. Efficiency, indeed, is the first quality to be sought after in a man, and the last to be applauded. One looks for efficiency—the ability to do a job—in every man, and praises it when there is nothing else to praise, and only because it is by no means in every man that even this quality is to be found.

And so it is in Art, in our conceptions of what is beautiful. English people, as a whole, take no interest in theories about art, and only a very few of us care to go to the trouble of making ourselves acquainted with the various types of painting which are the several manifestations of those theories. But we all of us like to see a job well done : like, that is, to see efficiency as it is applied to the creation of things. And thus it comes about that efficiency takes on in ordinary estimation a beauty of its own.

This is the whole of the ordinary man's theory of Art. Whatever does its job in the neatest possible manner, whether that job be the spanning of a river or the riding of the air, does that job in a beautiful manner, and is itself beautiful. We see then how strokes of the bat came to be considered beautiful. In performing perfectly what the human mind directing them wants performed they are beautiful, and the other instruments to those actions will be beautiful too—the muscles and the balance of the batsman himself.

This raises a point which in art criticism is often ignored. John Ruskin saw and preached the beauty of efficiency, but he applied it only to one section of Art. He had been caught between two distinct periods of criticism. Behind him lay the eighteenth century, languorous, melancholy, trying hard to be genuinely Gothic in a quiet, comfortable way ; before him was the world that had in its infancy bewildered Wordsworth, the busy world of the telegraph and the tram, and the Great Exhibition. John Ruskin belonged to neither period,

but he took possession of the art principles of both, and moulded them to his own use. When Ruskin looks at a masterpiece of Gothic art, it does not set him dreaming, in the manner of Horace Walpole or Monk Lewis, of old, unhappy, far-off things. He takes the thing to pieces. He examines it stone by stone. The eighteenth century suggested to him that it was worth his notice ; the nineteenth tells him how to explain to the world that it is worth theirs too. And the explanation is characteristic of the man and the age. Gothic architecture is beautiful, is superior to all other types of architecture ; is, moreover, morally excellent, because it can be seen doing its job.

It is for just this reason that to-day we consider machines as objects of beauty.

There is no doubt that to many people machines alone are beautiful. Pictures and sculpture have little appeal now to the ordinary man, but of those whom an express engine or a well-designed car body infect with an emotion quite definitely æsthetic the number is legion. Now one may admit that such things as cars and railway engines are beautiful. I do not personally see how one can deny them the right to be considered works of art. If architecture is an art, what else, then, is shipbuilding, and coach-building ? One can argue for a lifetime on what Art is and what it is not. It is simpler, and, indeed, only common sense to regard all human creative activity as Art, and one form of Art as higher or lower than another, according to the scope each gives for the expression of the human spirit.

This is where some would complain that only a fraction of human creative activity is concerned at all with expression. It may be so, if by expression is meant self-expression. But there is the expression of the soul of a people as well as the expression of the feelings of persons. One genius may be of more value to the world of the spirit than the combined talents of a whole race ; but geniuses are scarce, and a group of humble minds working together may produce results of enormous benefit to mankind. It is this co-operation, rather than the influence of geniuses, that is important if we are to consider how Beauty can be produced by (and in) the machine.

Let us take one instance. The annual competition for the Schneider Air Trophy has led to the designing of craft which can travel, given good conditions, at well over 300 miles an hour. The designers aim at constructing something that will fly through the air at a greater speed than anything

previously flown by man. That is their aim, and their sole aim. But the result of their efforts gives us something else—it gives us Beauty. It is possible, without going back a great number of years, to trace the development of the aeroplane and the motor car. In each case the design has taken upon itself the features which one looks for first in any work of art—simplicity, absence of unnecessary detail, strength of intention or *meaning*. The meaning of the modern aeroplane and the meaning of the modern car are both the same : speed. And if a sculptor were to want to give concrete form to the abstract idea of speed, how better could he do it than it has already been done, unconsciously, by the designers of aircraft and motor cars ?

Beauty lies, we are told, in the eye of the beholder. Have we then got this idea the wrong way round ? Is it that we merely consider those things beautiful which serve their purpose best ? Do we in this machine age only delude our minds into believing that we can still produce things that are beautiful ? The imagination can play strange tricks upon us. Once there were principles by which the world could test its conception of Beauty ; now there are none, but only theories which serve but to confuse the minds of simple folk and keep the critics from starvation. Faith has become a matter of fashion, and Paris, the centre of fashion, the centre too of all the window-dressing which the dealers call contemporary Art. Let it, if you like, remain an open question whether Beauty is to be found in the studios or the workshops of to-day ; but let us suppose that someone a thousand years hence digs up and presents to the British Museum a piece of sculpture by Frank Dobson, a painting by Van Dongen, and the last seaplane to win the Schneider Cup ; we may surely be forgiven for suggesting there is no doubt that the authorities will consider the seaplane the outcome of an earnest love of beauty, and the other relics but feeble amateurish attempts to revive the arts of a bygone day.

But this is the kind of Beauty that comes from mere efficiency, and I have already pleaded that Art should give us more than that. Can the machine give us more than that ? Can the machine provide scope for the expression of the spirit of man ?

Many who will concede to machines the power of turning out objects of some degree of beauty will stop quite definitely there. But surely this, so far as Art is concerned, is just the point where machines begin to be particularly interesting. Anyone with an ounce of imagination can foresee, in the not

distant future, artistic developments as tremendous as those that are now altering for each one of us the centuries-old limitations of time and space.

Long before the Industrial Age came into being, machinery was helping Art. There was printing, for instance. It may be objected that the printed book is merely a replica of the enscribed book. Certainly printing has not yet produced anything fundamentally different from what can be produced entirely by hand. Even in the printing of pictures, nothing has been done by the various complicated inventions of recent years that cannot be done more impressively by scratching with a needle on copper, though it may be argued that this method of printing a number of copies of the same picture gives us something that differs from any kind of direct painting, and is therefore itself an instance of the way in which mechanical processes can assist Art.

In the history of music one finds better instances of the influence of the machine. The history of music in the eighteenth century is the history of the perfecting of the instruments at the disposal of composers. Had the piano existed earlier in its present form, it is safe to say that the whole history of music would have been changed. Had it remained always the crude thing a harpsichord is, half of Beethoven's greatness would have been shadowed from us for ever.

Recently attempts have been made to continue the development of the mechanism of the piano. A two-manual instrument has been produced with octave couplings which enable average performers to play with complete success passages that have so far eluded all but the most accomplished. Since the invention of the pianola, too, it has become possible for the composer to forget that a piano is an instrument normally played only by two hands or four. The pianolo has as many fingers as the composer likes to write notes for. Nothing much, it must be admitted, has yet been produced solely for the pianola, and nothing may ever be written for the instrument in its present condition which will compare favourably with the work of composers writing for the piano itself or the ordinary instruments of an orchestra. The contemporary pianola is condemned generally as an unsympathetic instrument, and possibly it will always remain condemned, for prejudice is without a doubt as strong among people of high musical sensibility as among the rest of us. But there is no reason why the pianola should always remain an instrument which is incapable of recording a musician's idea of music, and, given the necessary improvement in the

quality of the instrument itself, it is not fantastic to suggest that we may in the near future be having serious piano recitals of music which it would be quite beyond the power of the most brilliant pianists to expound.

For the last half-century and more machinery has been exercising a great influence over the theatre. One instance of this is the work of Adolphe Appia, who revolutionised the art of stage production by using light instead of painted canvas as a setting for his characters, and variations in the intensity or grouping of his lights to denote change of scene and differences of mood in the course of a scene. These ideas of Appia have given the theatre a new life, and, as Mr James Laver has already remarked,¹ "what made them practicable was the invention of electric lighting; although it was the introduction of gas which first made it possible to use light not only for illumination but for effect." Thanks to electricity and other mechanical devices, stage properties now combine with actors to present the theme of a play, and the business of controlling both the men and the machines has been placed in the hands of one man, who seldom appears in the play himself, though in rehearsals he has had, or ought to have had, the most important part in it. Producing is now an art in itself, and perhaps the tendency now is for producers to rely too much on the power of machinery. Mr Basil Dean has often been accused of letting his dramatists suffocate beneath the trampling hosts of his electricians. Machinery can do almost anything with a stage, but it has yet to turn a bad piece of work into a masterpiece. The play is still the thing.

But in the cinema it is different. It is here, more than in all the other arts, that machinery rules. With pen and ink and a knowledge of life, one can construct a play, and it stands as good a chance of being a masterpiece as any, however it be produced, or even if it never be produced at all. But no one can make a cinema film of even the crudest kind without acquiring first a thorough knowledge of all the processes involved in film-production; and moreover, a film is not a film until it is projected upon a screen. Anyone, it is true, may write a scenario, but the scenario as written down will only be the raw material of the film-maker's craft, and is far less the eventual film than the written drama is the acted play. Machinery helps the drama. It is the making of the film.

There have been attempts in the past to reproduce by machinery the effects hitherto obtained only by the hand of

¹ *Design in the Theatre*, 1927.

man, but these, whatever their commercial value, have no æsthetic significance. In giving us the cinema, machinery gives us something new ; or rather—for this statement cries aloud for contradiction—gives to the right man the opportunity to express himself in a medium of enormous potentiality.

Everyone is now awake to the idea that the cinema is an art. It has become the fashion to subject films to the most relentless criticism, and it is certainly right that every film should be treated as if some definite intellectual process accompanied its creation. Some, indeed the majority, are not so far blessed, and the secret of their fatuity is not hard to find. Films that do not stand thinking about one second fill the cinemas. Artistically they are beneath contempt. Commercially they are the mainstays of what was, after all, a flourishing industry long before people ever even hinted that one day it might be an art. Art has always given a number of men a living, but it is the men who do not depend on Art for their daily bread who raise it to its greatest heights. In Art, as in sport (to compare great with small), it is the serious amateur who rules. But in the cinema there are no serious amateurs.

There cannot be. It is all too expensive. That is the trouble when Art has to rely upon machines. Machinery costs money, and artists are usually poor. If they want to use machines, the expense has to be borne by others, and those others have a natural tendency to demand an eventual return of the money they have disbursed. And that return must generally be a quick return.

And how often in the history of the Arts has the return been a quick return ? The artist can go on drawing till he dies ; those who throw him a crust will hardly grudge him paper and pencil. The composer is hardly less fortunate, and the writer only less free from material restrictions than Diogenes. But the more complicated the art be, the more does the financial factor hinder its free execution and the more probable is it that the artist will be tempted to let commercial considerations prevail.

Not that this is altogether a bad thing. Working for money is a good discipline for anyone. But there are some who are saved from the need for discipline of any sort by the natural vigour of their own minds. It should be possible for these men to use machinery if they so wish ; if, that is, they feel they can express what is in them best through the agency of the machine.

It will seldom happen that the funds to do so will be at their disposal. Machinery, it may be predicted, will therefore tend always to propagate the commonplace and grind down the work of genius. But it is definitely in the alliance of the man of genius, the true artist, with the machine, the true modern instrument, that the future of Art lies. The world has seen many wonders of recent years, but in the fertility of its many inventions the spirit of man is left curiously unenthralled. It rests with the artist to rid this mechanical age of the spiritual discontent which is more evident to-day than people like to admit even to themselves ; and to show that the machine, already so efficient an instrument of the body, can serve the soul as well.

But this, let millionaires remember, the artist can hardly do alone.

ROBERT SWANN.

CHELTENHAM COLLEGE.

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE

(1805—1872).

CHARLES GARDNER, M.A.

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE was born in 1805 of Unitarian parents. During the most impressionable years of his youth Sir Walter Scott was serving the public with two novels a year, Jane Austen was showing at longer intervals how a novel could be a perfect work of art, Wordsworth was feeding the spiritual life of thoughtful people, Coleridge was receiving pilgrims at The Grove, Highgate, Carlyle was introducing students to Goethe and German philosophy, and the great Goethe himself was holding sway over Europe's mental life with a sovereignty that must have stirred the envy of decaying kings.

Certainly to all appearances the age was romantic. But along with the romanticism there were certain reactions that might easily carry the younger men away from romance, and poetry, and art, and draw them into a scientific movement led by men who spoke with the certainty and assurance that had marked the religious revivalists of the eighteenth century, and who were as sure as their forebears that the millennium was within calculable distance. Philosophy was becoming deterministic. Religion under its influence became naturalistic. Deterministic philosophers and theistic religionists upheld the hands of the scientists, and all three spoke with supreme contempt of orthodox Christianity, and declared that it was dead.

In religious England most of the choice spirits who distinguished themselves in after-life were nurtured in Evangelicalism, which had lost its first fiery enthusiasm, but retained a fiery afterglow. It abounded in vetoes and negations. It suspected men's passions and energies, and sadly shook its head at the vast multitude of men and women

who were undoubtedly making for hell. Moreover, young men and women who were learning to think discovered that Evangelicalism had no intellectual framework. St. Thomas Aquinas had beaten out the intellectual implications of Roman Catholicism. Old-fashioned High-Churchism in England had plenty of fundamental brain work. The Evangelicals distrusted brains, and cared only to speak of the soul's immediate relation to God. Parents anxiously scrutinised their children to see whether they were also children of God. The children, instinctively and dumbly, feeling the spirit of life and adventure working in them, rebelled against the parental inquisition, and were presently asking to what they were to turn, to whom they were to go. For several decades before the opening of the nineteenth century young rebels were seeking mental relief in Unitarianism. A few found their way to the Church of Rome; but the general unreasoned opinion was that the Reformation had dealt such a blow to Catholicism that it could have no longer any significance except for superstitious foreigners.

Unitarianism was reasonable, its principles permitted freedom and tolerance, and its new conception of God compared favourably with the grim God of Calvinism, who had held the main sway over the Evangelicals of the eighteenth century. Maurice's father and grandfather were members of the despised sect, and hence his own early training was in Unitarian principles.

His revolt occurred early in his life, partly of intellect, partly of conscience. Unitarians at that period had not summoned Higher Criticism to their assistance. They retained the whole Scriptures, but read them so freely that Harriet Martineau declared that their interpretation was decided by their individual taste. Maurice was taught to reverence the Scriptures, and it seemed to him that the Unitarians too often evaded their plain statements. Nor was he satisfied with the new God, who appeared to him to be merely good-natured. Still deeper in himself he was poignantly aware of an unsatisfied thirst and an urgent need. The Bible, in its own way, spoke to his need by pointing him to the Son of God Who could give him personal deliverance and lead him to the Father of Spirits. He contemplated the Father and the Son till he saw that they were united in One Spirit. Thus he passed from Unitarianism to Trinitarianism, not so much by an intellectual process, as by an experience of his own needs, and of the way in which they were met by Christ. He no sooner apprehended Christ as his personal

Saviour and Deliverer than the question of his father's state, of the state of all Unitarians, pressed on him, and he could not rest till he found a Christianity deep enough to include them within the pale of salvation. Orthodox Evangelicals regarded Unitarians with horror, and had no doubt of what was in store for them. The old-fashioned High Church folk hardly knew of their existence, and, if they did, thought that they were, as a matter of course, outside the Christian covenant. It was impossible for Maurice to take this short and easy method of dealing with those who differed from himself. He would dig deep till he found an inclusive principle. If his new faith was really deeper and truer than that which was held by his father, it must not only include it but reveal to him whatever it held of the truth. He soon perceived that faith is not the foundation of the Christian life, but truth. Truth is a rock, and faith can stand on it securely. Truth was not an abstraction. Jesus Christ had made the startling claim that He was the Truth. Henceforth Maurice would prejudge no man and no scheme. If he knew Jesus Christ he would have light to discern the truth that struggled and lived in all persons and systems, and he need never feel tempted to live in proud exclusion. His personal experience of Christ revealed to him the treasures of the Gospel. Unitarianism had become a system of ethics. He discovered that the Gospel was the gift of life. To know Christ is to know God, and knowledge of God is eternal life. Instead of looking at eternal life as the ultimate reward of a moral life, he entered into it as a present possession, and found that the morality flowed from it as from a living fount. With his philosophical powers already awake he must learn how to relate the eternal to time. The solution of the problem was already within sight to one who was inwardly aware of both time and eternity.

Maurice's digging for a rock foundation brought him very near to the Quaker principle of the Inner Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. No sooner was he interested in the Quakers than he encountered them, and they aroused a new questioning very different from that called forth by the Unitarians.

The younger Quakers of his day were leaning towards the Evangelicals, and losing their hold on the fundamental principle of the Inner Light, which, of course, was the principle of St John's Gospel. Maurice found that the new Quakers were narrow and contradictory just when they should have been demonstrating a universal principle. Looking for the

root cause of their narrowness, he found it in their surrender of the Sacraments. The principle of the Inner Light required an ordinance that should embody it and make it universal. Holy Baptism, rightly understood, supplied the need. The baptised member of the Church of England was taught to say of Christ, "Who redeemed me and all mankind." It was because Christ had redeemed all mankind that the Church could claim the universal truth for the individual child, and give it the sign, seal, and token of its election.

Maurice started his college career at Cambridge, where he might easily have carried on the tradition of the Cambridge Platonists. But he presently, in 1829, moved to Oxford, and there his contacts and reactions decided much of his permanent thinking.

Dr Pusey had recently been made Regius Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church. His immense learning was already drawing all observing eyes, and Maurice both saw and felt the attraction of the man. Hitherto he had been mainly occupied with the more personal side of religion. Now he was striving with the idea of a church, or the Church, and it seemed likely that Pusey would give him what he wanted. Maurice, like Pusey, was aware of what the German theologians were saying. Mosheim was already dated. But Neander appeared a wise teacher, except for the fact that he and so many of his colleagues had no idea of the Church.

Unhappily Dr Pusey and Maurice never really met in the spirit. Their minds and methods were wholly different. Both had had a profound experience of Christ; both felt the need of a Church. Pusey's mind was more objective, more historical, more dramatic and, strangely, more mystical. While Maurice was puzzling how to include the Unitarians and the Quakers, the other was tingling with his awareness of the historical stubborn fact of the Church, and his mind went naturally back to the golden days when the Church was one, and the Fathers of many and varied minds, dealing with the subtlest, and most far-reaching questions of religion, were unanimously teaching the one Faith that had been delivered to them. Pusey's exhaustive study of the Fathers threw him partly out of touch with the needs of his own age. His work was consciously a work of recovery. The deep humanism, and the new social consciousness beginning to stir in many minds hardly touched him at all. But these were the very things that Maurice felt.

Church people, like the Evangelicals, were often de-

humanised by their other-worldly interests. If Christians really worshipped One Who was perfect Man, they should at least show their faith by spontaneous, full, deep, human feeling. The despised Unitarians felt this, and later in the century new novelists, like George Eliot, were to find their inspiration in the depths of their feeling for humanity.

Maurice perceived that notions, propositions, opinions were apt to warp the outflow of human sympathies. He looked for a Church that should be Catholic in the sense that it would transcend Papacies and Anglicanisms, and be a witness for the Divine Order that lay behind all institutions. He shared with most Victorians the passion for Nationalism, which was visibly at work in Italy, Germany and Poland; and since Roman Catholicism was anti-nationalistic, he hastily decided that she could offer no help. When, at last, he beat out his own idea of the Church, it proved to be an enlargement of his personal experience. He was convinced of God and of a Divine Order. Men may depart from that Order, but they cannot break it. It stands secure in Christ. Men, families, nations are free only as they acknowledge and stand in it. Man's personal conversion was a return to it. Nations must return in the same way. The Church, then, was in the world to witness to God, to His Christ Who revealed Him, to His Order, and must resist all notions and opinions that separate instead of unite, and have a merely passing interest.

Maurice followed Pusey till his famous publication on Baptism in 1835, which proved to be the parting of the ways. He protested passionately against the tract because he thought that Pusey was teaching that Baptism involved a change of nature. No. Man's nature stood in the image and likeness of God as God had created it. The fall was the denial or non-realisation of this truth. Baptism was the authoritative declaration to the individual of the universal truth. Conversion was the unveiling of what existed already.

Pusey was not satisfied with these statements, and, so far as I know, the two men never met that they might explain themselves to each other. The reconciliation has come from their disciples. Maurice was right in affirming that man's real nature stood in Christ, that sin and evil were a departure by unbelief from the Divine Order, that Baptism was a declaration of the Truth, and conversion an unveiling, but there is still need of Pusey's contention that regeneration is more than an unveiling. It is the re-creation of what is within by the action of something from without. Pusey

insisted on the transcendent element, Maurice on the immanent, and they separated. We, who revere the two men, accept both, and see in Baptism the full, rich teaching that really deserves to be called catholic.

Maurice's separation from the Oxford Movement forced him to stand on his own feet. Looking backwards he recognised his deep debt to Coleridge, and a lesser debt to Thomas Erskine of Linlathen. He did not forget his friendship with Stirling and intercourse with Carlyle. Oxford men, who did not follow Pusey, generally passed on, like Froude, to Carlyle; or like Matthew Arnold, to Goethe and Spinoza. Maurice thought that they all alike were making straight for Pantheism; and proceeded to follow his own thought to its logical implications.

Robert Owen was then the English apostle of Socialism. Socialistic ideas had been long at work in France. The English thinkers, like Coleridge and Wordsworth, who had once hoped for much good from the French Revolution, had with the passing years become disappointed, and fallen back on a more conservative position.

Robert Owen had not the religious fervour of the poets. His socialism was to take the place of religion in an enlightened age. Maurice was warmly in sympathy with much of his teaching. But he would not consent to divorce Socialism from religion. The early Church was communistic. So were the monastic houses of the Middle Ages. If the Church did its duty in the living present, it would acclaim all that was true in modern secular Socialism, and plant it on a Christian foundation. Maurice set himself to think out Christian Socialism, and was joyful to discover the social significance of the Lord's Supper, and of Christ's central conception of the Kingdom of God. He also began to speak in public to working men, who showed a great willingness to listen to him. When he was not actively engaged in public, he retired to his study, and travelled over vast tracts of moral and metaphysical philosophy, weighing his philosophers not so much on their own merits as on their agreement or otherwise with his own Christian Platonism. Those who have the key may almost know beforehand what he will say. Take, for example, Savonarola. The Florentine prophet proclaimed the profound truth that Jesus Christ was the real invisible King of Florence. Yes, says Maurice, but he did not see that Christ was equally the King of the other Italian States. Hence he fell into the exclusiveness of the old Hebrews, who believed that God had called them

and not other nations, instead of seeing that they were called as a nation to witness to the truth that was true of every nation.

The finding of his own voice made him a Master who could draw disciples, and a butt for the petty persecution of those incapable of understanding him. Among those glad to learn was Emily Brontë. Emily's opinion of the Shirley curates may be guessed, and Maurice gave her relief from the stifling clerical atmosphere. Next to Emily Brontë in importance was Charles Kingsley, who, once having met Maurice, for ever afterwards called him the Master. He had more drama and poetry than his teacher, but he was much less of a theologian. He interpreted certain aspects of Maurice's manifold teaching, and more especially welcomed his Christian Socialism, which was such an immense help in his practical ministry to men.

Tennyson learnt much from Maurice, and when college councils were thundering their anathema invited him to his hearth in the Isle of Wight. His influence percolated to Scotland through George MacDonald, who found in him relief from Calvinism, and a deep genial humanism. His influence was silently at work everywhere. Not that he founded a school of thought. He refused to become a party man. He disliked the term "Broad Church." The Evangelical who learnt of him rejoiced to find that his divine sonship did not depend on his faith, which was liable to fluctuate with his feelings and his illnesses. He learnt also to recognise his duties as a citizen. The Evangelicals who would not receive him called him a Unitarian, a muddy Mystic, and supported the *Record* in its constant and bitter attacks. Opposition came also from the Tractarians, who declared that he had created God in his own image. The charge was plausible, as anyone who reads his books will perceive. For all his heroes from Coleridge back through the Cambridge Platonists, St John, Isaiah, Moses, Adam to God have a Maurician flavour. It was there because Maurice lacked the dramatic faculty, and so could not quite make his prophets live apart from himself. Liddon found his goodness a rebuke to the true children of Zion. But many Tractarians were glad to learn of him. The late Dr Scott Holland, and Bishop Gore were as much the sons of Maurice as of Pusey; so that the painful misunderstanding between Pusey and Maurice was bridged in their pupils, and the whole *Lux Mundi* school may be said to have incorporated their teaching. But the opposition was bitter, and he had his full share

of the persecution that invariably follows good men of original mind. The first complaints that became audible were over his Socialism, of which many papers and journals were full.

Maurice was made Professor of Literature at King's College, London, in 1840, and Professor of Theology in 1846. Dr Jelf was appointed Principal of King's in 1843. He was an Oxford man, and had been tutor to the late King of Hanover. His tutorial duties might have given him a prejudice against any form of Socialism; but one would have thought that he might have learnt to appreciate St John's Gospel while at Oxford with Pusey and Newman. His first encounter with Maurice was over his Socialism—not so much that he objected to it itself, as that the papers had taken hold of it, and they might bring King's College into disrepute. The trouble might have passed but for the publication of Maurice's *Theological Essays*, which immediately brought the difference between him and Dr Jelf to a head. Ostensibly the trouble was that the essays not only denied everlasting punishment, but they put forth the notion that everyone would eventually be saved. This interpretation could easily be caught up and repeated by the public; but it was false. Dr Jelf believed in a system of rewards and punishments. Those who behave themselves here will receive the reward of eternal life in heaven. For him eternal life meant only the endlessness of heaven. Now Maurice, as we have seen, built the whole of his theology on the present possession of eternal life, which stands in the knowledge of God. Here he was simply following the best teaching of the ages, and that of St John, St Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews. He knew that a man might, here and now, pass out of a state of eternal death into a state of eternal life, and therefore, instead of thinking of hell as a kind of eternal punishment in the far future for the wicked, he found its essential content in the present. Whether a soul might remain for ever obdurate and refuse the knowledge of God, he would not presume to decide.

To us it seems incredible that Dr Jelf should have been given such an important post, in which he was called to make theological pronouncements solely on the merits of his academic requirements, with little or no understanding of the heart of Christ's teaching. Maurice was dismissed, and the public for the most part regarded Dr Jelf as the faithful champion of orthodoxy.

* We need not go into detail concerning the other opposi-

tions in his life. His real witness in the last century was for a true gnosticism against the agnosticism of Huxley, Sir Leslie Stephen, and a host of others. His encounter with Dean Mansel turned exactly on the point that the Dean denied the possibility of the knowledge that Maurice claimed. Huxley and Leslie Stephen saw as clearly and quickly as Maurice himself that the Dean was really on their side. They poured some contempt on Maurice's claim to know, and drew attention to his obscurities as John Morley did to his "smoky crucible." What they would not see was that he spoke from an experience that had never been theirs. They were like a man without music in his soul criticising Beethoven, or a man with no sense of art condemning Whistler, or blind men denying the reality of the sun. The knowledge of God, which is eternal life, is so wonderful, so overwhelming, so utterly real in a world of shadows, that those who have it, like Maurice, can but testify and speak of that which they know, and wonder why so many people cannot hear their word.

Maurice's books are many. He was at his best on St John's Gospel, the Lord's Prayer, and the Epistle to the Hebrews. His application of the Platonic principle to the first chapter of Genesis will not commend itself everywhere to-day, though it has reappeared in Christian Science; and the way he extracts the essence from the Apocalyptic books may not satisfy protagonists in the apocalyptic and eschatological controversy. We may feel that a little frank acceptance of the Higher Criticism would have helped him where his idea is not exactly in accordance with the letter of Scripture. Indeed, it would be easy to criticise. But after every criticism has been made, Maurice remains a great human figure—the strongest and least ecclesiastical of churchmen, the founder of no party, yet the needful teacher of every party man who will, after reading him sympathetically, be drawn by his nature and his spirit out of his many religious sins—his bigotry, narrowness, cruelty and intolerance—and learn to keep the deep wells of human feeling and sympathy unchoked and open for himself and any others who may care to come and draw clear water to refresh themselves on their journey.

He died in 1872 with the quietness and dignity of an old Hebrew prophet, not with the words of the Divine Shemah on his lips, but the name of the Christian Trinity into which he had been baptised when he joined the Church of England.

CHARLES GARDNER.

THE PLACE OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

CANON T. A. LACEY, D.D.

It is well to begin by settling the meaning of our terms. I shall not attempt to define religion, doubting, indeed, whether it is susceptible of satisfactory definition. But it is possible, by way of description, to detach some of its elements. Matthew Arnold's description, "morality tinged with emotion," will not suit me, true as it certainly is. I need something wider than morality, which I will call *conduct*. That may seem to be too wide. Not all conduct, you may say, is religious conduct; the conduct of a cricket match is not specifically religious. Perhaps not; but I think that religion may enter into it, and usually does enter into it—if real cricket be meant. At all events, I must retain the whole width of the term. Neither will "emotion" serve my purpose. I need something narrower, which I will call *belief*. You may say that all belief is emotional. I agree, it is both mover and moved. But it is only one kind of emotion, and with this alone I shall be concerned. I think it will be allowed that every kind of religion, however defined, or however indefinable, contains along with much else these two elements, conduct and belief.

First, of belief. I shall press what seems to me the obvious truth that belief, of whatever kind, is based exclusively on authority. But this also needs definition. It is an ambiguous term. We use it of a power that commands and perhaps can more or less effectively enforce obedience. There is authority of law, and there is military authority. This will not do for me; enforcement of belief by any external pressure is impossible. We must look back to the origin of the word. The Latin *auctoritas* seems to be free from ambiguity. Until the later stages of the language, at any

rate, it stood for an intangible influence moving or restraining all forms of public activity. Vergil's *vir pietate gravis* was the embodiment of it ; and, if you allow the proper extension of *pietas*, he was a constant figure in the Republic. Vergil's words are illuminating. *Auctoritas* may be defined as moral weight. It was not an official endowment, for a consul might have it in abundance or lack it entirely. It is thus sharply distinguished from *potestas*, which the most worthless magistrate could exercise equally with the best. You find it eminently in the assembled Senate, which had no legislative or executive functions, and in matters of public policy was a purely consultative body, whose decisive vote was significantly called *consultum*. But its authority was immense, and had a directive value only short of *lex* or *plebiscitum*. The famous *consultum*, "Provideant consules ne quid republica detrimenti accipiat," strengthened the hands of magistrates to do things not allowed by law, with comparative immunity. Cicero, indeed, found to his cost that the immunity was not complete, but it was certainly a safeguard.

In this proper sense the word has come down to us. We say that a man speaks with authority when his reputation stands high in respect of character, of knowledge, or of experience ; his words carry weight, without any thought of power in the background to enforce conformity with his opinions. And yet, so constant is our affection for ambiguous language, we shall probably call him a powerful speaker.

To balance this abuse of language we perversely describe the unquestionable power of the State as "authority of law." This is the power which, in the picturesque language of St Paul, "beareth not the sword in vain." That is to say, it can command, and, if you refuse to obey, can in the last resort put a stop to your disobedience by an executive act, appropriately called execution. Milder methods of coercion, however, are usually successful. It is true that this power is not invariably effective. Passive resistance is a very potent weapon of rebellion. Professor Laski has shown that the trade unions in this way nullified a judicial ruling in the Taff Vale case, and that the Welsh miners nullified the Munitions Act, even when the rest of us meekly submitted to all that was contained in the Defence of the Realm Act. But this was because prudent statesmen are aware that it is sometimes unwise to flourish the sword too ostentatiously. Power is still power, whether it be exercised here and now or kept in reserve.

I come back to my point that belief is based exclusively

on authority. I might illustrate this by dwelling on the fact that no display or exercise of power can influence any man's belief. It may be urged that if I refuse to believe that a bully can master me, he may convince me by giving me a sound drubbing; but I shall reply that the effect of this demonstration is not belief; it is knowledge. The distinction is important. It may be illustrated by the vulgar saying that "seeing is believing," which is about as false as any proverb can be; for to see is to know. Putting it crudely, you may say that what I see, I know; what I am told, I either believe or disbelieve. *Seeing* is here, of course, a symbolic term for any kind of sensory perception, simple or complicated. I am bold to say that I know, in the proper sense of the word, nothing but what is so perceived. What I infer from the perception, however assured I may be of the accuracy of the inference, is not something known; it may be called a persuasion or a conviction, according to the degree of assurance. Neither is it something believed, for it starts from knowledge. But belief may be an element in the process by which I arrive at the final conviction; for my assurance of the validity of the process may be entirely due to something which I have been taught, and now believe. Indeed, can this ever be entirely eliminated? Is any conviction possible without this element of belief founded on authority? Even in the most rigorous verification by experiment there seems to be involved some postulate, like that of causation, which we accept on the authority of the general opinion of mankind. That kind of authority pervades all our mental procedure, however unconscious of it we may be.

Do I seem to be limiting too closely the field of knowledge? There are intuitions. Yes, but intuition is a mode of seeing. What else does the word mean? I once asked a mathematical friend to set down on paper for me the proof that parallel straight lines meet if produced to infinity. He wrote a brief concatenation of symbols, at which I looked without comprehension. "Don't you see it?" he asked. I modestly replied that I did not, but I had no doubt he did. He explained, "of course it is nonsense." I rebuked him for setting at nought his divine science of geometry, adding that with another kind of vision I could plainly see parallel straight lines meeting when produced to infinity. He then told me that I, at all events, was talking nonsense. So we parted, quits. My own first steps in geometry were guided by a teacher of genius who would not allow me to believe,

on his own authority or Euclid's, axioms and definitions. He provoked intuitions, and at my first lesson succeeded in making me see that most invisible thing, the geometrical line. Such vision is possible, and it means knowledge. I would make the field of knowledge as wide as possible, but it remains very narrow. In thought and in action we are constantly dependent on belief. I do not, and cannot, know any events of a time anterior to my own experience ; for example, that John signed the Great Charter. What I know is that statements on the subject are read in ancient documents or modern histories. These are accurately called "authorities," or are dismissed as void of authority. On the authority of those that survive criticism, I believe that the thing happened. Things past I cannot know, for I have no access to them. Things now existing may be accessible, the floor of the Pacific Ocean, for example, but to very few of them have I had access. The field of my actual knowledge is very narrow.

Knowledge and belief are clearly distinguishable. We make confusion only by inaccurate use of the words, which is deplorably frequent. Belief is not an inferior kind of knowledge ; it is an entirely different mental state. Knowledge and belief are not distinguished by degrees of certainty. I know that the city of Worcester exists, for I am writing there at this moment ; I believe that the city of Peking exists. The knowledge and the belief are equally certain. In neither case is the certainty absolute, for my vision may be defective, and authority may mislead me ; but if we are to keep sane we must avow that knowledge is relatively certain—that is to say, certain for me—even when mistaken, and belief always has the same kind of certainty. It is false to claim either knowledge or belief, when one has only a hesitating opinion. We must sometimes be content with this ; probability is not all that Butler supposed it to be, but where certainty is lacking it may be a fairly useful guide in the art of living. If there were no certainty at all, human life could hardly rise above the level of the more intelligent beasts. Knowledge and belief, in the true sense of the words, are the prerogative of humanity.

My subject is the place of authority in religion. But belief is the same mental state, whatever its object may be. I believe the statements of a railway time-table ; I believe the teaching of some kind of religion. It is the same mental state. I find the same sort of identity in knowledge. I am quite sure that God can be known, though very few of us

may achieve that knowledge. When achieved, it belongs to the same kind of mental state as my knowledge that I have a watch in my pocket. But for the most part religion lies in the broad field of belief, and in a special corner of that field. So it rests on authority.

I am not concerned at present to distinguish any of the numerous kinds of authority which move men to religious belief; I have only to note their existence. But one case may be useful for illustration. There is a widespread belief that the collection of books known as the Bible has an exceptional value in respect of religion. It has nothing to do with the values, literary or documentary, which critics assign to the various contents of the collection; it takes in the whole collection and all its parts, regarded as a "Canon of Scripture." On what authority does this belief rest? There are some who will say that it is not belief, but knowledge; the Bible bears witness to itself; a reader can *see* its value. This assurance is obviously not open to argument; you either share it or you do not. Like all knowledge, it is personal, individual and direct. Few can make any reasonable claim to its possession. I cannot doubt that most of those who think they have it are really confusing knowledge and belief. Belief in the value of the Bible is certainly widespread. On what does it rest?

Various answers may be given, all possibly true. I shall take note of one, which is interesting if only for the eminence of the answerer. Faustus the Manichean had alleged against the current teaching of the Christian Church certain texts of the Gospel. Augustine retorted: "*Ego non crederem evangelio nisi me commoveret Catholicæ Ecclesiæ auctoritas.*" It was therefore waste of time to ply him with arguments against the teaching of the Catholic Church drawn from the Gospels. The retort is forensic, and forensic of a rough kind to which Augustine was too much addicted. But it is more than this. It opens a window into his mind. His conversion was recent; he knew what had moved him to accept the teaching of the Church in its various details. I think the account of that movement which he gives in this flashing remark is more precise than the laboured analysis which he made some years later when writing his Confessions. The two accounts are not inconsistent, but in the Confessions he was more concerned with his own interior reaction than with the impact from without. The impact came, he says, from the *auctoritas*, the moral constraint, exercised by the Catholic Church. He attempts some analysis of this authority, and

one important element is “*consensio populorum atque gentium*.” That gives me what I am seeking. I am sure that the widespread veneration for the Bible is due to nothing else but the general consent of Christendom, mediated by particular instruction given to children in their early years.

Most of the multitudinous beliefs on which we constantly rely, in all departments of thought and action, probably have no other origin. The general testimony of mankind, or of that part of mankind with which one is familiar, must inevitably carry weight and engender belief. To refuse credence here is to live a maimed life in ridiculous isolation. Such belief may very well be erroneous. It may be shattered by the acquisition of knowledge, or overborne by a narrower but weightier authority. Failing this, you do act upon it.

That brings me to the other element in religion—conduct. Conduct is governed, if not by knowledge, then certainly by belief, and in a vast number of actions by belief alone. For example, my conduct of life is to some extent ordered by belief in the solvency of banks : in other words, by a system of credit ; and this rests on the general consent of the City of London. Some of your actions may be ordered by a power external to your self, as is seen in military discipline, or indeed in the daily behaviour of all law-abiding citizens ; but in so far as these actions can be regarded as conduct, they are due to a belief that the power has a right to command and ought to be obeyed. Perhaps it is because of this moral element in submission that we have slipped into the unfortunate confusion of power and authority.

Conduct is more than an element in religion. Religion means conduct. It is not faith, or knowledge, or emotion, or sentiment, or speculation, or theology. It contains all these, without being composed of them. We must not expect to define anything by the etymology of its name ; but this word is one of the great legacies of ancient Rome to the modern world, and the more probable etymology of *religio* affords some guidance. Its value lies in restraint or control, and especially in control of conduct. It is not quite what we mean by piety, though it is near akin to the Latin *pictas*. It differs from this in being less individual. In the eighteenth century, when words did not sit as loose to meaning as now, Johnson essayed one definition which seems to me deplorable : Religion is “Virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and expectation of future rewards and punishments.” He tried another : “A system of divine faith and worship.” That is sounder, though too narrow. Whatever else religion

may be, it is always a system, and a system of human life, a system of conduct. And human life can never be entirely individual. Religion must therefore be a system of social relations, under control. For such a system organisation is necessary; unorganised religion is meaningless. What is sometimes so called is simple piety. If you are inclined to question the necessity of organisation, consider how those religions which make the least of this become conspicuous in effecting it. Where will you find a more efficient organisation than that of Quakerism? To hark back to our dominant word, where will you find any institution more truly authoritative than the quarterly meeting of the Society of Friends?

This brings me to my conclusion. I find in history two kinds of religious organisation, an organisation of power, and an organisation of authority. The religion of the ancient Greek city was based on civic power, and therefore the individualist who undermined it must drink the hemlock. The ancient religion of Israel had the same character, tempered at times by the authority of prophets. On the other hand, I take the Christian religion to be purely authoritative. It is the religion of an organised community, but the original rulers of that community certainly possessed no power of the sword, and were by implication forbidden even to aspire after it. They were to teach, to rebuke, to exhort, and even to command, but the recalcitrant were to be let alone. There is a definite injunction: "If a man refuse to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican." When Dr Hook, the famous Vicar of Leeds, offended the Court of Queen Victoria by a sermon based on the truncated text, "Hear the Church," a minister of the Crown suggested that he might have done better with a slightly extended quotation, "If he will not hear the Church, let him be." I think the Whig witticism lighted accidentally on the very meaning of the Gospel.

The rulers of the Christian Church have always been technically faithful in the observance of this injunction. Except when invested, accidentally and unhappily, with temporal power as well as spiritual authority, they have never attempted to exercise the power of the sword. But they have frequently called upon others to do this on their behalf, for their defence or for the enforcement of their commands. The ultimate form of this demand is found in the declaration of Boniface VIII. that there are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal, the one to be used *ab ecclesia*, the other *pro ecclesia*, wielded by kings and knights "sed ad

nutum et patientiam sacerdotis." He proved at Anagni the truth of the warning addressed to Peter, "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword." According to my reading of history, in proportion as ecclesiastics have enjoyed this supposed advantage of power, their authority has waned. I cannot imagine a greater misfortune for a Christian Church than to be *legibus stabilita*, established by law.

If I am right in all this, the familiar contrast between a religion of the spirit and a religion of authority becomes unmeaning. For the adherents of what is distinguished as a religion of authority invariably believe their leaders, past or present, to be endowed with particular spiritual gifts, for which reason alone they pay them reverence and acknowledge their authority.

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MACBETH AND THE NATURE OF EVIL.

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I.

MACBETH is Shakespeare's most profound and mature vision of Evil: in point of imaginative intensity, it is comparable alone among the tragedies to Antony and Cleopatra. There we have a fiery vision of a paradisaical consciousness; here the murk and nightmare torment of a conscious hell. This Evil, being absolute and therefore alien to man, is in essence shown as inhuman and supernatural, and is thus most difficult of location in any philosophical scheme. Macbeth is fantastical and imaginative beyond other tragedies. Difficulty is increased by the implicit blurring of effects, the pallid darkness, that overcasts plot, technique, style. The persons of the play are themselves groping. Yet we are left with an overpowering knowledge of suffocating, conquering Evil, and fixed by the eye of a nameless terror. The nature of this Evil will be the subject of my paper.

It is dangerous to abstract the personal history of the protagonist from his environment as a basis for interpretation. The main theme is not primarily differentiated from that of the important subsidiary persons and cannot stand alone. Rather there is a similarity, and the Evil in Banquo, Macduff, Malcolm, and the enveloping atmosphere of the play all form so many steps by which we may approach and understand the titanic Evil which grips the two protagonists. The Macbeth-universe is woven in a texture of a single pattern. The whole play is one swift act of the poet's mind, and as such must be interpreted, since the technique confronts us not with separated integers of character or incident, but with a molten welding of thought with thought, event with event. There is an interpenetrating quality that subdues all to itself.

Therefore I shall start by noticing some of the more important elements in this total imaginative effect, and thence I shall pass to the more purely human element. The story and action of the play alone will not carry us far. Here the logic of imaginative correspondence is more significant and more exact than the logic of plot.

II.

Macbeth is a desolate and dark universe where all is befogged, baffled, constricted by the Evil. Probably in no play of Shakespeare are so many questions asked. It opens with "When shall we three meet again?" and "Where the place?" (I. i. 1 and 6). The second scene starts with: "What bloody man is that?" (I. ii. i.), and throughout it questions are asked of the Sergeant and Ross. This is followed by :—

FIRST WITCH : Where hast thou been, Sister ?

SECOND WITCH : Killing swine.

FIRST WITCH : Sister, where thou ? (I. iii. 1.)

And Banquo's first words on entering are : "How far is't called to Forres? What are these . . . ?" (I. iii. 2). Questions succeed each other quickly throughout this scene. Amazement and mystery are in the play from the start, and are reflected in continual questions—there are those of Duncan to Malcolm in Sc. IV., and of Lady Macbeth to the Messenger and then to her lord in Sc. V. They continue throughout the play. In I. vii. they are tense and powerful :

MACBETH : . . . How now ! What news ?

L. MACBETH : He has almost supp'd : why have you left the chamber ?

MACBETH : Hath he asked for me ?

L. MACBETH : Know you not he has ?

This scene bristles with them. At the climax of the murder they come again, short stabs of fear : "Didst thou not hear a noise?—Did not you speak?—When?—Now.—As I descended? . . ." (II. ii. 15–17). Many of the finest and most heart-rending passages are in the form of questions : "But wherefore could I not pronounce Amen?" and, "Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood clean from my hands?" (II. ii. 31; II. ii. 60). The scene of the murder and that of its discovery form a series of questions. To continue the list in detail would be more tedious than difficult : to quote a few—there are the amazed questions of the guests and Lady Macbeth at the Banquet (III. iii.); Macbeth's

Macbeth of his new honours, confessing that he "knows not" the exact crimes of the former Thane of Cawdor (I. iii. 111-116). Malcolm has spoken with "one who saw him die" (I. iv. 4). Lady Macbeth hears amazedly of the Weird Sisters' prophecy by letter. Macbeth describes the voice that bade him "sleep no more," and the dead body of Duncan. People are continually receiving the latest news from each other (II. iv. ; III. vi. ; IV. iii. 159-174). Rumours are alive throughout :—

MACBETH : How say'st thou that Macduff denies his person
At our great bidding ?

L. MACBETH : Did you send to him, Sir ?

MACBETH : I hear it by the way ; but I will send. (III. iv. 128.)

We hear more rumours of Macduff in the dialogue between Lennox and the Lord in III. vi. There are the mysterious "two or three" who bring word of Macduff's flight (IV. i. 141). It is a world of rumours and fears :—

Ross : I dare not speak much further ;
But cruel are the times, when we are traitors
And do not know ourselves ; when we hold rumour
From what we fear, yet know not what we fear,
But float upon a wild and violent sea
Each way and move.

(IV. ii. 17.)

Ross has heard a "rumour" of a rise in Scotland against Macbeth (IV. iii. 182). In a hushed voice the gentlewoman describes Lady Macbeth's sleepwalking to the Doctor (V. i.) and the Doctor says he has "heard something" of Macbeth's "royal preparation" (V. iv. 57-8). Siward "learns no other" but that Macbeth is defending his castle (V. iv. 8), and Lady Macbeth, "as 'tis thought" commits suicide (V. viii. 70). These are but a few random instances : questions, rumours, startling news, and uncertainties are everywhere. From the time when Banquo asks "How far is't called to Forres ?" until Malcolm's "What wood is this before us ?" we are watching persons lost, mazed.¹ They do not understand themselves even :—

MALCOLM : Why do we hold our tongues
That most may claim this argument for ours ? (II. iii. 125.)

The persons of the drama can say truly, with Ross, "we . . . do not know ourselves" (IV. ii. 19). We too, who read, are

¹ Cp. Colin Still's *Shakespeare's Mystery Play : A Study of the Tempest* (Cecil Palmer, 1921). In his interpretation, The Court Party are related to the maze in ancient ritual ; and in my interpretation of *The Tempest*, I roughly equate the Antonio and Sebastian theme with *Macbeth*. See *Myth and Miracle*. Burrow & Co. 2s.

in doubt often. Action here is illogical. Why does Macbeth not know of Cawdor's treachery? Why does Lady Macbeth faint? Why do the king's sons flee to different countries when a whole nation is ready in their support? Why does Macduff move so darkly mysterious in the background and leave his family to certain death? Who is the third murderer? And, finally, why does Macbeth murder Duncan? All this builds a strong sense of mystery and irrationality within us. We, too, grope in the stifling dark, and suffer from doubt and insecurity.

Darkness permeates the play. The greater part of the action takes place in the murk of night. It is unnecessary to detail more than a few of the numerous references to darkness. Lady Macbeth prays:—

Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark
To cry, Hold! Hold! (I. v. 51.)

And Macbeth:—

Stars, hide your fires.
Let not light see my black and deep desires;
The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be,
Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see. (I. iv. 50.)

During the play "light thickens" (III. ii. 50), the "travelling lamp" is "strangled" (II. iv. 7), there is "husbandry in heaven" (II. i. 4). This is typical:—

Now spurs the lated traveller apace
To gain the timely inn. (III. iii. 7.)

Now this world of doubts and darkness gives birth to strange and hideous creatures. Animal-symbolism is percurrent in the play, and the animals mentioned are for the most part of fierce, ugly, or ill-omened significance. This suggests life threatening, fearful, hideous: and it culminates in the holocaust of filth prepared by the weird sisters in the cauldron scene. But not only are animals of unpleasant suggestion here present: we have animals, like men, irrational and amazing in their acts. A falcon is attacked and killed by a "mousing owl," and Duncan's horses eat each other (II. iv. 18). There is a prodigious and ghastly tempest, with "screams of death"; the owl clamoured through the night; the earth itself shook (II. iii. 59-66). We are thus aware of a hideous abnormality in this world; and again we feel its

irrationality and mystery. In proportion as we let ourselves be receptive to the impact of all these suggestions we shall be strongly aware of the essential fearsomeness of this universe. We are confronted by mystery, darkness, abnormality, hideousness : and therefore by fear. All may be unified as symbols of this emotion. Fear is predominant. Everyone is afraid. There is scarcely a person in the play who does not feel at some time a sickening, nameless terror. The impact of the play is thus exactly analogous to nightmare, to which state there are many references :—

Now o'er the one-half world,
Nature seems dead and wicked dreams abuse
The curtain'd sleep . . . (II. i. 49.)

Banquo cries :—

Merciful powers,
Restrain in me the cursed thoughts that nature
Gives way to in repose. (II. i. 7.)

Banquo has dreamed of “ the three weird sisters ” (II. i. 19), who are thus associated with a nightmare reality. There are those who cried in their sleep, and said their prayers after (II. ii.). Macbeth may “ sleep no more ” (II. ii. 43), he and his wife are condemned to live —

in the affliction of these terrible dreams
That shake us nightly. (III. ii. 18.)

The central act of the play is a hideous murder of sleep. Finally, we have the extreme agony of sleep-consciousness depicted in Lady Macbeth's sleep-walking. Nor are there dreams only : the narrow gulf between nightmare and the abnormal actuality of the Macbeth-universe—itsself of nightmare quality—is bridged by phantasies and ghosts : the dagger of Macbeth's mind, the Ghost of Banquo, the Apparitions, the Vision of Scottish Kings, culminating in the three Weird Sisters. There is no nearer equivalent, in the experience of a normal mind, to the poetic quality of *Macbeth* than the consciousness of nightmare or delirium. That is why life is here a “ tale told by an idiot ”—a “ fitful fever ” ; why the earth itself is “ feverous ” (II. iii. 66). The Weird Sisters are nightmare actualised ; Macbeth's crime nightmare projected into action. Therefore this world is unknowable, hideous, disorderly and irrational. The very style of the play has a mesmeric, nightmare quality, for in that dream consciousness, hateful though it be, there is a nervous tension, a vivid sense of profound significance, an exceptionally rich apprehension of reality electrifying the mind : one is in touch with absolute Evil, which, being absolute, has a Satanic beauty, a hideous,

serpent-like grace and attraction, drawing, paralysing. This quality is in the poetic style : the language is tense, nervous, insubstantial—without anything of the visual clarity of Othello, or the massive solemnity of Timon. The poetic effect of the whole, though black with an inhuman abyss of darkness, is yet shot through and streaked with vivid colour, with horrors that hold a mesmeric attraction even while they repel ; and things of brightness that intensify the enveloping murk. There is constant reference to blood. Macbeth and Banquo “ bathe in reeking wounds ” (I. ii. 39) in the fight reported by the “ bloody ” Sergeant ; Macbeth’s sword “ smcked with bloody execution ” (I. ii. 18) ; there is the blood on Macbeth’s hands, and on Lady Macbeth’s after she has “ smeared ” the sleeping grooms with it. There is the description of Duncan’s body, “ his silver skin lac’d with his golden blood ” (II. iii. 118). There is blood on the face of the murderer who comes to tell of Banquo’s “ trenched gashes ” (III. iv. 27) ; the “ gory locks ” (III. iv. 51) of the “ blood-bolter’d ” Banquo ; the “ bloody child ” Apparition ; the blood-nightmare of Lady Macbeth’s sleep-walking. But though blood-imagery is rich, there is no brilliance in it ; rather a sickly smear. Yet there is brilliance in the fire-imagery : the thunder and lightning which accompanies the Weird Sisters ; the fire of the cauldron ; the green-glint of the spectral dagger ; the glaring eyes which hold “ no speculation ” of Banquo’s ghost—the insubstantial sheen of the three apparitions, the ghostly pageant of Kings unborn.

Macbeth has the poetry of intensity : intense darkness shot with the varied intensity of pure light or pure colour. In the same way the moral darkness is shot with imagery of bright purity and virtue. There is “ the temple-haunting martlet ” to contrast with evil creatures. We have the early personation of Duncan, the bright linning of his virtues by Macbeth (I. vii. 16), and Macduff (IV. iii. 108) ; the latter’s words on Malcolm’s Mother (IV. iii. 109–111) ; the prayer of Lennox for “ some holy angel ” to fly to England’s court for saving help ; Macbeth’s agonised vision of a starry good, of “ heaven’s cherubim ” horsed in air, and Pity like a babe ; those who pray that God may bless them in their fevered dream ; above all, Malcolm’s description of England’s holy King, health-giver and God-elect who, unlike Macbeth, has power over the Evil,¹ in whose court Malcolm borrows grace

¹ The “ Evil ” of Macbeth is symbolised in a nation’s sickness. See V. ii. 27–29 ; V. iii. 49–56. The *spiritual* Evil of Macbeth is related to the *bodily* evil of blood destruction, and sickness in the community. This

to combat the nightmare Evil of his own land. The murk, indeed, thins toward the end. Bright daylight dawns and the green leaves of Birnam come against Macbeth. A world climbs out of its darkness, and in the dawn that panorama below is a thing of nightmare delusion. The "sovereign flower" (V. ii. 30) is bright-dewed in the bright dawn, and the murk melts into the mists of morning: the child is crowned, the tree of life in his hand.

I have indicated something of the imaginative atmosphere of this play. It is a world shaken by "fears and scruples" (II. iii. 135). I have emphasised two complementary elements (i.) the doubts, uncertainties, irrationalities; (ii.) the horrors, the dark, the abnormalities. These two elements repel respectively the intellect and the heart of man. And, since the contemplating mind is thus powerfully unified in its immediate antagonism, our reaction holds the positive and tense fear that succeeds nightmare, wherein there is an experience of something at once insubstantial and unreal to the understanding, and appallingly horrible to the feelings: this is the Evil of *Macbeth*. In this equal repulsion of the dual attributes of the mind a state of singleness and harmony is induced in the recipient, and it is in respect of this that *Macbeth* forces us to a consciousness more exquisitely unified and sensitive than any of the great tragedies but its polar opposite, *Antony and Cleopatra*. This is how the Macbeth-universe presents to us an experience of Absolute Evil.¹ Now these two peculiarities of the whole play will be found also in the purely human element. The two main characteristics of Macbeth's temptation are: (i.) ignorance of his own motive; and (ii.) horror of the deed to which he is being driven. Fear is the primary emotion of the Macbeth-universe: fear is at the root of Macbeth's crime. I will next notice the nature of these human events, actions, experiences to which the atmosphere of unreality and terror bears intimate relation.

III.

The action of the play turns on a deed of disorder. Following the disorderly rebellion which prologues the action we have Macbeth's crime, and the disorder which it creates. The murder of Duncan, and its results, are essentially things

description of "The King's Evil" serves a purpose deeper than professional flattery, which is usually given as the "reason" for its presence.

¹ Iago is not absolutely evil in this sense. He is too purely intellectual to antagonise our emotions powerfully.

of disorder, an interruption of the even tenor of human nature, and are thus related to the disorder-symbols and instances of unnatural behaviour in man or animal or element throughout the play. The Evil of atmospheric effect thus interpenetrates the Evil of individual persons. It has so firm a grip on this world that it fastens not only on the protagonists, but on subsidiary persons too. This point I shall notice before passing to the themes of Macbeth and his wife.

Banquo is early involved. Returning with Macbeth from a bloody war, he meets the three Weird Sisters. We may imagine that the latter are related to the bloodshed of battle, and that they have waited until after "the hurly-burly's done" (I. i. 3) to instigate a continuance of blood lust in the two generals. We must observe that the two generals' feats of arms are described as acts of unprecedented ferocity :—

Except they meant to bathe in reeking wounds,
Or memorise another Golgotha
I cannot tell. (I. ii. 39.)

The campaign seems to have struck general amaze into men. Ross speaks of Macbeth as—

Nothing afeard of what thyself did make,
Strange images of death. (I. iii. 96.)

Macbeth's sword "smoked with bloody execution" (I. ii. 18). The emphasis is important. The late wine of blood-destruction focusses the inward eye of these two to the reality of the sisters of blood and Evil, and they in turn urge Macbeth to add to those "strange images of death" the "great doom's image" (II. iii. 83) of a murdered and sainted king. This knowledge of Evil implicit in his meeting with the three Weird Sisters Banquo keeps to himself, and it is a bond of Evil between him and Macbeth. It is this that troubles him on the night of the murder, planting a nightmare of unrest in his mind : "the cursed thoughts that nature gives way to in repose." He is enmeshed in Macbeth's horror, and, after the coronation, keeps the guilty secret, and lays to his heart a guilty hope. Banquo is thus involved. So also is Macduff. His cruel desertion of his family is emphasised :—

L. MACDUFF : His flight was madness ; when our actions do not,
Our fears do make us traitors.

Ross : You know not
Whether it was his wisdom or his fear.

L. MACDUFF : Wisdom ! to leave his wife, to leave his babes,
His mansion and his titles in a place
From whence himself does flee ? (IV. ii. 3.)

For this, or for some nameless reason, Macduff knows he bears some responsibility for his dear ones' death :—

Sinful Macduff,
They were all struck for thee ! Naught that I am,
Not for their own demerits, but for mine
Fell slaughter on their souls. Heaven rest them now !
(IV. iii. 224.)

All the persons seem to share some guilt of the down-pressing enveloping Evil. Even Malcolm is forced to repeat crimes on himself. He catalogues every possible sin, and accuses himself of all. Whatever be his "reasons," his doing so yet remains part of the integral humanism of this play. Not that the persons are "bad characters." They are not characters at all, in the proper use of the word. They are but vaguely individualised,¹ and more remarkable for similarity than difference. All the persons are primarily just this : men paralysed by fear and a sense of evil in and outside themselves. They lack will-power : that concept finds no place here. Neither we, nor they, know of what exactly they are guilty : yet they feel guilt.

So, too, with Lady Macbeth. She is not merely a woman of strong will : she is a woman possessed—possessed of evil passion. No "will-power" on earth would account for her dread invocation :—

Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me from the crown to the toe, top-full
Of direst cruelty !
(I. v. 41.)

This speech, addressed to the "murdering ministers" who "in their sightless substances wait on nature's mischief" is demonic in intensity and passion. It is inhuman—as though the woman were controlled by an evil something which masters her mind and soul. It is mysterious, fearsome, yet fascinating : like all else here, it is a nightmare thing of Evil. Whatever it be it leaves her a pure woman, with a woman's frailty, as soon as ever its horrible work is done. She faints at Macbeth's description of Duncan's body. As her husband grows rich in crime, her significance dwindles : she is left shattered, a human wreck who mutters over again in sleep the hideous memories of her former Satanic hour of pride. To interpret the figure of Lady Macbeth in terms of "ambition" and "will" is, indeed, a futility of criticism. The scope and sweep of her evil passion is a thing tremendous,

¹ Dr. Bradley notices this in *Shakespearean Tragedy*.

irresistible, ultimate. She is an embodiment—for one mighty hour—of Evil absolute and extreme.

The central human theme—the temptation and crime of Macbeth—is, however, more easy of analysis. The crucial speech runs as follows :—

Why do I yield to that suggestion,
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,
And makes my seated heart knock at my ribs
Against the use of nature? Present fears
Are less than horrible imaginings.
My thought whose murder yet is but fantastical
Shakes so my single state of man that function
Is smother'd in surmise, and nothing is
But what is not. (I. iii. 134.)

This speech, spoken when Macbeth first feels the impending Evil, expresses again all those elements I have noticed in the mass-effect of the play : questioning doubt, horror, fear of some unknown power ; horrible imaginings of the supernatural and “fantastical” ; an abysm of unreality ; disorder on the plane of physical life. This speech is a microcosm of the Macbeth-vision : it contains the germ of the whole. Like a stone in a pond, this original immediate experience of Macbeth sends ripples of itself expanding over the whole play. This is the moment of the birth of Evil in Macbeth, this is the mental reality which he projects into action, thereby plunging his land too in fear and horror and darkness. In this speech we have a swift interpenetration of idea with idea, from fear and disorder, through sickly imaginings, to abysmal darkness, nothingness. “Nothing is but what is not” : that is the text of the play. Reality and unreality change places. We must see that Macbeth, like the whole universe of this play, is paralysed, mesmerised, as though in a dream. This is not merely “ambition”—it is fear, a nameless fear which yet fixes itself to a horrid image. He is helpless as a man in a nightmare : and this helplessness is integral to the conception—the will-concept is absent.¹ Macbeth may struggle, but he cannot fight : he can no more resist than a rabbit resists a weasel’s teeth fastened in its neck, or a bird the serpent’s transfixing eye. Now this Evil in Macbeth propels him to an act absolutely Evil. For, though no ethical system is ultimate, Macbeth’s crime is as near absolute as may be. It is therefore conceived as absolute.

¹ “Will” clearly finds no place in the passionate world of Shakespeare’s tragedies. To say that Shakespeare chose heroes lacking in will-power is less valuable than to say that poetic-tragedy is concerned only with those deeper springs of action which the will-concept tends to blur.

Its dastardly nature is emphasised clearly (I. vii. 12-25). Duncan is old, good. He is at once Macbeth's kinsman, king, and guest. He is to be murdered in sleep. No worse act of Evil could well be found. Now the Evil of which Macbeth is at first aware rapidly entraps him in a mesh of events : it makes a tool of Duncan's visit, it dominates Lady Macbeth. It is significant that she, like her husband, is overpowered by the Weird Sisters and their prophecy. Eventually Macbeth undertakes the murder, as a grim and hideous duty.¹ He cuts a sorry figure at first, but, once embarked on his allegiant enterprise of Evil, his grandeur grows. Throughout he is driven by fear—the fear that paralyses everyone else urges him to an amazing and mysterious action of blood. This action he repeats, again and again. He cancels the bond of human fellowship,² and of his own accord seeks out the Weird Sisters a second time. He cannot return, so determines to go o'er. And the strange thing is that he wins his battle. He is fighting himself free of the nightmare fear of his life. He adds crime to crime and emerges at last victorious, and fearless :—

MACBETH : I have almost forgot the taste of fears :
 The time has been, my senses would have cool'd
 To hear a night-shriek ; and my fell of hair
 Would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir
 As life were in't : I have supp'd full with horrors ;
 Direness, familiar to my slaughterous thoughts,
 Cannot once start me.

(V. v. 9.)

Again, "Hang these that talk of fear !" (V. iii. 36) he cries, in an ecstasy of courage. He is, at last, "broad and general as the casing air" (III. iv. 23). This will appear a strange reversal of the usual commentary : it is, however, true and necessary. Whilst Macbeth lives in conflict with himself there is misery, evil, fear : when, at the end, he and others have openly identified himself with evil, he faces the world fearless : nor does he appear evil any longer. The worst element of his suffering has been that secrecy and hypocrisy so often referred to throughout the play (I. iv. 12 ; I. v. 64 ; III. ii. 34 ; V. iii. 27). Dark secrecy and night are in Shake-

¹ There is a suggestion to this effect in Dr. Bradley's *Shakespearean Tragedy*. One might compare Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*. Rashkolnikoff commits his murder as a self-imposed duty.

² Macbeth prays to-night to "cancel and tear to pieces that great bond that keeps me pale." (III. ii. 49.) This is the bond of *nature*, that which binds man to the good which is in him ; the bond of daylight, reality, life. "Cancel his bond of life," occurs in *Richard III.*, IV. iv. 77. This bond Macbeth severs, and plunges through the unreal nightmare of hell on earth, to emerge, however, unscathed and victorious.

speare the badges of crime.¹ But at the end Macbeth has no need of secrecy. He is no longer "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, bound in to saucy doubts and fears" (III. iv. 24). He has won through by excessive crime to an harmonious and honest relation with his surroundings. He has successfully symbolised the disorder of his lonely guilt-stricken soul by creating disorder in the world, and thus restores balance and a harmonious contact. The mighty principle of good planted in the nature of things then asserts itself, condemns him openly, brings him peace. Daylight is brought to Macbeth, as to Scotland, by the accusing armies of Malcolm. He now knows himself to be a tyrant confessed, and wins back that integrity of soul which gives us :—

I have lived long enough : my way of life
Is fallen into the sere, the yellow leaf . . . (V. iii. 22.)

Here he touches a recognition deeper than fear, more potent than nightmare. The delirious dream is over. A clear daylight now disperses the imaginative dark that has eclipsed Scotland. The change is remarkable. There is now movement, surety and purpose, colour : horses "skirr the country round" (V. iii. 35), banners are hung out on the castle walls (V. v. 1), soldiers hew down the bright leaves of Birnam (V. iv. 4). There is, as it were, a paean of triumph as the Macbeth-universe, having struggled darkly upward, now climbs into radiance. Though they oppose each other in fight, Macbeth and Malcolm share equally in this relief, this awakening from horror. Of a piece with this change is the fulfilment of the Weird Sisters' prophecies. In bright daylight the nightmare reality to which Macbeth has been subdued is insubstantial and transient as sleep-horror at dawn. To these he has trusted, and they fail. But he himself is, at the last, self-reliant and courageous. The words of the Weird Sisters ring true :—

Though his bark cannot be lost
Yet it shall be tempest-toss'd. (I. iii. 24-25.)

Each shattering report he receives with redoubled life-zest ; and meets the fate marked out by the daylight consciousness of normal man for the nightmare reality of crime. Malcolm may talk of "this dead butcher and his fiend-like queen" (V. viii. 69). We, who have felt the sickly poise over the abysmal deeps of Evil, the hideous reality of the unreal, must couch our judgment in a different phrase.

¹ See *Lucrece*, 763-777 ; and *Richard II.*, III. ii. 36-53.

IV.

The consciousness of nightmare is a consciousness of Absolute Evil, presenting an heightened awareness of positive significance which challenges the goldenest dreams of blissful sleep : it is positive, powerful, autonomous. Whether this be ultimate truth or not, it is what our mental experience knows : and to deny it is to deny the aristocracy of mind. The "sickly weal" of Scotland is in the throes of this delirious dream, which, whilst it lasts, has every attribute of reality. Yet this Evil is not a native of man's heart : it comes from without. The Weird Sisters are thus objectively conceived ; they are not, as are phantoms and ghosts, the subjective effect of Evil in the protagonist's mind. They are, within the Macbeth-universe, independent entities. The fact that they instigate Macbeth directly and Lady Macbeth indirectly thus tends to assert the objectivity of Evil. To regard the Weird Sisters as a projection of Macbeth's mind is an illegitimate interpretation. The most we can say is that we understand something of the psychological state which gives these extraneous things of horror their reality and opportunity. And if we are loth to believe in such Evil realities, potentially at least alive and powerful, we might call to mind the words of Lafau in *All's Well* (II. iii. 1-7) :—

"They say miracles are past ; and we have our philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, things supernatural and causeless. Hence it is that we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge, when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear."

A profound commentary on Macbeth. But, though the ultimate Evil remain a mystery, analysis of the play indicates something of its relation to the mind and the actions of men. Such analysis must be directed not to the story alone, but to the manifold correspondences of imaginative quality extending throughout the whole play. A Shakespearean play is poetry, and, as such, is super-logical. Yet it is the work of interpretation to give some logical coherence to things imaginative. To do this, it is manifestly not enough to abstract the skeleton of logical sequence which is the story of the play : that is to ignore the very quality which justifies our anxious attention. Rather, relinquishing our horizontal sight of the naked rock-line which is the story, we should, from above, view the whole work extended, spatialised : and then map out imaginative similarities and differences, hills

and vales and streams. Then only Shakespearcan tragedy begins to reveal its riches. Interpretation must thus first receive the quality of the play in the imagination and then proceed to translate this whole experience into a new logic which will not be confined to those superficialities of cause and effect which we think to trace in our own lives and actions and try to impose on the persons of literature. In this way, we will know that Macbeth shows us an Evil not to be accounted for in terms of "will" and "causality"; that it expresses its vision, not to a critical intellect, but to the responsive imagination: and, working in terms not of "character" or any ethical code, but of the abysmal depths of a spirit-world untuned to human reality, withdraws the veil from the black streams which mill that consciousness of fear symbolised in actions of blood. It will then be seen that Macbeth is the Apocalypse of Evil.

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CHELTENHAM.

RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE "SACRED."

SIDNEY SPENCER.

IN the reaction against traditional other-worldliness and supernaturalism, which is to-day so widespread, and in itself so entirely salutary, there is found in certain quarters a tendency to identify religion with morality, to say that religion and right conduct (however, precisely, that may be conceived) are one and the same thing. "To do good," said Thomas Paine more than a century ago, "is my religion." Paine himself, in spite of these words, was not purely and simply an ethicist—he was a highly dualistic theist. But since the time of Paine, the tendency which his words, taken by themselves, imply has received a more logical and consistent expression. It has found expression, indeed, in certain organised movements. On the one hand, Positivism, founded by Comte in the early nineteenth century, identifies religion with the service of humanity, and definitely excludes any non-phenomenal reality from the sphere of human interests. On the other hand, the Ethical Movement, originated towards the end of the nineteenth century in America, while adopting a less dogmatic attitude towards ultimate issues, at the same time stands, as a movement, for the simple identification of religion with morality. "In an enlightened age of the world," says W. M. Salter, referring presumably to the age in which we live, "morality is alone fit to be a religion." This attitude is commonly expressed in the Ethical Movement in the equation of "God" with the "Moral Ideal."

The view thus embodied—which extends, of course, widely outside the sphere of these organised movements—finds some support in the work of modern students of religion, from both the psychological and the anthropological

standpoints. Thus, an American writer (Professor Ames) defines religion as "the consciousness of the highest social values." "All moral ideals are religious," he says, "in the degree to which they are expressions of great vital interests of society." Religion, in other words, is purely and simply a social phenomenon: as such it is identical with morality so far as morality represents the expression of social value. Essentially the same conclusion is reached from a different angle by Professor Durkheim and the French sociological school. In his valuable study of Australian totemism, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim reaches the conclusion that the essential religious reality, beneath the forms of totemic belief, is society itself. Religion, in all its phases, he maintains, is an expression of the social consciousness. It is a means whereby men affirm and reaffirm the fact of their own affiliation with and dependence upon the social group.

I.

The discussion of religious origins is a matter of very great difficulty, and one which calls for the greatest possible care and discrimination. At the same time, it is a study of considerable value for the light which it casts upon the subject that we are concerned with, and therefore I propose to say something about it. Durkheim defines religion thus: "A unified system of beliefs and practices relating to sacred things and uniting all those who adhere to them into a single moral community." There are two chief points in this definition: (1) that religion centres in what are deemed "sacred things," (2) that the attitude of devotion to the "sacred" draws those who share it in any particular form into a "moral community." It is widely agreed as the result of modern study that Durkheim is right in stressing the conception of the "sacred" as of fundamental importance—more fundamental and more far-reaching than "the belief in spiritual beings" which was long accepted as providing a "minimum definition" of religion. The emphasis which Durkheim lays upon the "sacred" as primary and fundamental is, of course, entirely independent of his interpretation of it as ultimately equivalent to the social. On this point a diametrically opposite view is maintained by Otto in *The Idea of the Holy*. The idea of the holy arises, as Otto conceives it, not through any reaction to the life of society, but as a direct response to the deeper Reality expressed in the universe.

" Religious dread or awe, an essential aspect of the religious consciousness, first begins to stir [says Otto] in the feeling of something ' uncanny,' ' eerie ' or ' weird.' It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire religious development in history. Dæmons and gods alike spring from this root."

They are, as we may say, the embodiment in personal and external form of the sense of mystery, which is fundamental.

It seems to me clear enough that Otto is right in tracing religion to its root in the feeling of the " uncanny." Primitive religion, so far as we can speak of such a thing (and we can know it, of course, only by inference), seems to rest upon some sort of cosmic sense, however rudimentary—a cosmic sense which found expression first of all, not in the belief in gods or spirits, but in the feeling of an undefined, mysterious " power," present particularly in all that aroused the feeling of wonder and awe in marked degree. But what is the relation of this " power " to morality? Has primitive religion a necessary ethical aspect? Or is the connection between religion and ethics something that only comes in at a later stage, something inessential, therefore, to religion as such? Oman has maintained, in opposition to Otto, in his essay on " The Sphere of Religion," that in the sense of awe in face of the holy there is from the first " a certain quality of moral reverence," which distinguishes it from the merely magical. But we have, in fact, no ground, as recent study goes to show, for dividing in this way between magic and religion at a primitive level. The " holy " and the magically potent are one. The " holy " has at first no directly moral quality. Yet, even so, it has from the first a moral bearing. Marcet, who anticipated Otto so far as the latter's analysis is valid (and it is so, I believe, only to a limited extent) defines the object of religion as " whatever is regarded as a mystery and treated accordingly." " Sacredness from a psychological point of view," he has said, " is the power of exciting awe." But he declares also that " the ethical character of primitive religion is its most essential characteristic."

Consider for a moment the particular case of Australian totemism, which is, in its main features, probably as close an approach to primitive religion as we are likely to get. The central feature of this religion lies, quite plainly, in the sense of sacredness which attaches to certain objects and

certain beings. The supremely sacred thing for the Australians is the clan totem—an animal or a plant which is regarded as sacred by the members of a particular clan, which gives its name to the clan and forms the basis of its unity. The sacredness of the totem animal finds expression particularly in the fact that it must not be killed or eaten by the members of the clan, save, in certain instances, ceremonially at an annual communion feast. The sense of sanctity, then, directly results in the modification of behaviour—in certain restrictions upon conduct which are enforced, not merely, and not mainly, by the threat of human punishment, but rather by the fear of supernatural terrors, through the unloosing of that magical potency which is the counterpart of the sense of sacredness. But the sense of sacredness has a wider bearing. It extends from the totem animal to the human members of the clan. One's fellow-clansmen are sacred beings, since all bear the name of the totem, and all are held to share its nature. Religion, therefore, at this primitive level promotes the sense of kinship in the social group and of mutual respect. In this way, it serves the interests of social solidarity. It promotes, also, directly the observance of the rules of the moral code. It is, of course, as I need surely not insist, a mere grotesque superstition to suppose that "savage" peoples are lacking in the moral sense. Their morality is not our own—and it is not always the worse for that!—but it is a very real and potent force, and it has behind it the sanction of religion. The rules of morality imposed by the social group—the prohibition, for example, of lying and murder and adultery—are themselves directly and intrinsically sacred. They are enveloped by an atmosphere of mystery. They are the product of an ancient tradition, and whatever is ancient is by that very fact mysterious, and so invested with magical potency. Their violation will call forth supernatural penalties, which will light not merely upon the head of the offender, but of the social group as a whole.

Westermarck has said that

"among uncivilised races the moral ideas relating to men's conduct towards one another have been much more influenced by the belief in magic forces which may be utilised by man than by the belief in the free activity of gods."

But what Westermarck here calls "magic forces" lies, in fact, at the very root of religion. Everywhere among savage

peoples we find the notion of a mighty impersonal power—widely known to-day by its Melanesian name, "mana"—which finds expression in whatever is felt to be mysterious, whatever arouses the emotion of wonder and awe. In itself this power has no moral quality, yet it serves by its sanctification of custom to promote the interests of morality. Religion is thus at this primitive level never a mere non-moral feeling of awe or dread. The feeling of awe in which it has its root is called into play in such a manner as to become directly a sanction of moral conduct. Religion, in other words, is identified with the cause of morality. The content of primitive religion, to quote Marcet once again, is "identical with the tribal custom or tradition in so far as it is felt to be sacred," so that religion is not a thing in any way apart from the practical concerns of life. It stands rather, to the savage, "for the whole of his concrete life so far as it is penetrated by a spirit of earnest endeavour."

It must not be supposed that the ethical aspect of primitive religion is exhausted by the reinforcement of customary morality by means of supernatural sanctions. That reinforcement itself assumes a positive aspect, since it tends to promote the sense of immediate obligation. Primitive religion, moreover, as I have pointed out in connection with Australian totemism, quickens the sense of social solidarity and the recognition of the common rights of the clansmen. It enhances by its ceremonies the sense of power. It brings an access of vitality, of strength, and courage and gladness, since the ceremonies are believed to set in motion on behalf of their participants the mysterious power which men regard as the source of all successful activity. "Let bad luck go and good luck come" is the general formula of spell or prayer in primitive religion. Its practice therefore brings confidence and a quickening of vital activity. It makes for the "consecration of life."

In the light of this we see how entirely mistaken is the view which regards religion in its origin and its essential nature as a matter of simple fear—"an attempt," as Bertrand Russell has put it, "to mitigate the terror inspired by destructive natural forces." The distinctive religious emotion is never a matter of simple fear, although fear has played, unfortunately, a prominent part in religious development. Religion is essentially, in its primitive phase, a quickening and inspiring and unifying force. It lifts men out of weakness and isolation into oneness with a larger life. It links them up with the greater powers of the universe, and so brings

into their lives gladness and invigoration and the sense of unity, the sense of obligation and the subordination of the separate self.

I have dwelt at some length upon the basis and meaning of primitive religion, because it helps us, as it seems to me, to see clearly the essential quality of religion in itself and in its relation to life. Religion, as this study shows, rests upon the sense of cosmic mystery, so that it cannot be rightly regarded as purely and simply a question of morality. Yet it can never rightly be dissociated from morality, which has developed in close connection with it, and to which it gave in the earliest times its sanction, in which it found a direct and necessary expression of itself.

II.

If that is true of religion in its origins, so far as we can trace them, it is equally true of religion in its higher phases. There are certain intermediate phases of religion of which the moral aspect is less evident. There are gods whose worship has little or no bearing upon human conduct. That is due to the general nature of social development in historical times. With the growth of civilisation and private property, society lost its early unity and solidarity. It became divided into separate classes, and the established religion of the community became identified with the separate interests of the ruling class, and infected in too many cases with fraud and violence. A cultus was elaborated which stood increasingly apart from human and ethical interests. Religion was perverted into a means of supporting the vested interests of rulers and nobles and priests. Gods arose, naturally enough, who had no concern with any wide social morality. Sanctity became a thing apart from life—an affair of temples and ceremonies and priests and kings. It was in such circumstances as these that there occurred the prophetic revolt in Israel which brought such a deepening and purifying of the religious consciousness.

Developed religion, so far as it is true to itself, is, like primitive religion, directly and intrinsically ethical. Pratt remarks in his book, *The Religious Consciousness*, that each of the great religions "may be said to be both a religion and a system of ethics." That is a seriously misleading statement of the case. It suggests that religion is one thing and morality another, connected, no doubt, but intrinsically distinct and separate. But, in so far as religion is deep and vital, it

includes morality as a necessary part of itself. Religion is the response of the whole being to the universe—"the endeavour to live in harmony with the universe as a whole," the endeavour, in other words, to express in life the sanctity which we perceive in the universe. Life includes feeling and thought as well as conduct or practical activity, so that religion cannot be merely a question of "doing good"; but conduct holds a special place, since it is the test both of the reality of religion and of its worth. We hear of men occasionally, it is true, who combine an intense devoutness with an entire absence of moral sense. But such "devoutness" is not religion. It is said of Benvenuto Cellini that "he lived in an atmosphere of exalted religious emotion," while "his life was one of profligacy and murder lived without any consciousness of inconsistency. . . . He could murder his enemy in cold blood just as he was leaving Mass filled with beautiful religious emotions." An extreme instance, certainly, yet one that is an analogue of a great deal that passes for religion in the modern world. In great numbers of cases to-day men leave their churches filled with what seem to them "beautiful religious emotions," yet with no consciousness of inconsistency in the acceptance of social wrong and injustice and of a way of life utterly remote from any moral idealism. But such religion is utterly unworthy of the name. A religion which does not express itself in conduct, which does not shape our practical attitude, is not a genuine thing. Religion must carry with it an ideal for life, and an ideal for the whole of life, or it is a meaningless futility. Religion is "all or nothing," as Browning said. That does not mean that unless a man follows out his religion with complete consistency in every detail of his life, he is a fraud and a hypocrite. It does mean that unless a man's religion claims to cover the whole of life, in its political and social and economic aspects, as well as in its more purely private and personal relations, it is poisoned at its very root by an essential unreality.

Religion must carry with it an ideal of life. That is the test of its reality. But what sort of ideal? There lies the test of its worth. A religion may be intensely real, in the sense that men believe passionately or whole-heartedly in its teaching and obey that teaching in their lives, but it does not follow that its influence is good. It is sometimes assumed, curiously enough, that religion as such is always and necessarily "good," in the sense that it makes for human betterment. Actually we know that the effect of religion, even

where it is deep and vital, is sometimes very far from being good in that objective sense. To the sincere believer in it every form of religion seems good, of course, even where it supports such horrors as human sacrifice or persecution. In fact, just because such things can be literally "sanctified" by religion, just because religion can invest them with its own distinctive quality of sacredness, it can become "a potent and violent force for evil"—a force which makes for the perpetuation of cruelty and strife and darkness in the world. "The worst atrocities that the world has seen," says Robert Briffault, "have been committed by men who were intent on being 'good.'" We can only judge of the real moral value of a religion by discovering the meaning which it assigns to that principle—the kind of "good" which it actually promotes. Religion has promoted, and it does to-day promote, widely differing ideals and attitudes towards life. Consider only the contradictory influences which emanate, in history and in contemporary life, from Christianity in its varying forms. We find Christianity making for intolerance and for catholicity, for external authority and for the rights of the individual conscience, for war and for peace, for class privilege and for social equality. Can it be said, in view of the manifest and flagrant contradictions in the morality which it supports, that religion in itself stands for any particular moral principle?

The religious life everywhere has this much in common, that it rests upon, and seeks to give expression to, the sense of sacredness. Whatever it touches, whether for good or for evil, religion "sanctifies"—that is to say, invests it with the sense of awe and mystery. It matters not whether the sacredness is felt as directly present in the object or act itself, or whether it is held to be imparted to it by a spirit or deity—the essential attitude is the same. The Australian feels in the dictates of his customary morality a direct magical potency; the Hebrew attributes his moral code to Yahweh—the result is the same. In both there is a certain awe-fulness, which demands of men the fruits of awe—which creates, in other words, the sense of transcendent obligation, the spirit of earnestness and solemnity, the subordination of self. Here, then, we have the distinctive mark of religious morality—the attitude towards life which distinguishes the "religious" from the "non-religious" man. To be religious, on the ethical side, is to take life seriously, to feel what has been described as the sense of "imperativeness and acting under orders," to subordinate oneself to something greater.

That is common to religion everywhere so far as it is religion at all. Wells has recently spoken of the subordination of self as the essence of religion. Certainly, it is an essential aspect of religious morality—an essential aspect of the sense of the " sacred " as expressed in life. Always, as Durkheim says, religion unites those who adhere to its principles into a " moral community "—a moral community which may be co-extensive with the social group, or may assume the form of a separate Church. The evils which religion too often promotes are not the evils which spring from the assertion of the separate self. Religion does not, at any level, directly sanctify the quest of gain or of private ambition. It has again and again been prostituted to such ends, but always in violation of its essential spirit. The spirit of religion is the very opposite of blatant egoism and self-assurance. It is the spirit of reverential awe in face of the sacred reality, expressing itself in moral seriousness, in the sense of imperativeness or constraint, in the subordination of the self.

The evils which religion serves are those which spring from the misdirection of these things—the misapplication of the sense of the holy. They are evils committed, not for the sake of personal profit or aggrandisement, but on account of ignorance or fanaticism. The root of the trouble is really this, that the sacred is externalised, it is identified with the forms, the objects or activities, in which it is held to find expression. At the primitive level it is discerned directly in all kinds of material things—in anything, in fact, which is felt as a mystery. This feeling is everywhere aroused by human blood, so blood becomes sacred, and endowed with magical potency. But since blood has this mysterious power, it may well be utilised for human purposes. Hence the widespread rite of human sacrifice, which appears to have originated along with the rise of agriculture, as a means of securing abundant crops. It has been suggested, I may mention, that one of the factors which led to the growth of organised warfare was the search for victims for sacrifice. However that may be, here we have a clear case of a gross and terrible evil resulting from the idea of the materialisation of the sacred which was fundamental in primitive religious thought. Here also we see how the externalisation of the sacred in the shape of custom tends to perpetuate an evil once established. Human sacrifice itself, having once become established in the order of life, was " sanctified "—regarded with veneration as a sacred rite. Everywhere we find that same tendency asserting itself. A religious ceremony or

belief once accepted, becomes sacred, and woe betide the man who seeks to alter it. So long as this external view of sanctity prevails, so long as men believe in holy customs and rites and books and days and beliefs, religion is bound to be essentially conservative in its attitude. The innovator is a breaker of "taboo," a violator of ancient sanctities. His attitude arouses a feeling of horror, in which religious dread is intermingled. Consequently, lest his presence should infect the whole community, he must be destroyed. Religious persecution derives its peculiar quality from the combination of this horror in face of heresy, in which religious awe is infused, with the spirit of earnestness and solemnity, which is an essential aspect of the religious attitude, and which readily passes, under the stress of strong emotion, into fanaticism. The flames of fanaticism are fanned, moreover, by the very sense of solidarity, the subordination of the self to the group, the church-consciousness, which religion promotes.

The evils for which religion is responsible are due, then, to the conditions of its development. The main fact from which cruelty and persecution and intolerance spring is that externalisation of the sacred in material things, in rites and customs and moral codes, in institutions and beliefs, which was the very medium whereby the religious sense developed. The essential meaning of religious progress, from the moral standpoint, lies in the growth of a new and higher consciousness of sanctity—a sanctity not embodied in outer things, in material objects, in rites or customs or beliefs or moral codes, but immanent in life and the soul—a sanctity carrying with it no conception or suggestion of magical potency, but an inner quality of being, and that alone. As between differing types of religious morality, the test lies in the relative inwardness or externality of the sacred as they conceive it, in the extent to which the vision of an immanent sanctity has emerged. At certain points in religious development the two contrasted types of sanctity come into direct conflict with one another. That is the essential meaning of the great conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees. Both for Jesus and for the Pharisees the sense of sacredness was fundamental. But in the case of the Pharisees it was externalised in the Law and its observances, while Jesus, in spite of his formal acceptance of the authority of the Law, had the insight to see that it is essentially an inward principle. Jesus was a breaker of taboo, a violator of ancient sanctities. "The Sabbath was made for man," he said, "not man for

the Sabbath." Life and the needs of life, it is implied—that is the sacred thing. No rite or code or institution that man has made is sacred in and for itself. When laws and institutions are set up as sacred in themselves, it is time to break the spell and to violate the taboo.

Take, again, the conflict in which the early Church was involved with the forces of Roman paganism. The Church was persecuted, as we know, not by the irreligious Emperors, who cared only for their own personal aggrandisement; it was persecuted by the Emperors who took their own State-religion seriously, for whom patriotism was, in fact, the great virtue, for whom the State and its interests were the supremely sacred thing. The early Church stood for a higher loyalty than State-obedience—it had the vision of a deeper sanctity, the sanctity of human personality, made, as it taught, in the image of God, a sanctity which found expression, as such a vision naturally must, in the repudiation of the claims of the State to moral supremacy. The conflict between early Christianity and the Roman State was essentially a phase of the ever renewed struggle between sanctity as a thing externalised and the higher sanctity that is immanent in the soul.

The progress of religion everywhere, so far as progress is achieved, is towards the repudiation of outer authorities and external sanctities, and the discovery of life and the soul as the essentially sacred things. It is that discovery and its expression in all its implications, for our thought and for our life, which is the supreme need of religion to-day. The position to-day in its ethical aspect, so far as religion is concerned, is broadly this: that religion as it exists has little or no moral initiative, it is not a creative factor, it has no distinctive social ideals—and unless an ethical ideal is an ideal for society, unless it involves some vision of transformed human relationships, it has and can have no true significance. The outstanding need of religion to-day is a recovery of initiative in thought and in life—that initiative which can only come from a fresh and living vision of truth, from a quickened sense of Sacred Reality as a living power in the soul, from a reawakened effort to give expression to it in the whole range of life.

SIDNEY SPENCER.

LIVERPOOL.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BY REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

THE death of Dr Arthur S. Peake is a distinct loss to theology, and those who know something of the manifold services which he rendered in this department will realise how much the present generation is indebted to him. A pupil of Dr Driver at Oxford, he carried on the work which Dr Driver did, of interpreting evangelical Christianity in the light of the newer criticism, not only in his own church, but far beyond its borders. Unlike Dr Driver, he covered the New Testament as well as the Old ; and, indeed, by means of his books on the Bible and Christianity, instructed the general reader with a persuasive combination of scholarship and faith. His well-known Commentary on the Bible, which was edited with skill and thoroughness, was merely one of the contributions which he made to the spread of enlightened views about the Bible. But his own works in exegesis and interpretation must not be overlooked. There are still no better short editions of Job, Jeremiah, and Hebrews, than those which he contributed to the Century Bible. And it would be a pious tribute to his memory, as well as a gift to students far and wide, if the authorities of Manchester University would reprint in one volume the scattered essays on Paulinism and other subjects which he issued in their series of publications. These are too valuable to be forgotten ; they are constructive and clarifying, and they illustrate Dr Peake's power of reaching to the central problems and stating them effectively in a critical as well as in a profoundly religious spirit. He had a frail physique, but the amount of work he carried through in spite of it, was a marvel and a challenge to his friends.

Professor Auguste Bill's *La Morale et la Foi dans la philosophie antique* (Paris, Felix Alcan), ought to have been noticed before now. It is one of the monographs which are being issued by the University of Strassburg, and which are of such varied and sustained excellence in theology and history and philosophy. As Dr Bill rightly points out, the controversy in early Christianity over the Jewish law and also over the question of morality and religion, presupposes an older issue in philosophy, and to the latter he addresses himself. His

ample volume forms an independent sequel to works like those of Hirzel and Burle. It begins by tracing the rise and evolution of "Law" in the polity of Greece and Rome, the moral problems raised thereby, and the cognate ideas of an unwritten law and of a law of the universe, down to Maximus of Tyre and Dio Chrysostom. The Stoic and Epicurean positions are explained, and there is a special chapter at the close on Cicero. As Dr Bill admits, the problem of the early Christians was not so much the relation of Law in general to the specific laws of the State as the problem of revelation, *i.e.* of the moral Law as a divine code or rule. Hence the preoccupation of philosophers like the Cynics and the Stoics was not theirs. Nevertheless, the issues raised by the Pagan thinkers affected the situation before long, and such a survey of the controversy as Dr Bill provides is of real value to the student of the religious interests of the early Church in relation to Judaism in particular. It is to be hoped that this volume will be followed by another on the place of the divine Law in early Christian controversy, especially in connection with Marcion. Dr W. A. Heidel's book on *The Day of Yahweh* (Century Company, 1929), is on more specifically religious lines, and on ritual in the Hebrew religion. The sub-title is "A Study of Sacred Days and Ritual Forms in the Ancient Far East," and it consists of nine studies upon subjects like Pentecost, the Day of Atonement, Succoth, and the Sabbath, in the light of contemporary civilisation. One of his aims is to bring out what he considers the affinities between the Hebrew religion and the practices of people in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially with regard to ritual, since "the greater sanctities of Judaism are those of its ritual, its times and seasons." The pilgrimage idea is ranked as central in this connection, and Dr Heidel offers many curious suggestions on its influence. Affinities between Apollo and Yahweh are, however, precarious. The Sabbath he regards as a later importation, probably from Babylonia. As a pendant to this, Dr S. Mowinkel's essay on "A Quel Moment le culte de Yahwe à Jérusalem est-il officiellement devenu un culte sans images" (*Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, 1929, pp. 197-216) may be chronicled. When were the older customs of representing Yahweh under the figure of a bull, for example, superseded—the representations current under Gideon, for instance, and Jeroboam? Mowinkel agrees that the break took place under Asa, and that it was associated with the separation of Judah from Northern Israel, but the religious break, like the political, was prepared for. Solomon's religious policy must have provoked an opposition movement, and traces are to be found in the Yahwist document with its version of the decalogue in Exodus 34.

To open Dr R. H. Charles' *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel* (Clarendon Press, 30s.) is to expect surprises. The Massoretic text fares ill at Dr Charles' hands, and we miss some good old texts before we are done. Thus xii. 4 ("Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased") is almost certainly wrong; the last words are not so innocuous and hopeful as they sound in

English. But Dr Charles emends them, on the basis of suggestion from the Septuagint, into "Many shall become foolish (or apostates) and the earth is filled with iniquity." Similarly, the famous writing on the wall is changed beyond recognition, and even beyond understanding. The criticism of the text is brilliant and daring, as might be supposed—even drastic. Originally the book closed, Dr Charles thinks, with xii. 10: "But they that be wise shall understand." This would certainly be a fine ending, could we believe that the following verses were an appendix added in order to bring the book up to date. The apocalypse itself, it is held, was written originally in Aramaic. The Massoretic text is "in hundreds of places wholly untrustworthy." At such conclusions Dr Charles only arrives after prolonged grammatical and philological arguments, as readers of his commentary on the Apocalypse of John will understand. The commentary, as a result, is full of challenging interpretations, and the volume as a whole is masterly—in some parts masterful.

Dr Oesterley's well-stored commentary on *Proverbs* in the Westminster Commentary (Methuen, 18s.), recognises the use of Amenemope in xxii. 17f. The commentary is packed with suggestive material, equipped with scholarly material, and generally may be said to furnish the reader with the most comprehensive view of the book available in English. The setting of the proverbs in the light of ancient lore outside Israel is one of its most attractive features. And in this connection the publication of a new, thoroughly revised edition of Jeremias' *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur* (W. de Gruyter, Berlin und Leipzig), deserves to be noticed. No manual is more valuable for its illustrations as well as for its text. The new edition brings it up to date, and increases its value to the student of the Old Testament. Another informing work on the outskirts of the subject is the new volume of *Schwab's Lectures* (Oxford University Press). The two first survey the history of Israel, though the title of the book is really *Palestine in General History*. Professor T. H. Robinson traces the history down to the fall of Nineveh, and Mr J. W. Hunkin continues the theme as far down as the capture of Jerusalem by Titus. As a pendant, Professor Burkitt's essay on Petra and Palmyra is added. Professor Robinson, who describes Israel as "the one genuine Palestinian nation of ancient times," calls attention to the check upon autocracy in the kingdom which was laid by the religious sense of human brotherhood; the king was supposed and expected ideally to exist for the sake of his people, and, for all his authority, to be one of them. "To understand the unique importance of Israel in history, it is necessary to remember not only her geographical position between the two great empires of the ancient world, but also her gift to man's political thinking. For while to every other ancient monarch the subject was a slave, to the Israelite king he was a brother."

The general question of the relation between primitive Christianity and Judaism, is discussed in six papers printed in a special number of the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (vol. xlviii., 1929).

Professor Porter (1-23) notes the dangers and defects of the method which seeks to explain the Judaism of the New Testament period from the rabbinic writings. He also points out that "neither John nor Jesus were prophets of the apocalyptic type," and that the apocalyptic movement in Judaism is not the final clue to the New Testament. This latter point is driven home by Professor E. F. Scott in a penetrating paper on the originality of Jesus (pp. 109-115), in which he shows that Jesus was concerned with morality itself and not with any restatement of rabbinic morality, and that his originality is to be tested not by what he said so much as by his power of moving men to action, a power resident in his personality. Mr S. S. Cohen (pp. 82-108) concludes, after a patient examination of rabbinic data, that Jesus belonged to "the company of the Hasidim who stood outside of Pharisaism." Professor Torrey (pp. 24-36) has no hesitation in stating that the Gospels and Acts represent a Christianity dominated by the characteristic ideas of the Second Isaiah. He ventures to place them all before the year 70 A.D., as translations from Hebrew or Aramaic, and as documents in which Jesus is regarded not only as the Danielic Son of Man and the Scion of David, but as the Servant of Yahweh depicted in Second Isaiah. Professor Ropes (pp. 37-39), on the other hand, sees no direct dependence of St Paul on Second Isaiah in his christological ideas, though he admits that 1 Peter ii. 22f betrays a recognition of Isaiah 53 as a prediction of Jesus' sufferings. These papers are in the main concerned with Palestinian Judaism, though Professor Porter notices the preparation for Christianity furnished by the Hellenistic Judaism of a man like Philo, which anticipated "Christianity's conveyance of a religion built on Hebrew presuppositions to the Greco-Roman world." The problem of Philo's allegorical method is handled in Dr Edmund Stein's monograph on *Die Allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria* (Giessen, Topelmann). He analyses the varied elements of allegory in Jewish Hellenism, including the Therapeutæ and the Essenes, to whom Philo is supposed to have been specially indebted, depreciates Philo's originality as an allegorist, seeks to show the tradition which he followed, and paradoxically denies him very much knowledge of Hebrew. A stimulating theory, though not convincing at every turn; the possibilities of Palestinian allegorising, for example, are ignored.

Mr Harold R. Willoughby's *Pagan Regeneration* (University of Chicago Press) is a patient and thorough study of initiations in the mystery cults. The author discusses the separate cults with a view to stressing the characteristic emphasis laid by each on the relevant data. The closing chapter is on Philo's mysticism,¹ but

¹ It is a real pleasure to welcome the first two volumes of a long overdue fresh translation of Philo in the Loeb Classical Library, from the competent hands of Mr Colson and Mr Whittaker. The German translation of Philo in the series called "Schriften d. jüdisch-hellenistischen Literatur," and edited by Dr I. Heinemann, has now reached its fifth section: *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria* (Breslau: M. und H. Marcus, 1929). The translations are by various hands, and have short notes appended.

the earlier chapters handle the cults of paganism, beginning with the Eleusinian mysteries. Mr Willoughby is careful to draw no definite conclusions as to the connection between these and contemporary Christianity, though he evidently desires to find in them a soil for the rise of the Pauline mysticism; his book is comprehensive and objective, a valuable handbook for students, and plainly the result of wide research. On the Eleusinian mysteries he is perhaps inclined to idealise a little; recent researches by scholars like Kern, Koerte, Picard and Lagrange, for example (to which he does not allude), point to a use of the sexual organs as symbols which indicates a crude and even gross element in the cult, and diminishes our faith in the alleged moral value of the initiation. But, details apart, the volume forms a convenient approach to the subject for the English student, well arranged and free from generalities. In the paper above referred to, Professor Porter argues that "Paul had no intention of transforming Christianity into a Greek mystery cult, but his teaching of the inner oneness of the Christian with Christ was certainly fitted to support the claim that Christianity could fill the religious needs that the pagan mysteries professed to meet; and Paul sometimes puts this experience in language that seems to imply that claim." This cautious verdict represents the limit of what most expert classical scholars, who are quite alive to the religious sense of the cults, would admit.

Some of the twenty-three essays and studies in Dr Lowther Clarke's *New Testament Problems* (S.P.C.K.) have already appeared in print, but the contents are all worth reprinting for their acute estimates of current issues, especially those on the synoptists and St Paul. Dr Clarke thinks that one welcome result of the *Formgeschichtliche* method is to prove the impossibility of constructing "a chronological life of Christ, tracing His mental development from Baptism to the Cross." He argues that the only alternative to the orthodox doctrine of the Church is that the body of Jesus "must have been removed during the night of the first day of the week . . . by a person or persons unknown, neither friend nor enemy, actuated by motives so obscure that we cannot even hazard a guess at them." St Paul's thorn in the flesh, he suggests, may have been stammering; in which case he was like Charles Kingsley, a man who made his mark in literature despite the physical handicap which made his speech contemptible. And so on. The book is full of shrewd comments and well deserves study from those interested in the newer phases of research upon the New Testament.

On the gospels, attention should be called to Canon Deane's admirable popular book, *How to Understand The Four Gospels* (Hodder and Stoughton, 2s. 6d.), which is critical and evangelical in the true sense of the terms; to Mr J. W. Jack's ingenious idea that Luke wrote "Saturninus" and not Quirinius in ii. 1-3, Saturninus having been legate between 2 and 6 B.C., and that the nativity, therefore, might be dated about 7 or 6 B.C. (*Expository Times*, August, pp. 496-498); and to the review of work on the *Formgeschichtliche*

method by Martin Dibelius in the *Theologische Rundschau* (pp. 185-216). Dibelius insists on the literary interests of the method, but at the close he sums up what seem to him to be the religious implications, which are fairly definite and radical. Writing on the fourth gospel, Dr Clarke seeks to find a eucharistic significance in the story of the miracle at Cana, and rejects any attempt to distinguish the two words used for "love" in xxi. 15-17. Mr J. A. Maynard (*Journal of Society of Oriental Research*, pp. 155-159) identifies the beloved disciple with a wealthy youth of the priestly aristocracy, one of the "cohanim" (Lev. x. 6; xxi. 1f), who could not enter a tomb till he was sure it was empty. This John became a priest (hence the reference in Polycrates). As belonging to the Sadducean party, he was acquainted with Greek philosophy and rightly made the Pharisees call themselves "the (true) Jews." In the *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (pp. 148ff) Lothar Schmid gives a study of John iv. 1-42, in which he shows that the aim of the story is to bring out the gradual recognition of Jesus, first as greater than Jacob, then as a prophet, then as Messiah, and finally as the Saviour. There is a corresponding rise in the idea of belief.

With regard to the Pauline epistles, some attempts have been made to throw fresh light upon Galatians. Dr E. Barnikol (*Die vorehristliche und frühchristliche Zeit des Paulus*, Kiel) argues that there was a Gentile Christian movement prior to Paul in Damascus and the north, that Paul's retreat to Arabia was really a return to Damascus, which then was held to belong to Arabia, and that i. 16 should be read: "When it pleased God to reveal His Son in me that I should preach him among the Gentiles immediately, I conferred not with flesh and blood." "If I still preach circumcision" (v. 11) is, for Dr Barnikol, an allusion to the apostle's pre-Christian mission as a leader of Judaism. On the other hand, Dr J. H. Ropes in *The Singular Problem of the Epistle to the Galatians* (Harvard Theological Studies, xiv.) elaborates a theory partly on the lines suggested some years ago by Lütgert, viz. that there are two parties controverted by the apostle, one a Judaizing party, and the other a radical party which desired Paul to throw over the Law altogether in the interests of a religion of the Spirit. As for the Judaizing party, Dr Ropes does not think they need to be identified with emissaries from Jerusalem who maligned Paul; therefore a later date for Galatians is open, the local controversy having no relation to the controversy of Acts xv. The radicals, against whom the major part of the latter is directed, held that "the Jewish taint in his gospel originally received from the Jerusalem apostles" had led him to compromise with his own fundamental ideas of the Spirit and freedom in Christ. The theory is certain to compel a fresh study of the epistle; it will be interesting to see how further exegetical study corroborates or controverts the ingenious reading of the Galatian situation thus put forward.

The theology implicit in the worship of the primitive churches has also received some attention recently. A religious movement expresses itself first in worship: literature emerges later, and often in con-

nection with the worship. This consideration underlies an essay like that of M. Jacques Marty in the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses* (pp. 234-268), which analyses not only the allusions in Paul but the hymns of the Apocalypse. From Hebrew the Church took expressions like Maranatha, Amen, and Hallelujah; less commonly Hosanna. The liturgical features of the Apocalyptic hymns are noted as expressions of the prophetic spirit uttering itself in worship; the doxologies of the New Testament are also examined, in the light of their religious significance for the worship and beliefs of the churches. The Didachê prayers come under notice in Mr A. D. Nock's "Liturgical Notes" (*Journal of Theological Studies*, p. 381f). By the time the Didachê was written, Mr Nock thinks, a word like Maranatha had "the psychological value of a holy word in an unfamiliar tongue" for a circle which thought in Greek. As for the Didachê prayer, "Remember, Lord, Thy Church," to which Lietzmann could find no parallel in Jewish or Greek ritual, Mr Nock recalls the sixtieth psalm, and indicates the reasonable explanation that this form of prayer "springs from a feeling of the solidarity of the new Israel akin to that feeling of solidarity which is so characteristic of Jewish religion." He adds references to the use of "remember" as an acclamatory prayer to the deity in Syrian dedications and graffiti. Finally, it may be noted that Dr Clarke (as above, pp. 141-150) is disposed to agree upon the whole with Lohmeyer's theory that Philippians ii. 1-11, is a pre-Pauline hymn of the primitive church. Perhaps it was, like the Nunc Dimittis, an Aramaic hymn of the Jerusalem church; a version in Aramaic by Mr Levertoff is added to the article. The particular aspect of worship in relation to the eucharist is to the front in Dr G. H. C. Macgregor's *Eucharistic Origins* (James Clarke, 6s.). He handles temperately the vexed question of the Didachê service, for example, and agrees in the main with Dr Oesterley that the Kiddush rite lies behind the eucharist of the gospels. The study is a competent contribution to the subject, written with judgment, and with a refreshing plea for the historical nexus between the sacrament and Jesus.

Mr B. L. Woolf's *The Authority of Jesus and Its Foundations* (Allen and Unwin, 12s. 6d.), is a combination of New Testament research and constructive statement. The author carries through an exact analysis of the gospels, to show the prophetic authority of Jesus, and seeks to establish a divine element in Him as Son of God for Christian believers, though the latter must not evade the appeal of His personality to experience. In this connection, we note that two recent theological conferences, both held at Cambridge, have published their papers. The Congregationalist Conference discussed the idea of God, the Modern Churchmen were occupied with the problem of Authority. On the former subject Professor Sorley, surveying the philosophical approach to theology, noted the changes produced by modern science in the views of space and time and of matter, the breakdown of the notion of the continuity of nature, and so forth. He thought there was more reason than ever to believe in the cosmos as implying intelligence, but pressed the Conference to recognise that the Johannine

doctrine of love was central in the Christian interpretation of God. Sir Oliver Lodge took a similar line. Dr Cadoux pleaded boldly for the abandonment of the doctrine of any distinction between the Father and the Holy Spirit, as an unmeaning expression, since the transcendent Father is Himself immanent. Dr R. S. Franks, on the other hand, outlined a conception of the Spirit which should be adequate for a restatement of trinitarianism. "The modern philosophy of Spirit can transform the stark logic of the doctrine into a vision of the Eternal Divine Life." This paper is the most constructive of the group. The seventeen papers contributed to the other Conference are too ample and varied to be summarised; the subject involved not simply theological issues but political, as Professor Barker ("Corporate Authority and its Sanctions") and Mr Oakeshott ("The Authority of the State") recognised. A thoughtful discussion of what authority means in the realms of science, art, and morals is contributed by Professor Sorley, who incidentally urged the Conference to recollect that "the ethical insight of the persons who form the government of the State is probably on about the same level as that of the average citizen and certainly below that of the best citizen." Mr Hunkin gives an extraordinary illustration of the risks attaching to a hasty exercise of judgment by the Church; he points to a figure at the base of the font in Coventry Cathedral, representing Error or Heresy. The figure holds a book on which are inscribed the words, "Essays and Reviews"! Dr Inge's introductory address surveys the whole question with acute care. He is conscious of the loose thinking which often runs under the glib term "Spirit," and also of the caricatures of Authority, but he declines to accept any necessary contrast between Authority and Spirit. Without being invidious, one may call particular attention to the blend of good sense and originality in Professor Burkitt's essay on the Bible ("A Corpus of Sacred Writings") and Principal Galloway's words on "A System of Doctrine as Revealed Truth."

Dr Franks has written a capital little book on *The Metaphysical Justification of Religion* (University of London Press, 3s. 6d.), calling attention to an aspect too much neglected in many circles and handling the problem with first-hand knowledge. Such prolegomena to the study of theology are essential. Valuable as history and experience are, the metaphysical implicates of any idea of God remain fundamental. It is interesting to notice that Dr Franks considers the central point of view for regarding the universe is "given by religion, which constitutes such an experience of the Holy as enables the reflecting mind to see how it unifies the True, the Good, and the Beautiful." This recourse to the idea of the Holy occurs also in Dr H. R. Mackintosh's book on *The Christian Apprehension of God* (S.C.M., 6s.), which consists of lectures on the nature of religion, the special character of religious knowledge, revelation, the divine personality, and other themes. The audience in view was general rather than theological, but Dr Mackintosh's philosophical ability enables him to handle his subject with thoroughness as well as with

the power of lucidity. He considers that the three crucial characteristics of God are His holiness, His love, and His sovereignty. These are discussed with an insight which is too rare in theological works, particularly the idea of holiness. The writer goes so far as to say that when Christians speak about "God" they mean not simply "holy love" but absolute or almighty love. He presents the case for this interpretation persuasively, all the more so that he is acquainted with the current misconceptions on the subject. "It is clear," he admits, "that in apprehending the holiness of God we are in contact with paradox." So with the idea of the divine omnipotence. Yet both, as he succeeds in showing, are essential to a right belief. The book is indeed an unpretentious and thorough statement of the case, and, with a volume like that by Dr Franks, it is bound to influence Christian thought in this apprehensive age.

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REVIEWS.

The Naturalness of Religion. By A. Barratt Brown, M.A., and John W. Harvey, M.A.—London: James Clarke & Co., 1929.—Pp. 192.—5s. net.

THIS book is more important than its size might indicate. Written by two well-known members of the Society of Friends, it is described in the Preface as "an attempt to present, so far as possible without trespassing on theological ground or introducing issues of dogma, a view of religion as a normal if not inevitable expression of man's life and nature." While it thus reminds us of books like those of the late Dr Bosanquet and more recently of Dr Whitehead, which try to set forth the meaning of religion in its essential quality, it differs from both of these in allying itself more definitely with Christian tradition. Its subject is the naturalness not only of religion, but of the Christian religion when interpreted at its best. Its point of view is further indicated as psychological rather than philosophical, though, as the title indicates, and as the reader soon finds, it is impossible to exclude more fundamental questions of the nature of the world, and man's relation to it. In the first chapter on "Religion and its Critics," the present situation is described in comparison with former periods (in which religion was first looked at as "imposture," next as "self-deception," later still as a "harmless self-indulgence")—as one of simple "indifference" and inability to understand "where religion comes in." If this were intended as a complete analysis of the prevailing attitude of mind, the reader might be inclined to doubt whether the case is not more serious than that, and whether there is not a deeper cause for the indifference in the ruin in which the war experience of a whole generation seems to so many to have left the doctrine, if not of the existence, of the goodness of God. The writers do not ignore this, and have something to say about it later on. Here they are merely concerned from their own point of view in showing that, bad as things are, the evil is aggravated by the superficiality of popular psychologies of religion. These are apt either to exaggerate with William James the abnormal phases of religious experience and to fail to bring out its common and essential attributes, or to bamboozle their students with a question-begging terminology of "complexes," "self-suggestion," "sub-consciousness" and the like. The chapters that follow this introduction are devoted to the discussion of the source of religion in the human mind, the main characteristics of

religious experience and the various means, individual and collective, by which it is sustained and deepened.

In discussing the origin of religion, as we might expect from the translator of Rudolph Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, the emphasis is laid not on *fear*, which merely repels from its object, but upon the awe that draws as well as repels. Even Schleiermacher's "sense of dependence" is criticised as containing only a part of the truth, and religion is finally defined, in terms which will compare with the best that have been elsewhere used, as "a man's total attitude of response to a quality or spirit in the universe which evokes his reverence because it is felt at once to transcend his own finite nature, and yet to be akin to him; and at the same time to be supremely precious."

Proceeding to bring out the characteristics of religious experience, the authors are led to identify this feeling with "an inner urge to completeness," and to correlate it with the stimulus coming from "an outer quality of the spiritual environment"—described, in terms borrowed from General Smuts's book on *Holism and Evolution*, as the "whole-making" tendency in the universe, illustrated both in the inorganic and the organic, the mental and the spiritual worlds. One has nothing to remark on all this, except that it seems a pity to go to this eminent South African writer for a doctrine that is staring us in the face in the long Platonic and Christian tradition of our own country, to which the writers adhere, and of which their book is so interesting a development.

The third question, that of the means of sustaining and deepening religious consciousness, occupies the rest and main portion of the book. It is introduced by a particularly helpful chapter on "Growth and Renewal," in which, among other things, the attempt is made to rescue the word "salvation" from its more negative meaning of the opposite of being lost ("salvaging" Mr Wells might call it) by assigning to it the meaning of "turning to the best use and with the least possible waste, all the powers of a man's personality." This is followed by a defence of the Christian conception of the Fatherhood of God against the Freudian theory of "Infantilism" and the sociological theories of the "Herd-leader" and "collective hallucination." The writers disarm criticism by admitting that Fatherhood is merely an ideogram or symbol. Yet, what they say raises questions as to the relation of God to the universe and the universe to personality, on which one should have been glad to hear more from them. For their own purpose, sufficient, they think is proved to justify Prayer, not only in the sense of "joining with the creative elements giving breath to you," as Meredith's Dr Shrapnel expresses it, nor only in the sense of adoration and aspiration, that kind of prayer which may be said to answer itself, but in the sense of petition and intercession. With regard to the former, it is not wholly clear whether the effect claimed is more than psychological; and, with regard to the second, whether, apart from telepathic influences which are purely human, more is proved than a species of vicarious aspira-

tion. If, as they say, people are not now worrying so much about their individual sins as about corporate failures, there is clearly plenty of room for this latter kind of supplication, telepathy or no telepathy. As might be expected, the authors have some fine things to say of the place in worship of corporate silence of which speech is often but "the small change." In the chapter on "Religion and Moral Practice," the man of religious faith is described as "open to a kind of guidance which enables him to blaze new trails that go beyond and at times run counter to established ways of living. . . . Without it morality would sooner or later wither into a mere traditional convention, or dissolve into an arbitrary collection of permits, fiats and vetos." *Vice versâ* "it is no accident of language that connects religious responsiveness with moral responsibility."

If the reader finds the chapter on "Provocation and Forgiveness" itself a little provocative, he will find nothing to complain of in the inspiring chapters on "Inspiration" and "Religious Genius and Normal Experience," with which the book ends. As religion is essentially natural in the sense the authors have described, seeing that "all our faculties have an outward reference, man is a creature born to concern himself with what is beyond himself, even though it is at the cost of ever recurrent dissatisfactions," so irreligion is in essence something abnormal and morbid. For, as the specific mark of religion is reverence, so "the fundamental mark of irreligion is *irreverence*, taking the form either of pessimism and world-weariness, or of a narrow self-complacency. As therefore "the moments of religious insight and response express the expansion of the human spirit as it reaches outward and upward to the more precious meaning and the profounder reality," so "the moments of irreligious blindness and apathy are of the nature of an arrest of growth, a relapse into what is by contrast a state of torpor and inertia."

Some readers will miss a discussion of individual immortality. It is not clear whether the writers assume it or reject it. Whatever the interest of the subject, they are undoubtedly right in separating the questions of the spiritual nature of the world and man's power of response to it from that of personal survival, and in claiming belief in the former as the quintessence of religious consciousness.

Short though it is, the book is worthy of the great Society to which the writers belong, and whose inner spirit it so finely expresses. It deserves, and we may hope that it will have, a wide circulation both in England and America.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

ROTHERFIELD, SUSSEX.

Dogma in History and Thought. Studies by various writers, edited by W. R. Matthews, D.D.—(Library of Constructive Theology.)—London: Nisbet & Co.—Pp. xi + 228.—8s. 6d. net.

THIS is an important, and for the most part, a steadying and constructive piece of work. The title indicates the scope of the dis-

cussion. It is one of the valuable series of volumes in the "Library of Constructive Theology," and is edited by the Dean of King's College, London, who writes the Preface and the first chapter on "The Nature and Basis of Dogma." Of the other six contributors, five are members of the Theological Faculty of King's College, namely, E. J. Bicknell, Bishop Gore, Richard Hanson, Claude Jenkins and H. Maurice Relton; while the other contributor is R. S. Franks, Principal of Western College, Bristol.

A better company for group-work on scholarly Anglican lines could hardly have been assembled, for the volume gains in interest and vitality from marked divergences of view subdued by a prevailing unity of purpose. Dean Matthews and Professor Relton are courageously liberal and progressive, if also a little uncomfortable and hesitating, in the effort to step forward on one foot while keeping the other firmly on the old ground. They both feel that while dogma, in their somewhat equivocal use of the word, is necessary, yet doctrine, however definitely carried over into dogma by having been authoritatively and officially decreed, cannot be accepted as a static structure, but must, as a living intellectual interpretation of a living faith, submit to growth and restatement, however essentially harmonious the new formulation must be with the older symbolisms of the creeds. Dr Bicknell also, though in a good sense conservative in spirit and intention, is outspoken and fearless. "Indeed we may say that the more completely they [formulations] satisfy the intellectual curiosity of one age, the more certain it is that they will become intolerable to the next" (p. 46).

The outstandingly constructive essay of the book, which alone would make this volume remarkably timely and clarifying, is Bishop Gore's on "Dogma in the Early Church." This bids fair to become a classic in brief. It has all the sagacity and learning, the wise poise and caution of statement, the swift and shrewd all-round glances at the effect of his admissions on opponents, Roman and Protestant, ever on the pounce for any unwary moment, and all the profound concern for ecclesiastical discipline and spiritual seriousness that one would expect from the greatest of modern Anglicans. In small compass it is far and away the most perfectly balanced expression of reasonable Anglo-Catholicism that we have read. It sails with skilled and sure seamanship on an even keel between the Scylla of Protestant modernism and the Charybdis of Roman absolutism. Only those who have endeavoured this voyage in other boats will fully appreciate the excellence of this achievement. Mr. Hanson's contribution on "Dogma in Mediæval Scholasticism" is astringently ironical and stimulatingly intransigent. In some respects he sees the issues between scientific Naturalism and Revealed Religion more fiercely and starkly clear than any of his colleagues. He is out to kill, and refuses one courtly salute to the enemy. One almost envies his students, who will go through life chuckling at the delicious asides of their lecturer. The bitterness of these is not the bitterness of mere frivolous cynicism, but rather the expression of a tragic sense of the

tremendous values that are at stake. One cannot resist quotation. "The philosophy of religion may be said to be in our time approaching completion. The elimination of God some time ago now quite appreciably simplified the problem. The approaching and consequent elimination of man may be confidently expected to finally solve it. At least with no God to save and no man to need salvation the problem will assume manageable proportions" (p. 95). Our only quarrel with that sour plum is the split infinitive about which writers will continue to differ. Another little acid-drop to refresh the weary wayfarer appears on p. 105. "Though the modern man gets on very well without God and can even make it his boast, he finds the conception of a God who can get on very well without him highly offensive." This essay is a brilliantly critical piece of work, provocative and challenging, and leaves us wondering how long the claim of an absolute authority, articulate, visible, audible, and disciplinarily tangible, will whisper menacingly or seductively at the ear, before Mr Hanson will be compelled to shrink back a little or make the last irrevocable self-committal. For truer than "no bishops, no dean" is "no living authority, no dogma"; and the authority of all authorities is always the *auctoritas interpretiva*.

Principal Franks, on "Dogma in Protestant Scholasticism," has written a searching and really profound study. It is a sympathetic and much-needed exposition of the better mind of the Reformers, and it leaves at least one reader lamenting the intellectual decadence of the modern inheritors of that once rich and aristocratic estate—inheritors who too often seem, now that P. T. Forsyth is gone, to have nothing to tell us about Protestantism except its popular journalism which secures the applause of only the secular and disintegrating interests of our day.

Dr Claude Jenkins, on "The Decline of Dogma and the Anti-dogmatic Movement," gives us a sparkling yet illuminating discussion of the Encyclopedists, Deists and others of that clan. He too, like Mr Hanson, has a cultivated palate for irony and satire. One could wish, however, that he had broadened his historical survey to include the non-, rather than the anti-, dogmatic movement represented in its more mature aspects by Richard Baxter, the moderate episcopalians of the Commonwealth and Restoration periods, and the non-subscribing Presbyterians of the catholic school of churchmanship before they petered out in a Unitarian sect. As the editor remarks: "The reader may be conscious of a gap between Dr Jenkins and Dr Relton." May we beg the editor in a second edition to include an additional chapter covering this other very important field of history?

Dr Relton, in the last chapter on "The Reconstruction of Dogma," struggles valiantly, like Laocoon, with writhing and overwhelming difficulties. He is frank and honest in his description of the difficulties that confront him, and only rarely gives the impression that here and there he has to hedge a little in order not to break too decisively with some of his colleagues. This essay would, we venture to suggest, be

improved by some pruning and compressing. We make this suggestion with deep respect as being of those who are much indebted to Dr Relton's *Study in Christology* and other writings, and as admiring greatly his appreciation of the need of boldness in readjusting dogma to the demands of modern thought.

The book as a whole leaves us with a deepened sense of the tactical and strategical advantages of Rome over Canterbury whenever Anglo-Catholicism is driven to shelter behind dogma and "authority," while well aware that it has no court of appeal to declare the living judgment of that authority, except indeed the Living Spirit which is open no less to every free and evangelical Catholic, and exposes us all alike to the charge of subjective experience and arbitrary interpretation. There remains only one other genuinely objective authority which ideally might be but actually is not, namely, the *consensus communis* of competent Christians as such. And that, in the face of the disciplined and well-equipped armies of Rome, presents to-day the pathetic spectacle of a very ragged regiment. How long shall it be before this is recognised and non-Roman but Catholic-minded Christians, pressed by the desperate urgency, come together in a genuinely united and alternative Catholic Church?

J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

THE OLD MEETING CHURCH,
BIRMINGHAM.

Problems of Providence. By Rev. Charles J. Shebbeare, M.A. (Anglican Library of Faith and Thought).—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929.—Pp. vi + 120.—2s. 6d. and 4s. net.

MR SHEBBEARE'S book is one of a series intended for the educated layman, which has been begun at the suggestion of the Literature Committee of the English Church Union. This fact may tend to hinder the recognition of the importance of Mr Shebbeare's book. Little books in series for intelligent laymen are frequently nothing more than statements of positions and conclusions already familiar to the expert, and it is perhaps in general a counsel of wisdom never to read little books. I have to say at once that *Problems of Providence* is an exception to this rule. It is an original contribution to philosophical theology which deserves the serious attention of every student of the subject, adorned with copious and various learning, and in tone and sobriety of judgment not unworthy to come from the rectory which was once inhabited by Bishop Butler.

Mr Shebbeare protests in his preface against the contempt into which "natural theology" has fallen, and avows himself an "enthusiast for a rationalist theology." The theology of religious experience is not rejected by our author, and indeed he quotes with approval Professor Cook Wilson's saying, "We don't want merely inferred friends. Could we possibly be satisfied with an inferred God?" But he holds very strongly that experience is not enough. We need

a rational conception of God and His relation with the world. The centre of the problem of rational theology is the doctrine of a special providence, and it is to this that the book is mainly devoted. Modern theologians, it must be confessed, have generally left this question in obscurity, and there is a disposition to emphasise the active element in religion, that of co-operation with the Divine Will, at the expense of the passive element which trusts in the sovereign power of that Will.

The problem of evil is naturally the first difficulty to be encountered in the development of a doctrine of providence. The distinction between evil which is directly willed by God and that which is only permitted is not one which Mr Shebbeare can accept, if I interpret him aright. He will not allow that the creation may have departed in any real sense from the Divine plan. Nevertheless, he will not agree with Lotze that the problem of evil is insoluble. Though in detail we cannot show the justification of any particular evil, yet in principle we have in the Christian faith a sufficient answer. "The Christian solution, stated in a sentence, is that only in the conquest of great evil can the rational will come to its highest good: that therefore a world devoid of great evils would be devoid also of the noblest activity which our world exhibits. The world would not be the richer, but the poorer, without its Calvaries and Gethsemanes." It is not quite clear whether Mr Shebbeare's theology involves the conception of some future state, a "glory which shall be revealed," in comparison with which the "sufferings of this present time" are not worthy of consideration. Probably in the end he would find the justification of evil not in the future, but in the whole. It is on points such as this that we should welcome some clear statement of his attitude towards such an idealism as that of Bosanquet.

We have not space to follow Mr Shebbeare through the whole of his argument. His suggestive chapters on the teleological view of the world are worthy of attention, though he has not allowed himself sufficient room to work out the full theme. The main point of the book is the conception of the universe which it defends. It is very like that of Leibniz. The faith which Mr Shebbeare presents to us is an "ultimate optimism," and the world, though the phrase is not used, "the best of all possible worlds." Leibniz was, however, hampered in his optimistic faith by the orthodox doctrine of the final perdition of a large part of the human race. Mr Shebbeare has a wider hope. The following sentences give an excellent idea of his position on this subject. "If we draw the more obvious conclusions from certain Pauline texts—if we hold that God not only wills all men to be saved, but also works all things after the counsel of His will—if, further, from St Paul's conception of the body with many members (each indispensable) we pass to his even profounder thought that we are all members one of another, we shall see the whole with all its variety become the good of each. From this Universalist—and at the same time Individualistic—standpoint the common complaints that Providence 'cannot possibly do equal justice to everybody'

would be seen to fall to their proper level. The Cæsar Borgias and the Judas Iscariots—those who have at long last been won back from the furthest wanderings—will not complain that their lot has been ‘unfair,’ if they regard those very wanderings as a necessary part in the perfection of the whole, of which all equally are in the end partakers.”

Mr Shebbeare has no difficulty in showing that the common objection against the kind of determinism which is involved in the doctrine of special providence—that it would destroy moral action and responsibility—is based largely on misunderstanding. The well-known discussion of Sidgwick might have been mentioned in connection with this problem.

The present writer must confess that in spite of Mr Shebbeare’s persuasive presentation of the case, he cannot accept the full doctrine of special providence. The New Testament data are not so decisively on the side of predestination as is suggested. I cannot agree that the sayings of Jesus about the sparrow and the hairs of the head indicate a doctrine of the complete predetermination of all events. But the chief difficulty which I feel is concerned with the doctrine of God and His relation with the world. Mr Shebbeare’s predestination is not that of Calvin or Augustine, because his God is not a purely transcendent Creator. On the contrary, it is not easy to see how He is distinguishable from the world. “The Universe which can satisfy religion on both its sides,” writes the author, “must be at once as necessary as Fate and as personal as we are ourselves. To that ultimate power by which all things are what they are, we must be able to speak as to a Friend.” We feel a curiosity to know in what sense the word Universe is used, and how, if at all, it is distinguished from God. The idea of creation again appears to be in need of further definition.

There is a fundamental paradox involved in religion at its highest. As Mr Shebbeare points out, the call to active co-operation, to “come to the help of the Lord,” is no less inherent in the religious experience than rest upon the eternal Will. We cannot finally reconcile these two elements, nor can we abandon either. I cannot think that this book has entirely succeeded in reconciling this essential active moment of religion with a thoroughgoing doctrine of special providence. This does not detract from the value of the work, which is a distinguished and stimulating discussion of some of the most difficult problems of theology. The candour of the author in stating both sides is as conspicuous as the ability with which he presents his argument.

W. R. MATTHEWS.

KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON.

Vision and Authority. By John W. Oman, M.A., D.D.—Hodder and Stoughton, 1928.—Pp. 352. New and revised edition.

IN 1902, when this book was originally published, Dr Oman was minister of a small church in a Northumbrian country town, and the

story then went that it was based on week-night addresses to his congregation there. In the new and revised edition he gives this amount of countenance to the story, that he speaks of the form of the book as having been determined by the necessity of explaining himself to ordinary people, among whom he appears to have met with an encouraging degree of response. The discernment, however, which prompted that response was apparently shared by only a narrow circle of readers, who perceived in the book an outstanding contribution to religious thought and valued their copy as a precious possession, for no second edition was called for, and the work has for a number of years been out of print. In the interval Dr Oman has passed on to the headship of a theological college, and has acquired for himself a place among the definitely original thinkers of our time. The reissue of this his earliest work is, therefore, a welcome event.

The author tells us in the Preface, to the first edition, that in commencing the work he had no thought beyond the more practical issues of the ecclesiastical situation as it then was, but that it had grown to be an inquiry into the foundations on which all Churches rest. Even with this wider aim it might have been expected that such a work would "date"; but, in spite of the fact that there has been no material alteration either in the thought or the presentation of it, the subject-matter of the book is as relevant to the religious situation of to-day as it was to that of a quarter of a century ago.

The central problem now, as then, is that of authority in religion. With so general a shaking of the foundations, affecting man's thoughts of the world he lives in, his own dignity as a moral and spiritual being, the validity of religion in general and of Christianity in particular, no firm footing seems to be left on which to wage the unchanging conflict with the world, the devil and the flesh. Yet, the need for such authority as will put a bridle on man's passions continues as of old, for only by submission to the stern control of some right and noble personal convictions, by the acknowledgment of something imperative because it is great, can the interests of man's higher life be sustained. And that authority must be such as to demand no mere external obedience, but derive its absoluteness from the inner consent of the heart which obeys it.

Dr Oman proceeds with his inquiry as to the existence and the seat of this authority by, so to speak, turning the tables on those who use the conception of evolution to deery the dignity of man and by showing that what is of real significance in evolution is not its pathway but its product. What he sees to be evolving in humanity is a new order of freedom in which man is governed not by mechanical law, but by his own insight; and in such an order no religion can have any place which looks upon man as only to be determined by outward authority and ordinances. On the other hand, frail though the foundation may seem, in personal insight into truth and consciousness of right an authority is to be found which is an adequate support and stay even amid the infinities of time and space. For such spiritual vision, no less individual than physical vision though it must be, is as

little as the latter a merely individualistic possession, shutting each man up in a world of his own fancy, but is a faculty of truth and a principle of unity whereby each sees for himself that which is only truth because it is truth for all. With the trembling of the delicate optic nerve as his sole guidance, "man marches more confidently through life than if he were guided by a fellow-mortal or even led by the hand of an angel; spiritual insight, in its degree, is a like authority and confers a like security."

The thesis of the book is thus the grounding of religious authority upon the spiritual vision of man, made in the image of God and, therefore, capable of receiving His revelation. Dr Oman never uses the words "subjective" and "objective"; but he is always aware of the dangers of subjectivity, and still more of possible objectors who will accuse him of that vice, and the great body of his argument is directed, not only to relieving the latter of their fears, but to showing that those interests of truth and stability which they seek to conserve can only truly be safeguarded along the lines he himself lays down. In this latter regard, the book performs a signal service, revealing the essential scepticism of those who, impatient of the slow method of freedom which is God's own appointment and contemptuous of so fallible a guide as personal insight, would introduce into the sphere of faith so worldly a device as an external authority, with its close-knit organisation and its divinely-guaranteed dogmatic tradition.

Consistently with his main thesis, Dr Oman has in view throughout the plain man rather than the theologian or ecclesiastic, for his book may be described as an attempt to show why it is that the things that are hid from the wise and prudent may be received by babes. In both matter and style, the book conforms to the author's own dictum that "religious thinking ought to face ordinary religious life, and it ought, as far as possible, to be expressed in ordinary language."

G. K. MACBEAN.

PENRITH.

The Faith of the Future. A Short Study in Religious Evolution. By James Henry Tuckwell. ("The Faiths" Series.) London: Methuen & Co., 1929.—Pp. xiv + 201.—5s. net.

THE thesis of this book is that the essential element in religion is desire for union with God; that hitherto the desire has, as a rule, had a dualistic basis, a great gulf having been fixed in human thought between nature and the Supernatural, between earth and Heaven, between man and God; that in the future the basis of the desire will be monistic, in the sense that men will realise that the union which they desire has already been potentially accomplished, God being no other than the ideal self of man; and that it rests with each of us to make the union effective by living to his higher self.

The typical example of a religion which meets and undertakes to satisfy the desire for union with the supernatural God is, of course, Catholicism. The secret of the attraction of Catholicism for the

average man is, according to Mr Tuckwell, the Mass. This is no doubt one of the secrets. But there are others. There is the offer of mental repose, of spiritual direction, of the "clean slate," of "safety" to those who do not aim at "perfection." But behind all these offers, behind the offer of union with God in and through the mystery of the Mass, behind the appeal to the heart of the Crucified Christ and the Mother and Babe, is the uncompromising dualism which is characteristic of Catholic philosophy, theology, policy and practice. And because Catholicism is dualistic to the core, what it offers with one hand it takes back with the other. If it gratifies a pantheistic craving, the desire for union with God, in the Mass, it does so, one might almost say, without realising what it is doing. For pantheism, as a philosophy, is as abhorrent to it to-day as it was when it sent Giordano Bruno to the stake; and the God who gives His own being to His worshippers in the Mass is yet "distinct really and in essence" from the world, and admits man to union with himself only through His chosen Church, whose priests are alone privileged to transform the bread and wine of the Eucharist into the Body and Blood of Christ.

A dualistic response to the craving for union with God will not permanently content mankind. The constant tendency of dualism is to infect religion, on the one hand with a spirit of superstition and belief in magic, on the other hand with a spirit of separatism, intolerance and exclusiveness. For both these reasons it may safely be predicted that sooner or later Catholicism will lose its hold on the heart of man. Mr Tuckwell emphasises the former reason. I feel inclined to emphasise the latter.

Mr Tuckwell's name for the Ultimate Reality which is at once the real self of the Universe and the ideal self of man is Reason. "The Rational is the Real." . . . "To be rational is the distinguishing attribute of man." Therefore "Reason is itself the essence of the nature of God." . . . "The faith of the future will assert the implicit but real divinity of man by virtue of his rational nature." I cannot think that the word Reason either goes to the heart of Reality or adequately sums it up. It is true that our author distinguishes reason from the "discursive intellect." But the idea of intellectuality clings to his conception of Reason. Towards the end of his book he "ventures to assert" that "religion is essentially a metaphysical experience," and, again, that "the experience of union with God is pantheistic and metaphysical." Now, metaphysics has been defined by an eminent metaphysician as "the intellectual attempt to understand the Universe." If this definition is correct—and it would, I think, be accepted by most metaphysicians—man's experience of God must be an intellectual experience, and the "Reason," which is at once subject and object in the experience, must be predominatingly intellectual.

But is it? The great secrets of Reality have been the spiritual mystics. Were their experiences intellectual, or even metaphysical, if that is the more appropriate term? Was St Catherine of Genoa's love of God as Love metaphysical? Is the passion of personal love

metaphysical? Is delight in the glories of a sunset metaphysical? Is the response of the soul to beautiful music metaphysical? In each of these cases the union of subject with object, the experience of reality, is surely emotional, not intellectual.

That man's experience of the Ultimate Reality which men call God, and which our author calls Reason, can be spoken of as metaphysical, points to a serious defect in the connotation of his favourite word. What does he mean by Reason? He means, I presume, self-conscious mind, the self which is aware of itself and is, therefore, able to look before and after, to reflect on its own experiences, to take counsel with itself, to order its own goings. But surely the name for this is Spirit rather than Reason. Desire and Will are essential elements in the being of man. There is no place in Reason for either of these. In Spirit there is room for both.

The distinction between Reason and Spirit becomes all-important when we ask ourselves a question which imperatively demands an answer: How will the faith of the future express itself in action, in the conduct of life? Faith without works is dead. The faith which does not of inner necessity overflow into life and express itself in conduct does not rise above the level of mere belief. Morality, in the widest sense of the word, begins and ends in obedience to the two great Commandments as formulated by Christ, the command to love God with the whole of one's being, and to love one's neighbour as oneself. Mr Tuckwell finds a metaphysical basis for the life of love in the pantheistic identity of man with God, and through God with his fellow-men. But the "real" (as distinguished from the "notional") basis of the life of love is other than metaphysical. It is man's instinctive desire for God and his instinctive sympathy with and affection for his fellow-men. The identity of man with God, and through God with his fellow-men, is a potential identity which has to be realised. The chief obstacle to its realisation is *selfishness*—the assertiveness and the claimfulness of the lower self. To overcome this obstacle demands an age-long effort, carried on, one may believe, from life to life and from plane to plane. Self-transcendence through self-loss is the ideal way of life which the pantheistic quest of the Ideal Self prescribes. And self-transcendence through self-loss begins, as it ends, in *Love*.

In more than one passage Mr Tuckwell couples the Stoics with Plato as exponents of the essential divinity of man. This is not the impression of Stoicism which its accredited interpreters, such as Professor Gilbert Murray, have given me. So far as Stoicism was pantheistic the basis of its pantheism was materialistic. It identified the physical world with "the Universe." It deified the material Cosmos in its unity and totality. And it approached the soul of man from without instead of from within. It bade man accept the Cosmos and do its will, by fulfilling his own characteristic function; but it never answered the question which Plato and the Vedantists answered in terms of the higher Pantheism—What is the characteristic function of man as man? To say that God's will for me is

that I should do God's will is to leave me without guidance, except on the assumption—which Stoicism never countenanced—that God has kindled a lamp in my soul.

That the sublime faith of the Vedanta in the essential oneness of Man and Nature and God will be a vital element in the religion of the future is a belief, or at least a hope, which I for one share with the author of this book. And if I cannot go with him in his deification of Reason, I can at least thank him for having tried to rescue the religious thought of the West from its present state of bewilderment, confusion and apathy, by directing its vision towards the Higher Pantheism which is at the heart of the "Wisdom of the East"; in other words, by calling upon it to transcend the fatal dualism of Nature and the Supernatural. It is possible, as he suggests, that in the New Thought and Mind-cure movement in the United States we are witnessing the dawn of the happier day to which he looks forward. But surely there was an earlier foreglow of it in the "Inward Light" of the Quakers, a light which has guided them so effectively that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that, as a community, they are almost the only Christians who try to live up to their religious convictions.

As we pass, along the path of self-transcendence, more and more fully into the light of the coming day, we shall begin to realise, each for himself, what the great Mystics, in all lands and ages, have learned by direct personal experience, that, not as a mere figure of speech, but "really and in essence," God is Love.

EDMOND HOLMES.

LONDON.

Kant's Conception of God. A Critical Exposition of its Metaphysical Development, together with a Translation of the *Nova Dilucidatio*. By F. E. England, M.A., Ph.D., with a Foreword by Professor G. Dawes Hicks.—London: Allen and Unwin, 1929.—Pp. 252.—10s. 6d. net.

THIS is a scholarly work showing much ability, though not without certain defects which somewhat impair its usefulness. The book seems to me, on the whole, "to fall between two stools" (if the use of this colloquialism be allowed), that is, it is neither full enough adequately to meet the needs of the professional philosopher and research student, nor elementary enough for the ordinary student, although it does give evidence that the author is capable of producing a book which would adequately fulfil either of these two functions. This is not to say that it does not contain many valuable suggestions, and it is well worth the consideration of anybody who is interested in Kant's conception of God on the metaphysical side. Professor Dawes Hicks says in the Foreword that "during many years Dr England has been assiduously devoting himself to a minute study of the writings of Kant and of the huge literature that has gathered round them," and much that the author has to say is very

illuminating, *e.g.*, his account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments and of the transcendental deduction, his attempt to base Kant's belief in immortality on the conception of a systematic unity of ends, and the last chapter in general. In other passages, however, the style is condensed to and at times beyond the verge of obscurity, and there are a certain number of statements as to Kant's teaching which are either actual errors, or, at the best, phrased in such a way as to convey a wrong impression to readers. For example, on p. 89 n., the author speaks as if he were unaware or had forgotten that Kant identified the principle of substance as applied to appearances with the principle of conservation of matter, and that in the *Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Science* Kant claims to give an *a priori* proof that action and reaction are always equal. On p. 91 it is said to be an essential position of Kant's philosophy that "the categories are not products of thought, nor does their function in knowledge in the least resemble that of the concepts of general logic." But how can this be reconciled with the fact that Kant attempts to guarantee the list of categories by deducing them from the conceptions of formal logic on the ground that the activity of the self is one and the same in judging and in synthesising appearances, or with his insistence that the categories come from the understanding and are simply logical principles applied to appearances? Also the author's attack on Kant's view that the categories are prior to the particular experiences which fall under them, on the ground that in experience we first notice the particular and then only arrive at the universal by abstraction, involves a confusion between temporal and logical priority (p. 111). There are also some rather surprising omissions, *e.g.*, the neglect to give any account of the important discussion of the problem of laws of nature and design in the *Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, and the small space devoted to Kant's criticism of the traditional proofs of God; and the book obscures the great significance of the *Inaugural Dissertation* as first laying down the doctrine that space and time are only appearances, not reality. Chapter I, which deals with Kant's predecessors, should include some reference to Hume; what the author tells us here leaves the fact that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not only a revolt against rationalism, but a defence against scepticism totally unintelligible. Many of these defects would no doubt have been removed if the author had found it possible to expand the book so as to deal a little less briefly with the great number of questions raised.

The main object of the work is to show that Kant's negative conclusions in regard to knowledge of God are not warranted by, or indeed consistent with, the main principles of his philosophy. The author holds that, since the only proof of the categories is that they are indispensable for our knowledge and for the organisation of experience, the same proof must be accepted as valid for the "Ideas," and especially the idea of God, and that although an inconsistent agnosticism prevents him from describing this as knowledge, Kant is really forced to admit the idea of God as an essential part of philo-

sophy alike by the contingency of phenomena, by the appearance of design in nature and by the consciousness of the moral law. Dr England, however, hardly succeeds in overthrowing Kant's main distinction between the categories and the Ideas, which is that the former are necessary if we are to have any knowledge at all, the latter only if our knowledge is to attain a completely systematic character for which we may hope, but which, since it is not necessarily presupposed in all our judgments, we cannot posit as a proved fact. But it is most important for an adequate understanding of Kant's work to realise also the more positive tendencies in his philosophy, and the important part which the idea of God plays for him, not indeed as a certain dogma, but as an object of well-justified belief, and this tendency is brought out very effectively and without much, if any, exaggeration.

To the book is appended a translation of the *Nova Dilucidatio*, Kant's earliest work on a metaphysical topic. The rendering is very clear and should be very useful, as there is no other English translation. There are a certain number of minor points, not worth mention here, to which I should take exception, but in general the translation fulfils its function accurately and effectively.

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Classical Studies. By G. M. Sargeaunt.—London: Chatto and Windus, 1929.—Pp. vii + 285.—7s. 6d. net.

MR SARGEAUNT is a true humanist, and these essays, three of which will be familiar to readers of the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, are a real contribution to the understanding of Greek life and thought, and the influences that have come directly or indirectly from them. It is a most welcome contribution, for after a good deal that has been written in recent years so fanciful in its interpretation of the Greek spirit as to lead us further away from the Greeks rather than back to them, it is pleasant to find so scholarly and so just a critic among those content to take an orthodox view. Here, at any rate, we may feel that right opinion is of the nature of understanding, and Mr Sargeaunt makes us feel at home with the Greeks, if only that we may feel too at the end how little at home we are. He is surely right in emphasising the individual character of the Greek ideal. We do not understand a fifth-century B.C. Athenian by making him out a twentieth-century A.D. Londoner, and Mr Sargeaunt makes us appreciate how different from the Greek is that which has come from the Greek in the Roman and modern world; he writes that "the classical world and all that recalled it, was essentially romantic to the mind of the Renaissance," and so, we might add, in a sense, it has been ever since with regard, at any rate, to the Greek world. It is something which in essence remains apart. How little we get of the essentially Greek spirit in translations and in imitations of the Greek; how little do those who have been most inspired by the Greeks con-

vince us of their inspiration. Perhaps only Swinburne, of modern poets, does give us this impression. There is in that extraordinary genius something that makes him at times an echo of Greek poetry ; it is an instinct at once for economy and perfection of utterance. There are lines in *Poems and Ballads* and in *Atalanta in Calydon* where it would be hardly fanciful to say that Sophocles has taken the pen out of his hand, and Swinburne stands apart from modern poets as they do from the Greek.

All this may seem to be taking us away from Mr Sargeaunt, but it may bring us back to him. It is that love of the beautiful with economy ; to quote the famous saying of Thucydides (though, probably, unfortunately resting on a false reading), that ideal of an ordered perfection which provides him with his theme in his interpretation of many aspects of Greek life ; as he writes, for instance, of the Parthenon : " There in a form into which no element of the unknown or infinite intruded, whose limits were defined and imposed by itself, the mind recognised something entirely good and fair, in which it could rest satisfied, freed from the accidents and incalculable forces by which actual life was disturbed." And, again : " We might call the Athenian way of life in the fifth century B.C. the gospel of the finite. The Athenians followed out that gospel with a seriousness and energy of which the splendour of their manifold achievements is the measure. Its failure has proved that the finite is not enough for man to live by."

The reader who reads one of these essays will want to read all, but particular attention may be called to " an aspect of education in Plato's laws," a particularly clear and interesting piece of interpretation, to the slighter but charming essay on Winckelmann in Rome, and to that entitled *The Imperial Legend in Suetonius*. " We must be grateful to him (Suetonius)," Mr Sargeaunt writes, " for many things ; grateful for those unique descriptions of the personal appearance and way of life of the emperors ; grateful for the many *obiter dicta* which he has preserved, examples of the shrewd wit, the sound judgment, the grim and sometimes brutal humour so characteristic of the Romans, which never deserted even the feeblest or the maddest of the Twelve Cæsars."

This leads to a reflection, to the justice of which Mr Sargeaunt would perhaps subscribe. The Greek ideal is something set apart, " all a wonder and a wild desire." The Roman is nearer to us ; wherever we go we tread Roman ground. And as with the qualities, so is it with the defects of the qualities of these two great peoples. Our impression of the Greeks, at least of the fifth-century Athenians, is that of a people living at a high pressure, the life of the Florentines of George Eliot's *Romola*. They were what we would describe as a " nervy " people, and there is something abnormal and atavistic in their reactions. Our impression must be coloured by the way the story is told by the historians, but when we contrast what Thucydides and Xenophon tell us of the Greeks in time of revolution with the tales of Tacitus and Suetonius of times of terror at Rome, we feel that the Roman may have been more brutal and more often brutal

than the Greek, but that somehow he was more humanly brutal and always something of a gentleman.

LAWRENCE SOLOMON.

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Love in the New Testament. By James Moffatt, D.D., D.Litt., LL.D., Washburn Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary, New York.—Hodder and Stoughton, 1929.—Pp. xv + 333.—10s. 6d. net.

CHRISTIANITY is so frequently described as the religion of love that it becomes increasingly necessary to ask what is meant by this estimate, especially as "love" is such an indeterminate word. In taking up this question in *Love in the New Testament*, Dr Moffatt has accomplished a much-needed task. His main contention is that the love of God is revealed "not in His being, but in His purpose; in His attitude and action towards men," and that the God of the New Testament "is a God who has revealed Himself through Jesus Christ His Son in self-sacrificing love for the sake of life to His own on earth." He argues that the term "love" in its application to God has frequently been profaned, and that for this reason it is timely to examine the classical New Testament standards. Too often a statement like "God is love" is separated from its Biblical context, and "brotherly love" is isolated and treated as if in itself it constituted the essence of Christianity. "No one who is acquainted with the history of the Church will hesitate to affirm that 'love' has covered much loose thinking and also much loose living on the part of the devout who have sung or shouted 'I love God' and been idle or worse in their behaviour" (p. 8f).

In some respects the full Introduction is the most interesting part of this scholarly work. The Christian conception of love is contrasted with the "cool estimate dropped by pre-Christian Greek philosophy," and a sympathetic discussion is given to the nearest analogy of Christian love in the development of "bhakti" in Hinduism. As might be expected, Dr Moffatt treats in detail the words and the linguistic peculiarities of the Biblical usage; the use of "hesed" ("love" or "loving-kindness" rather than "mercy"); the failure of the New Testament to use a word like *ἔρως*, which, while capable of including higher impulses, was too frequently identified with desire; the deliberate preference shown for *ἀγάπη*, which in the Latin versions finds its counterpart in the preference for *dilectio* and *caritas*, to the practical exclusion of *amor*. Like the late Archbishop Bernard, he holds that *φιλέω* and *ἀγαπάω* are synonyms, and that it is fanciful to infer any fine distinction between them, as if the former meant no more than "be a friend to," and the latter denoted the higher love of devotion. He points out that in the New Testament "love" is one or other of three things—God's love to man, man's love to God, and man's love to his fellow-man; and that the data are handled in this order. This concise summary omits ideas like the Father's Love for the Son, and the ideal of Perfect Love, or Christian Perfection as it has sometimes unhappily been called. Both these topics receive

attention under one or other of the principal divisions, but under this arrangement the latter scarcely obtains the treatment it deserves by reason of its place in the New Testament and in Catholic, Quaker and Methodist writings.

In discussing the New Testament evidence, the teaching of Jesus, as recorded in the synoptic tradition, is naturally considered first. Dr Moffatt at once notes the reserve of Jesus in applying love-language to the relations of God and man. Jesus does not speak directly of God as Love, or as loving men, but rather assumes these truths when He speaks of God as Father and as the inspiration and exemplar of love. This is a characteristic New Testament note; re-echoed, for example, in the reluctance of not a few in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to use Charles Wesley's hymn, "Jesus, Lover of My Soul," which Bishop Wordsworth even thought "inexpressibly shocking" for use by a mixed audience in Westminster Abbey. A particularly burning question is raised by Dr Moffatt's claim that "for Jesus" God is "the Father of those who share his fellowship, not of all men generally," and while it is not to be doubted that this represents one side of the truth, the statement seems much too sweeping. Did not Jesus speak of the Father who makes His sun to rise on the evil and the good (Matt. v, 45), who is kind toward the unthankful and evil (Luke vi, 35), and whose heart is revealed in the Parable of the Lost Son (Luke xv)? In contrast with the "reserve" just mentioned, the teaching of Jesus upon mutual love is richer, and Dr Moffatt fully brings out its character in his illuminating discussion of the Golden Rule, of the significance of loving one's neighbour and one's enemies, and of brotherly love as a religious duty.

In discussing Pauline teaching, Dr Moffatt stresses the Apostle's concentration upon the proof of God's love afforded by redemption. For Paul, "redemption is no longer a supernatural crisis at the end of the national drama, but a deliverance of the human soul already inaugurated by God in the triumph of Jesus Christ over the allied powers of Sin and Death, which, like demonic forces, have invaded the world of men" (p. 134). A detailed exposition follows of the three classical passages, Gal. ii, 20, 2 Cor. v, 14, and Rom. v, 8. The divine love, he reminds us, is self-sacrifice, but a self-sacrifice which is based on urgent necessity. It has for its assumption the fact that man is "in evil case," and the belief that "even God cannot forgive sin without showing His moral integrity, and that therefore Christ had to die, Christ the sinless" (p. 140). What this means Dr Moffatt does not tell us, and perhaps we ought not to expect him to do so in a work which is not intended to be a discussion of the meaning of the Atonement. In any case, he succeeds in bringing home to us the depth and power of Paul's convictions and the determinative influence they exercise in all he says and does. It is especially interesting to note in this part of his task the use which Dr Moffatt makes of Ephesians, in view of his rejection of the Pauline authorship of this Epistle in the now famous *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (3rd ed., 1918). "I take even the epistle to the Ephesians within this group of writings, for, while it may not have been written

by the apostle, it voices an attitude which, for our purpose, is sufficiently close to his mind to be called Pauline " (p. 57).

The account of the apparently scanty references to love for God or Christ receives a satisfying explanation in the contention that, while Jesus Christ inspired primitive Christians with far more than mere awe and reverence, " at the same time their love and devotion were charged with a sense of him as their lord (κύριος), which imposed an instinctive check upon the use of ordinary love-language." " The very depth of their devotion appears to have made them generally reticent about employing such terms " (p. 161). In contrast with this, the abundant examples of the way in which love to God manifests itself in love to fellow-Christians is striking; and to this theme Dr Moffatt devotes a valuable chapter in which among other passages he discusses Paul's great " Hymn of Praise to Love " (1 Cor. xiii), and shows how the emphasis on brotherly love proved a safeguard against ascetic developments, mystical extravagances and mere intellectualism.

The third part of Dr Moffatt's work treats the same themes as they are illustrated in the literature of the primitive Church, in the Epistles of Peter, Judas, James, Hebrews and the Acts. In the fourth part the Johannine literature is examined. Here, for the first time, we read that " God is love " (1 John iv, 16); but here, again, it is no pervasive love-principle in the universe that is in question, but a love visible in the Person and Mission of Christ, a love which evokes a natural response in the soul of man enlisting mind and will in the carrying out of God's commandments (1 John v, 3). The admirable treatment of brotherly love and its relation to belief, unity, and fear is based for the most part on the Epistles, and we wonder why more attention is not given in Section III of Part D to the teaching found in the Farewell Discourse in the Gospel. But perhaps it is ungenerous to ask for more when so much is richly given.

Love in the New Testament is both a manual of exposition and a work of devotion. Based upon the text of the *Moffatt New Testament*, the exegesis is supported by apt quotations from, and references to, writers of all schools and types, ranging from Plato, Epictetus, Philo, Dante, à Kempis, and many of the Mystics on the one hand, to Dostoieffsky, George Eliot, and Dora Greenwell among more recent writers, and including even a reference to the modern evangelist, Jerry McAulay. It is not possible to read this scholarly exposition without learning the secret of the confidence with which the first Christians faced the world. This confidence—so Dr Moffatt reminds us—rests on definite belief in a revelation made by God. " There is no notion of brotherly love being a fine intuition or ideal, deduced from observation of human nature, or generated by earnest souls striving to keep themselves warm in a chilly universe. On the contrary, a valid belief in God is presupposed, not simply in the unity of God, nor even in His unwavering will of good, but in His manifestation through Jesus Christ " (p. 316).

VINCENT TAYLOR.

History and Cartulary of Carbone. By Gertrude Robinson, M.A., late Scholar of Girton College, Cambridge. (*Orientalia Christiana*, vol. xi 5 and vol. xv 2, May 1928 and June 1929.)

THESE two instalments form an interesting contribution to a little-known field of Monasticism, the Greek monasteries of Southern Italy. The convent of Carbone, near Bari, was probably founded somewhere about 790 A.D., as one of a group built in that mountainous district during the barbarian invasions. It was already important when the Norman, Robert Guiscard, became ruler of Southern Italy in 1059; and these Norman conquerors greatly increased its prosperity. They heaped privileges and endowments upon it, and raised these Greek monks, with their Greek rite of worship, to the level of the great Benedictine monasteries of Italy. Like many others, it suffered heavily and repeatedly from fire; twice at least it was burnt down (1174 and 1463). Miss Robinson traces its decay from about 1200 onwards. These Greek monasteries in Italy became isolated and therefore stagnant; the monks gradually forgot the language in which they chanted their liturgy; there was no enduring result from the successive attempts to reform (Empress Constance about 1200; Pope Honorius III. in 1221; Urban V. in 1362; Eugenius IV. about 1440; Cardinal Bessarion about 1470). In 1477 the abbey fell under the then growing abuse of *commendam*; the title and income were given as a sinecure to a series of favourites who allowed the monks a bare livelihood and plundered the abbey. "They filched all that was valuable in the way of pictures or manuscripts; the monastery buildings and churches went to ruin; the offices and ceremonies could not be kept up for want of vestments and books; the monks starved and were forced to go from place to place begging for sustenance." By about 1500, there were only four monks in the abbey; the numbers once rose to nine, but had sunk again to three before the French armies occupied the country and suppressed the abbey (1809).

This, after all, is a too common story, and can be too often paralleled from every country in Europe. The second instalment of Miss Robinson's work gives us some 150 pages from the Chartulary, with English translations of the Greek documents. In general, it resembles a French or German or English chartulary; but there are three peculiarities. In the earlier days property was given to, held by, and passed on to successors by the abbots in person, in order to avoid the mortmain laws: thus, it was not that the abbot was supported from the general monastic funds, but rather that the whole monastery lived from his purse. Secondly, when we come to the period where endowments were given in the ordinary way, the descriptions of the bounds of these properties are extremely picturesque, in the glimpses they give us of rugged country broken by occasional vineyard-terraces. Thirdly, the grisly curses usually pronounced on all who should violate the donor's testamentary dispositions take, in these documents, a peculiarly Greek form; these sinners are not only to have their lot with Gehazi and Judas, as in

our northern countries, but also "to lie under the anathema and curse of the 318 Holy Fathers"—i.e. of all the bishops who attended the Council of Nicæa, and whose souls were therefore presumed to have special influence in heaven.

G. G. COULTON.

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Spinoza. By Leon Roth, M.A., D.Phil., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jerusalem. ("Leaders of Philosophy" Series.)—London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1929.—Pp. xvi + 250.—12s. 6d. net.

Leibniz. By Herbert Wildon Carr, D.Litt., LL.D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. ("Leaders of Philosophy" Series.)—London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1929.—Pp. vi + 220.—12s. 6d. net.

THESE two volumes are the first to be published in a new series of monographs entitled "Leaders of Philosophy," under the general editorship of Professor J. L. Stocks. There can be no doubt that such a series is needed, and that both Spinoza and Leibniz are philosophers to whose works a general introduction is especially valuable. For different reasons a first reading of the *Ethics* of Spinoza, or of the *Monadology* of Leibniz, is likely to lead the student into serious difficulties. The central thought of Spinoza is difficult to grasp, and its nature is obscured by his adoption of the geometrical method of exposition in his best known work. Leibniz' voluminous writings, his casual manner of expounding his metaphysical views, and the extreme condensation of his systematic exposition of his theory, as given in the *Monadology* or in the *Principles of Nature and of Grace*, have rendered the apprehension of his theory quite unnecessarily difficult. In the case of both these philosophers, great help may be obtained from a careful study of their correspondence with friends and critics. This correspondence is not, however, always easily accessible to the student, whilst much labour must sometimes be expended if the relevant passages are to be found. It is a great merit of both these monographs that extensive quotations from letters have been made in such manner as to throw light upon obscure points of interpretation. Professor Roth and Professor Carr have adopted very different methods of exposition, but they have each succeeded in writing a very readable book, which is likely to fulfil the purpose of sending the student to the study of the original.

Professor Roth has set himself to expound the central thought of Spinoza as it appears in "the whole compass of his writings." Consequently, "every opportunity has been taken of listening to Spinoza himself," whilst "the criticisms which have been introduced are mainly those which were made in his own lifetime and to which replies can be found in his own works." There can be little doubt that this is a sound method of exposition in the case of a philosopher such as Spinoza. In a previously published work, *Spinoza, Descartes*

and *Maimonides*, Professor Roth has discussed Spinoza's relation to Cartesianism, and has shown, conclusively in the opinion of the present reviewer, how wide of the truth was Leibniz' statement that "Spinoza did nothing but cultivate certain seeds of Descartes's philosophy." In this book he is content to let Spinoza speak for himself. He insists from the outset that Spinoza is "primarily a moralist," and that he "came to philosophy from the problem of conduct." Professor Roth admits that at first sight it would seem that "the first part of the *Ethics* has nothing to do with morals at all," but he shows not only that it has, but also that "if this point be appreciated the central peculiarity of Spinoza's outlook is grasped." It is no small part of Professor Roth's achievement that he enables the student to appreciate this point. He develops this central position by means of relevant quotations both from the *Ethics* and from Spinoza's other writings. This development cannot be followed here. It is safe to say that there is no other book in English so admirably fitted to introduce the student to a systematic study of Spinoza's thought.

Professor Carr has written a set of more or less disconnected essays dealing with Leibniz' life and times, with the historical background, with his scientific contemporaries, with his debt to other thinkers and with his influence upon the future. These essays are interesting, but they do not succeed in presenting a clear exposition of Leibniz' doctrine. Professor Carr's treatment seems primarily designed to establish his final estimate of Leibniz' philosophy in relation to modern developments in physical science. Hence the exposition is controlled by a preconceived theory as to the significance of Leibniz' system. Thus Professor Carr says: "The two metaphysical principles which lie at the basis of physical science in its new orientation are identical with the two principles of Leibniz, although we cannot claim for Leibniz that he had any preconception of the actual course of scientific development." Again: "In expounding Leibniz' doctrine of space and time, we have already had occasion to call attention to the remarkable way in which it anticipates the modern relativity principle. What is more remarkable is the way in which the principle of individuality and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles find their complete exemplification in the modern scientific principle." Professor Carr does not show *how* these principles are exemplified in the principle of relativity, but he maintains that Leibniz indicated "the true view of idealism" and that "the modern world has adopted his view." In the opinion of the present reviewer, Professor Carr's interpretation of Leibniz' philosophy is based upon a misconception of the significance of Einstein's theory of relativity, whilst his preoccupation with the latter has to some extent distorted his view of the former. It is to be regretted that Professor Carr has not paid more attention to the gradual development of Leibniz' own views, for this development throws considerable light upon the conception of the *Monad*.

† Both volumes are supplied with an adequate bibliography and an index.

L. S. STEBBING.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL



RUSSIAN COMMUNISM AS A NEW RELIGION.¹

THE European is little acquainted with the Russian form of Communism; in the most favourable case he knows its external features only, the features which are officially paraded before him and expounded to him, and which form, as it were, the scientific basis of the movement. Nor has the average European much knowledge even of the European species of Communism, which, speaking generally, differs greatly from the Russian, and is on the whole incommensurable with it. Meanwhile for the historian and the ethnologist, and indeed for every thinker, the study of this phenomenon, which has played such a great part in the life of Europe during recent years, is of serious importance. It is my purpose in this article to give an objective and impartial sketch of the physiognomy of Russian Communism.

Russian Communism is not at all what it intended to be, as taught and even practised by Lenin, and it has long ceased to resemble the literary exposition of it; it is not a branch of the Marxian scientific and materialistic idea of sociology, on which it is supposed to be based. The complex

¹ Written in Russian and translated for the HIBBERT JOURNAL. For obvious reasons the name of the writer has to be withheld—Editor.

and capricious reaction of these ideas, or more often of their echoes ; the refraction of the simplified agitational forms of them in the still virgin psychology of the mass of the Russian people ; the immemorial Russian mysticism, not yet exhausted, and certainly inconceivable to the European ; the possibility of belief in some stable and superhuman authority—all this, together with the elementary style of Russian life, which still persists, produced something to which we might perhaps deny harmoniousness and solidity, but which is manifestly alive and growing. And with it we have to reckon.

Russian Communism is a genuine religion, with all the indications and methods, with all the merits and defects, of a religion. The complex of agitational slogans flung at the Russian masses has been refracted as a new religious sense. Of course this creed was embraced by an inconsiderable number only, by the more primitive, proselytised minds, who sought an active combination of religious thought with a practical, organised form of life. But, it may be asked, what can this religion be, seeing that it is based on a materialistic conception of the world, and that the Marxism of the Russian Communist is at war with God and religion, which it regards as "an opiate for the people" ?

To this I reply that this hostility to God and existing religions only proves the religious nature of the new idea, and its religious construction, if I may so express it. The essence of every religion is exclusiveness, intolerance, a refusal to accept the religious views held by others. The scientific thinker—whether atheist, materialist, deist, or an adherent of other philosophical doctrines—is never aggressive, nor endeavours to destroy and discredit by every means the opinions which he himself does not hold. He adopts a pacific attitude towards all this ; in him there is nothing of the proselyte's pathos, nor can there be—he seeks the truth, but does not believe in it. Communism, which attacks other religions, is not this objective, scientific outlook, sure of its methods—in it there is the pathos which convinces us of its religious nature.

But how can we have a religion without a God ? Well, we know many of them. The Oriental creeds, such as Confucianism, or the later, typical Buddhism, are essentially "godless." The idea of a personal, partly anthropomorphic Deity is Semitico-Syrian and arose in the Mediterranean countries. The pure form of Confucianism is as "godless" as pure materialism, perhaps more so, as Confucianism is not

interested in the corporeal, causative structure of the world. Russian Communism is no exception in this instance. It is worth noting that, though it sprang from the materialism of Western Europe, from a scientific outlook on the world, it assumes the typical features of the religions of the Far East. The seed of European civilisation, when grown in other soils, produces forms of thought and religion suggestive of the products of those soils, and unlike those of the original source.

Russian Communism sprang from the soil of materialism. Similarly, Christianity itself grew from the Greek and Syrian culture, from a vast, age-long civilisation in the throes of death. The seed fell on virgin soil and gave life to new cultures. That soil was not Palestine and Syria—"the cradle of Christianity"—as might be supposed, but Europe, which was its real cradle. The seeds of a religion do not, as a rule, complete their growth in their original soil, and Christianity, born in Palestine, came to fruition in distant Europe, where it created its culture. Mohammedanism, originated in the deserts of Arabia, bore its fruit on the Asiatic continent and in Northern Africa. The germ of the Russian Communist religion came from the brain of Karl Marx, the European Jew, and perhaps he least of all gave any thought to the "religious" consequences of his theory. But the fruits were borne in the wide spaces of Russia, amongst a virgin people, still almost untouched by culture, for only in such nations can religions arise.

In its early days religious thought is usually abstract and moralistic. It does not concern itself with theogonies and cosmogonies, nor indulge in scientific perspectives; its task is to throw a new light on morals. Mysticism, ritualism, mythology, and even the reconciliation of religion and science, are the business of later generations. We know that primitive Christianity was without the dogmatics created in the Syrian period and reflecting all the ancient and typical mystical profundity of thought of the magician soul of the Syro-Arab; nor had it any connection with scientific thought, since in the obscure, proletarian, ochlocratic sphere in which it made its appearance it was never in contact with scientific questions. It was an ignorant sphere. Nor had it any ritual, which did not come into existence until the second and third centuries. Buddhism was originally a pure, moral doctrine of individual self-perfection, and its scientific aspect, and its mystics and ritual enter into it many centuries afterwards, as the inevitable expression of the artistic instinct. Mohammedanism was for nearly two centuries a

moral doctrine pure and simple, and a minimum of ceremonial was observed, whilst science was put entirely out of bounds. I will not multiply examples, which are as numerous as the religions themselves. I will only say that Communism is passing through the characteristic phases of religious thought, and with a rapidity corresponding to the accelerated tempo of modern life.

It originated as a typical moral teaching, as a derivative of the ancient Christian philanthropic idea. Its primary theme, like that of any form of socialism, has an astonishing resemblance to the old leitmotiv of Christianity—the religion of the oppressed, of the proletariat. The persecution of the Christians by the Roman Empire was dictated by the clashing of class interests far more than by the difference of religious views: Imperial Rome, expiring in its age-long culture, was, of course—as is typical of a dying culture—“majestically” sceptical in its religious opinions, and was least of all inclined to attach any importance to religious thought. The interests of Rome, as the interests of the ruling class of agrarian oligarchs, came into collision with those of the town and village proletariat, and the persecution of the Christians was not a strife of religious opinions, but a class struggle.

Communism came into the world as the moral doctrine of the oppressed, nevertheless its meaning is to a certain extent opposed to the moral signification of Christianity. The moral centre of Christianity lies in a humble attitude to the hostile natural process. The kingdom of this world is declared to be the kingdom of evil, and by way of compensation the idea of a heavenly kingdom is introduced, the kingdom of the oppressed who are defrauded in this life.

Christianity is therefore the typical religion of the downtrodden class, which expects consolation but has not the strength to rebel. Communism, born under other conditions, is also the religion of the persecuted, but in this case they rise against their enslavers and will not submit. It is the religion of revolt and its morals are the morals of revolt. Therein consists its resemblance to Islam, its unlikeness to the religions of non-resistance—Christianity and Buddhism. The Mohammedan idea of a holy war is repeated in the idea of a civil war against the oppressing class, which is the moral basis of the religion of the Commune. It, too, is a holy war, but in the first stages of development its opponent, the “class enemy,” has no racial characteristics. Early Christianity was, of course, the international religion of the poor

and suffering, so to speak. Islam was at first the religion of the nomad Arab tribes. It was not until later that both acquired national features. Communism passes rapidly through the religious stages, and we have seen in our time the formation of a substantial national kernel of this idea—the religion of the Russian proletariat. All the cruelty and exclusiveness, all the racial intolerance generally characteristic of national religions, have not as yet become part of Russian Communism, but they will certainly do so, and we already see symptoms of them in the growth of Anti-Semitism.

The famous commandments enjoined by the Communist moral code, the holy war declared on the bourgeoisie, the injunction to “spoil the spoilers,” and other formulæ—all this was in the first place included in the religions of former times. Two codes of morals—one for the faithful and the other for the infidel—were characteristic of the Greeks, of the Jews particularly, and, above all, of Islam. This two-sided morality even breaks through the general philanthropic tone of the Christian faith, in the sectarian wars and the internecine strife of the Reformation. Every creed becomes embittered when it acts on base racial instincts and the feelings of the mob.

This religion is completely lacking in mysticism. Again I assert that for the moment we can speak of its embryonic stage only, analogous to the Christianity of the first centuries, before mysticism was evolved. I do not think that the mystical method of reasoning was quite foreign to Communism; on the contrary, I see more data for it here than, for example, in Protestantism. As a rule, the potential of mysticism decreases in proportion to the lateness of the appearance of religious forms; the Egyptian religion, the Syrian cults, Christianity, Islam, Protestantism—in all this the mystical “method of thought” shows a falling curve as it were. It would not be at all surprising if the Communist religion proved even less capable of mystical thought, nor would this fact alter its religious nature.

In what does the religious nature of Communism consist? First of all in its fundamental prerequisites. The religious method is primarily belief—belief in something unconditional, absolutely correct and true, belief in revealed truth. All religions are marked by this feeling, be they atheistic, theistic, materialistic, or idealistic, national or international. Science never knows the truth, it only tries to learn it; to science doubt is always permissible—it is the core of knowledge, which usually begins with doubt. The religious man

has no right to doubt. Science knows very well that empiricism is the only method of obtaining relatively accurate results ; anything else is merely a working hypothesis. Religion always has the idea of the possession of immutable truth, and this very feeling provokes proselytism, mania and fanaticism, and intolerance of those who are not infected with that truth. And it is characteristic of religion in its embryonic stages that it is very little concerned to have proofs of its creed. It was the Middle Ages that occupied itself with the question of proofs of the existence of God and the truth of dogma ; the early Christians, like the contemporary Communists, cannot doubt the genuineness of that in which they have once believed with all the ardour of their youthful souls. The rewarding of every man according to his deeds, and the existence of a future Kingdom of Heaven, anticipated by Christians, cannot conceivably be proved by reasoning, and there are no grounds for the Communist's inference that a Communist earthly paradise is possible. The outlines of the latter are as vague, as unconvincing, and as little comprehensible as the early Christian's dreams of the Heavenly Kingdom, or the Mohammedan's conception of paradise with its houris. Every religion, no matter what human material it works with, inevitably adapts its ideal, its eschatological centre, to the comprehension of its adherents. The "ordering of mankind" expected by the Jew and the Christian is postponed until the other life ; in Islam its features were more earthly, real and prosaic ; the previous "heavenly kingdom" of the Communist displays a definite tendency to transplant itself to earth.

The first attacks of religious proselytism are usually lacking in judgment and purely emotional. These are infected by the microbe of faith, they do not reason at all—in fact they are incapable of doing so. Of the evidence put before them they accept only the more or less incoherent proofs—nobody is interested in their coherence—of that which they have already believed once and for all. The logical and practical facts of life deal shrewd blows at their inward beliefs, but this does not disconcert them. The primitive Christian was confident that the second coming of Christ to judge men, *i.e.* the oppressors, was at hand. Outside this hope it is difficult to imagine the possibility of the development of Christianity. The Kingdom of God gradually receded into the distance, beyond the bounds of time, and later, with the influx of the ancient Syrian mysticism which produced the amazingly profound and powerful phenomenon

of Gnosis, it became esoteric and mystical. Communists still hold the idea of a socialistic paradise in this transient world, but when it fails to materialise in this generation I cannot guarantee that it will not be transferred to the misty depths of the ages, and become an abstract dream of the future, a pure eschatology.

The idea of recompense existing in the religions of the oppressed draws a sharp line of demarcation between them and the transcendental creeds, such as Buddhism or Confucianism, or the ancient beliefs. The persecuted class threatens with its curse or revenge the persecuting class. It enters into an alliance with a mystical Deity, or with a mere abstraction of morals and belief in world-justice. Christianity held out to sinners and persecutors the terrors of the Last Judgment; Islam menaced the infidel with a holy war; Communism proclaims a world-revolution, a sort of Last Judgment of the proletariat on the bourgeoisie of the world.

This world-revolution, like the Second Coming or the Last Judgment, was at first expected from moment to moment. The earliest apostles of Communism believed as clearly and passionately in the prompt fulfilment of their hopes as did the early Christians. But years, decades, centuries passed, and the Saviour did not come. The Last Judgment became a mathematical concept. The world-conflagration refuses to be realised, and it also is postponed, perhaps for ever.

It might be thought that herein lies the ruin of the Communist creed. A belief in personal survival after death could save the eschatological idea, could reconcile man to the removal of the Kingdom of Heaven and its attributes to an infinitely remote point in the world's history. But how is the Communist, deprived of belief in a future state, a materialist perforce, by the dogma of his creed—how is he to find a substitute for the vanishing dream, and reconcile his sorrowful and fleeting existence with the disappearance of the mirage of eternity?

Logically it is impossible, but, as I have already remarked, in the embryonic stages of thought of every kind very little attention is paid to logic, and its belated appearance is not an occasion for much lamentation. We have evidence of this. Roman heroism—the “antique” virtue of the Roman—was also illogical; its possessor sacrificed his life to the idea of the state, to the idea of pride of race, without any notion of personal immortality. Modern Japan supplies

another example of this "political" heroism, coupled with very little belief in survival after death. During the period of militant Communism in Russia a great many Communists, who also disbelieved profoundly and fanatically in a future life, sacrificed themselves. One idea inspired the heroism of the Roman, the valour of the Japanese, and the self-sacrifice of the Communist and the man of science—the idea of posthumous fame and of being participators in great deeds.

Heroism, however, cannot go on for ever; the heroic era may be brief, and it is followed by a lowering of the potential. In contemporary Russia the era ended with the civil war, and the Communist is no longer a conspicuous hero. The religion of Communism has become an everyday affair, and as the Communist's earthly paradise has been postponed, he is now engaged solely in preparing for the future; the contours of his religion have been and are being altered. And again I would point out that in this respect Communism does not differ from the historical creeds.

Has not historical Christianity changed? What had the Byzantine Christianity with its splendid ritual, its learning and its mysticism, in common with the religion of the humble fishermen who expected from the Saviour an actual, ordinary "salvation," and the establishment of peace on earth and justice for the oppressed? Nothing, save that both are different stages of the same phenomenon. And has the typical feudal, militant bishop of the Middle Ages—"*bonus miles optimusque pastor*"—any resemblance to the character of the primitive religion of universal forgiveness and non-resistance to evil? Who can say that a similar distortion of ideas in the religion of Communism, a similar adaptation of it to the modes of life, will not soon be evident? Or that we shall not see, *à la* "*bonus miles optimusque pastor*," some respected and very wealthy man who is at the same time an excellent Communist? I will go further—they are already appearing; very rich Communists have arrived—perhaps too soon. . . .

If we consider the genesis of Russian Communism, we shall perceive a further resemblance to the outlines of religious thought. I refer to the primitiveness of the slogans, which are as "lapidary" and as suited to the popular comprehension as the catchwords of the ancient creeds. Religions are always born in a society possessed of little culture; their first adherents are always "fishermen"—in a metaphorical sense, of course. Philosophers do not found religions; in the best case they only develop and

deepen them. None of the great founders of religions was a philosopher; they were "teachers." What was "Christianity," as a philosophical doctrine, to the proud Greek sage of that period? Certain provincial, amateur ravings, displaying ignorance and lack of culture. Nevertheless, this ignorance conquered the world, which it was destined to conquer. We Europeans, proud of our culture, are often inclined to treat with scorn and condescension the phenomenon of Russian Communism. With the majestic and contemptuous smile of old Pontius Pilate we are ready to ask the adherent of the new religion: "What is truth?" confident that he does not know the answer. But the fact is, he does know it; at least, to him it is the answer. Christ knew the answer, though He was silent, and the Russian Communists know it too.

To the haughty Roman patrician, proud of his culture—his authority and the might of to-day—what was this pitiful provincial, this semi-savage Jew, this madman who spoke incomprehensible and almost meaningless words? With the same feeling of perplexed superiority the cultured European world passes by the strange phenomenon which has appeared in the east, the remote province, of Europe. The analogy is full of tragedy: in both cases we have a "branch of culture"; a country which is associated with, but has not wholly accepted, culture; the incomprehensible psychology of the race; the obscure forces fermenting in the souls of the people. . . . A strange and seemingly wild school of thought arises, a whimsical refraction, as it were, of the ideas of Western culture—for Communism, as Europeans rightly tell me, is a European idea. But Christianity was equally a phenomenon of the Greek culture. Again there is no difference. Did Pilate imagine that this singular stranger, whom he was reluctantly compelled to crucify lest unpleasantness of a political character should ensue (how like this is to the contemporary position with regard to the Communists!)—did he imagine that he would infect with his spirit and his "provincial" madness proud Rome herself, and even, *horribile dictu*, the whole of Europe, the whole world? Well, some strange Russian, a semi-Asiatic or Mongol, brought from Europe the seed of knowledge, and in his Mongol brain it developed a curious blossom, incomprehensible to those who had originally produced it. And cast into the soil of distant Russia—semi-Europe, semi-Asia—it suddenly brings forth a plant. What will be the fate of that plant? Is it true that it

is doomed to destruction? Is it true that European culture is immune from this "microbe"? Rome, of course, also thought herself immune. History often gives us unpleasant surprises. And the most unpleasant thing about them is their inevitableness. It did not matter what Rome thought—she could do nothing to stop the spread of Christianity.

In most cases the founders of religions are average men, not geniuses by any means, nor at all prominent. It is not a question of genius or talent, but of the crowning of a series of transactions predetermined by history. It is necessary to be an "historical medium," to listen to the "song of history" within oneself. Mediums are often downright idiots, and it is better so, as they then pay more attention to what they ought to hear and less to the voice of reason. Lenin was a medium of history; to what extent, it is too early to say.

Possibly he was sincere in thinking that his teaching was radically positivist and scientific. A simple-minded man, he did not know that ideas falling on different soils undergo various transformations. He brought from Europe a positivist, scientific confidence in such and such an organisation of the economic process of the world. It is true there was already an element of fanaticism and therefore of religion, in it—and these qualities are, as a rule, neither scientific nor positive. But least of all he felt himself to be a religious pioneer. And then the unexpected happens: slogans are scattered broadcast, and instead of the anticipated scientific doctrine there arises a strange religion, breathing of the forces of barbarism—the religion of a new generation of the oppressed. The feeble vestiges of science are submerged in the flood, which fills everything with the typical religious substance, with its methods, its intensity of faith, its incapability of conviction.

Therefore a new code of morals makes its appearance, a new religious core, and around it the other attributes of religion spring up. Logic and inference, unconvincing to the believer, are rapidly replaced by the only form of argument acceptable to him—the appeal to the recognised authorities. In modern Communist Russia this method has long supplanted the positive testimony of science. The "Holy Scriptures" in the form of writings of Marx and Lenin, the epistles of these or the other "holy fathers" and "apostles," the works and opinions of prominent Communists, become the sources of opinion, exactly reproducing the scholastic period of the religious thought of Christianity, when authority

also reigned. Marx was the Aristotle of the movement, and the rôles of the saints are played by Communists of distinguished merit. Through a strange misconception, this is known in Russia as the "dialectical" method, whereby its genesis is recalled; just as the Christian doctrines often kept the Old Testament in mind.

The new religion promptly engages in conflict with scientific thought, not to mention religious thought. The idea of a Communistic science is created—a proletarian science, a proletarian art. This is inevitable if the religion has vitality. Every religion is the beginning of a new culture, and no new culture comes into existence without its own characteristic religion. And the first period of a culture is always painted in religious tones. The early Christian art and science were religious and necessarily "Christian." The early Moorish art and science were "Islamic," and could not be otherwise. If a new religion is really a religion it must create its own art and science. It creates them, and perishes in the process.

Everything at variance with dogma is rejected; everything that accords with it receives consideration, supplying the original contours of the new logical thought. Moreover, the inevitable and indispensable obscurantism arises. At this period of the contact of the new religion with the remnants of the old culture or civilisation, dogma makes its appearance and consolidates itself, and together with it the idea of heresy springs up. In the Christian Church heresies began from the moment when religion entered into political life. They were nothing but the result of the reaction of dogma and belief on the scientific values already created. Defending itself from the heritage of the old scientific thought which enveloped the new religion, the heritage of the previous culture, religion surrounds itself with an impenetrable and immovable husk of dogma, hiding behind it as behind a fortress wall. The Communist creed has reached this stage already, thanks to the rapid rate of its evolution.

Heresies and dogmas—these connected "relative" concepts—it has. The famous conflict of the "opposition," and the exile of the heresiarch Trotsky compel the historian to smile with the sarcastic smile of omniscience. The Communist religion has its nonconformists and its separated churches. Simultaneously, thought, following the laws of its development, stumbles on the idea of an artistic shaping of life, or, in other words, the idea of ceremonial or ritual.

Already it is created—this ceremonial or ritual. Already processions of Communists march through Moscow ; already heretics are cursed in some places and extolled in others, until the vigilant eye of the victors compels silence by the cruel means characteristic of the early period of the religious consciousness. Already emblems and badges have appeared, and the ikons of the fathers of the Communist Church adorn the clubs—those temples of the new religion. Already there are preachers and apostles (agitators), who are sent abroad into all lands to preach the new Gospel and seek new adepts. Christianity, born in Palestine, reaped its harvest in Europe, foreign to it in race and climate. Where will be the harvest of the new religion ? Will Russia continue to accept it, or will it find adepts in other climes and amongst other races ? It is difficult to say.

Already the deification of the actors in the early period has begun. The founders of a religion always become mythical beings to the next generation, thanks to the exceptional piety which grows up around their names. Lenin is now a legend, like "Judas" Trotsky, the first heresiarch of the new creed, who, as often happens with heresiarchs, may be nearer to the fountain-head in his convictions. Compromise usually gains the day, just as in the European world state Christianity prevailed. The very same thing is to be seen in Russian Communism. The line of compromise is victorious. Its opponents are denounced as heretics.

Deification gives rise to the idea of eternity, which is generally wanting in the earlier religions. When the founder dies, his death provides a reason for the erection of a Pantheon, or the establishment of an Olympus for the new deities. A tomb or sarcophagus appears, and "imperishable relics." The act of worship begins, preceded, imperceptibly to the faithful themselves, by a new belief that their deceased leader or prophet still lives in some other sphere. All this, too, actually exists : we have the mausoleum of Lenin—that Moscow parody of the Egyptian pyramid, that stone of the Kaaba in the Communist Mecca—and in it rest the relics of the founder of the Religion, the first prophet, and, perhaps, deity.

From what has been said it will be evident that the evolution of the Communist faith is quite unlike the evolution of scientific or political knowledge, whereas it is identical with that of religion. It seems strange, therefore, that little attention has been paid to this phenomenon.

This religion has been in existence for not more than ten

years, but it has already passed through the phases of three or four centuries of the Christian faith. Many suppose that the Russian people were forced to become Communists, that it is not their religion, that they have no Communist convictions, and that all this was imposed upon them by fear—that they were terrorised. I want to show that this preconceived conviction, widespread in Russian emigrant circles, has no foundation whatever.

The whole of the people, of course, were not captured by this teaching, but only an insignificant portion of them, and amongst the latter, as amongst the early Christians, there were many insincere adherents, who were prompted, not by faith, but by the motive of gain. This does not affect the question. There does exist a nucleus of those who believe absolutely, with all the power of an elemental temperament, who listen to no arguments of reason. An active centre of such a kind is sufficient to secure the effectiveness of a religion. When a religion becomes a political force it degenerates and is transformed, but at the same time it acquires the possibility of extending its form and conquering new souls. The heroic period of Christianity ended with its recognition as a state religion; after that, the Christian state, which had little general resemblance to the original "community," propagated and consolidated religion. People were drawn into it from various considerations, but whatever the reason, once they were involved in the orbit of this cultural force they remained there and could not break away. And the most important thing in the future is the growth and education of new generations in these new ideas. Christianity was strengthened when it became the creed of the youthful generations born in it. Moral inertia, of course, prevents a man from abandoning a once acknowledged and innate religion. The thinkers are always fewer than the human herd—and from the herd the cadres of passive adepts of religion are made up. The Communist religion already has its new generation, thinking in terms of Communism, with a logical organisation of thought quite incomprehensible to us, with an unfamiliar view of the reductions of logic; but, again, to the historian it is a well-known picture—the early Middle Ages, with its system of compulsory conversion, threats, and repressions by the ruling church; with its careful attention to the education of the young in the spirit of religion. I do not think that the Communism of the youthful, pioneer generation of Communists was that of the "holy fathers," of Lenin or Bukharin,

but in any case it constitutes a specific outlook on the world, unlike the European view and foreign to it. And it forms a growing and expanding force, since into it are drawn the classes which had not previously tasted culture. Every religion catches souls—Communism has already caught more than a few.

Thus we have before us all the signs of the birth of a new religion, and consequently—since every religion creates its own culture—the birth of a new culture, manifestly non-European. But every culture has usually had a new race to carry it on. Where, then, is this new race?

So far we have the Russians. But this still proves nothing. The fact is, the early stages of a religion are usually spent amongst races other than those with whom its culture is destined to be developed. The Russians may be only the recipients of this new creed, just as the Jews were of Christianity, and its future may prove to lie elsewhere.

The Russians have a culture of their own, a branch of the European culture. This, of course, makes us doubt whether the Communist religion is theirs. It is most probable that the new creed will not be developed here. A race already possessing a fully expanded culture of its own rarely creates once more a new scheme of life. On the other hand, it is possible that what is called Russian culture actually applied to the upper stratum of the Russian people, and was created in the form and semblance of the European culture, and that the real Russia has not yet said its say. It may turn out that *this* is its new word, and that its own, real culture is not the European.

But, I repeat, this is unlikely. The Communist religion nowadays has a tendency to propagation amongst and infiltration into other races. It is an interesting fact that peoples and tribes untouched by culture appear to be the most sensitive to Communism. This again is analogous to what sometimes happened with other religions, especially with Christianity—it was not the older cultures, such as those of Rome and Syria, that yielded most readily to it, but the entirely new races of Northern Europe. The idea of Communism underlying this religion has an irresistible attraction for the primitive mind and sentiments. Usually, the man belonging to a race which is drawn into the circle of civilisation, but has not yet received culture, possesses a distinct sense of oppression, of his position as a pariah in the world. The religion of the oppressed acts on his “vindictive centres.” When we speak of the Communist religion we do

not, of course, have in view its original form, which sprang up in Russia on the cultural soil of Europe, nor do we think of it as in any way preserving many of the traits inherited from a previous culture. The Communism of the future may become a powerfully developed religion, with a fine assortment of various deities and prophets; it may lose once for all the features of the atavistic Marxism which Russian Communism still possesses. It may acquire the outlines of mysticism, in which it is at present deficient. In a word, it may become as unlike contemporary Communism as modern Christianity is unlike the original. And its keen propaganda will instinctively and inevitably be directed at peoples who have not been drawn into this orbit of civilisation.

There are many such. Ancient Rome, which slumbered majestically in the twilight of her culture, surrounded by numerous and terrible European tribes of whom she was ignorant, resembles modern Europe, who also dozes in the glitter of her civilisation, outwardly the mistress of the world and unobservant of her increasingly hostile environment. The European world is, of course, a little handful amidst an ocean of peoples, some tenth part of the human race. I repeat that the situation is tragically like that of Rome. The new religion is directed to the masses of these very peoples, and it is just from thence that it threatens the mighty edifice of European civilisation. Europe is tranquil, relying on her military power. What to her are the savage races, the 300 millions in Africa, as many in India, the 500 millions in China? I should just like to say that it is unfortunate that historians pay very little attention to the vast rôle which the Christians at one time played in the Roman Army—a rôle which undoubtedly diminished and almost destroyed that army's power of resistance. The twilight of European culture is near; it is approaching the accomplishment of its allotted span. Where are its successors, to whom it will hand over the domination of the world which has belonged to it for nearly 2,000 years? I do not wish to appear unduly pessimistic—but Imperial Rome on the eve of her fall was likewise apparently indestructible. The twilight of culture steals on imperceptibly. In the darkness of bygone ages millions of new barbarians drew near to the stern fortresses of Rome, and somewhere in the depths of Asia a new religion was prepared for them, which afterwards became their creed. The situation is again tragically similar—there are the barbarians and their masses, and a ready-made

religion which has already begun its activity and its infiltration. It remains to await events.

It must not be imagined that I have in view the protection of European culture from conquest by the new religion. Nothing of the kind : if this religion is destined to begin a new era, nothing can stop its victory ; just as no power was able to stay the downfall of Rome and the growth of Europe. Resistance is futile. In me there speaks only the historian, who foresees the near future on the basis of analogy.

A DEHUMANISED SCIENCE OF MAN.

THOMAS BROWNE.

ANTHROPOLOGY has assumed a name to which it has lost the right. *Nihil humanum a se alienum putare* should be its motto, but it has handed over nineteen-twentieths of its subject to other sciences and sunk into a mere branch of comparative physiology. The economy would not greatly matter had it been attended by a corresponding self-effacement, but so far from confessing its limitations a study which stands last in order of importance has arrogated the primacy and dictates conclusions based on an insignificant fraction of the evidence. Darwinism itself concedes that Evolution is the prerogative of psyche, for the struggle for existence whereby man is supposed to have attained his eminence was none the less purposive, that is psychic, because it was a struggle for self-preservation ; but anthropology relies on fossil bones and finds no place for psyche in its scheme. Man as he interests us, moreover, is differentiated from the ape, not by petty physical details, but by capacities and aptitudes whose high development in this one creature go wholly unexplained. The days are past when we could conceive of big brain and dexterous hand as waiting upon simian mentality until their owner thought of turning them to account. If function precedes structure, brain and hand were developed in response to an inner urge, and it follows that *Homo primigenius*, whatever he may have been, was quite unlike the animals in which no such craving is apparent. Had he not been inspired from the earliest beginning by some nobler instinct than mere self-preservation, he could never have risen above the simian level. He might have become a craftier, better-armed gorilla, deadlier in attack, more skilful in defence, but the desire to save his skin could never have taught him to turn against his nature and sublimate it into something higher.

Anthropology has forgotten to take account of the missing motive power, and indeed has overlooked nearly all the differences between man and ape ; among them this. The simian world is characterised by great physical dissimilarities united with practical psychic uniformity. Gorilla and gibbon, baboon and chimpanzee, belong to strongly contrasted species, all mutually infertile, but there is little to choose among them in point of intelligence or emotional capacity. They differ, no doubt, but the differences are relatively slight and as between members of the same species almost non-existent. Man, on the other hand, belongs to a single species whose stocks are all physiologically indistinguishable and inter-fertile, but whose various branches and individual members are divided from one another by enormous psychic disparities. Even children of the same parents may be utterly unlike in mind and disposition, while the gap between Asiatic and European, yet more between civilised and savage, is unbridgeable. Newton and Dick the black-fellow, Francis of Assisi and the Comte de Sade, would look very much alike on the dissecting table, but if the qualities for which we value or despise them could be made visible to our eyes, they would be seen to differ more widely than horse from tortoise or dog from snake. Mathematician and saint are distinguished from savage and pervert by the same inner superiority that makes man higher than the ape, and unless we can adhere to a now discredited philosophy, the disparities must be ascribed to inequalities of psychic evolution. In brief, Nature has worked on humanity in such wise as to produce a physical uniformity coupled with immeasurable differences of mind and character not only between race and race, but between man and man, and in this respect the human species is unique.

Taking humanity not as it may have been a million years ago but as it is to-day, we find the urge to self-betterment, an innate desire to rise in the scale of values, more or less present in every individual. Whatever his pursuit, art, philosophy, or science, exploration, industry, or pastime, man always wishes to excel, and the individual is esteemed among his fellows in proportion to his success, the more if success has been gained by dint of self-denial. This urge is intimately associated with Religion, source of all the ideals and all the virtues, including self-respect ; indeed, man knows no other stimulus excepting the instincts which slake themselves in animal indulgence. If it be the fact that he has risen out of apedom, Religion is the only known agency that could have

brought about the promotion. No ingenuity in satisfying physical necessities could have done it, for it is characteristic of the urge that it subordinates bodily to psychic advantage. An unremarked distinction may be noticed here. Using the verbs in their etymological meaning, it may be said that Science instructs but Religion educates. The one is indifferent to, but the other acutely interested in, personal development. Science seeks to master the environment, devoting her energies to easing the conditions of life, producing new conveniences, increasing means of communication, multiplying amusements, and perfecting weapons of destruction. But Religion cares nothing for comfort or convenience, teaching man to improve himself by mastering his passions and to serve his fellows in preference to himself. The one aims at conquering Nature, but the other at conquering human nature, and inasmuch as society depends on the subordination of personal to communal interests, it must be inferred that that which both "holds together" and "binds back" lies at the root of social life. We find accordingly that the earliest form of society was the religious community, and that the savages who exhibit the germs of Religion are those in whom social organisation has made the greatest progress.¹ Man is the religious animal *par excellence*, says Reinach—he owes all his moralities and sciences to Religion²; Hegel, Schelling, Max Muller, Bachhofer, and others reach the same conclusion. If so, it follows that man recedes towards the simian level in so far as he ceases to be religious. And an elementary knowledge of the facts will show that the lower races are distinguished from the ape not by differences of bone and muscle, but by the religious faculty, a *dunamis* of which no least trace can be discovered in the animal, but which governs every detail of savage life and thought.

Evidently, then, Religion is the specifically human differentia and should take precedence of all other factors in an anthropology which pretends to scientific rank. But the Victorian convinced himself that Religion is an affair of superstition and idle ceremonial, mistaking the outward expressions for the inward stimulus. The expressions were, and still are, supposed to have originated in spontaneous mass-production; a manifest impossibility. Emergence notwithstanding, you cannot get liquor out of an empty bottle. No gathering together of speechless multitudes could ever have evolved language, much less an assemblage of

¹ Frazer, *Golden Bough* (2nd edit.). i.. 72n.

² *Orpheus*, 34.

selfish savages a doctrine of self-denial. Religion itself was the condition precedent of the evolution. Not only so, but superficiality fails to realise that inspiration is an exclusively personal matter, no more to be derived from crowd imaginings than Napoleon's strategy from his army or Handel's oratorios from the audience. Creeds and moralities are inventions in the same sense as any other scheme of thought, and to suppose that they or any of them can have been spontaneous mass-products is to misconceive their very nature. They are rooted in *authority*, the sole compelling power that can enforce their acceptance or endow them with vitality, and the authority is always personal.¹ With rare exceptions every man who holds a religious belief has acquired it from some person, dead or living, of whose authority he feels assured ; with no exception at all, the history of a religion, wherever it is known, leads always back to personal authority. When, therefore, Sir J. G. Frazer writes that the great religious movements which have stirred humanity to its depths spring ultimately from the deliberate efforts of extraordinary minds and not from the blind unconscious co-operation of the multitude,² he mingles truth with false suggestion. What religious movement, great or small, has ever been known to spring from the blind unconscious co-operation of the multitude ? History records not one example, experience can offer none. As Reinach justly observes, " on ne peut guère concevoir l'essor d'une religion sans l'ascendant d'une volonté puissante, d'un génie comme Moïse, saint Paul, Mahomet." ³ A faith, however humble, connotes a founder as surely as a picture or poem connotes an artist or a poet, and why should we suppose that the inspiration which taught the Australian to believe in Daramulun or the Chono in Yerri Yupon was any whit less authoritative than that which revealed Jehovah to the Jew, or God the Father to the Christian ? All religions have sprung from extraordinary minds, and the logic which finds proof to the contrary in the fact that sometimes no memory of the founder has survived would equally persuade us that the Assyrian bas-reliefs are natural rock-formations because we do not know the names of their sculptors.

That every creed has had its founder is a truth more certain than any other in the whole range of sociology. In the case of civilised peoples it is guaranteed by history, tradition and experience, and among the backward races by

¹ νόμος καὶ βουλὴ πείθεσθαι ἑνός ; Heraclitus.

² *Op. cit.*, iv., 260n.

³ *Orpheus*, 280.

the yet more convincing testimony of their beliefs. Stupid, bestial, absorbed in the satisfaction of his appetites, the lower savage nevertheless amazes us, writes Lang, by the wealth of his metaphysical ideas.¹ His life is beset by superstitious terrors, but he knows that justice rules the earth and ascribes his miseries to his own wrong-doing. He can hardly count his own five fingers, but he analyses the soul into half a dozen different constituents and chatters of Emanation, Evolution, reincarnation, the divine mediator, the world-soul, the creative Word, the second death. Civilisation owes those ideas to men like Plato or St Paul, but savagery is supposed to have got them from a corroborree of witch-doctors! Philology brings similar incongruities to light. Speech "must have been" invented by the small band of anthropoids who chanced to cross the boundary between animalism and manhood; yet there are upwards of two hundred linguistic stocks, no two of which can be descended from a common parent. The more ape-like the man, the more primitive should be his language, but the vile Australian uses a complicated grammar with three genders, the Makuchi a tongue as flexible as Greek, while cultured and intelligent China has to be content with a crude monosyllabic idiom. Fact and theory everywhere conflict, but the nineteenth century was rejoicing in a new-found freedom, positivism was in the air, and Science was impatient for finality. So a not too well-informed ethnology invented its own kind of savage to suit its purposes, never doubting that hypothesis and evidence would presently agree.

Darwinism, too, easily confused with Evolution by the uneducated, sprang from the same impatience. Revolting against a literalist religion, Science declared that Matter alone was real and sense-evidence man's sole guide to truth. Mind was a mere by-product; growth, adaptation and the like were due to accident co-operating with blind law, man himself was a kind of monkey. Reason and evidence were alike ignored in this philosophy. On the one hand, consciousness, the court to which sense-evidence appeals, is the one inexpugnable fact for every human being, and no one outside Bedlam could hope to explain primary in terms of secondary. On the other hand, the common parent of the anthropoids was *ex hypothesi* older than any ape; therefore he could not have been an ape. Equally, he could not have been an ape if he was capable of begetting man. He was a creature in whom both man and ape were latent, and it

¹ *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, i., 94.

should have been apparent that those of his posterity from whom the human latency had disappeared were *ipso facto* proved degenerates. Logic compels the inference, embryology confirms it.¹ Further, the fact that no prehistoric or extant man can have descended from any prehistoric or extant ape, and *vice versa*, proves that the bifurcation took place at a much more distant date than anthropology supposes, and in conditions which make it impossible that any remains of the common ancestor can have survived. *Anthropoides primigenius*, in short, was a creature quite unlike any now on earth, possibly a kind of man, quite certainly not an ape. He or his near descendants were capable of difficult metaphysics and had a wonderful talent for inventing languages. Inspired moreover by a strange ambition to foster brain at the expense of belly,² they rebelled against the laws of jungle life and taught their children to practise self-denial, chastity and other irksome virtues. What very singular apes they must have been !

Culture comes second to Religion in the list of human differentiae, and here also the evidence has been misconstrued in deference to assumption. Lower man, it is supposed, rose gradually into higher man, and savagery through barbarism into civilisation, but that is all imaginary. Civilisation, says Tylor, is a plant more easily propagated than developed ; it would be more accurate to say that it is always propagated and never developed. Wherever the origin of a culture can be traced, it leads always back to antecedent culture, nor has the later phase always been an improvement on the earlier. There are many instances of civilisation lapsing into barbarism, but none of savagery rising unaided into civilisation, and degeneration is just as conspicuous as progress. It may be that savages once occupied the lands of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Ægean, but that does not prove that they were authors of the later culture—does not even raise a presumption, because the backward races are always static if not retrogressive. Moreover the savage, as we know him, cannot assimilate a higher culture than his own. He copies the vices of his teachers, but not their virtues ; he wilts and withers away before “ enlightenment ” like an orchid before

¹ G. F. Scott Elliot, *Prehistoric Man and His Story*, p. 80.

² The early development of the brain is the most distinctive feature of man's embryonic growth : W. H. Duckworth, *Prehistoric Man*, 7. And the brutal features of the ape's skull do not make their appearance till some time after birth : A. Keith, *Antiquity of Man*, 197. If these facts count for anything, they indicate that the common ancestor was a creature of high intelligence, some of whose descendants have lapsed into bestiality.


a bonfire ; he cannot even bear transplantation to a better environment.¹ The whole world over, there is not one sign or symptom of savagery, hardly even of barbarism, spontaneously undertaking an ascent towards civilisation, nor does any sane man expect that Shakespeares, Newtons and da Vincis will presently emerge from Papua or darkest Africa. Where the savage is, there he stays, no matter how sedulously the missionary inculcates the virtues of petticoat and trousers, and if enlightenment leaves him to himself, he is back again in cannibalism and witchcraft almost before the departing steamer is out of sight.

There is much misunderstanding about this subject. Culture of whatever degree is merely a name for the sum-total of racial or national self-expression, and self-expression, like heredity, is determined by the two factors of capacity and environment. If the factors are those of Borneo, the result is Papuan culture ; if those of France or England, French or English civilisation. The effort to impose Papuan culture on the Englishman or English culture on the Papuan is foredoomed to failure, and the fact receives ocular demonstration when the one exchanges his beads and necklaces for hat and collar, or the other his sober dress for savage finery. Apart from external interference, customs and beliefs, arts and handicrafts, social organisation and sanctions, are the natural product of land and people, just as leaves and flowers are the natural product of seed and soil.

But that is not to say that the ancestors of civilised peoples may not have passed through a state resembling that of savagery. They have certainly done so, but their savagery was distinguished from that of Veddah or Fuegian by the fact that they did not remain in it. It proves that the state from which Greek or Briton emerged at a certain period of his history is not to be judged by that of any extant savage. The nascent culture of the one was as different from the adult culture of the other as an English child from a full-grown Ojibbeway—as growth from stagnation. A group of Europeans set down upon a desert island and cut off from communication with the outer world would lapse into savagery in the fourth generation, but it would be a savagery quite unlike that of the Tasmanian, even though circumstances forced it to manufacture celts and scrapers. If the environment allowed it, their posterity would approximate towards

¹ Changed conditions of life, says Darwin, even though not in themselves injurious, seem to be the most potent of all causes of extinction among the lower races : *Descent of Man*, ch. vii.

civilisation within 1,000 years, whereas the lower savage has not advanced one step since the close of the Pleistocene. The career of every race follows the trajectory prescribed by talent and conditions. A simple diagram will explain our meaning :



The spaces between the dotted lines represent the lower culture (A), the middle culture (B), and the higher culture (C), and the curves are the respective trajectories of savage, barbarian and civilised societies. All start from and return to the zero points of birth and extinction, and near the beginning and the end may seem indistinguishable ; but the savage can never rise above the lower culture or the barbarian above the middle, whereas civilisable man passes quickly through those stages to his proper level. In just the same way individuals are divisible into bad, mediocre and good philosophers, mathematicians, chess-players, cricketers, golfers and so forth (with a special category for genius), each attaining his natural proficiency with no great effort and improving with practice up to a certain point, but never capable of rising into the class above him. As with the individual, so with the community.

Attractive in its simplicity, the progression from apedom to humanity through savagery and barbarism up to civilisation is not only unsupported by evidence, but transgresses the law which tells us that bodies will remain at rest or in motion in a straight line until compelled by force to change that state. What was the force that deflected the primordial anthropoid from the jungle to the city, or the savage from brute stupidity to civilised intelligence ? No such influence is visible in extant apes or extant savages, nor do the sustained and well-directed efforts of animal-trainers and missionaries suffice to bring about the desired advancement. Struggles for survival and natural selection were hardly likely to succeed where science and enthusiasm fail. Evolution must be rightly interpreted when applied to man. In

body the European is not one whit more complex than the Melanesian, and it is at least questionable whether he is more so in mind. The real distinction between them is that the European is more fully individuated, therefore more intellectual, less unstable, and better capable of organisation. Savagery, on the other hand, is more religious, more moral, and better capable of certain non-intellectual arts. Lower man and higher man, each has his appropriate culture, and the one is as little receptive of science and mathematics as the other of telepathy and *mana*.¹

Humanity, then, is broadly divisible into the two classes civilisable and non-civilisable, separated from each other by an impassable gulf. Such is the case at present, such also was the case in the prehistoric past. Wadjak man, bigger brained than the average European, dwelt cheek by jowl with *Pithecanthropus*; the splendid Aurignacian, a finer type than any now extant, with the brutal Neanderthalian, and if the anthropologist would date his fossils by the surroundings in which they are found, instead of forcing them into a prearranged sequence, other instances could be added.² Now the evolutionary status of an extinct people can only be gauged by its physical characteristics, especially cranial size and conformation, and by the material relics of its culture. Of these the first is the more important, because size and shape of head afford a sure index to capacity, whereas the material relics are at best uncertain. No attention is paid to certain immaterial relics, because it is not positively known that they were in the possession of Trinil or Cro-Magnon, but they have come down to us from the remotest past, and no society could have thrived without them. Postponing the detail for the moment, we may safely affirm that the culture of a people with large, well-shaped skulls cannot possibly have resembled that of a lower race with ill-shaped skulls, and the high artistic gifts of Aurignacia enforce the point. No doubt, if complex metaphysics and elaborate psycho-analyses are the natural products of stupidity, so also may have been the artistic gifts; but common sense will ask, who, if not his educated neighbour, taught the Neanderthalian to believe in survival of the soul? And who, if not Wadjak, or his race,

¹ The argument is reinforced by Professor B. Malinowski's admirable article in the new *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and Dr Raymond Firth's *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori*.

² The Calaveras skull, for example. The recent discovery of *Ameranthropoides Loyi* in Venezuela will revolutionise anthropological opinion on this and other subjects.

taught the bestial Australian to dream of androgynous human souls emanating in sanctity from the Self-existent ? ¹

Science, however, places the celts and scrapers first in order of importance, judging of prehistoric man by the physical relics he has left behind. That was not unreasonable, so long as we believed that nothing in creation was more than six thousand years old, but the test has grown ridiculous. Chipped flints are the most durable of human artifacts, shape, smallness and material making them almost indestructible. Twenty thousand years of neglect aided by a few minor cataclysms would obliterate all traces of our own great civilisation. Cathedrals and museums, battleships and motor cars, picture palaces and merry-go-rounds, all would crumble into dust, but the celts and scrapers would survive. Reconstructing our culture from those poor relics, along with a few cut gems, a gold ornament or two, and some bits of gingerbeer bottle, the ethnologist of A.D. 25,000 would find it vastly inferior to his own. It would never occur to him that where he used platinum perhaps, we used perishable steel ; just as it never occurs to our men of science that Asia (like Australia) may once have relied on wood instead of metal. Nor would his nascent science have had time to realise how swiftly Nature destroys man's handiwork, no matter how laboriously fashioned. Egypt did her utmost to construct a monument that should bear perpetual witness to her accomplishment, and nothing that Europe can create would endure one-tenth as long ; yet the Great Pyramid might vanish to-morrow in an earthquake. But again the celts and scrapers would survive, to convince the superficial that the world was in its infancy and civilisation a thing of yesterday.

Again, A.D. 25,000 might discover European skeletons side by side with those of Bushmen, all mixed up with the scrapers and bits of gingerbeer bottle. Both races would forthwith be credited with the same culture, and the Darwin of the time would declare that the lower type was certainly the older. It would not, and does not, follow from the evidence. Higher man is less massively constructed than ape or lower man, and solidity of bone points to evolutionary recency rather than antiquity ; for form was plastic in Eocene times, or felines, bovines, equines, simians and the rest could not have been moulded into their strongly contrasted species. Plastic means perishable, and the remains of the original mammals therefore were long since dissolved

¹ Spencer and Gillen, *The Arunta*, i. 358f.

away. As for man, Science cannot explain the differentiation into Aryan, Semite, Mongol, Australian, negro and other races, but the bony structure capable of such diversification was necessarily more malleable than it has since become, and if all are descended from a common stock, their common ancestor is never likely to be found. Yet anthropology looks forward to discovering the much more ancient progenitor of man and ape. Even modern bones soon disappear before the action of heat and moisture.¹ The fact is important to ethnology, because the ancient civilisations were all established in hot, well-watered countries where dissolution is as swift as growth, and only by design or happy accident can human remains even of moderate antiquity have escaped destruction in those regions. What do we know of the peoples that once inhabited Bengal and Burma, Florida and California, Rhodesia and the Congo? Nothing at all. Every year enlarges our time-scale and brings undreamt-of civilisations to light, but ethnology persists in tying itself down to the childish notions of an age that knew nothing of the Minoan and Mycenaean empires, the politics of Sumeria and the Indus Valley, or the great civilisations of Honduras and Yucatan. And what may not the future have in store?

Convention has decreed that civilisation came to the birth in the fifth millennium before our era, when Egypt, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, India, China and Central America all made a simultaneous leap, from the lower culture into the higher. A case of emergence, no doubt, but even so, the notion seems a little fantastic. Inquiry shows, in fact, that it has no better warrant than Bishop Usher's calculations; he prescribed the date and Science still bows to his authority. Men once thought otherwise. Egypt, it was said, had records reaching back to 470,000 B.C.; Hindu, Maya and other tradition speaks of human history in terms of several million years; do not those figures point to a less inadequate conception of our evolution than the pitiful little span conceded by the modern? Of course, 5,000 B.C. is only a symbol for unknown antiquity, but ethnology forgets the fact, and treats it as a verified dating. Again, we were assured not long ago that civilisation was synchronous with the invention of writing, an art supposed to have originated after the death of Homer. But it has since been discovered that writing was familiar not only to prehistoric Egypt and Babylonia, but to

¹ See Dr Thomas Gann's remarks on this subject in *Ancient Cities and Modern Tribes*. The skeletons and crania of the Old Mayan empire, A.D. 500 c., have almost entirely disappeared.

savage Polynesia, even perhaps to the predecessors of the Australian, if not to palæolithic man himself.¹ If, then, the synchronism stands good, civilisation must go back to the ante-prehistoric past. But the *Annales Veteris et Novi Testamenti* is as sacrosanct as the *Descent of Man*, and nothing can persuade ethnology to revise its seventeenth-century time-scale. Accepted opinion on all these subjects is based on the belief, natural to minds untrained in logic, that absence of evidence is proof of non-existence. Jones didn't see Smith in church last Sunday, therefore Smith wasn't there; there is no trace of higher man or his culture in Oligocene or Eocene formations, therefore higher man did not then exist. That Smith may have been hidden behind a pillar, or Eocene man and his artifacts have been so frail that they dissolved away within a century, are possibilities that never cross the reasoner's imagination.

There is a graver error in the argument, an error not of logic but of value-sense. What does civilisation mean? Tylor conceived it as an affair of material and intellectual attainment, the general improvement of mankind by higher organisation of the individual and of society, to the end of promoting man's goodness, power and happiness.² The words read oddly to a generation that has seen the horrors of Paschendacle, Verdun and Bolshevik Russia, and shrinks appalled from the abominations of slum life in our great cities. Matter and intellect are close akin, says Bergson, and we can all see that material and intellectual attainment quickly becomes inimical to progress. It fosters anti-social qualities and debasing vices; it leads to the concentration of huge communities in restricted areas where healthful life is impossible and men are degraded to machines; it breeds the plutocrat and the slave-driver. Civilisation is a matter of the character, not of the intellect or body. It does not consist in learning to foretell eclipses or make cinema films, but in the refinement of thought and feeling which shows itself in respect for oneself, consideration for others, indifference to baser pleasures, and interest in the things that matter. Our judgment of a man's value turns chiefly upon those considerations, taking relatively little account of his talents, and none at all (except among the unevolved) of his possessions. The criterion for the race must be the same as for the individuals

¹ Three different scripts have been discovered in Polynesia, and Grey found markings in an Australian cave which he describes as almost unmistakably writing: *Journal of Expeditions*, i. 214.

² *Primitive Culture*, i. 27.

composing it, but materio-intellectual attainment has produced a bastard culture in which actions and ambitions that the citizen despises in himself and reprobates in others are deemed essential to national well-being. Europe is still uncivilised.

What, then, is the true path of progress? Plain living and high thinking have always been complementary. The Christ who had not where to lay his head, the Buddha who forsook a palace for the forest, stand indefinitely higher in the scale of values than Lucullus feasting in his villa or the profiteer lounging in his motor car. Those are the acknowledged leaders of our race, whose precepts and example are revered by all, but the fact has not been noticed that they belonged to a different *kind* of civilisation from our own. The contrariety forced itself into prominence during the Great War and caused much heartburning among the faithful, but circumstances did not permit of reconciliation between profession and performance. Materio-intellectual attainment reigned supreme and no alternative seemed possible, for it is the unhappy truth that the ideals of Christianity and Buddhism are unattainable in Europe. Given an environment in which the needs of daily life could be satisfied with little cost of labour, civilisation of a far higher order than our own might be evolved by a community ignorant of science and mathematics. Men might maintain themselves in such a *milieu* with nothing better to serve their wants than Nature's gifts, clad in skins, subsisting on fruit, yet—were certain indispensable conditions present—wise beyond the wisdom of all our learned societies. Judged by any worthy standard, such men would have better right to call themselves civilised than any extant people, and Plato, Socrates, and Paul Confucius and Sankaracharya, Francis of Assisi and the Wesleys, would be far more at home in their company than in London or New York. Now, antiquity, the age of Religion, was constantly throwing up societies of this very kind, and they are still known among us; but they leave no material relics behind them, and it is vain to search their homes for the appliances of modern culture, even for celts and scrapers. What, then, could be more irrational than to apply such tests to the forgotten past? Happy is the people that has no history, says the proverb, and the words themselves imply that the higher civilisations of antiquity can never yield their secrets to the archæologist. But in Religion, with morality, language and all the arts of life—agriculture, fire-use, the domestication of useful plants and animals—they have bequeathed to us the

imperishable records of their genius. We lesser peoples can but perfect the instruments of death.¹

Current notions as to human origins and history are therefore founded in unreason. An admittedly psychic evolution has been assessed entirely by physical remains. Human descent has consequently been derived from an ancestor supposed to have existed before he had been evolved, and in any case incapable of begetting man, and the non-human progeny in which we are asked to recognise this ancestry is convicted of degeneracy by the argument. The supposititious development of culture from savagery through barbarism up to civilisation has led to the absurd conclusions that all peoples are equally civilisable, and that difficult metaphysical conceptions and inventions are natural to bestial stupidity. Civilisation itself has been identified with a materio-intellectual culture which offends against our ideals and bears within it the seeds of suicide. Finally, creations stamped with the plain mark of genius have been mistaken for the chance by-products of a brutal struggle for existence. Such is the synthesis of fact and observation compiled by Science for our instruction ; some of us may prefer the Book of Genesis.

It would be much to the advantage of society if a preliminary course in philosophy and logic were required of all who take up scientific studies. Incalculable mischief has been done by the ill-digested opinions put forward by high authority as proven truth, from Tyndall's denial of the soul down to the amateur discovery that morality is a matter of convention. Men of science are notoriously prone to err on questions lying beyond their proper ken. Only the other day a distinguished anthropologist declared that man must assuredly have descended from an ape " if we can believe the evidence of our senses "—the very evidence which we must *not* believe ! Otherwise, the conjurer would be an authentic

¹ Sanskrit, Arabic, Greek and other ancient languages betray deliberate manufacture in their every syllable. The mastery over fire, absurdly credited to an infra-human brute devoid alike of courage or motive to attempt the conquest and of imagination to foresee its value, called for genius of the highest order. Domestication of useful plants and animals is almost unknown to the lower savage, nor does he practise agriculture. Science is confessedly unable to explain the dietary change-over from fruit to flesh and then from flesh to cereals, a double revolution effected independently in the Old World and the New, and attended by complete change of habit. Needless to say, fruit came first, then cereals, then flesh, the last only under pressure of dire necessity. The sequence is obvious, and anthropology will accept it as soon as the dates have gone back a little further.

miracle-worker, and we should still be supposing that the earth is flat and that the Sun goes round it. The senses are bad witnesses, said prehistoric Thales, but the venerable truth has not yet dawned on Science. Now oculists tell us that the image formed on the retina is presented to the brain upside-down, and is so seen in infancy, until reason effects the necessary correction. That is what antiquity would have called a myth—a psychological law illustrated by a physical application. The nineteenth century was young of soul, like the Greeks of Solon's time, and reason is now correcting its inversions of the truth ; but it is a slow process. Religion is the first of man's concerns, said Acton, but the Victorian called it baseless superstition, and Europe has suffered bitterly for the error. Religion is also the cardinal distinction between man and ape, and if then anthropology would deserve its name, it should leave bones and fossils to the antiquarian and place Religion in the forefront of its studies. As for the ethnologist, he must get rid of Archbishop Usher for good and all, and rise to some less parochial conception of human history.¹

THOMAS BROWNE.

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¹ A reply to this article by Dr R. R. Marcet, Rector of Exeter College, Oxford, will appear in the next number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL.—EDITOR.

THE TESTAMENT OF BEAUTY.

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MR ROBERT BRIDGES, in happy phrase, has spoken of that "birthday of surprisal" which is ours when for the first time we light upon some masterwork of art: the pleasure and surprise are all the greater when the masterwork is a creation of our own time. Matthew Arnold has assured us that the future of poetry is immense; but it is always easier to believe in the future than in the present; and though much verse of real poetic quality had been written in our century, there was little of sustained power or wide sweep of thought. But now we have *The Testament of Beauty*. I would not suggest that the excellence of a poem depends upon its length; all we ask of any work of art is that it should approach perfection in its kind; yet surely scale has something to do with greatness, and the measure of a poet is to be gauged not only by the grace and energy of his flight, but also by his power of keeping on the wing. I am aware that another view is current. Some eighty years back, Edgar Allan Poe asserted that poetry is the language of excitement, and that as excitement must necessarily be brief the phrase "long poem" was a flat contradiction in terms; and thus putting *Paradise Lost* in its place he proceeded to enlarge on the merits of *The Raven*. And Croce has lately shown Poe's view to be eminently reasonable. But, as Mr Bridges says:

How in its naked self
reason were powerless showeth itself when philosophers
will talk of art, the which they are full ready to do;
. . . but since they lack vision of art
(for elsewhere they had been artists, not philosophers)
they miss the way.

Perhaps, after all, Dante and Milton and Wordsworth knew

their own business. Naturally enough, the long poem has not, throughout, the intensity demanded of the lyric; but its great moments are the more telling in that they are set in a wider context of thought and feeling. In the lyric we must supply this context for ourselves, and often fail adequately to supply it: in the longer poem we reach the heights step by step with the poet, following the same path as he had traversed; and his poem is far greater in its total effect upon us either than the mere sum of its finest parts or than a sheaf of separate lyrics. The argument against the long poem implies a simple antithesis between pure poetry and bald prose, whereas prose and poetry shade imperceptibly into one another; and the poet's aim is accomplished if his less inspired passages are lifted by style and metre so securely above the level of prose that the poetic impression is not disturbed. That all poets have not achieved this is true enough. To maintain a mastery of form when the emotional pitch is low needs a finer technical skill than to write well under the compelling influence of strong emotion. But Mr Bridges, at least, never forgets that he is an artist, or rather he does not need to remember it; his innate distinction of style and deft handling of metre preserve from bathos his least poetic line.

This prejudice against the long poem tends to become more acute when its theme is philosophic. I suspect that the prejudice is not wholly modern, and that Rome had more than one Jeffreys to register his "This will never do" against the *De rerum natura*. Poetry to many is an escape from the perplexities of thought to the luxuries of feeling, and they resent what they regard as the indecorous spectacle of philosophy masquerading in fancy dress. Yet, despite such protests, the poet will always write upon those themes that most firmly possess him, and if he is a comprehensive thinker as well as a poet, he will be impelled to express in verse a conscious philosophy of life. It is a difficult task: for abstract thought is recalcitrant to poetic handling. Coleridge complained that "whatever in Lucretius is poetry is not philosophical and whatever is philosophical is not poetry," and he looked to Wordsworth to write "the first and only philosophical poem in existence." He was disappointed. "I expected," he said, "the colours, music, imaginative life and passion of poetry, but the matter and *arrangement* of philosophy." Yet, in truth, Wordsworth's failure does not lie where Coleridge placed it. *The Excursion* fails because, though it contains much superb philosophic

poetry, it contains also too much that is neither philosophy nor poetry. In expecting the *arrangement* of philosophy Coleridge asks for something which the independent life of a poem cannot give. "The fair train of imagery" that rises before the poet as he muses

on man, on nature and on human life

is likely enough to disturb the logical sequence of the thought, and where imagination leads the poet must follow; it is left for us to arrange his ideas as logically as we choose. For the philosophic poem is not a philosophic treatise in verse. It is, primarily, like any other poem, a passionate personal experience. It is the work of a poet recalling in tranquillity the diverse emotional experiences that have kindled him into thought, and correlating them into a harmonious conception of life; but when he comes to record that conception, the emotional experiences from which it arose once more regain their vividness, and in large measure direct the progress of the poem, substituting for the logic of prose argument the logic of the passions. Pope's *Essay on Man* fails as a poem because it is too much of a treatise and too little of a personal experience: it is the skilful versification of a train of thought which was not his own, and which he only partially understood; and the reader is aware throughout of a definite prose argument distinct from its poetical embellishment. Lucretius, Dante, Milton, expressed ideas in which they lived and moved and had their being, and the impression the work of each leaves upon us, despite some passages which, in isolation, may be prosaic, is that of great poetry, because it is the impassioned utterance of a great poetic personality. A poem, as Mr Bridges says, is "the intimate echo of the poet's life."

And however much critics may cavil at the philosophical poem, poetic readers have always welcomed it. *The Excursion*, with all its faults, was to Keats one of "the wonders of the age"; and if it did not reach Coleridge's impossible ideal, its *Prelude*, at least, was to him "an Orphic song" raising him to that mood of mystic rapture which great art induces in all who are worthy to receive it. What Wordsworth did for the choicer spirits of his own time Mr Bridges has done for ours. His poem is

the bounteous gift
of one whom time and nature have made wise,
gracing his doctrine with authority.

The Testament of Beauty is an imaginative exposition of

the spiritual origin and destiny of man. The world is conceived as the emanation of the Divine Mind :

Reality appeareth in forms to man's thought
as several links interdependent of a chain
that circling returneth upon itself, as doth
the coil'd snake that in art figureth eternity.

From Universal Mind the first-born atoms draw
their function, whose rich chemistry the plants transmute
to make organic life, whereon animals feed
to fashion sight and sense and give service to man,
who sprung from them is conscient in his last degree
of ministry unto God, the Universal Mind,
whither all effect returneth whence it first began.

The general affinity of this to many theories of life, to Aristotle's conception of the Final Cause or to St John's of the Logos, is clear enough ; among our own poets it is paralleled in detail in Raphael's speech to Adam in *Paradise Lost*, whilst a kindred thought inspired Wordsworth

with a sense sublime
of something far more deeply interfused,
whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
and the round ocean and the living air,
and the blue sky, and in the mind of man ;

and led him to speak of that "Soul of all the worlds" which "circulates from link to link," and has in the mind of man its most apparent home, *i.e.* that home where it is recognised for what it is.

For the distinctive character of man's link in this chain of being is his self-conscient mind ; and with conscience comes reason, the incipient faculty of judgment ; by his reason man endeavours to comprehend and harmonise the intuitions which spring from his sense-experience ; and thus he learns to interpret the world about him, so that what in Nature is mere innate propensity becomes in him spiritual aspiration, and he realises the true purpose of his being, a conscious reunion with Universal Mind.

Now the Universal Mind, to Mr Bridges as to Plato, is compact of different qualities or essences which are reproduced in the world, and act as vital controlling forces in its evolution. To the mind of man, these essences appear as ideas, and these ideas are the supreme efficient causes of his thoughts. He does not owe them to his reason, though it is through his reason that he is able to apprehend them ; science cannot explain them ; and if Aristotle and other philosophers have boggled at them, they yet cannot disprove them ; they are the ultimate entities of Being, transmitted from the

Universal Mind by the way of the animal senses. If man's mind held all ideas in due proportion and in their purity, it would be a perfect microcosm of the Divine Mind ; but in man nothing is wholly pure ; and individual differs from individual in the manner in which these ideas are co-ordinated in his mind, and in the strength and worth in him of that reason whose task it is to co-ordinate them. For consciousness implies a measure of freedom. The power of reflecting on things carries with it the power of getting outside them, and judging them, and consequently implies an infinite number of attitudes towards them and an infinite number of possible actions determined by those attitudes. But man's mind is only an infinitesimal part of the Universal Mind, most of which lies below consciousness, and is expressed in those instincts which lie deeply imbedded in animal life. Reason has in itself no power to initiate ; for the material on which it works it lies in deep insolvency to sense, and in its task of co-ordinating that material it is still a novice. It is often baulked by self-puzzledom and doubt, and in arrogant ignorance often goes astray, misreading the intentions of Nature, thwarting them, ordering human activities for ravage rather than defence. Thus we are confronted with the paradox that though without reason man would not be conscious of his spiritual destiny, nor could achieve it, yet his reason may often pervert those very instincts through which Nature has designed his spiritual ascent. For reason only fulfils her true function when she subserves the soul. Hence the essential defining term of man as distinct from the brutes is not reason, but spirit :

In truth ' spiritual animal ' were a term for man
nearer than ' rational ' to define his genus.

Here again we are reminded of the central thought of Wordsworth,—his insistence on the prime importance of the experience of eye and ear as the only avenue to truth, and on the inferiority of reason, in itself a mere calculating process, to that higher Reason, or " Reason in her most exalted mood," which is imagination, which enables its possessor to see the world of sense-experience in its real spiritual significance. With this conception the Greek idea that God is pure reason and that man can only attain to communion with him, by *theoria*, or pure speculation, from which all emotion has been purged away, is inevitably superseded by the conception that God is essentially love, and that man's communion with him is only attainable through the exercise of his whole being, in

which, if reason directs, yet the emotions supply the energising force :

the arch-thinker's heaven cannot move my desire,
nor doth his pensiv Deity make call on my love.
I see the emotion of saints, lovers and poets all
to be the kindling of some Personality
by an eternising passion.

The higher function of reason, therefore, is to interpret in the light of spiritual intuition ideas which come to it through the senses ; and chief of these ideas in its spiritual potency is the idea of Beauty :

As some perfected flower, Iris or Lily, is born
patterning heavenly beauty, a pictur'd idea
that hath no other expression for us, nor could have
for that which Lily or Iris tell cannot be told
by poetry or by music in their secret tongues,
nor is describable in logic, but is itself
an absolute piece of Being, and we know not,
nay, nor search not by what creative miracle
the soul's language is writ in perishable forms—
yet are we aware of such existences crowding,
mysterious beauties unexpanded, unreveal'd,
phantasies intangible investing us closely,
hid only from our eyes by skies that will not clear ;
active presences, striving to force an entrance,
like bodiless exiled souls in dumb urgency pleading
to be brought to birth in our conscient existence,
as if our troubled lot were the life they long'd for ;
even as poor mortals thirst for immortality :—
And every divination of Nature or reach of Art
is nearer attainment to the divine plenitude
of understanding, and in moments of Vision
their unseen company is the breath of Life.—

Thus Mr Bridges' song, like Wordsworth's, proclaims

How exquisitely the individual mind
... to the external world
Is fitted, and how exquisitely too
The external world is fitted to the mind.

For man is so framed that he recognises beauty in the world about him, and recognising it, desires it. To see beauty and to love it are one and the same thing. *The Testament of Beauty* reveals the manner in which by the influence of beauty man may rise to a consciousness of his spiritual heritage.

The urge of the life-force within him finds elementary expression in the two root instincts of Selfhood and Breed. Mr Bridges pictures them, after the manner of Plato's vision in the *Phædrus*, as two steeds driven by the charioteer

Reason ; but he makes a significant change in the Platonic allegory. To Plato one steed figured the unruly passions of man, the other his nobler instincts ; and the task of the charioteer was to force the unruly steed into accord with the heavenward path sought by his nobler fellow : to Mr Bridges both steeds, though wilful and restive, are potentially good, and their course is determined for better or worse according as their charioteer, the Reason, is inspired by the idea of beauty or swayed by lower impulses. For both these instincts of selfhood and breed have within them a faint adumbration of soul. Selfhood is primarily a remorseless fight for existence, yet even in the animal kingdom Nature has placed the germs of a higher development. The wolves that hunt in packs, the flocks that herd together for mutual protection, show signs of escape from a blind idea of self ; whilst motherhood, which is ready to jeopardise its own life to ensure the safety of its offspring, is an instinct which, becoming conscious in the human mind, rises to the noblest altruism. And the passion for life, without which life could not be, is everywhere associated with the idea of beauty :

For since there is beauty in nature, mankind's love of life
 apart from love of beauty is a tale of no count ;
 and tho' he lingered long in his forest of fear,
 or e'er his apprehensive wonder at unknown power
 threw off the first night-terrors of his infant mind,
 the vision of beauty awaited him, and step by step,
 led him in joy of spirit to full fruition.

So Breed, originally Nature's provision for the continuance of the species, develops by association with the idea of beauty into the love of a Dante. For sensuous Beauty is the mother of heavenly Love. In so far as reason, the controlling force of these two animal instincts, is possessed of the true idea of beauty, man's spiritual destiny is achieved ; but when reason is blind to its true purpose, these animal instincts are perverted, so that man sinks lower than the beasts, his selfhood degenerating into such vices as gluttony or cruelty, and breed into degrading lust.

As fundamental in man as selfhood and breed is his artistic instinct, which, like them, he owes to his animal nature. The beauty by which the animal—in song, in dance, in grace of movement, expresses his joy in life is recognised consciently by man's reason and exploited in his art, which thus becomes

that ladder of joy whereon
 slowly climbing at heaven he shall find peace with God.

There is thus no contrast between art and Nature, for man's inborn passion for art is but Nature herself,

who danceth in her garden at the blossoming-time
'mong the flowers of her setting.

But though in every man this instinct is innate, the genius for artistic creation is rare and not at his command. It is largely an unconscious process. Here, as with the other instincts, reason does not supply the impulse ; it is the mere servant and drudge whose task it is to order what the creative impulse supplies. All excellence in art springs from a divine inspiration under whose influence man shows himself most clearly a partaker in the Divine Mind which, in its wisdom delighting in Beauty, created the world after Beauty's image. Hence just as Milton, with unerring vision, invokes his heavenly Muse :

Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse
Wisdom thy sister, and with her didst play
in presence of th' Almighty Father, pleased
with thy celestial song,

so to Mr Bridges the wisdom of God granted this gift to man that she may

take back from his hand her Adoration robes
and royal crown of his Imagination and Love.

Even as all spiritual growth has its roots in the animal passions of selfhood and breed, and finds its true expression through the creative instinct of art, so our moral conceptions have developed from animal instinct awakened to consciousness of itself. Out of natural necessity arose the idea of obligation :

There is a young black ouzel, now building her nest
under the Rosemary on the wall, suspiciously
shunning my observation as I sit in the porch,
intentiv with my pencil as she with her beak :
Could we discourse together, and wer I to ask her for-why
she is making such pother with thatt rubbishy straw,
her answer would be surely : ' I know not, but I MUST.'
Then could she take persuasion of Reason to desist
from a purposeless action, in but a few days hence
when her eggs were to hatch, she would look for her nest ;
and if another springtide found us here again,
with memory of her fault, she would know a new word,
having made conscient passage from the MUST to the OUGHT.

Thus Duty is not a law arbitrarily imposed by some external power : it is the conscious fulfilment of that law which nature

follows by instinct. Wordsworth's sublime apostrophe to Duty :

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong,

is no fanciful extravagance ; it is a profound imaginative truth. The first rudimentary conception of morals sprang from the customs adopted by primitive man in order to safeguard for himself what he most valued in life ; as his reason grew his sense of morality grew also, and was codified in laws. But such codification, though continually modified with man's moral growth, must always lag behind his spiritual capacity ; true progress is only achieved by those great teachers who transcend established morality, and rise to heights as yet unsealed by the common herd, whom by precept and example they beckon to follow whither they

with beauty have made escape, soaring away to where
the Ring of Being closeth in the Vision of God.

And to Mr Bridges, as to Wordsworth, the path of duty is essentially the path of joy. Pleasure, the intrinsic joy of life, is in itself an absolute good ; for it is man's natural response to beauty. That there are bad pleasures as well as good is simply due to the weakness of man's reason, which has diverted joy from its natural function as the ally of spirit. Hence moralists, who from fear of bad pleasures repudiate all pleasure, are guilty of a reasoned folly. The pleasure of life attendant on all its activities is not to be denied the soul ; rather it is true that the quality and value of man's pleasure rises with the growth of his spirit. The animal joy persists, but is transformed by the influence of Beauty into something greater than itself, till vision is gained of that omniscient Creator whose beauty and wisdom are only approached, and only apprehended, through a joyful understanding of his creation.

This approach of man to his Creator is what we call religion. That blind fear felt by the savage mind in the presence of incomprehensible power is gradually transmuted by the influence of Beauty into Love. The religious instinct, when not rightly ordered by reason, like man's other instincts, will go astray, and thus often degenerates into superstition,

with creeds and precise focusings of the unsearchable,

bringing religion into disrepute and provoking that scepticism which denies man's spiritual claims. And scepticism, in

revulsion, breeds a recrudescence of such superstitions as are rife to-day. For scepticism starves the soul ; and the soul, bereft of its true nutriment, will ravin gall. But man ever craves for beauty, and this hankering after a beauty, denied or lost, "is the remnant grace of nature's covenant, the starved germ athirst for God." Rightly directed, it finds its consummation in a vision of love as of the essence of the Divine nature.

God's love is, indeed, beyond the reach of man's comprehension. Our finite minds can only grasp it from its prefigurings in our earthly relationships ; but even as the idea of the divine essence of beauty is derived from our intuitive recognition of beautiful things, so in the passion of motherhood, in the ecstasie dawn of man's love for woman, in the ideal of earthly friendship, we get a glimpse of Love's Infinity. Nor does the disparity between man with his finite imperfections and divine perfection cut him off from a real friendship with God :

From this dilemma of pagan thought, this poison of faith
Man-soul made glad escape in the worship of Christ ;
for his humanity is God's Personality
and communion with him is the life of the soul.

Such, as I understand it, is our poem's main trend of thought. It offers, inevitably, many occasions for sceptical assault. To the question why this universe, if its source is divine, presents such a confusion of evil with good and ugly with beautiful, Mr Bridges replies that to ask *why* is fruitless ; for the imperfect human mind the only profitable inquiry is to ask *what is*, not *why it is*. *What is*, at least, suggests to him that ideas have no significance without their opposites ; the beautiful implies by contrast the ugly, joy implies sorrow, and morality vice. If he has not Browning's almost truculent combativeness in the presence of evil he yet holds that all hindrance to good

maketh occasion for it, by contrast heightening,
by challenge and revelly arousing Virtue to act ;

rather 'tis as with Art, wherein special beauty
springeth of obstacles that hav been overcome
and to graces transform'd ; so the lover in life
will make obstructions serve, and from all resistance
gain strength.

But this would not explain the presence of evil and ugliness in the natural world. How far, it might be urged, is all this poets' talk of the beauty and spiritual significance of Nature

possible to those only who are either ignorant of the facts, or wilfully and sentimentally blind ? Thus, Keats admitted the "fierce destruction at nature's core," "the hawk at pounce," and even "the gentle robin ravening the worm," but turned from the sight as merely "a horrid mood" of his own mind, preferring to lay his head

mid hush'd, cool-rooted flowers, fragrant-eyed ;

whilst Wordsworth is charged with so stark a blindness to all that might tell against his comfortable doctrine, that Mr Aldous Huxley has lately assured us that had this placid Lake-poet visited the Tropics and seen what *he* has seen, he could never have written so complacently of nature. Mr Bridges, indeed, does not lay himself open to the same attack ; he admits what he calls "the inhumanity of Nature's omnipotence," and sees the holes which science has knocked in the sentimental fallacies of poetry ; and yet it may be asked whether in so doing he really puts himself in better case, since in the end his attitude is little different from that of Keats or Wordsworth. In a beautiful allegory, published some few years ago, Mr Bridges meets this objection in a way which his predecessors would, I think, have accepted. Therein he compares the world to a room adorned with fair Arras hangings,

wherein my spirit hath dwelt
from infancy a nursling of great Nature's beauty
which keepeth fresh my wonder as when I was a child.

The young modern heir who inherits the estate orders his steward to turn this tapestry with its face to the wall, "so we shall have more colour and less solemnity." But though he would do well to take down the tapestry and examine it thoroughly, back as well as front, to look for ever on its back is to misconceive its artist's purpose :

But as a man, owning a fine cloth of Arras
in reverence for his heirloom will examine it all
inside and out, and learn whether of white wool or silk
the high-warp, what of silver and gold, how fine the thread,
what number of graded tints in hatching of the woof ;
so we study Nature, wrong side as well as right
and in the eternal mystery of God's working find
full many unsightly a token of beauty's trouble ;
and gain knowledge of Nature and much wisdom thereby ;
but these, making no part of beauty's welcome face,
these we turn to the wall, hiding away the mean
ugly brutish obscene clumsy irrelevances
Which Honesty will own to with baffling humour
and in heightening the paradox will find pleasure.

But if to this the clever young man replies that he prefers the wrong side, or goes still further, and asks who are we to tell him which *is* the wrong side and which the right, that one which is a mere tangle of threads or that other which has a significant design, then the answer is only faith ;

The wise will live by Faith
faith in the order of Nature and that her order is good.

Of these two fundamental articles of faith, the first, faith in the order of Nature, is in itself a postulate of science ; but science, that activity of man's reason which for its own specialised purposes rules out of count the things of the spirit, has no concern with the second. Mr Bridges admits no quarrel between science and poetry. None of our poets, indeed, save Shelley, has shown so deep an interest in science, nor kept in closer touch with its advance. He delights in recording how

comforting man's animal poverty
and leisuring his toil [she] hath humanized manners
and social temper ;

nor has more lovely tribute ever been paid to her than is found in his commemoration of her latest achievement :

and now above her globe-spredd net
of speeded intercourse hath outrun all magic,
and disclosing the secrecy of the reticent air
hath woven a seamless web of invisible strands
spiriting the dumb inane with the quick matter of life :
Now music's prison'd raptur and the drown'd voice of truth
mantled in light's velocity, over land and sea
are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear,
into every heart and home their unhinder'd message,
the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood.

Here, indeed, is the "impassioned expression which is upon the countenance of all science." It calls to mind Shelley's prophetic ecstasy at man's conquest of the air, which he saw, not as we have seen it, as an instrument of ruthless destruction, but as a compelling influence to draw the world into closer bonds of peace and friendship. Yet Science does not satisfy the spirit. After her greatest triumphs we are no nearer to the First Cause of all than a child "who thinketh he is nearer the Pole-star when he is put to bed." For Science knows nothing of Beauty :

what kenneth she
of colour or sound ? Nothing ; tho' science measure true
every wave-length of ether or air that reacheth sense,

there the hunt checketh, and her keen hounds are at fault ;
 for when the waves hav pass'd the gates of ear and eye
 all scent is lost ; suddenly escaped the visibles
 are changed to invisible ; the fine-measured motions
 to immeasurable emotion ; the cypher'd fractions
 to a living joy that man feeleth to shrive his soul.

Hence to those who do not realise her limitations, Science
 may prove a curse. The very benefits she has conferred on
 man's animal life may lead him into a gross materialism,

whence now whole nations, by their treasure-trove enrich'd,
 crawl greedily on their knees nosing the soil like swine,
 and any, if they can twist their stiffen'd necks about,
 see the stars but as stones ;

whilst some of her nobler votaries, concentrating their
 attention on the remorseless forces of nature, and those
 cruelties that rend the heart, in a love of truth which refuses
 "to blink dishonestly the tribulation of man," deem that
 tribulation to be "final truth, and see no clue therof." The
 only clue is found in that second faith, which is the faith of
 the poet. To the man of science, indeed, such faith is often
 granted, as when he is drawn by a spirit of wonder before
 nature's immensity into a mystic rapture, and himself
 becomes a poet ; which thing happened to Ptolemy the
 astronomer who

gazing with naked eye upon the stormy night
 forgot his science and in transport of spirit
 his mortal lot—and it seem'd to him as if his feet
 touch'd earth no longer.

By such faith alone a man can save his soul ; and it is the
 sense of beauty innate in all men that prompts and justifies
 that faith. How far each man may attain it depends, in the
 last resort, upon his native disposition ; but to those who
 have it the experience is as real as their experience of
 scientific fact. Between pessimism and optimism there is a
 great gulf ; and yet the optimistic view finds some support
 in man's innate passion for life, and this even the pessimist
 cannot deny, or he would not himself be alive :

for howso deliberately a man may wish for death
 Stil wil he instinctivly fight to the last for life

Verily indeed if hope wer not itself a happiness
 Sorrow would far outweigh our mortal joy ;

but our nature is so framed that

our hope is ever livelier than despair, our joy
livelier and more abiding than our sorrows are
which leak away until no taint remain ; their seeds
shriveling too thin to lodge in Memory's hustled sieve.

These leading ideas of the poem are the centres whence radiates a wealth of pregnant thought on many aspects of life. Most memorable are those passages which illumine the life of the child. The child, as father to the man, that human being that is nearest to animal nature in impulse and desires, in whom for good and ill reason has barely begun its work, might be said to hold the key to the whole position ; and alike in his subtle interpretation of Plato's doctrine of anamnesis in terms of heredity, of the significance of our conception of Godhead as shadowed in the infant Christ, and in setting forth the child's instinctive response to beauty, and hence the vital influence of environment upon his spiritual health, Mr Bridges speaks with the wisdom that is born of imaginative insight. If I ventured to advise those about to enter that most responsible of all professions, the profession of teacher, I would say : " Lay aside, if only for a moment, your statistics of child-fatigue and your manuals of psycho-analysis, and read *The Testament of Beauty*." Hardly less suggestive are thoughts casually let fall on the love of man and woman both in its ideal and its failures, and the profound criticism of some of the diseases of our modern body politic. The democratic idealist might, perhaps, be inclined to protest against Mr Bridges' truly Miltonic contempt for the herd, and urge that he, no less than our poet, recognises " spiritual attainment, individual worth " to be the true goal of our endeavour. He might urge further that his aim was not to reduce life to the lowest common level, but rather to open to all those chances for spiritual attainment which are, even to-day, the lot of but a favoured few ; yet, even so, he could not deny the evils on which Mr Bridges has thrown his searching light.

In prosaically laying bare the skeleton of the poem's thought I have hardly suggested the nature of that living organism which *is* the poem. Only, perhaps, for a few hundred lines in the centre of the last book does the argument get the better of the poetry. Taken as a whole *The Testament of Beauty* is imaginative rather than didactic. And the field of experience over which it ranges is astonishingly wide. It is the " intimat echo " of the life of one whose home has always been in the land of the Muses, yet who has been a

tireless adventurer in many countries, and from them all has brought back with him treasures with which to adorn the shrine of his divine mistress. In reaching his conclusions he has tested against his own experience the findings of many philosophers. Different facets of his thought sparkle in analogies drawn from physics or chemistry or medicine; others are expressed in vivid episodes from ancient or mediæval history, or the achievements of the sister arts of painting and music, or the conditions of modern life. The dawn of wisdom in Hellas, the birth of modern poetry at the court of Raymond of Toulouse, the lives of St Francis and St Thomas and Henry VIII., the Crusades and the Albigensian War, Raphael's Madonnas and Titian's *L'Amor sacro e profano*, the feasts of city aldermen, and the latest discovery of prehistoric tombs in Mesopotamia,—these are but a few of the scenes in which the thought of the poem takes life. The logical argument, indeed, sits lightly upon it; pedants might complain that it sits too lightly, and that there is little proportion between some of the incidents and their relative weight in the argument. But this charge could be met as another poet met it, with the plea that "his course is often stay'd, yet never is astray." For in whatever by-paths he wanders, Mr Bridges finds beauty on the road. Beauty is all his argument; and even where poetic inspiration flags there is always the beauty of accomplished art.

Of versification Mr Bridges is a master. If we have had greater poets than he, we have had few artists as impeccable. A classical scholar, who has made a life-long study of the technique of English verse, and has probed, as far as they can be probed, the secrets of Milton's incomparable music, he has been also a bold experimenter; and if some of his classical adventures have not proved happy to an English ear, they have doubtless contributed to his own final facility. The new metre which he has evolved, in which our poem is written,—loose Alexandrines, or neo-Miltonic syllabics, as he calls them, was suggested by the choruses of *Samson Agonistes*, with as generous a licence in the positions of stress, and the use of elision, substitution and extra-metrical syllables as is compatible with the retention of a feeling for the line as a true metrical unit. This metre is a triumph of art. It is capable of infinite variety, as is proved by the ease with which quotations from poets writing in different languages and different metres can be fitted into its mould; and according as it is loosely or strictly handled it is adaptable to any mood and any subject. It can move with the sweet regularity of

a softly gliding stream, or dance with the sparkling gaiety of a mountain torrent : it is equally successful in light familiar discourse or pithy reflection ; it can assume a dignity consonant with high prophetic utterance. If it cannot rise to the majesty of blank verse, it is much happier than that measure upon the lower poetic levels. In range it can, perhaps, only be equalled by the metre of Byron's *Don Juan*, and in Mr Bridges' hands it is capable of a delicate and subtle music quite out of Byron's reach. By its invention Mr Bridges has definitely extended the musical capacities of our language ; whether future poets will be able to develop it still further, or to handle it with his skill, I am not rash enough to prophesy.

With this metrical dexterity goes an exquisite sureness in the use of language, the gift only of those artists who are also scholars, and those scholars who are also artists. Again and again we meet that perfect union of sound and sense, that effect of the unexpected that is yet inevitable, which awakens the true poetic thrill. Sometimes we owe it to single words, as of the baby who "*clarioneth* for food," or of the historians who "*jaunt* on their *prancing* pens after their man of war" ; more often it comes to us from that magic moulding of the right words into phrases at once melodious and significant. What could be more lovely, and at the same time more finally expressive, than the few lines that speak of the voice of Duty ?

whereby the creature kenneth the creator's Will
that, in stillness of sound speaking to gentle souls,
dowereth all silence with the joy of his presence.

Mr Bridges has no cramping theory of diction, he uses those words and forms of words in which lucidity is joined with melodic grace : where he is slightly archaic, as in his use of verb-forms in *-eth*, it is not from wilful pedantry but to gain a definite metrical effect. He is indeed an aristocrat in his use of language, delighting in words that have a noble association, so that his true savour can only be tasted by those who have feasted at the same high tables. Only at his peril will a minor poet recall to our minds his great predecessors ; Mr Bridges in doing so both honours them and enriches himself. In that lovely description of the bees in autumn he has blended reminiscences of Keats and Shelley into a picture that is all his own :

when, tho' *summer hath o'er-brim'd their clammy cells*
the shorten'd days are shadow'd with dark fears of dearth,

bees ply the more, issuing on sultry noons to throng
in the ivy blooms—what time October's flaming hues
 Surcharge the brooding hours, till passionat soul and sense
 blend in a rich reverie with the dying year.

And like the true aristocrat he can be boldly familiar without
 sinking to the vulgar or commonplace, using with gallant
 lightheartedness phrases of everyday life ; as of the little
 chorister who, while " the parson's mild discourse pass'd o'er
 his head unheard," read his Bible with unassumed devotion,

What was it *fetch'd him*

Matthew Mark Luke and John *was it* ? Nay 'twas the bloody books
 Of Jewish war.

Like Chaucer and like Byron, but like how few of our poets,
 Mr Bridges has a fine humour which he can use without
 ceasing to be a poet ; his witty mockery is a weapon of attack
 far more effective than satire or denunciation. Thus he can
 laugh even at his master Plato for bolstering up an advocacy
 of the community of wives and children with the assumption
 that

a bastard nursed in a bureau
 must love and reverence all women for its mother,

or he will contrast with those magi who followed the star in
 the East to Bethlehem their descendants of to-day, who

hav seen
 the electric light i' the West and come to worship,

or with light touch he will expose the psycho-analysts who

impute precocious puberty
 to newborn babes, and all their after-trouble in life
 to shamefast thwarting of inveterat lust.

And since this same humour is the humour of a poet, it can
 blend in a scene of real romantic beauty, heightening by
 contrast its final effect. The story of the deluge has for me
 a more vivid charm since I read of

old Methuselah
 who when the flood rose higher swam from peak to peak
 til, with the last wild beasts tam'd in their fear, he sat
 watching the whelm of water on topmost Everest,
 as thatt too was submerged ; while in his crowded ark
 Noah rode safely by.

The situation is irresistibly comic ; but listen to the sequel :

and sailors caught by storm
 on the wide Indian Ocean at shift of the monsoon
 hav seen in the dark night a giant swimmer's head

that on the sequent billows trailing silvery hair
at every lightning flash reappeareth in place,
out-riding the tempest, as a weather-bound barque
anchor'd in open roadstead lifteth at the sea.

For the impression which the poem leaves upon us, which returns most often to the memory, is its pervading beauty, a beauty which at the flood-tide of inspiration has power to recall to us and charge with deeper significance those moments of our own lives when we too have felt within us something of a poet's heart :

As when a high moon thru' the rifted wrack
gleameth upon the random of the windswept night ;
or as a sunbeam softly, on early worshippers
at some rich shrine kneeling, stealeth thru' the eastern apse
and on the clouded incense and the fresco'd walls
mantleth the hush of prayer with a vaster silence,
laden as 'twere with the unheard music of the spheres ;
—nay, incommunicable and beyond all compare
are the rich influences of those moments of bliss,
mocking imagination or pictured remembrance,
as a divine dream in the vaulted slumber of life.

To such heights as these does our poem rise, whether its theme be the loveliness of nature, or the glories of art, or the intimate simplicities of human experience. Where is the "spiritual elation and response to nature" which is "man's generic mark" brought home to us more vividly than in these faultless lines, in which a series of cloudscapes such as Shelley alone could rival is followed by a loving rehearsal of those features of an English countryside which have touched to fine issues all true poets from Chaucer and Shakespeare to the present day ?

The sky's unresting cloudland, that with varying play
sifteth the sunlight thru' its figured shades, that now
stand in massiv range, cumulated stupendous
mountainous snowbillowy up-piled in dazzling sheen,
Now like sailing ships on a calm ocean drifting,
Now scatter'd wispy waifs, that neath the eager blaze
disperse in air ; Or now parcelling the icy inane
highspredd in fine diaper of silver and mother-of-pearl
freaking the intense azure ; Now scurrying close o'erhead
wild ink-hued random racers that sling sheeted rain
gustily, and with garish bows laughing o'erarch the land ;
Or, if the spirit of storm be abroad, huge molten glooms
mount on the horizon stealthily, and gathering as they climb
deep-freighted with live lightning, thunder and drenching flood
rebuff the winds, and with black-purpling terror impend
til they be driven away, when grave Night peacefully
clearing her heavenly rondure of its turbid veils

layeth bare the playthings of Creation's babyhood ;
and the immortal fireballs of her uttermost space
twinkle like friendly rushlights on the countryside.

Them soon the jealous Day o'errideth to display
Earth's green robe, which the sun fostereth for shelter and shower ;
The dance of young trees that in a wild birch-spinney
toss to and fro the cluster of their flickering crests,
as rye curtsying in array to the breeze of May ;
The ancestral trunks that mightily in the forest choirs
rear steadfast colonnade, or imperceptibly
sway in tall pinewoods to their whispering spires ;
The woodland's alternating hues, the vaporous bloom
of the first blushings and tender flushings of spring ;
The slumbrous foliage of high midsummer's wealth ;
Rich Autumn's golden quittance, to the bankruptcy
of the black shapely skeletons standing in snow :
Or, in gay months of swelling pomp, the luxury
of leisur'd gardens teeming with affection'd thought ;
the heartfelt secrecy of rustie nooks, and valleys
vocal with angelic rilling of rocky streams,
by rambling country-lanes, with hazel and thorn embower'd
woodbine, bryony and wild roses ; the landscape lure
of rural England,

or who has entered more profoundly into the spirit of great
art where "man's pensiv play" outdoes nature, or summed
up for us with more imaginative penetration the undying
appeal of Homer and the tragic writers of Hellas ?

But these and all old tales of far-off things, bygones
of long-ago whereof memory still holdeth shape,
Time and the Muse hav purged of their unhappiness ;
with their bright broken beauty they pervade the abyss,
peopling the Solitude with gorgeous presences :
as those bare lofty columns, time-whiten'd relics
of Atlantean adoration, upstanding lone
in Baalbec or Palmyra, proudly affront the waste
and with rich thought atone the melancholy of doom.

And the genius with which he reveals to us the secrets of art
and nature does not fail him in his vision of the elemental
emotions of humanity : as when he tells of a mother's love
for her child :

The unfathomable mystery of her awaken'd joy
sendeth her daily to heaven on her knees in prayer :
and watching o'er the charm of a soul's wondering dawn
enamoureth so her spirit, that all her happiness
is in her care for him, all hope in his promise ;
and his nobility is the dream-goal of her life ;

or when he sets before us the hopefulness of the child just
awakening to manhood

as he rideth forth to do battle, a chevalier
in the joyous travail of the everlasting dawn,

or the ecstasy of spirit with which youth greets the coming
of first love :

as the ocean-tide of the omnipotent Pleasur of God,
flushing all avenues of life, and unawares
by thousandfold approach forestalling its full flood
with divination of the secret contacts of Love,—
of faintest ecstasies aslumber in Nature's calm,
like thought in a closed book, where some poet long since
sang his throbbing passion to immortal sleep—with coy
tendernesses delicat as the shifting hues
that sanctify the silent dawn with wonder-glams,
whose evanescence is the seal of their glory,
consumed in self-becoming of eternity ;
till every moment as it flyeth, cryeth ' Seize !
Seize me ere I die ! I am the Life of Life.'

All this is great poetry ; our century, at least, has not heard
its like before. In eloquent discourse which has "all the
colours, music, imaginative life and passion of poetry," and
which at the same time expresses a mind delicately sensitive
to the varied conditions and interests of our strange modern
world, Mr Bridges has revealed to a generation, which more
than any other had need to listen,

how Nature teacheth man by Beauty
And by the lure of sense leadeth him ever upward
To heavenly things.

Verily by Beauty it is that we come at Wisdom.

E. DE SELINCOURT.

OXFORD.

SOME INTIMATIONS OF THE SOUL'S DESTINY.

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DIFFICULT of approach is the problem of soul and body, of the strange participation of such diverse entities, of the unfathomed communion between ineffable and actual, between absent and present. We are in a region of unresolvable dichotomy ; to the hour of our death we suffer on the horns of a mortal dilemma.

Equally mysterious is the relation between eternity and time in their mutual ingression and their mutual denial. Time is a process, an emergent character of being which yet dominates, and dissolves being into flux ; eternity is a state which in its persistent transparency transmutes and contains such evanescence ; eternity is ubiquitous, omnipresent in time, it is that which makes " our noisy years seem moments in the being of the eternal silence."

But it may be that the two problems, of soul and body, of time and eternity, are one in their ultimate significance, and in any case light may be thrown on the intimacy of soul and body by reflecting upon the coupling of time and eternity.

The body is here and now, "*présence invinciblement actuelle*," but the body shares an experience which is neither here nor now.¹

" Le corps entre en partage de tout ce qui arrive à l'esprit ; sa joie ou sa tristesse, son espérance ou sa crainte, sa douceur ou sa colère, dont les motifs sont souvent très spirituels et très supérieurs à la matière,

¹ For translation of passages quoted from French authors, see end of article.

font une telle impression sur le corps, que tout exprime en lui les mouvements de l'esprit ; que sa couleur, sa parole, ses gestes, prennent l'image et la teinture de toutes les actions de l'âme, et qu'il s'offre tout entier à elle pour entrer dans ses vues et ses sentiments, comme n'ayant que le même intérêt et la même fin." ¹

As facts are patient of interpretation, as words are patient of meaning, so is the body patient of the impress of the soul ; the stubborn actuality of the here and now is transcended, and the body in its docility to the behests of the soul reaches out towards the fluent possibility of the there and the thereafter. By its quality of "disponibilité" the body escapes from its narrow ranges, and shares the fair ground and the goodly heritage of the soul.

For the soul is neither here nor now ; it cannot be contained in, cannot be content with, the present ; it cannot be constrained by, cannot be confined in, the actual.

"L'objet unique et perpétuel de l'âme est bien ce qui n'existe pas : ce qui fut, et qui n'est plus ;—ce qui sera et qui n'est pas encore ;—ce qui est possible, ce qui est impossible ;—voilà bien l'affaire de l'âme, mais non jamais, *jamais*, ce qui est." ²

✶ For the soul past, present, and future are not locations and hardly habitations ; in the life of the soul their service is interchangeable and their synthesis is unity, unity which on its negative side becomes timelessness and in its positive aspect is eternity.

And the incidence of soul upon body, the ingression of this "absence créatrice" in the "présence actuelle" is *life*, life which perpetually hovers between possible and actual, between being and doing, between eternity and time, life which maintains itself precariously on the knife-edge which separates what is from what is not.

Life satisfies a certain paramount need of the soul, the need of realisation ; apart from the body the soul is "trop simplifié pour ne pas subir jusqu'au bout le mouvement de quelque idée." The body is a mirror focusing the fugitive, it imposes a limit and effects a synthesis.

"Mais ce corps et cet esprit, mais cette présence-invinciblement actuelle, et cette absence créatrice qui se disputent l'être, et qu'il faut enfin composer ; mais ce

¹ Duguet.

² Paul Valéry.

fini et cet infini que nous apportons, chacun selon sa nature, il faut à présent qu'ils s'unissent dans une construction bien ordonnée, et si, grâces aux dieux, ils travaillent de concert, s'ils échangent entre eux de la convenance et de la grâce, de la beauté et de la durée, des mouvements contre des lignes, et des nombres contre des pensées, c'est donc qu'ils auront découvert leur véritable relation, leur acte." ¹

The act is the essential product of soul and body, it inherits a certain amplitude from the soul and a definitiveness from its situation in the body. It has the vector qualities of direction and magnitude, and the additional character of a point of application. The act may be likened to a force, and is indeed always forceful. The amplitude or significance of the act varies indefinitely, and may perhaps be taken as a measure of the degree of ingression of the soul. Such ingression, such domination is precarious, hence the rhythmic character of life, theebb and flow of vitality, our need of rest, our need of change, our need of sleep.

Life of any compass cannot be lived in the present; the life of a stock or stone may be momentary, fragmentary, with no link between present and past, but we as conscious beings have no experience of such momentary existence, and we must regard it as a limit, as a vanishing point of being. We say that such things as stocks and stones are *in-animate*, without soul, and we postulate this limit because in the inanimate we detect no sense of past or future, no sense of time. In the lower animals, and more in the domestic animals, we recognise some apprehension of a time element. The placid cow is not bored after many hours of patient chewing of the cud, because the hours are uncounted, form no part of a linear series of events, are really *out of time*. But for the cow—or the hen, or the pig—there is *some* rudimentary sense of time in the *expectation* of certain things, food or the like, after the lapse of certain intervals. The dog has a more developed time sense, and *expects* many more things, and at more definite intervals.

But human life, life of any greater span, is very much more richly differentiated by the selective principle of expectation. We cannot, if we would, enjoy a mere present, "we look before and after, and pine for what is not," we are still always pursuing, and divine discontent is not a phrase, but the inevitable attitude of a mortal mind. Every hope

¹ *Ibid.*

looks to the future, every plan is forward-pointed, every judgment impinges on the unknown; and equally, every word is backward-looking, every fear is retrospective, every act resumes a past. Our lives are woven of past and future, though web and woof vary indefinitely between pattern and pattern,—the pattern of the dreamer who weaves the past into semblance of future, the pattern of the man of action who seeks to project a future plan on a screen of the past. Past and future move to and fro, interact and interchange, and between them, included in them, is the whole spaciousness of life—no room, no rôle for a present.

Philosophy recognises this vanishing part of the present in the term “specious present,”—a present surely which has nothing of its own, makes no original contribution to being, a present which supports itself upon a neighbourly past and future.

It would seem that human life is especially characterised as time-life, life *in* time, almost *of* time, and the fact that our daily lives are so at the mercy of our clocks is simply a reflection of the larger dominance of time over our being. There is a hierarchy in time from the minimal momentary existence of the stock or stone right up to the “moments of vision” of the saint or seer, moments which reveal the incidence of the eternal in time.

Indeed, soul life and time sense seem to advance side by side and step by step; the more highly developed soul life is accompanied by a more complex and an ampler sense of time, and the correspondence seems to indicate some deep-lying identity of being or likeness of function. It is this correspondence which must be analysed more closely.

Of what kind then is the relation between soul and body, and in what manner and how far does it resolve and include the problem of time?

I think the soul *is*—*is* in the most complete and concrete sense of the word,—and I think such *is*-ness is what we mean by eternity; it is *being*, unconditioned, uncanalised, unlimited. It has something more positive about it than is indicated by such negative attributes, but this positive quality, though essential, is indefinable by its very self-sufficiency. Indefinable, too, is the manner of the soul's ingression in the body; in some fashion the soul *does* impinge on the material, accept its limitation, utilise the body's power of receptivity, live its life in and through the life of the body. But the ingression is *given*, pure matter of fact, and therefore admitting of no definition.

And before we seek to investigate further, it is of interest to note the extraordinary ambiguity of the word "is"; indeed, "ambiguous" is quite inadequate in designating the wide range of the word's applicability. Its meaning seems to come round, full circle, so that its highest significance really negates that of its primary phase. A man's spiritual—and in some degree his intellectual—status may be judged by the ambience to him of the word "is."

In its first elementary sense, the word stands for gross material existence, and to some men and probably to all lower animals only those things *are* which can be seen and handled, and, of the world of the visible and the tangible, only that part *is* which can be *used*, and for the most part, used in the common affairs of everyday living. For animals the *is*-content seems to remain almost stationary, but with man uses increase, "the world is so full of a number of things," and the kingdom of the "*is*" assumes ever larger proportions, and becomes less and less a kingdom of this world. In higher ranges, the idea of utility gives place to the notion of self-subsistence, of being as contrasted with doing, of essence as against accident, of the possible alongside of the actual. By this time the word "*is*" begins to stand for that which *cannot* be seen and handled, for that which is real as compared with that which is actual, for an "*absence créatrice*" instead of a "*présence actuelle*."

And the soul *is* in this last transcendent sense; the soul is self-subsistent, essential, real, and to *be* in this degree is to be eternal.

The soul in its complete freedom and abundant liberality would confer in full measure this freedom of eternity upon the body, but matter is weighted by inertia and only partially receptive, and the ingression of the ineffable in the actual, the imposition of eternity upon the material, induce a strain and constitute an embarrassment, which strain and embarrassment *are* themselves what we call time. Time then is the tension induced by the attempted interpenetration of body by soul; the deep inertia, the sleep, of the body is quickened by a pulse, and the amplitude of the movement is the time-span of life. Time has no existence, no meaning, apart from the life of bodies and their indwelling souls; time-life would appear to be a compromise between mere existence as such and the fulness of life eternal. The body, "*invinciblement actuelle*," is incapable of full submission to the spirit, and the measure of its acceptance *is* its span, its *durée*. This span, this *durée*, vary from person to person according to the mode

of ingress and the measure of tension, and there is no accounting for such variation, since "the spirit bloweth where it listeth." But the *durée* of human life is a gauge of the individual relation, and a measure of the mutual interpenetration of soul and body.

Time in its mechanised form, the clock-time of our business world, would appear to be the reflection of such *durée*, an aggregate compounded of the mutual relations of many souls and bodies.

Durée gives a certain persistence to the body, persistence which its actuality could never have foreseen or hoped for; and indeed the body, under the impress of the soul, achieves a strange continuity, it lives and moves and has a being, "*pas si fugace que mes rêves*," as Proust remarks. It assumes a sort of self-subsistence, and has a measure of control over the complex situation of its drama.

Our bodies feel, where e'er we are,
Against or with our will.

Let us not always say
'Spite of this flesh to-day
I strove, made heed, gained ground upon the whole !'
As the bird wings and sings,
Let us cry 'All good things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul !'

To man, propose this test—
Thy body at its best,
How far can that project thy soul on its lone way ?

But the soul is still patron and paramount, and it is through the soul that we live and enjoy—enjoy *ourselves*, as we phrase it, since the soul stretches the self till it includes a manifold other—enjoy ourselves in what has been and in what may be, in the near and the far, in the actual and the possible.

The soul lights the body into many worlds, worlds of varied patterns, plans and purposes, and in these worlds we live many lives, lives of our heroes, lives of our fellows, and, in more deeply-lived intimacy, lives of our friends. We live by admiration, hope and love, and such life is the dower to the body of an indwelling soul.

The span of participation seems almost illimitable, but nevertheless it is conditioned by the degree of organisation of the vehicle, by the state of the body; a certain harmony in the complexity of the parts of the body, some internal efficiency of structure, are necessary for the maintenance of any deep ingression of soul life. We all know to our cost how

incapable of thought or action any illness renders us, how difficult it is to be at our best, as we say, whenever head or ear or tooth ache. And in such conditions our sense of time is dimmed, we do not look forward, but more or less resign ourselves to a state of inertia, of passivity, of "suffering" as contrasted with doing. If the parts are too much out of gear, if the machine cannot function more or less normally, the current does not pass, and *in extremis* the inhibition is complete and dissociation of soul and body takes place. The body becomes *in-animate*, its soul has fled.

Death has been likened to sleep, but indeed the two are at opposite poles of life. In sleep the soul abides with the body, but shares rather than penetrates the body's inertia; the soul abides, but is subject—subject to the random mechanism of the brain. It pauses, as it were, on its individual flight towards beauty, and humbly takes refuge in some nest, humbly shares some dim communal existence whose undifferentiation we designate as "nature."

In sleep the mutual tension of soul and body is at its minimum; as we lay us down to sleep, we renounce the stress of action and evade the effort of time.

But death, on the contrary, indicates a maximum of strain, association of body and soul broken by the inadequacy of a worn machine, or by some violent or disastrous change of structure. The soul has risen from the slumber of infancy or the heavy sleep of weariness to the vivid life of enjoyed communion with all that is, and from this it moves on, pushes past its bodily trammels, urges time beyond its safe amplitude, till the tension becomes critical. Then the body breaks and the soul is free once more, out of time, in eternity. It would seem from the above reflections that the problems of soul and body, and of time and eternity, are inextricably interwoven. Time is meaningless apart from bodily life, and the very being of the soul is eternity. No attempt has been, or can, of course, be made to *explain* these things, but it appears that in pursuing the track of time we reach intimations of immortality.

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TRANSLATIONS OF PASSAGES QUOTED.

The body shares in everything that happens to the soul; its joy or its sadness, its hope or its fear, its meekness or its anger—things spiritual in their source and remote from the

material—so deeply impress the body that it becomes a reflection of the moods of the soul ; its colour, its speech, its gestures take the form and colour of the actions of the soul, and it yields itself entirely to the soul, entering into its views and feelings as if itself had the same interest and the same intent.—Translated from Duguet.

The simple object of the soul is ever that which does not exist : that which was and is not ;—that which will be but is not yet ;—that which is possible, that which is impossible ;—the soul's concern is with these, but never, *never* with that which *is*.—Translated from “ L'ame et la danse,” by Paul Valéry.

But this body and spirit, this “ présence invinciblement actuelle ” and this “ absence créatrice ” which dispute between them the range of being and which yet must be harmonised ; this finite and this infinite which we bring with us, each in his own measure, must unite in an ordered structure ; and if, by the favour of the gods, they do work in harmony, if they mutually interchange order and grace, beauty and “ durée,” movement as against line, and number as against thought, it is that they will have found the true relation between them, that which is their act.—Translated from “ Eupalinos,” by Paul Valéry.

THE DIGNITY OF LABOUR.

SIR JOHN MARRIOTT.

“YOUR labour only may be sold ; your soul may not.” In that sentence John Ruskin crystallised his economic creed. In the seventy years which have elapsed since that creed was formulated English labour has been sold at a steadily increasing price. Has the labourer, in the process, bartered his soul ?

That question is pressed home in an arresting little book which came into my hands a few weeks ago.¹ And it seems to me to demand an answer. Among the many difficult problems which confront the citizen-rulers of the modern State there is perhaps none at once more baffling and more insistent than that of the *status* of manual labour. The problem is not, of course, new ; in one form or another it must needs confront every political society at all stages in its economic evolution. Somebody must do the dull work and the dirty work. But the problem, as it presents itself to us to-day, is far more complex than the problem which confronted the ancient world, or indeed the modern world, down to the last decades of the eighteenth century. Even later than that—down to the later years of the nineteenth century, the problem was primarily, almost exclusively, economic. The manual workers of the nineteenth century built up their great Trade Union organisation chiefly with the object of improving their material conditions—of getting higher wages and shorter hours. The product of industry was, as it seemed to them, unfairly distributed as between capital, management and manual workers, and the latter were determined to get a larger share of it. Trade Unions helped them to get it, and, incidentally, convinced John Stuart Mill that the doctrine

¹ *My Neighbour the Universe : A Study in Practical Ethics*, by L. P. Jacks. (Cassell.)

of the Wages Fund, accepted by himself, as by most of the older economists, could no longer be maintained. The pendulum of Economic Theory swung too far in the opposite direction—as it generally does. There *is* a wages fund ; but it is not rigid and inelastic as the older economists taught ; it is not predetermined by the fiat of the capitalists ; it depends mainly on the efficiency of the workers by hand and brain. But let that pass : I am not concerned in this paper with Economic Theory.

The economic factor, though no longer exclusive, remains nevertheless a constant one ; but to-day the problem is complicated by other factors. The material reward of labour is still a basic consideration ; man does not live by bread alone ; but he cannot live without it. The labourer must still sell his labour, and will naturally try to get the highest price for it. But “ wages ” are no longer his sole concern.

All the conditions of the problem have been entirely altered since Ruskin wrote *Time and Tide, Munera Pulveris* and *Unto This Last*. Two tremendous revolutions have been peacefully accomplished. The mass of the manual workers have received at least the rudiments of education, and they have become the rulers of the State. There are those who think that even in England we have moved too fast towards “ Democracy ” ; that some other countries have moved too fast is evident by the reactions which have alone saved them from anarchy. Many more think that education should have preceded, instead of followed, political emancipation ; that it would have been wise to educate our masters before making them masters of the fate of an Empire. But we must face the situation as we find it.

The situation is admittedly paradoxical. To admit the humblest worker to partnership in things of the mind ; to admit him to partnership—and senior partnership—in the government of the commonwealth, but to exclude him from partnership in the government of the industry to which he devotes his working life, and by which he earns his livelihood, may seem to betray a lack of sense of proportion : to swallow the camel while straining at the gnat. Be that as it may, it is quite certain that much of the restlessness and discontent so evident, less among the poorer than among the best-paid artisans, is due to a sense of indignity evoked by the contrast between material sufficiency and political supremacy on the one hand, and on the other industrial dependence and inferiority. To use (against my inclination) the cant phrases of the day, the democratisation of industry has not kept pace

with educational emancipation and the march of political democracy. That the problem of industry is infinitely complex is true ; that works' councils and similar devices have done a great deal to improve industrial relations, to allay suspicion and to give representative workmen some inkling of the intricacy of world-trade, is happily no less true. More rapid progress in this direction would be made if working-class investors (of whom there are at least 15,000,000) would invest some of their savings in the concerns in which they work. The precept against having all one's eggs in one basket is a prudent one ; and it commends itself, naturally enough, to the shrewd men and women of Lancashire and Yorkshire. But working-class capitalists, like others, will have to learn that risk is of the essence of trade, and that if they want a " partnership " they must be prepared to accept liabilities.

The problem, then, is in part economic, in part psychological ; it is also, in the large sense, political ; but it is from the side of ethics that Principal Jacks and others are to-day inclined to approach it.

The pertinent part of the argument advanced in the book to which I have referred may be summarised in a sentence : " Occupation determines character."

" A man's daily occupation [writes Dr Jacks] is always the determining factor in making him the kind of man he is. . . . Many other influences contribute to making the man what he is—such as religion, philosophy, schooling, parentage, family upbringing ; but none of these factors will have its full effect on his character, and some may have none at all, unless his daily occupations give him an opportunity for putting them into action ; unless, that is, he practises them *there*. It follows that every human occupation has its own moral type, sometimes distinct and sharp, sometimes indistinct and subtle, stamped on the character, often stamped on the face—of him who follows it " (p. 52).

Is this true ? That the passage embodies a truth of vital importance cannot be questioned ; but is it the whole truth ? Before attempting to answer that question, let us see the implications and consequences of the argument. If it be true that occupation determines character, it is evident that the moral character of a very large portion of mankind must, *by reason of their occupation*, fall very far short of the ideal. Dr Jacks admits and deplors it, and like Ruskin and others

of the same school he lays the blame upon the mechanisation of industry, upon large-scale production; in a word, upon that minute sub-division of industrial processes which we ascribe to the Industrial Revolution. But was there no drudgery before the end of the eighteenth century? No monotony in labour before the introduction of machinery? For answer let us turn to a society in which economic activities were reduced to the simplest elements, to a people whose wants were relatively few and a country where conditions, climatic and social, conduced to a desire for leisure rather than compelled to toil. I refer to ancient Athens, and I call to witness Professor Zimmern, whose detestation of the Industrial Revolution and all its fruits is at least equal to that of Principal Jacks. He is writing of social life in Athens.

“Yet society cannot get on without a basis of unpleasant and monotonous labour. There are regions of social work which can never be made artistic, and only with difficulty joyful, where with all the willingness in the world, the best that can be aimed at is a mere humdrum conscientiousness. There are pitchers to be filled, dinners to be cooked, clothes to be made and mended within the household. There is rough work to be done outside, in the heat of the sun, digging and lifting, pulling and pushing and carrying. . . . Even in a Greek city, which dispensed with so many conveniences, there must be someone to make roads and walls, to fell trees and quarry stone and extract the ore from the hillside. . . . Without the help of the general labourer the craftsmen of Greece were as helpless as our own more specialised societies. Plutarch makes this very clear for us in his account of the labour employed on the Acropolis buildings. . . . It is hard for us to realise how heavy and wearisome such labour was in the days before cranes and steam-rollers and all our labour-saving contrivances. . . . When we . . . look at the vast masses of stone used in the great State buildings of Athens, we begin to realise how much straining man power and brute power was expended on their construction.”

The odd thing is that one who realises this so clearly, and can state it with such admirable lucidity, can apparently regard with such profound distaste the “capitalistic” economy which has transferred to machines so much of the toil and drudgery formerly imposed upon human beings.

Upon human beings it is true; but in Greece mostly upon

such as were included in the category of "things." For most of the manual labour in Athens was done by slaves. In the ideal State, as conceived by Aristotle, it was all done either by slaves or by a class of artisans who were not admitted to the privileges nor called to the duties of citizenship.

Aristotle draws an even sharper distinction than Dr Jacks between one occupation and another. Some occupations, he holds, are liberal and honourable, others illiberal or sordid (*βάναιμσα ἔργα*).

"We must set down as sordid [he says] any work or art or study which makes freemen unfit for the active exercise of virtue either in body or character or intelligence; wherefore we call those acts sordid (or vulgar) which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employments, for they absorb and degrade the mind" (*Politics*, viii., 2, 3).

Dr Jacks does not go quite so far as this; but the spirit of Aristotle is surely strong upon him when he writes:

"If we try to classify human occupations according to the effect they have upon character, we shall find that they fall into two clearly distinguishable groups: (1) those whose value to the worker lies mainly in the work he does; (2) those whose value to the worker lies mainly in some extraneous reward (such as money) that he gets for doing the work."

And he takes an artist as typical of the first class. It is invidious to draw comparisons even between classes, but would Dr Jacks seriously contend that the level of character is higher among sculptors or painters than it is among (say) bankers? No one will deny high type of English character found in the Society of Friends. Are Quakers more commonly occupied in painting or in banking?

But Aristotle has an argumentative resource denied to Dr Jacks. He not only accepts slavery as an established institution; but defends it as a beneficent institution—in the ideal State. For in such a State the citizen-body is, *ex hypothesi*, composed of completely virtuous men (*σπουδαῖοι ἀπλῶς*). Slaves, and indeed manual labourers, can have no real part in such a State; they are only the necessary conditions of its existence. "Without these shall not a city be inhabited," but "they shall not be sought for in the council of the people." It is their function to provide the citizen with the material substratum of the good life, which the State

exists to render possible. In the full virtue of the good life no one can share who does not possess leisure ; whose mind and activities are absorbed in care for material necessities. "The wisdom of the scribe," says the Preacher, "cometh by opportunity of leisure, and he that hath little business is wise." So thought Aristotle. All citizens' activities of mind and body must be devoted to the promotion of the well-being of the State—to Politics. Military service for the young ; philosophy and politics for those of advancing years—these alone should be the preoccupation of the citizen, living the good life. The sordid occupations, necessary to life, must be performed by those who being themselves *βάνανροι* may not be admitted to citizenship. Not that (under ideal conditions) the slave or the artisan suffered by such exclusion. On the contrary, the "natural slave"—the man whose condition is due to nature and not to the fortunes of war—will be uplifted in character by association with the wholly virtuous citizen.

To the modern world such views are, of course, anathema. Christianity has revolutionised the standard of human values. But this must be said in explanation, if not extenuation, of Aristotle's views. The slavery which he knew and defended was of a totally different kind from that denounced by Wilberforce and abolished by Lincoln. Moreover, the defence applied only to the conditions of the ideal State. As one of the finest of Aristotelian commentators has said :

"The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The notion that *that* was the end to which a thousand lives of toil were a mere means would have seemed an astounding one to him. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul, this is the kind of 'high life' with which *βάνανροια* is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable."

But Aristotle's exclusiveness did not stop short at manual labour : it extended to retail trade, and this for a reason eminently characteristic of Athenian if not of Greek thought in general. The retail trader was constantly handling money. Indeed, as Professor Zimmern points out :

"Retail traders, when one comes to think of it, were almost the only people in a Greek city who were con-

tinually handling coin, and were thus peculiarly exposed to the temptation of reckoning wealth or happiness in that fallacious medium."

On this point Aristotle is very emphatic: money, though indisputably a convenience, is nevertheless the root of all evil, since it creates confusion between the means and the end, in fine, between money and wealth.

"Originating in the use of coin, the art of money-making is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it. . . . Indeed, wealth is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the art of money-making and retail trade are concerned with coin. . . . Men seek after a better notion of wealth and of the art of making money than the mere acquisition of coin; and they are right. For natural wealth and the natural art of money-making are a different thing" (*Politics*, 1, 9).

Thus did Aristotle anticipate the teaching of Adam Smith, and prophetically expose one of the root fallacies of the "Mercantilist" or rather the "Bullionist" school. Aristotle's treatment of the whole subject of Economics is, indeed, a curious commingling of profound truth and transparent error. But that a Greek philosopher should have attained so much of Economic truth is far more remarkable than that he should have lent his authority to some curiously persistent errors.

Among these the most serious and the most persistent is, perhaps, the contempt and suspicion with which he (and many more recent prophets) regard the economic function of "Exchange." Even now it would seem to be imperfectly apprehended how largely the people of these crowded islands owe their daily bread to the Exchange operations of the "City," to the fact that London is still the financial centre of the world. But a discussion of this point would carry me beyond the limits of this paper. The immediate point is that in Aristotle's view βάνανσιὰ attaches to the occupation of the retail trader, no less than to that of the manual labourer; both, therefore, must, in the Ideal State, be excluded from the ranks of citizenship.

But he goes even further. "All paid employments absorb and degrade the mind." So anxious is he on this point, that he would carefully limit the degree of excellence to which children should be permitted to attain in music.¹ Music is a

¹ μουσική meant more to Aristotle than 'music' to us. It meant any art over which the muses presided.

necessary element in education, since "it has a power of forming the character," and is also conducive (if not studied to excess) to the right use of leisure. But danger lurks in excellence: for the child may be tempted to become a "professional."

"By professional we mean that which is adopted in contests, for in this the performer practises the art, not for the sake of his own improvement, but in order to give pleasure, and that of a vulgar sort, to his hearers."

Consequently,

"the right measure will be attained if students of music stop short of the acts which are practised in professional contests, and do not seek to acquire those fantastic marvels of execution which are now the fashion in such contests, and from these have passed into education" (*Politics*, viii., 6).

We shall do well to ponder these sayings. They have an obvious bearing not only on the whole question of "professionalism" in sport, but on the place of "games" in education. The prevailing tendency to-day is, I imagine, in the direction of professional excellence; the Victorian amateur (*e.g.* in music and painting) is somewhat at a discount; the child with a "gift" for music or painting is encouraged to cultivate it to the standard of professionalism, if not to make it a profession; the child who has little aptitude is advised to "drop the subject." The contrast between this attitude and that of Aristotle needs no emphasis. The essential point at issue in the whole discussion is whether or no the taking of pay for work done, for "professional" or other services rendered, is degrading to the recipient—so far degrading as to exclude him, under ideal conditions, from the duties and privileges of citizenship, from participation in the highest of all intellectual activities—that of "ruling and being ruled."

In this connection Professor Zimmern has a passage so singularly apposite that I venture on a lengthy quotation:

"The real reason why, in spite of the predilection of Plato and other writers for a Socialist system, Athenians managed their affairs on such sturdily individualistic lines, was the rooted dislike of the Greeks, and chief among the Greeks of the Athenians, to discipline and organisation. It was not that they objected to working

in a State system ; it was that they objected to working in any system whatsoever. It was their settled inclination and one of their proudest boasts to remain amateurs, to be supreme, as they said of perhaps their greatest statesman in 'improvising right remedies for sudden emergencies,' and this inclination, strengthened by the sudden and startling successes by which they emerged into prominence, grew with every enlargement of their experience. . . . Athenian enterprise presents a picture, if ever there was one, of the artistic temperament in action ; and the artistic temperament, as we know from its hard struggle with modern conditions, shuns, rather by instinct than out of policy, the drudgery of office work, the restraint of a 'settled' position, and all the discipline and regularity of organised service. These things are for others : and the artist will not envy them their reward." ¹

Incidentally, but irresistibly, the question obtrudes itself whether one of the foremost of modern peoples, though hardly an example of the "artistic temperament in action," has not, like the Athenians of old, been too much inclined to rely on "masterstrokes of improvisation" ? Anyway, England has been described as a "nation of amateurs." Mr Oliver's Baron von Hexenküchen was, in the early days of the war, quick to contrast the "quiet experts" who virtually ruled Germany through its admirable civil service, with the "loquacious amateurs" whom he supposed to be the dominant power in English affairs.

"With you [said the supposed German critic] the fame of the showy amateur fills the mouths of the public. We, on the contrary, exalt the expert, the man who has been trained to the job he undertakes."

The war did not prove so conclusive an argument in favour of the "expert" as the Baron had exultingly anticipated. Other critics, perhaps more discerning, discovered the peculiar and characteristic excellence of English institutions—the secret of the success of self-government in England—to consist in the felicitous combination of amateur and professional, of layman and expert.² This co-operation undeniably runs through the whole gamut of public life in England ; judge and jury ; mayor and town clerk ; magis-

¹ *The Greek Commonwealth*, pp. 287-8.

² A. Laurence Lowell : *The Government of England*, i., 176.

trate and justice's clerk ; cabinet minister and civil servant. Has not Fielding immortalised the association ? And Walter Scott ? And Mr Nupkins and Mr Jinks are perhaps even more familiar associates than Justice Foxley and Nicholas Faggot, than Squire Western and his clerk.

And this brings me back, if by a somewhat devious route, to Principal Jacks. Is he right in his contention that occupation determines character ? Is the " artist " whose chief aim is, or ought to be, not money reward, but artistic perfection, likely to be the better man and the better citizen, than the managing director of Harrod's Stores or the chairman of Barclays Bank ? Does it give me any purer pleasure to write a letter to *The Times* than an article for the HIBBERT JOURNAL ? It may be the sign of a mercenary spirit, but I think the latter is somewhat the higher pleasure ; I have an equal satisfaction in writing, and there awaits me an additional pleasure in the one case which is absent in the other.

These considerations bring us, it would seem, to the heart of the whole matter. It is not (with all deference to Aristotle and Dr Jacks) the nature of the occupation that determines character and brings joy to the worker, but the spirit in which the work is done. Far be it from me to deny that the nature of the work has *some* influence on character ; it may be easier for the artist to find pleasure in his work than for the weaver. Yet even in these days it takes as many generations (so they tell me in the Stroud valley) to make a first-rate weaver as it is proverbially (but untruly) said to do to make a scholar. Has Dr Jacks never come across " hands " in a calico printing mill who are as proud of the product of that mill, as though they had made it from start to finish themselves ? These may be exceptional cases, and in a good part of Dr Jacks' contention I am more than ready to concur. None the less I respectfully submit that he has not pierced to the heart of the matter. He would reverse the proportion at present existing between skilled and unskilled workers, between " liberal " and " sordid " occupations. So would I —if I dare. But I could venture to do so only if Dr Jacks would help me to take a preliminary step. At least 50 per cent. of our existing population would have to find new homes overseas. The point which the Utopians invariably ignore is the obstinate fact of population. England, in the pre-industrial era, sustained perhaps 7,000,000 people. With the improved methods of husbandry which we owe to " capitalistic " farming, we could perhaps sustain 15 to 20 millions to-day. Dr Jacks must help the rest to migrate.

Yet, even if sordid occupations are essential to the existence of a large population on a constricted area, they may still have a bad influence on the formation of character. Admitted. But is there any evidence that they have? Is the level of character lower (say) in Banbury to-day than it was before there was a process-worker in the town. Put it the other way round. Are there not (proportionately) as many artists painting portraits with the primary object of earning a large fee as there are printers bent on high wages? Great surgeons are, no doubt, inspired, as a rule, by professional zeal, by a desire to alleviate human suffering; but does the fact that the alleviation of suffering also brings them large material reward tend to deteriorate their character?

Much depends on inspiration and education. And that brings me to my final point, and to the essential purpose of this paper. I am convinced that the future of a democratic society like our own mainly depends on the spirit with which we can inspire all our young citizens—whatever their destined avocations. Are they destined to be surgeons or scavengers; to bake bread (by machinery) or manage a bank; to distribute milk or preside over a Cabinet? Equally they can serve the Commonwealth if they be inspired to go the daily round and perform the trivial task,

“As ever in the great task-master’s eye.”

To banish the trivial task, the sordid occupation, is impossible, save perhaps in Utopia, and even in Utopia you can do it—if at all—only by a strict limitation of population. But it is not impossible to idealise the banal occupations; to help the scavenger to perceive that in the scrupulous performance of his allotted task he is performing a service to the community as important as the trained skill of the great surgeon. Few dairymen, perhaps, are idealists; nor are all artists. But it should not be impossible to convince the former that the health of the community is not less, but more, important than its appreciation of colour and form. Such a conviction—the sense of service, whether the service be “honourable” or “menial,” can alone give dignity to labour.

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THE LEISURE PROBLEM.

PRINCIPAL A. BARRATT BROWN.

IT is significant that the word "leisure" and the word "licence" have a common origin in the Latin verb "licere" = "to be permitted"—to possess freedom of action in a certain sphere. A "licence" is a permission to exercise freedom in certain matters. "Licentiousness" is misuse of that freedom. The connection with "leisure" is not without significance. Leisure is the time permitted to us to act freely, the time that is at our own disposal, to be spent in our own way in activities of our own choosing. The opposite of leisure, then, is not work, but industry or business—the work that must be performed at certain times and according to orders.

Leisure is not necessarily vacant, idle, or unemployed; its characteristic is that it is employed exactly as we choose, and not at the beck and call of others or under the continuous pressure of a disciplined routine. It may be spent fruitfully or misspent licentiously, and that is why the leisure problem, though it is seldom spoken of as a problem, is no less important than the labour problem. Moreover, the two problems are closely interrelated. The interdependence of industry and leisure is shown in three main ways:

(1) The amount of time spent in industry determines the amount of time available for leisure.

(2) The amount of energy absorbed in industry determines the amount of energy available for leisure.

(3) The character of our leisure interests and occupations (or preoccupations) determines in large measure the character and direction of productive industry, because in our leisure we consume not only time, but goods and services.

I.

One of the biggest differences between ancient and modern civilisation (and probably also between Eastern and

Western civilisation) is in the attitude to work and leisure, and in the proportion of workdays to holidays. It is partly perhaps a question of climate. Modern civilisation is predominantly a Northern and Western civilisation, while the ancient civilisations were of the East and South. The Northern climate is more conducive to continuous physical and mental activity. At any rate, it would appear that in the ancient world life was more leisurely and work more intermittent. Primitive man pursued his objects in life, including the prey on which he depended for his food, by intermittent spells of energy engaged in "by fits and starts." That is probably the natural tendency of the human organism, and Professor Graham Wallas is of the opinion that

"sustained muscular or mental effort is 'unnatural' to us, though it is necessary for the creation of the wealth and power without which civilised man cannot exist.

"Civilised man, therefore, when he digs potatoes, or adds up figures, as his regular daily occupation, is using continuously, under the direction of self-conscious will, powers which were evolved for intermittent use under the direction of impulse; and he suffers, in consequence, daily fatigue, and at longer intervals severe nervous reaction."¹

The ancient civilisations, which were nearer to primitive conditions, preserved something of the intermittent attitude in their arrangement of work, and it is probable that the dislike of more regular and exacting work and its restriction to native serfs or foreign slaves was prompted not by the desire to be idle, but by the desire to be leisurely.

It is significant that though there is a Greek word for "work," there is no word for "business," except a negative term meaning "absence of leisure" (*ἀσχολία*). Leisure was the positive term (*σχολή*), and it has often been pointed out that it is also the word from which we derive the words "school," "scholar," and so on.

Time was divided in the ancient world between agriculture and mental and physical culture. The frequency of popular and religious festivals or holidays (*i.e.* holy days) down to the end of the Middle Ages is further evidence of a more leisurely tradition. We must probably ascribe the beginning of industrial civilisation in large part to the Puritan Movement, with its emphasis on continuous industry as a moral duty and its disparagement of the arts and amusements of leisure.

¹ *Social Heritage*, p. 29.

The Industrial Revolution wrought a further change in the habits of life. Work became more rigidly organised and disciplined when the factory supplanted the domestic workshop, and the machine and not the craftsman's will dictated the speed of work. In the interests of profits the fullest use of the machinery required a long working day, which left little or no time or energy for leisure interests. Just as Aristotle invented the excuse for slavery that some men are by nature "living tools" and "have a capacity for belonging to someone else," so the early capitalist employers invented the excuse that some men are "incapable of profiting by leisure and fit only for the long discipline of factory hours." The Hammonds declare that this was the prevailing view among the employers in the early nineteenth century, and quote a statement of the year 1818 to the following effect :

"All experience proves that in the lower orders the deterioration of morals increases with the quantity of unemployed time of which they have the command."¹

Holidays were reduced to a minimum, and although the Festivals of Christmas, Easter and Whitsuntide remain Festivals of the Church and public holidays, they make the rest of the working year stand out in even greater contrast than when there were more frequent festivals.

Mr. Delisle Burns, in *Industry and Civilisation*, has pointed out the significance of the modern institution of "Bank Holiday." Speaking of the festival in the Middle Ages and in non-industrial countries to-day, he says :

"The holiday which is a festival is not a mere rest or interval in work. It is an expending of energy upon other objects : and indeed the working days are conceived to be for the sake of the holiday. In such festivals there is communal enjoyment, and the art of consumption is expressed in song and dance. These festivals died out with the coming of the industrial era, but it was found that the rhythms which they had allowed in life had been useful and reinvigorating. The other effects were unnoticeable, for they were not calculable in exchange values. In order to obtain, therefore, a reinvigoration, the reformers reintroduced the intervals in work, but no longer as festivals. Significantly the intervals were called 'bank' holidays, and they were thus made part of the economic life. They were times

¹ *The Town Labourer*, p. 49.

when even the banker ceased to bank. . . . The new bank holidays, therefore, good as they were by contrast to the continuous toil which was the only alternative then imagined, are signs of a degraded civilisation" (pp. 214-15).

It is generally recognised that the gradual reduction of hours of work during the last half-century brought some measure of relief from the strain of industry to the actual advantage of output and quality of work. It is notable that one of the advantages claimed for the Ten Hours Act was that it made clear the distinction between the worker's own time and his master's. The Report of Inspectors of Factories for 1848 says :

"The worker knows now when the time which he sells is ended, and when his own begins, and by possessing a sure foreknowledge of this, is enabled to prearrange his own minutes for his own purposes."

They go on to suggest that the employers also felt the advantage, as they were free to give time to something other than business, and even for a little "culture," whereas in former days "the master had no time for anything but money, the servant had no time for anything but labour." ¹

It is significant that a certain hostility that is sometimes manifested against factory welfare work that extends to the organisation of the leisure time and interests of the worker arises from the feeling that is expressed in the words : "I give the employer my work time, why should he want to encroach on my leisure ?" ²

We may expect the length of the working day, or at any rate of the working week, to be still further reduced from the eight-hour standard that largely obtains to-day.

Lord Leverhulme, in his evidence before the Munition Workers' Committee, made his famous pronouncement in favour of a six-hour day :

"When our modern industries are run on a less fatiguing system of, say, two shifts each of six and a half hours, with half an hour off for meals (making six working hours in all per day), the efficiency of the worker by thus avoiding fatigue can be increased by 33 per cent., and consequently as much work can readily be done in

¹ Cited by Marx in *Capital*, Vol. I., end of chap. viii.

² R. M. Fox, *The Triumphant Machine*, p. 12.

six working hours as under present conditions is done in eight."

Mr Cecil Chisholm, in his *Vulcan*, prophesies a four- or five-day week, with a working day of six to eight hours, by 1950--and looking further ahead expects a three-day and a two-day week to follow--until ultimately one day a week is reached. Machinery and synthetic chemistry together make this prospect at least conceivable.

In the meantime, how far is even a moderate expansion of leisure a compensation for the uninteresting work which we have found to be increasingly the human lot?

The author of *The Triumphant Machine* holds that even a short period of repetition work is bound to have serious consequences for the worker, and that its influence must inevitably carry over into his leisure, resulting, as he puts it, "in a 'feed and speed' outlook on life." For "if a daily dose of poison, however small, is taken, the worker can hardly escape unharmed."¹

Mr Bernard Shaw, on the other hand, has contended that we all ought to contribute "a daily share of service to the community," and asserts that he himself would prefer to contribute it in the form of work that is "as brainlessly mechanical as you can make it." "For my two hours or so of obligatory service let me be as complete a Robot as possible, so that I may do my job without having to turn my mind on to it."²

We have good reason to expect that the more mechanical repetition work of the machine-tender will increasingly itself be taken over by the machine, and it would appear desirable on the one hand to hand over to the machine all the work that is heavy, or repetitive, or in any other way uninteresting and monotonous, and on the other hand to reclaim from the machine some forms of work that are peculiarly enjoyable because they call for all the absorption and artistic skill of the craftsman. The remaining drudgery--and it is not likely that we shall eliminate all forms of drudgery--can be allotted in short spells of labour to those who have a second or alternative occupation--whether intellectual or artistic. Already in the allotment and small holdings movement and in the "Homecraft plan" we have a means by which not only spells of unemployment may be tided over, but also permanently attractive and fruitful occupations of leisure can be found.

¹ R. M. Fox, *The Triumphant Machine*, p. 12.

² Cited by Chisholm, *Vulcan*, p. 72.

II.

And that brings me to the question—how is leisure spent to-day, and how can we educate with a view to its better employment in the future? It will have already appeared that the way in which leisure is employed is bound largely to depend on the hours and conditions of work—not only on the amount of time left over from it, but the amount of energy left over. After a long working day there is little time available for anything, beyond eating and sleeping. Rest indeed, complete relaxation of both mind and body, is a rhythmical necessity of man's nature which is always bound to occupy from five to eight hours of the twenty-four, which consequently further restricts the period of waking leisure. Recreation again, in the form of physical exercise or the various kinds of play, is an essential means of restoring and recreating both body and mind. Change of occupation indeed, and not merely cessation of occupation, has a remarkable effect in restoring poise and tone. Here in fact the brain worker has a marked advantage over the so-called manual worker, for he can turn with relief and zest to physical activity, whereas the manual worker cannot turn as readily and gladly to mental activity, for, in the first place, many kinds of manual work are falsely so-called because they require a considerable degree of dexterity, alertness and decision involving more brain activity than some forms of clerical work which are largely automatic; and in the second place, physical fatigue affects the nervous system and the brain, and incapacitates for arduous mental effort. A working-class student who was asked to supply evidence for the Adult Education Report of the Ministry of Reconstruction reported that in his case after his day's work "Physical exhaustion has usually reached a point where no advantage can be taken of educational opportunities."

Hence the familiar tendency of the worker to resort in leisure hours to amusements that titillate and mildly entertain a passive mind rather than to those which make exacting demands on his attention. The music-hall performance and the "pictures" owe their excess of popularity over that of the drama and the concert not merely to cheaper prices nor to "lowbrow" tastes, but to the tired bodies and jaded nerves of the audience.

Mental fatigue again, arising from monotony and lack of interest in life and work, is accountable for the resort to forms of excitement like betting and gambling, or to narcotics

like alcohol. Alcohol presents a means of escape and of detachment from irksome conditions of life that is eagerly sought by those who need escape, and who resort to this as a form of dope. For it is notable that drinking and gambling are alike resorted to by those who are either too tired or too bored to be able to occupy their leisure in more creative forms of interest and enjoyment. Working-class students have told me that during their period in college they have lost any desire to gamble or to drink to which they would normally succumb in their ordinary working life.

The tendencies to gambling and drinking are not merely a question of economic conditions, for the same tendencies are found often in the most extreme excesses among those who are relieved from all economic pressure, but who are afflicted by an excessive amount of unemployed leisure which they have never learnt to occupy in any fruitful way. This "leisure class" has been well analysed by Veblen, who points out two main characteristics: (1) "conspicuous leisure" or non-productive consumption of time, involving dependence not only on the productive workers of the world, but also on the personal services of a "vicarious leisure class" of footmen, lacqueys and other domestic servants; (2) conspicuous consumption and ostentatious display of luxury. To these habits of a "leisure class" may be added a tendency to restlessness and futile movement. Mr Wells, in *William Clissold*, describes the "stratum of futility" among the prosperous middle-aged:

"The activity to escape mental solitude is remarkable. Most of the rushing about in motor cars is plainly due to that. The rich, ageing Americans in particular, seem constantly in flight across the Atlantic from something that is always, nevertheless, waiting for them on the other side, whichever side it happens to be. There would not be all this vehement going to and fro if they were not afraid of something that sought them in the quiet places. And what else can that something be but just these questions that have confronted us? 'There is only a little handful of water left now. What do you mean to do with it? What under the stars is the meaning of your life?' 'Oh hell!' they say at the first intimation of that whisper, 'Where are we going to to-morrow?'"

Principal Jacks, in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for January, 1929, draws attention to the same tendency in all quarters to-day:

"We tend more and more to spend our leisure on the move, like nomads; seldom in one place for five minutes without wishing to be somewhere else, a want which the waiting motor stands ready to satisfy. Our homes, in which we are supposed to rest, are in danger of becoming mere points of departure."

Consideration of the habits and standards of a class removed from the necessity of work and supplied with a superabundance of both wealth and leisure, leads one to sound a warning against any social policy which is confined to the demand for increased material prosperity and decreased hours of labour. It becomes increasingly important to accompany the pursuit of higher wages and shorter hours by a process of education which will guide men in the spending of their wealth and in the spending of their leisure. And such education will reflect itself not only in the character of leisure occupations but also by the reaction of the leisure demands of the consumer upon the character of the commodities and services which are the objects of production. Principal Jacks asks us to examine the goods in the shop windows and the type of industrial securities that are booming to see "from what quarter the wind mainly blows in our industrial climate. *It blows mainly from the leisure end.*" He points as characteristic of our time to the fact that pleasure *buying* has taken the place of pleasure *seeking*; that, as Mr Joad says in his *Diogenes: or The Future of Leisure*, we are coming to have "a false notion of entertainment as something for which one pays."

"Change the character of a nation's leisure," says Dr Jacks, "and a corresponding change in the character of its labour is bound to follow."

It is possible that we are going through a transitional period in which we are experiencing a reaction from a condition in which our appetite for material goods and comforts has been overlong starved and thwarted, and Professor Dewey thinks that we may look forward to "recovery of a sane equilibrium after the so long inhibited appetites have glutted themselves."¹

But we have to remember that a younger generation is growing up which knows nothing of the former inhibitions and hardships, and is acquiring standards of taste and enjoyment which it will be difficult to dislodge.

Education in all stages—from the school to the Uni-

¹ In *Whither Mankind?* p. 325.

versity—is too generally viewed as a means to a livelihood and a career, *i.e.* as an equipment for work ; and too seldom viewed as an equipment for leisure. For this reason two forms of education are of peculiar importance—education in the humanities and education in the arts and crafts—the latter of increasing importance if we are to witness the disappearance of the craftsman's skill from the field of industry.

For it is both probable and desirable that what we regard to-day as hobbies—from handicrafts to allotments, and from philosophy to play production—will become the occupations which engage the major interest and attention of men's lives.

Already in the various branches of the adult education movement there is a growing demand for all kinds of education for leisure—not only in intellectual studies, but in artistic and practical pursuits. This movement, in fact, is no less important than the other wings of the working-class movement, since the organisation of leisure is no less important than the organisation of labour. As Dean Inge has recently reminded us : “The soul is dyed the colour of its leisure thoughts.”

It might seem at first sight that the organisation of leisure was a contradiction in terms, since leisure is by definition the time that we spend in our own way and on our own initiative. But just as the play of children loses nothing of its freshness and spontaneity when it is guided in organised games by judicious and unobtrusive suggestion and leadership, so the leisure of adults may gain from the guidance and direction of groups who are not only able to provide the best facilities for leisure occupations, but also to foster the corporate life and atmosphere which enhance and reinforce individual effort. We must, however, guard against over-organisation. It is possible so to organise people's leisure that they never have any time to themselves to be really leisurely. Over-organisation here, as elsewhere, defeats its own ends. Many of us are already in danger of losing one of the most valuable features of leisure—the opportunity of mental relaxation, which, as Professor Graham Wallas has reminded us in his *Art of Thought*, affords one of the best conditions for the “incubation” of new ideas, and the inspiration of creative art.

In conclusion, I would suggest that the arrangement and enjoyment of leisure is an art that needs careful thought and preparation. The art of life, indeed, consists largely in the capacity to spend wisely and happily the hours in which we

are most free—free from the demands and behests of others, free to plan our own activities in and at our own time. To waste those moments is to waste something extraordinarily precious. One of the most horrible and insensate forms of cruelty is killing time.

Let me not be misunderstood. I am not suggesting that rest and relaxation or recreation (bodily or mental) are a waste of time. There are worse abuses of time than either rest or sport. To name but one, there is idle gossip, which is the very degradation of the art of conversation.

We often speak of the margin of leisure. I am reminded of the wide or narrow margin of a piece of writing on the page of a book. Often there is little or no margin in which to write one's comments or suggestions. But when the margin is wide what do we do with it? Sometimes when the print is fine to look at and the matter irreproachable, the margin is best left white and clean, save for a few marks of personal appreciation or corroboration. Sometimes, as in the essays or examination papers that some of us have to read (for our sins), the margin must be filled with corrections or comments in blue pencil or red ink. So when the daily text of life is poor and mean, the margin of leisure must be used to correct and readjust it.

But the ideal perhaps is to be found in one of those old illuminated manuscripts of the Middle Ages that you may see in the Bodleian, and that belong to the days (though I do not say the good old days) before the age of the machine. The big black letters of the small space of text are surrounded by beautiful and delicate pictures and decorations—brightly coloured scrolls and leaves and flowers or landscapes and portraits that illustrate and illuminate the text. And in Utopia the margin of leisure will be wide and full of beauty, if, indeed, the text and the margin are distinguishable, and a man's leisure will illuminate and illustrate his work. For work and play, industry and art, will have come together, craftsmanship will complete the work of the machine, and the machine the work of craftsmanship, leisure will complete the life of work, and work complete the life of leisure.

Till then we must prize what margin of leisure is vouchsafed to us, and fill it with what fancies most delight us and are most likely in their turn to delight our fellow-men.

A. BARRATT BROWN.

ART AND RECREATION.¹

SAMUEL S. FLEISHER.

Founder of the Graphic Sketch Club, Philadelphia.²

IN one of his most inspired moments, Henri Lavedan, the French Academician, in a series of articles written during the World War, entitled *Great Moments*, asked the pertinent question as to what all the nations were really fighting for. And he answered it by saying that, amid all the tumult of discussion and controversy, the one thing that everybody knew they were fighting for was the safety and the future of the children of all countries. If this was the real issue in the greatest of all wars, we know to-day that there is no greater issue in times of peace than the question of what we are doing for the child of to-day in order that he may, in every way, be the finer man of the morrow. How to accomplish this is exercising the greatest minds in education and statecraft, not only here, but all over the world. For there is a community of interest in this issue to-day which is leading all countries into a universal exchange of experiences at Geneva, in promoting those cultural and spiritual things that will make life better and happier for the young, and, inevitably, through the young for every one in any given civilisation.

The question of the hour is, What is America doing in this line comparable to what has been credited to it in the line of its unexampled achievements in applying science to the convenience and comforts of everyday life. If the indictment of the alleged materialism of America may have been warranted or unwarranted in the past, as compared with

¹ An address delivered before the National Education Congress, Louisville, Kentucky, October, 1929.

² This remarkable institution, which the Editor has recently visited, is described in the article.—EDITOR.

civilisation elsewhere, the thing for us to take into account is what we can do in a free democracy to remove the reproach that we ourselves may make as to any indifference we may have shown in general to those things that will bring art and beauty not only into the lives of the few, but into the lives of the many and at the earliest possible age. There is no question about it that on all sides we see signs of a great enthusiasm in this matter of art for the people, used not in any narrow sense as to the value of the fine arts, the arts of sculpture, painting, music, the dance, literature, or the applied or decorative and domestic arts, but in that greatest of all the applied, greatest of all the fine arts, the fine art of living. Our time on earth is of but short duration; with each life comes its apportionment of joy and sorrow—we can enlarge on either, but I know of no better way of expanding one's opportunity for real pleasure than in the cultivation of one's tastes for beauty and art. As a matter of fact, no life seems quite complete, be it ever so useful or successful, that has not felt the thrill that comes with such appreciation or creation. Thousands of young people toil during the day whose lives are unavoidably cast upon a background of routine and sameness—the world's work must be done—to them should be offered pastures where beauty and inspiration may be gathered, places where rich and poor alike may give expression to their finer emotions—play-grounds for the soul.

To accomplish this in America should be no difficult task. For it is agreed by all, even by our European critics, that nowhere in the world are what is called the welfare movements and the playground and recreational activities, interacting through the public schools of all grades and through public institutions such as the Public Libraries and Art Museums, carried on on a scale we all know is true of this country. Indeed, the interest in these matters is intense, even in political as well as educational circles, the country over. Everywhere men and women of competence are giving their thought as to how we may realise all the possibilities of the school-life period and all the recreational functions connected with the school-life and how the museums and art galleries may be made a part, as it were, of the everyday life of the young, and so, in turn, a part of the life of the home and the elders as well. That in certain instances we are reaching out in the right direction is shown in that at an international conference on museums, the Director of the Museum at Lyons, France, and the Director of the Museum

at Brussels pointed out that the art museums of America, not only the older ones, but the younger ones in the West, were getting nearer to the people and doing more for the children of the country than was the case in Europe. Among the museums mentioned as ramifying everywhere into the life of the city, that of Toledo was especially praised, while it is well known to most of us that the late John Cotton Dana, of the Newark Public Library and the Newark Museum, acquired a country-wide fame a few years ago by showing how he was bringing the museums not only into the schools and the homes, but into the industries and the department stores as well. His admirable efforts along these lines represented the achievements of a strong personality who believed that art could be apprehended by all the peoples. As for the American library, at an international conference of librarians it was also pointed out that all the libraries of America were unique in their efforts to get at the public and make the library an accessory of the home as well as the school. Indeed, what we have done in this particular was well summed up very recently by Dr Guido Ferrando, Professor of English Literature at the University of Florence, Italy, who declared the public library system of the United States to be one of the most astonishing accomplishments of modern democracy.

“The American library [he said] functions for all the people; the European library exists to preserve books. Your libraries are wonderful not merely in the books which they contain, but especially in the details which emanate from them and become socialising and spiritualising forces.”

With all that is going on in this country to bring the arts into the schools and into the public life and homes of the people, I am sympathetic in the greatest degree. However, after thirty years of effort in bringing art to the humblest in Philadelphia, I realise that in all centres throughout the country there are untouched fields that we must develop if we are to attain our highest aims. Granted everything that is being done for the play side and the recreational side of life in our schools, colleges, and in the summer camps, Playgrounds, Boy Scouts and Girls' Camp Fire movements, many of which are concerned chiefly with the athletic side of life developed on an extensive and magnificent scale, it still must be remembered that we must exercise the souls just as well as the bodies. Even the sound mind in the sound body, said to be the concern of the old pagan education, called for

an extensive training in the appreciation of the arts of poetry, music, the dance, and painting and sculpture. And in view of the very stress of things physical and mechanical in modern life, we must insist on the spiritual as well as the physical being made a matter of high concern in the playgrounds in the recreational movements of American public schools and in American life in general. Art with us cannot be aristocratic, something to be enjoyed and understood by the few, for art itself is the most democratic thing in the world. And a triumphant democracy will be empty of accomplishments unless it represents the triumph of the arts in life instead of mere physical well-being. There should be no difficulty in bringing this about, since the approach to art is simple when one really understands it. Art itself knows no caste or class or distinction or origins or conditions of birth, and very often passes over the heads of the rich only to drop its choicest blessings in some little court where one would least expect it. As a matter of fact, any one who has worked at this problem knows that the people can be trusted to enjoy art, to understand art and to live with it and by it. For we all have bottled up within us the finer emotions inherent in human beings, such as love of and a pleasurable reaction to flowers, music, pictures, wholesome plays, wholesome dancing, good reading and the simple and magnificent phenomena of nature; the slant of the sun across the shut-in courts of noisome alleys or the gleam on towered skyscrapers, or the still small voice of the wind among the trees.

The question before us is how we may utilise all these various movements that are now part of American life so as to give art its proper place in every department of our educational endeavours as well as in the home life and the public life of every centre. As we look around at the great recreational grounds being established for the young, stadiums and such like, and find that most municipalities that are up to date are now concerned about the play outlet of youth as an offset to idleness and crime, and indeed are concerned about what people in general are to do with their leisure, the results of industrial advancements, why not let us insist that in every great centre, whatever else may be done for the benefit of the people, there should be a Temple of Youth, a real palace of delight, in which all those recreational and creative and interpretative activities in which art plays its part shall be enshrined. In such a Temple of Youth the theatre would have its place, as well as the music hall, and the dance be brought into its own. The

beauty that inheres in every phase of the interpretative arts should be revealed first in the building itself, which should be distinguished in all its exterior and interior appointments, but, in addition, the existence of such a Temple of Youth should make it possible to hold exhibitions of works of art in sculpture and painting, to carry on carnivals and competitions, and to develop a centre where not only could be shown the work of those who have arrived, but which would also give an outlet for the productions of those who have not arrived, the artists and artificers who need, above all, to be brought in contact with a larger public and to experience the encouragement of public appreciation. Such a Temple of Youth would well fit in with the plans of public improvements that are going on in so many centres. But, if some may say that this kind of a centre would be beyond the possibilities of many of our municipalities, it must be remembered that our municipalities and our schools are spending and expect to spend many more millions on recreational features which deal only with a relatively narrow aspect of the life of the young. It must be remembered that the Olympic Games which made a little town in Greece memorable in all history did not overlook the finer things, and the poets were as conspicuous there as the athletes, and it would seem to me that it is an extremely practical thing to develop continuously in American life such Olympic centres worthy of the democracy of the twentieth century.

If, however, while waiting for this larger project to develop, as the result of my experiences with the Graphic Sketch Club, which in a way is such a Temple of Youth, I can see no reason why every public school in the United States should not play its part in the development of a municipal centre by having in every school-house its own Art Sanctuary, which sanctuary, by being part of the daily life of every child, would bring art to the home of the present generation in a way that would be unique in every particular. All that is required to establish such an Art Sanctuary in any school, the expense of which may easily be inconsiderable, is that a quiet room should be set aside where the representative arts may be installed and where, as it were, any one, teacher or student, could enter for the purpose of contemplation. In developing this Art Sanctuary, the co-operation of the local museum of the city, which even at the best most people or most children can see only a few times in a year, could be secured and the museum brought into the school through the encouragement of exhibitions of works of art including

pictures and sculptures, while the various schools of art in any given centre could also co-operate through exhibitions of contemporaneous art, examples of which under very easy conditions might be purchased from year to year by the graduating classes, or by the student body as a whole, as is done to-day on a small scale in certain high schools of the country. And in addition to this, the Art Sanctuary would be made the focus for school exhibitions, work done by the students in the decorative and creative arts, and in all those activities that are part of the training in the schools, thus supplementing the use of the auditorium where, as it is well known, student choruses, student orchestras, and even student theatrical interpreters are given full play. The co-operation that is called for here, aside from the use that might be made of all school buildings now existing, is that the architect of the public schools would bear this question of an Art Sanctuary in mind, as well as leaving certain wall surfaces in the corridors which would give an opportunity to the exhibitions of painting, of sculpture, and also to the application of murals on a larger scale than has ever been done before in this country.

It must be plain that in any given centre where the schools would set up not only an Art Sanctuary, but also a Temple of Youth, in addition to the auditoriums and the playgrounds which they now have, they could indulge in cultural Olympics which would lead to such a concern for the soul as has never been known anywhere in the past. All the existing cultural movements in the public schools could be brought into a focus, as it were. There would not be only the rivalry of æsthetic games, but the rivalry of intellectual and creative activities. There is no reason why competitions in music, in the dance and in the arts, in poetry, in oratory, in debating, and, so far as applied arts go, in every possible form of handicraft should not be made a matter of school life, and the æsthetic rewards be made as conspicuous as the rewards that now come to athletics for the individual and for the various groups connected with competing schools. In other words, to express it briefly, if, as seems clear, there is, in connection with the newer expenditures of schools to be a greater expansion for baseball and football grounds, for stadiums for the actions of the body, we should not be timid about insisting that our schools in one way or another should be stadiums of the soul. It is as a result of having encouraged school art leagues, circulating picture clubs for the school and home, business men's art clubs, and, above all, the various activities

that are summed up in the Graphic Sketch Club, that I have come to realise what is needed along these lines, and what seems to me should be our next step educationally. In my humble efforts to bring opportunities for self-expansion along cultural lines to the people, I have reason to know that there are millions of plain people whose souls are hungry, whose ears are open to the call of Art, and whose eyes light up and welcome her approach. The people can be trusted with art. I do not mean that the untrained masses appreciate the best in art, on the contrary, they have a natural tendency to lean from, rather than towards, the restrained and the æsthetic. I do believe, however, that the vast majority of children are susceptible, whether rich or poor, to the message of true art, and that if such teachings be applied in the child's most receptive years, the effect will be pronounced and lasting. When once the child becomes imbued with correct standards of appreciation, it adheres to them and applies them. Each of us can be, aye, even is, an artist in the widest sense of the term, and the recognition of this from the days of childhood to maturity is fraught with profound possibilities and opens up the wider horizon of a real golden age of nobility and beauty for all.

It is from my own personal experience with the work of the Graphic Sketch Club that I have a supreme confidence that all these things that I outline can be done. To those who do not know what the Graphic Sketch Club is, I may say that it is a school of art for those who are employed in the daytime and have no opportunities to study or develop themselves except at night, as well as a social centre for the region in which it is situated and for the city at large as well. May I say, further, that it is located in what is called the foreign section of Philadelphia in one of the oldest sections of a very old city, and that within easy access of the Club are some of the worst courts and alleys and the worst housing conditions in what is known to the country at large as the "City of Homes." But it is because, after thirty years of experience with the Graphic Sketch Club, I have found it possible for thousands through the Club to bring joy into their own lives and into that of their homes as well that I know what can be done and how it may be done. What I have accomplished has been through night classes in drawing, painting, illustration, etching, fashion design, sculpture and all the associated arts, through classes in dancing and through the social relaxations that bring out the best that is in those who come to the Club as human beings and the

social units in a great city. Again excellent results have been secured through the use of the museum in the Club, whose objects of beauty and rarity have never been taken away, though open freely to all to look and to touch, while through the permanent and annual exhibition galleries (indeed all the hallways, all the rooms in the Club are exhibition galleries), an opportunity is given to rising and arrived talent to show what it can do. Above all, the most subtle inspirations have come through the Art Sanctuary, which is a remodelled church, abandoned by the denomination that owned it, where not only the eye, but the ear, through good music, is trained in all those things that add an elevation to life. It is encouraging to me to find that when Dr L. P. Jacks, the British writer on "Constructive Citizenship," visited the Graphic Sketch Club and studied what is being done in its night classes and its social relaxations, he was kind enough to admit that this institution in Philadelphia, now a generation old, was the nearest approach in its ideals and practical results to what he was after, of anything he had seen anywhere.

My experience with the Club naturally leads me to believe emphatically in the value of art as a social solvent, especially when it is brought into the life of the young who live in congested cities and have small opportunities of enjoyment but who, through such movements as the Graphic Sketch Club have been given opportunities to develop what is in them as well as to appreciate the achievements of others and get deeper ideas of what social relationships that are worth while really are. I have found out that all this may be carried on, moreover, with the most significant of results without any idea that one necessarily must be engaged in turning out artists, since, of course, the question of what can be done with any human material that comes to one's hands is partly a matter of encouraging the inherent talents that are born in certain individuals, and partly a matter of the general human discipline and what may be called social training for the less competent. There is nothing impractical in any of these experiments so far as technical or social matters go. As for those who are really artists by birth and by training, it must be remembered that even they need a social rendezvous, as it were, even though they have left the art schools. They still have to find a public, and the more they are taught to look upon art as a matter of everyday life, they can see more clearly the necessity of winning the public from the ordinary machine-made decorations to the purchase of original

creations of beauty. Both the artists and the people need music, lectures and the theatre, and other things sometimes classed as luxuries, but which are really necessities of the soul. To help the artists to supply this and to help the people to realise it is no mean service. And it is along the lines of these human experiences in the Graphic Sketch Club that I have come to a realisation of the practicality not only of what can be done, but of what must now be done everywhere on a much larger scale. All the work of thirty years has made me optimistic as to the possibilities of what our schools and our municipalities may do. So, as things stand to-day, though most of these ideas may sound Utopian, as though I expected the millennium to come to-morrow, this is not the case. One meets everywhere unexpected co-operation in an effort to redeem city life that is most heartening. What we need is a definite plan, and to remember that we must start in to-day along the lines laid down by experience in order to realise the happier to-morrow. If this be done well, the future is underwritten, and will see the rich fulfilment of our present preparation. Already the ground-work is laid and the actual achievement of many of the things I have suggested is closer at hand than any one supposes. In another generation, America bids fair to stand at the top of the civilised world in its standards of life, and it may easily revel in a new age with all the arts applied to life surpassing anything the world has ever seen. We are a people of infinite promise and possibilities, but to achieve anything calls for complete co-operation, and the obligation rests upon every one to further the practical plans that lead to spiritual futures. Each one of us indeed must be in the widest sense an artist; an artist who plays upon life as an organist plays upon keys and transforms the simplest of *motifs* into a connected thing of beauty.

SAMUEL S. FLEISHER.

PHILADELPHIA.

ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY.

ALEXANDER MACKENDRICK.

It is to be feared that much loose thinking results from the failure to define clearly the meaning we attach to certain words in common use. We speak of education, for example, without first having assured ourselves whether we mean the storing of the mind with information, or, what is an entirely different thing, the culture and refinement of the tastes and emotions and standards of happiness. The word "civilisation," again, may stand for the modern steamship, for motor cars and airplanes, machine-guns, poison-gas, and the other paraphernalia of what some cynic has called "the hell that is paved with good inventions"; or, on the other hand, it may suggest the idea of communities that are "civil" to each other and that have learned the art of living together in peace and harmony. Similarly, when we turn our thoughts to what Mr H. G. Wells has aptly described as "that grey confusion called democracy," we may have but the vaguest notion of the remoter implications of the word. Yet when we consider the momentous issues that centre upon the ideal for which it professes to stand—its inevitability, and its failure so far to realise the results of which it gave promise, it seems only common prudence to inquire what democracy really means.

If we consult the dictionaries and encyclopædias, we get little more by way of definition than that it means "a form of government in which the sovereign power of the State is vested in the whole people." This definition or ideal has been realised more nearly than elsewhere in our own country and in the United States, the two greatest democracies of modern times. In both countries the outer forms of democracy have been set up. Every man and woman of mature age can now enjoy the privilege of electing the ten-thousandth part (more or less) of a representative to the National Council. The

criminal laws have been adjusted to the point of bearing with something approaching impartiality upon rich and poor. Freedom of thought and speech has been proclaimed as the birthright of every citizen, and religious toleration and a free press have become parts of the social structure. And yet, to quote Mr Wells again, "democratic countries are governed by politicians, and the system is in essence as complete a tyranny as government by Czars." And Carlyle, we may remember, described democracy as "the despair of finding wise men to govern you, and the contentedly putting up with the want of them," or again, as "calling in new supplies of gullibility, bribability, and amenability to beer and balderdash, by way of remedying the evils we already suffer from an over-supply of these commodities." Professor Huxley likened democracy (we quote from memory) to "throwing the captain into irons and putting the navigation of the ship into the hands of the cook, the cabin-boy and the man before the mast." And even in a recently published book bearing the promising title *The Meaning of Democracy* the author seems to be obsessed by the idea that "power" to control and coerce must find lodgment somewhere within the social organism, and that democracy means the conscious assumption of that power by the people. It does not appear to have occurred to any of these writers that the ultimate implication of democracy, the thought that gives it vitality, may be that of a community in which no individual or class should ever have either the desire or the opportunity to exercise "power" over any other individual or class.

That there is an essential though elusive meaning of this kind underlying the word democracy, our deepest instincts assure us. We have an inward certitude that this haunting thought of an ascertainable principle of free, spontaneous, unregimented, healthy social life is not an *ignis fatuus* or will-o'-the-wisp born of man's restless imagination, but a prophetic foreshadowing of a condition towards which the great soul of the world is slowly feeling its way. But the fact remains that in both the countries named, the question is perpetually being asked, "Is democracy a failure?"; and those whose conception of democracy goes no deeper than ballot-boxes, party-systems and the dethronement of kings are compelled to answer, "Yes; a dismal and disastrous failure." It is at this point that the full title we have given to this article suggests the remoter implication we are in search of, and makes it possible to say by way of rejoinder, "True democracy has not yet been tried."

For it will be evident on a little reflection that democracy has hitherto been conceived of only in terms of political privileges, whereas it is primarily a matter of economic liberties. As life and the means of sustaining it are of vastly more importance than the civic recognition that has been the sole gift of democracy hitherto, it seems obvious that liberty to earn livings without awaiting the convenience of other men must lie pretty near to its essential principle. Familiarity with the distinction between the Spirit and the Letter has perhaps blinded us to the importance of the antithesis. Every reform movement is inspired by an imperfectly visualised ideal which clothes itself clumsily in symbols and uses for its partial realisation such instruments or materials as come to hand. But a perverse tendency in the human mind leads to concentrated attention upon these tentative manifestations, and forgetfulness of the aim or end which alone can justify them. This, we venture to believe, is what has happened to the concept which originally inspired the word democracy. When the Old Testament seer Micah, rising on the wings of prophecy, beheld the vision of a time when not only should swords be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks, but when every man would sit under his own vine and fig tree, none daring to make him afraid, what really rose before his imagination was a picture of economic democracy, though he did not call it by that name. Economic democracy means that every man shall hold his life in his own hands and be the arbiter of his own destiny. This, we must believe, has been the inspiring idea that has lain in the subconscious mind of the race from the time of the Old Testament prophets onwards, which has manifested itself from time to time in the outward forms of political institutions, and which, in spite of failure after failure, has kept alive that stubborn faith in democracy which we of to-day have inherited.

To those who have caught sight of the subtle relationship that undoubtedly holds between the economic miseries of society and the strangle-hold of monopoly upon those natural resources on which our physical well-being depends, it should not be necessary to attempt a demonstration of the effect which a loosening of that strangle-hold might be expected to have—in releasing pent-up vital energies, in bringing light and hope into lives that are dark and cheerless, and in converting numbers of inert, self-centred, sometimes rebellious, and always merely nominal “citizens” into living members of the community and real assets to the State. But to those

whose vision has not yet been focussed to this point, a brief survey of the problem as we may now envisage it may not be out of place.

When Man emerged from barbarism and his distinctively human qualities began to assert themselves, he would, if he had been given to reflection at that time, have found that he had entered upon his new life in two different capacities, both as regards his physical and intellectual activities. He would have discovered himself in one sense as an individual, solitary, insulated, self-dependent, and of severely limited competence ; but in another sense as part of a larger self—a self of wider range and greater capacity, the companionate self which consists in membership of a group or tribe. He would have found that in the satisfaction of his wants in food, clothing and shelter, Nature responded but grudgingly to his solitary and unaided efforts, while she rewarded lavishly the united, co-operative, sub-divided and friendly efforts of the tribe ; as though determined to teach him at all costs the advantage of being sociable. He would have discovered indeed in the region of economics, that fundamental dualism or duplexity which runs like a mysterious thread through the gamut of human experience in philosophy, science, art or religion. Man is an individual, but when he works in whatever direction, he does so as part of a larger organism we call Society, to which he stands in the same relation as his hand does to himself. When, therefore, men apply their *combined* labour to developing the natural resources of the earth, the wealth produced distributes itself automatically in two separate and easily distinguished streams, one of them reaching the individuals and delivering to each in various forms of remuneration the exact value he has by his own effort produced ; the other stream carrying on its bosom that *additional* value which results *not* from individual labour, but entirely from the increased efficiency, the economised time and saving of effort effected through mutual helpfulness. This additional wealth being a purely social product, belongs obviously to Society in its collective or organic aspect, and finds its accurate expression in the situation-value of the areas on which such co-operative labour has been carried on.

It is at this point that ethical principles make their first contact with the science of political economy. The word "ethical," it must be confessed, seems to have had no place among the forces and methods by which Life has climbed the long and steep ascent from the worm to the man. Even in

the early stages of human development, sheer strength and the ability to catch and eat and to avoid being caught and eaten appear to have been the only credentials required by Nature for the privilege of being permitted to live. Nature has been described as non-moral, and perhaps we must rest satisfied with that. There can be no wisdom in attempting to hide the inhuman manners of the universal Mother under the uniform of a doctor of divinity. Nature knows nothing of right and wrong as we understand the words. She permitted men to assert the right of property in each other under the institution of slavery ; and she allowed these two streams of wealth to which we have referred—the privately-owned one and the publicly-owned—to be scrambled for and appropriated by those who had the strength to seize them, without a word or a gesture of protest. She shows not the slightest appreciation of motives, and rewards the strong for his strength and punishes the weak for his weakness with no regard to other considerations. But in the fulness of time a wondrous thing happened. Nature conceived and brought forth a child that has repudiated its mother and denied her name. From out of the womb of this struggling, fighting, bloodthirsty humanity, there was born that ethereal spirit we call the Moral Sense, the mystery of whose appearance, along with that of the starry heavens above, filled the soul of Immanuel Kant with awe ; and it has probably not yet entered into the heart of Man to conceive the change in his condition that may ultimately follow the advent of this mysterious intruder upon the cosmic stage.

For this new sense is yet but in its infancy. Like all the higher forms of life in contrast with the lower, its childhood is prolonged and it reaches maturity slowly. It may indeed be more true to say that the maturing process itself is what constitutes the higher life of the human race, and that its terminus is beyond the range of finite imagination. Meanwhile, though our faith assures us that the rudiments of the moral sense slumber in the subconsciousness of every man and woman, it must be confessed that it is as yet but feebly developed in this or that individual—in this or that tribe or nation. But the change it effects in the outlook of those in whom it has reached any considerable degree of development is fundamental and revolutionary. It sets up entirely new standards of value. It consigns to the scrap-heap many time-honoured axioms of conduct. Its view of the landscape of life is entirely changed. It is recorded of an eminent jurist that when a prisoner at the bar urged the plea in

extenuation of his crime that "a man must live," the Judge replied, "I don't see the necessity." There spoke the old order of things. There really was no necessity for particular or individual men to continue living under Nature's tooth and claw dispensation. There is no necessity to-day why any of our fellow-creatures should be allowed to live—apart from the mysterious and imperious mandate of the moral sense. Those, therefore, in whom the moral sense is now asserting itself and who have caught sight of the inmost meaning of economic democracy and discovered the path that leads to it, should have no hesitation in saying :

"Yes; the criminal was right and the learned Judge was wrong. A man must live. It is necessary that every man and woman born into the world should have life and have it more abundantly; and it was in defence of this necessity that the Carpenter of Nazareth lived and died."

Economic democracy then, is based upon an ethical postulate; it is indeed itself an ethical postulate. It asserts the eternal difference between rightful and wrongful possession of the physical means of life. It recognises the two distinctive streams of wealth to which reference has been made, and which between them carry the total results of Man's individual and co-operative efforts; and it affirms emphatically that it is wrong for individuals to lay hands on wealth that flows from the social or combined efforts of men; that it is equally wrong for society to appropriate in any way the natural rewards that accrue to the labours of individuals; and that it is trebly wrong to permit the closing up of the sources from which either form of wealth is produced. This ethical postulate, we would urge, will validate all the other moral standards by which we attempt to regulate our lives. It will bring all the dictates of the social conscience into their proper mutual relations. It will provide what may be called a moral perspective. Every painter knows that when planning or composing his picture, his ultimate success depends upon the truth of his perspective. If the relationship in size and apparent importance between the remotest object and the immediate foreground is wrong, the whole picture will be out of drawing. No amount of tinkering will rectify it; no brilliance of colouring will atone for it; no cleverness of technique will cover it up. If, on the other hand, the relationship between the first and last things be right, all details will fall into their places naturally and spontaneously.

One of the profoundest utterances of Herbert Spencer's was contained in his dictum that no man can be completely moral until Society is completely moral. Until the initial postulate of economic democracy is built into the structure of our political system as its corner-stone, all our other moral standards will lean awry and refuse to adapt themselves to the exigencies of daily life.

Within the four walls of his own house a man may live a strictly ethical life ; but the moment he crosses his doorstep he becomes entangled in a bewildering maze of relationships—with the postman who brings his letters, with the urchin who delivers his milk, with the scavenger who sweeps his street—relationships in which the first principles of social justice may have been violated, but which he is powerless to control. Throughout the remainder of the day he may be faced with the same perplexities. He refrains from buying cheap goods in the fear that they are produced by under-paid labour, and discovers later on to his chagrin that sweating is just as likely to underlie the high-priced goods in the fashionable establishments of the West End. He may find indeed, if his sociological curiosity should carry him thus far, that the books he buys with which to nourish his soul and stimulate his moral sense, including the sacred Bible itself, are printed, folded, and bound by men, women and girls under conditions which preclude the possibility of their enjoying the leisure of mind and circumstance in which the higher moral sensibilities may freely develop. Under the prickings of an unsatisfied social conscience he may associate himself with "Brotherhood" movements whose aim is to abolish class distinctions and to promote feelings of fraternity between intellectual culture and manual labour. But in spite of all attempts to hypnotise himself with fine words or poetic imagery, the haunting suspicion will not be held under that it is but a thinly-veiled pharisaism to think of abolishing class distinctions, when at any one of those Pleasant Sunday Afternoon meetings specially organised for that purpose, one man looks forward to a good dinner with a comfortable fire at which to finish the evening, while another has nothing in prospect but dry bread and cheap tea, followed by the social intercourse of a street corner. It will then be borne in upon him that the most ineradicable class distinction is the distinction between those who hold well-paid and secure jobs and those who have ill-paid ones or none at all.

In what direction do these reflections lead us ? Only to the conclusion that under present conditions our highest

moral impulses and intuitions—the best that is in us—can never find effective expression. It is a dismal conclusion, but to those who believe that the present is not a final condition, but only a passing phase, the elements of a great hope are not lacking. Meanwhile, there is something exceedingly depressing in the knowledge that so much positive effort to regenerate the world on the part of high-souled enthusiasts is rendered abortive by our failure to establish the initial principle of economic freedom. Ethical standards are at their best but rough and ready rules by which to prevent the infringement of each other's liberties; and, like the ten commandments of Moses, contain the negative injunction "Thou shalt not" in equal proportion with the positive "Thou shalt." But widely transcending the comparatively cold stimulus of ethics, there is a measureless volume of fraternal feeling, good-will, brotherly love—call it what we may—with all the weight of the great over-soul behind it; bubbling up in springs, breaking out in streams, everywhere struggling for expression and everywhere being choked and dammed back by the very conditions that have evoked it.

One of the most prominent figures in our Society of to-day is the wealthy philanthropist, the genuineness of whose sympathy for the condition of the poor cannot be doubted. It is only right, however, that his attention should be called to the fact that the total sum of poverty shows no sign of diminishing. The truth should be pressed upon him that neither by giving nor by teaching can he bring serenity of soul to men and women who live in chronic poverty and insecurity; and that until he can open up the avenues of honourable employment so that each man may stand upon his own feet with full responsibility for his own well-being, neither he nor they are ready for that mutual relationship in which brotherly feeling is possible. If again, there is a potential William Morris or John Ruskin in our midst, with soul aflame in sensitiveness to the beauty that lurks behind all natural phenomena, and indignation at the sordid ugliness which characterises the artificial surroundings of our lives; if he is gifted with sufficient intelligence to grasp the sorry scheme of things entire, it should become self-evident that the vision of ideal beauty that has so spontaneously revealed itself to him might come in time with equal spontaneity to many of his brethren if only their souls were emancipated from the crushing anxiety for the bread that perishes in the eating. Or if a statesman should arise among us who conceives of his mission upon earth as that of

abolishing international war, we may well ask ourselves what progress he can possibly make in promoting peace and goodwill among the nations, while within the boundaries of his native land no notion of a social ideal has yet arisen, but where, in the words of Carlyle :

“ Each grabs what he can get and cries ‘ mine,’ and calls it peace because in the scramble that ensues no steel knives are used but only weapons of a far crueller and cunninger sort.”

If he ever reaches the point of view from which it is possible to “ see life steadily and to see it whole,” he must surely then realise that it is hopeless to expect that attitude of mind on the part of the people that forbids war until we have peace and contentment at home. Among the countless wastefulnesses for which our economic system is responsible, surely none can be greater than the awful waste of energy that goes on in unintelligent and unenlightened philanthropy ; and Dean Inge has said that “ The essence of sin is wastefulness.”

It was remarked by a recent magazine writer that reforms never come until the machinery that operates the abuse has broken down ; and that reformers only delude themselves if they expect to accomplish anything by appeals to mere reason. The first part of this dictum is certainly true. The force of habit rules men’s minds even within the domain of reason, and so long as old customs and ways of thinking continue to work with some semblance of effectiveness, the appeal for reform will be disregarded. Our hope must rest therefore upon the obvious fact that the machinery of taxation by which the just or unjust economic relationships between the citizens of a country are determined is creaking dismally notwithstanding all the lubricants that the engineers can supply. That it will ultimately break down completely seems now more than a probability. When that time comes, the future of society may depend on the promptness with which public opinion rises to the occasion, placing the burden of the public income where it properly belongs, and bringing about those conditions of freedom in relation to the Natural Opportunities that are implied by the words “ Economic Democracy.”

ALEXANDER MACKENDRICK.

GLASGOW.

THE CONCEPTION OF A COSMOS: FROM PLATO TO EINSTEIN.

PROFESSOR J. S. MACKENZIE.

It is a notable characteristic of our time that large views about the Universe in which we live are becoming common and even popular. This is to some extent a new development, especially perhaps in our own country, where it is, on the whole, true that thought has usually been somewhat tentative and traditional, more concerned with details than with the effort to interpret the whole. No doubt there have always been some exceptions to this; but I think the widespread interest in a larger outlook, based on scientific research and speculative interpretation, is a somewhat new development. This new outlook may be partly ascribed to the changes that have been brought about by purely philosophical inquiry which, since the time of Hegel, and, in our own country, F. H. Bradley, has gained considerably in boldness and thoroughness; but I suppose it is mainly to be ascribed to some striking results of recent scientific investigation—especially to the analysis of the Atom and the general conceptions of the Universe in which we live that are chiefly associated with the name of Einstein. In our own country, Mr Eddington is now, I suppose, the best known and one of the most reliable, as well as the most charming, of those who have interpreted the results of these scientific inquiries; but there are several others, such as Professor Whitehead, who appear to be hardly, if at all, less worthy of attention. Those of us who are not experts in astronomy and mathematical physics have not much right to an opinion on the details of these investigations; but those whose interest has lain almost exclusively in philosophical speculation have to make some effort to interpret them. Among those who have to be classed as philosophers, rather than as scientific

investigators, Professor Alexander is probably the best known, perhaps the most capable, and certainly the most comprehensive in his treatment. There are some respects, however, in which his exposition does not appear to me to be satisfactory, especially in his neglect or subordination of the idea of value. The work of all these writers is largely dependent on a long chain of elaborate scientific researches ; but the results are of great philosophic interest, partly because they tend to confirm some views that had been previously entertained on more purely speculative grounds, and that had been difficult to reconcile with the results that appeared to be reached, in former generations, by scientific analysis.

A recently published book by an American writer—*The Intelligible World*, by Professor W. M. Urban—has set forth, in a striking and detailed way, the contrast between the general views that philosophical thinkers have tended to maintain and the apparently conflicting views, partly based on the results of scientific inquiry, that have often been simultaneously current. Of course, the antithesis has seldom been an altogether sharp one ; but at least it is broadly true that there have been two somewhat opposite tendencies in modern thought—and indeed in ancient thought as well—and that we appear now to be within sight of a possible reconciliation. If so, it would be a reconciliation of a very far-reaching kind.

Professor Urban points out that there has been what he calls a "great tradition" in philosophic thought—the tradition, namely, of trying to think of the Universe in which we live as a Cosmos, *i.e.* as an orderly whole, which is essentially a thing of beauty, intrinsically good and harmonious throughout, however much it may appear to present itself to us in a different light. It may be doubted whether it is right to characterise this way of thinking as a "tradition," unless we are to say that the views of mathematicians are also a tradition. The foundations of Geometry and of the Calculus, for instance, might be said to have become traditional. In so far as the views of philosophers have been in agreement—and it is only to a limited extent that this can be affirmed even of the greatest of them—they are in agreement, not because they have been accepted as a tradition, but rather because they are views to which the attempt to understand human life and the world in which it is carried on appears inevitably to lead us. It is true, however, that some of the most fundamental conceptions, both of philosophy and of mathematics, were first formulated in ancient

Greece ; and that a good deal of what was thought out in those early days retains its validity at the present time. Certainly it is still worth while to study the work of Plato, just as it is still worth while to study the work of Euclid. But, if we are really to profit by such study, we have to think it out afresh for ourselves, as if it were a new discovery. Indeed, Plato and Euclid themselves were, to a large extent, rethinking what their predecessors had thought.

Now, it is to some views of Plato that I wish to refer in this lecture, in the belief that they may still be of use to us in the attempt to interpret the conceptions to which modern scientific discoveries appear to point. As Professor Whitehead has remarked :¹

“ Plato’s guesses read more fantastically than does Aristotle’s systematic analysis ; but in some ways they are more valuable. The main outline of his ideas is comparable with that of modern science.”

The theory to which I wish more particularly to refer is contained, in its most explicit form, in the Dialogue that is called *Timæus*. Some eminent scholars—notably Professor A. E. Taylor—are of opinion that the views expounded in that Dialogue are not to be taken as Plato’s, but only as those of an earlier philosopher called Timæus. This is a controversial question on which I am not qualified to form a definite judgment ; but it seems to have been Plato’s general practice to select ideas from earlier thinkers, and to reinterpret them in his own fashion ; and, indeed, that is what we, at the present time, have to do with Plato’s own ideas. The exact views, even of the greatest thinkers, are often, in Emerson’s phrase, “ good for this trip only.” Human thought does not stand still, even in exact sciences like mathematics. Certainly we have constantly to be reconsidering what has been said in the past even by the greatest philosophers.

Plato’s main contention in the *Timæus*, as I understand it, is that the universe in which we live can only be made intelligible by means of certain general conceptions, the most fundamental of which is the idea of Good. The Temporal Universe has to be thought of as an imperfect realisation of what is good, in the fullest sense of that term. Plato’s chief disciple Aristotle agreed with him in this. So did Leibniz in more modern times ; and so do many philosophers, such as Professor Urban, at the present day. But there is some difficulty in determining what is meant by “ good.” Pro-

¹ *The Concept of Nature*, p. 18.

fessor G. E. Moore has urged, very forcibly and clearly, that the term itself cannot be defined. Aristotle said that it had been well defined as "that at which all things aim"; but it hardly appears that that could be regarded as a satisfactory logical definition; and indeed it may be doubted whether even all human beings can be said to aim very directly at what is good. Milton represented Satan as saying, "Evil be thou my good"; and though, by calling it good, he was recognising that, in a certain sense, he did aim at good, yet he appears to be contradicting it in the same breath. Of course, this is due mainly to a certain ambiguity in language. We sometimes mean by "good" what is morally deserving of approbation; and, at other times, the term is used in a more comprehensive sense for an ultimate realisation that should yield complete satisfaction. It is in that more comprehensive sense that the term is here being used; and it is necessary to inquire what is included in this use of the term. This is a somewhat controversial subject; but perhaps it may be said to be generally recognised that what is good, in the fullest sense, must be beautiful or harmonious, so as to yield joy; must be an object of active pursuit, not merely a passive acquisition; and must be real or realisable. But these terms are not self-explanatory; and I am afraid we must assume for the present that we know sufficiently well what is meant by good in the most comprehensive sense of the word. If so, then we understand, as well as is possible, what Plato meant by maintaining that the Universe can only be understood if we think of it as aiming at good. Indeed, if Aristotle's definition were to be accepted, that the Good is that at which all things aim, the statement would seem to be tautological. But fundamental truths often seem to be almost self-evident when they are clearly apprehended. It has to be remembered, however, that not everyone is prepared to admit that all things aim at good. Mr Russell, for instance, seems to be unable to do so, though he holds that the supreme values are the object of "The Free Man's Worship." Probably most of us have sometimes felt a similar difficulty.

Hence, besides the conception of Good, Plato conceived that we have to think of a self-subsistent living Being as a fundamental postulate. If the pursuit of the Good is to be taken as the interpretation of the Cosmic process, it seems clear that there must at least be some Mind that apprehends and pursues it, and that is able to achieve it. But both Good and Life or Mind are universal conceptions; and universals,

as such, cannot properly be said to *exist*, in the sense in which particular things exist. They *subsist* as universal meanings ; and particular things—particular goods, particular lives, particular minds, exist as instances of those eternal meanings. What “ meaning ” means has been a good deal discussed, but here I must assume that that is sufficiently understood. It was, of course, in view of this distinction between subsistence and existence that F. H. Bradley declared, in his emphatic way, that “ a God who should be capable of existing would most assuredly be no God at all.” He meant, as I understand him, that such a transcendent Being could not be thought of as existing as one among others, but only as a universal Postulate of all existence.

But a world, containing many particular things, does evidently exist ; and we have to ask how it manages to exist. It can hardly be supposed to be self-subsistent, as a pure Universal may. The answer that appears to be given by Plato or Timæus is that it exists because it is brought into existence by a World-architect or Demiurge. What are we to understand by this ? We seem now to have entered into the region of the particular, and it is not very easy to see how we have got there. One of the most acute of the commentators on the *Timæus*, the late Mr Archer Hind, suggested that Plato probably did not mean to postulate a separate Being, but only what we might characterise as a creative aspect of the universal Mind ; and he found some support for this in Plato’s language. Is this intelligible ? It seems clear that, if anything is to exist at all—and it is evident that some things do exist—we must somehow get out of the region of what is purely universal. There must, in some sense, be both universal meanings and particular existences ; and it has to be taken as a presupposition of all thought that what *must be* somehow *is*. But is it intelligible to maintain, as Plato appears to do, that the Universal Mind has a particular aspect which can somehow give birth to other particular existences ? It is certainly a very difficult postulate to make. But I think it must be admitted that it is also very difficult to see how otherwise particular things and persons could have come into existence at all. It must be remembered that particularity is itself a universal conception ; and it would be difficult to attach any definite meaning to it if there were not some particular things. The thought of a creative aspect, as being involved in the Universal Mind, is perhaps the simplest way, if not the only way, of getting out of the difficulty. It seems clear that a Universal would be meaning-

less without particulars ; and perhaps this is all that is meant by saying that the Universal Mind must have a particularising aspect. It must be admitted, however, that it is not easy to understand how this is to be conceived. It is perhaps easier to understand it if we begin with the consideration of human life, rather than with that of the Cosmos as a whole. It is evidently true that human life, with all its defects, is guided by the idea of some good to be achieved, whether it be the thought of wisdom, moral perfection, beauty, joy, or the more external goods of wealth, power, fame or any other desired end. Even animals appear to pursue ends, though probably without any clear consciousness of what they are. Perhaps even flowers, as Wordsworth thought, may "enjoy the air they breathe." Plato's theory is that the whole Universe is to be thought of as guided by the conception of Good, and as having been brought into being with this end in view. He could not conceive, however, that the idea of Good itself, or the idea of Mind itself—both being pure universals—could suffice to account for the existence of particular men or animals ; and so he postulated a world Architect or Demiurge or a particularising aspect of the universal Mind. This view is not easy to understand ; but it is doubtful whether any other can be suggested. Ultimate postulates cannot, of course, be interpreted in terms of anything more fundamental.

Now, the modern view of what the Universe is, has made it easier than it formerly was to interpret the creative process that has to be thought of as ensuing. The creative aspect of the Universal Mind or Absolute must be supposed to aim at the realisation of Good—*i.e.* of a Cosmos. It is here that the newer views of the spatio-temporal system seem to afford some help. According to the older scientific doctrine, it would have been necessary to suppose that the creative principle proceeded to generate Atoms and material combinations of these ; and it certainly seems difficult to imagine how these could issue from a purely mental or spiritual source. In the face of such views of the material system, philosophers (unless they were greatly daring) hardly ventured to call their souls their own. But the Atom has now been resolved into modes of energy which can more easily be supposed to issue from an active Mind, containing in itself the aspects of universality and creativeness. Probably the simplest way of representing to ourselves how such a process might take place would be to conceive that it began from the end that is, as we say, *presupposed*—*i.e.* from the conception

of the Good that is to be achieved. This means, presumably, the conception of a world of highly developed spiritual beings, bound together, as Dr McTaggart explained, by Love. From this there would follow what the early Greeks were accustomed to designate as a Downward Path, *i.e.* the thought of the antecedent stages that would have to be passed through before the final realisation could be attained. The consideration of this process from the end backwards would gradually lead down to simpler and simpler modes of being, ending in the thought of those elementary forms of energy which underlie the existence and movements of those electrons and protons out of whose movements, according to the latest scientific theories, the most rudimentary modes of being are generated. The Upward Path would then be pursued ; and it is on that Path that we may all be said to live.

The most fundamental difficulty in all this seems to lie in the conception of the Demiurge or creative aspect of the Universal Mind. It may be urged that a Universal which, as such, does not exist, cannot be regarded as a Source of Existence. Some would meet this by saying that Existence is essentially only Appearance. The things that exist in the world, as we know it, can hardly be supposed to be, in the fullest sense, real. It is probably best to think of them as being only on the way to complete reality. They become real, in the full sense of that word, only when they attain to the realisation of the Good. But their existence is a necessary stage on the way to that, and cannot, therefore, be held to be wholly unreal. I think this was sufficiently explained by F. H. Bradley in his doctrine of Degrees of Reality, though I do not commit myself to all his views about it ; nor could they be satisfactorily discussed in such a paper as this. We all know now that most of the things that we say " exist " can be analysed into elements that are very different from what appears. Still, the appearances are not wholly without reality.

The general view that was suggested by Plato or Timæus, and that I have been endeavouring to interpret in modern language, bears a certain resemblance to the later contention of Leibniz, according to which the existent world is the " best of possible worlds." It seems doubtful, however, whether this is a satisfactory way of stating the general view. It would seem that any world that God or the Demiurgic Power might choose to produce would be possible. It is hard to see what could hinder its production. And, of course, Good-

would be realised in it. But there might be many such worlds ; just as there are many good plays of Shakespeare, though no one of them exhausts the significance of human life. Mr Alexander has suggested that there may be a long succession of spatio-temporal systems ; and he has even given an elaborate account of the way in which they might be supposed to arise ; and, though his manner of thinking of them may be open to question, it seems at least quite possible that there might be many such systems. If so, there may be no reason to assume that any one of them is the best that is possible. We really are not in a position to decide about this. All that we appear to be entitled to assume is that Good, or " Deity," as Mr Alexander prefers to say, is somehow realised in them. It is evident that evil also occurs in them. But this need not disconcert us. There are some forms of Good—especially moral goodness—that cannot be achieved without some difficulty or opposition which, in itself, must be described as evil. There could be no courage, for instance, without some possibility of danger, no creative achievement without previous defect. This has been so fully emphasised in many well-known writings—especially Gifford Lectures—that I need not dwell upon it here. There is, however, another difficulty that has recently been brought to light, and that it may be well to touch upon at this point.

It may be urged that the conception of a Cosmic system is inconsistent with the presence of Chance in the world. Now, a conspicuous element of chance seems to be found in what has recently been discovered about the formation of our Earth. Astronomers have, within the last few years, been led to the conclusion that there is no known planet except our Earth on which Life, at least in any form in which we are familiar with it, would be possible ; and that our Earth itself came into being as the result of what can hardly be otherwise described than as the accidental collision, or rather close approximation, of two suns. Some bits happened to be chipped off, and one of these bits became our Earth.¹ But, of course, there is no insuperable difficulty about that. Such a collision might quite well have been in the plan of the Demiurge. Even a great work of art may involve an element of Chance. The plot of *Othello*, for instance, is largely dependent upon the circumstance that at one point Desdemona accidentally drops her handkerchief. Still, it may be somewhat disconcerting to think that the highest good that

¹ This has been very fully explained by Sir James Jeans, especially in his book on *The Universe Around Us*.

we at all definitely know can only be realised in an extremely insignificant part of the spatio-temporal system ; and that, even there, it has only been made possible by what looks like an afterthought—even granting that it had been planned at all. But perhaps there is nothing that need really trouble us in this. The mere fact that the realisation of the Good in such a form as that of human life involves much evil, may be a ground for limiting that part of the realisation to comparatively small dimensions. Though some evil is necessary, it may suffice to have just as much experience of evil as we get in the particular dangers, difficulties and pains that occur on our planet—the rebuffs that turn life's smoothness rough. We do not know, with any definiteness, what other forms of conscious experience may be possible under quite different conditions ; though some believe that we are beginning to have glimpses of other modes of being. At any rate, the history of human life on Earth—fine as in some respects it is, and may increasingly become—is not so glorious a record that we need regret that it is probably not duplicated in any other sphere. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that it has been worth while, and that it may become so more and more. Indeed, it even seems possible that it may be the only place in the Cosmos to which is assigned the final task of shaping the Temporal in the image of the Eternal. But that is perhaps hardly probable.

It has to be recognised, however, that, though we can hardly suppose that there is such a thing as Chance, there may very well be an element of Contingency in the Universe. We can still distinguish between what *must* be and what *may* be. The general plan of Reality *must*, it would seem, be regarded as universal and necessary ; but the particular ways in which Good can be achieved may be indefinitely varied ; and it may not be legitimate to affirm that any one way is necessary or is the best that was possible. At any rate, we do not know how much may be involved in the complete realisation of Good. It would probably involve at least some memory of the process by which it had been achieved. There might be a final looking backward. But it certainly seems to me that the speculations of Plato or Timæus about it are still enlightening, however much it may be necessary to reinterpret them, and however difficult it may be to reach any final reinterpretation. Perhaps finality is not to be expected in human thought.

It is one of the chief glories of our age that there is now no serious obstacle in the way of such attempts at

reinterpretation. In all departments of thought and belief—in science, in philosophy, in religion, and in the practical activities of life—the ancient landmarks have been rapidly disappearing. The old antitheses between East and West, between ancient and modern, between science and philosophy, have to a very large extent lost their significance. There are no closed doors. But life and thought are still difficult ; and it is still important that we should cling to the faith that the Universe in which we live is an intelligible whole, and that it is in essence good, a Cosmos and not a Chaos. There has been a certain tendency in modern thought, on account of the many fresh speculations that have become current, to adopt an attitude of general scepticism—the attitude that was expressed by Nietzsche in the phrase, “Nothing is true : everything is permitted.” That is not the result to which modern investigations lead. The conclusions to which they point are clear and definite in their general features, though open to much reinterpretation in detail. But it has certainly been shown that the ultimate truth is highly complex. Our outlook is being continually transformed in several of its features. But, as Professor Urban has urged, adopting a phrase from Sir Thomas Browne, the “Magnalities”—the larger outlooks on the world—retain their validity ; and the larger outlook is found in the conception of a Cosmic system, based on the idea of what is ultimately good. How, in particular, it is being brought about in the Cosmos as a whole, or in its innumerable parts, it is for scientific research—including researches into the history of human progress—to determine. But the general faith in progress rests on the recognition that human life at least is essentially guided by the idea of intrinsic Value or Ultimate Good ; and that it is a not unreasonable faith that the whole Universe is so guided. It is hardly conceivable that it should ever, in this life, become more than a faith ; but it may become more and more fully confirmed by fresh scientific discoveries, similar to those that have been made in recent years. Science and philosophy have, at any rate, entirely ceased to be antagonists, and have become cordial allies.

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RELIGION AS A VALUE-EXPERIENCE.

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I.

THE attempt to define philosophically the nature of religious experience has led to a wide acceptance of the view that religion is essentially an experience of value. The history of religion throughout the ages reveals the fact that *worship* is the characteristic religious act or attitude. And it is not without significance that "worship" is, etymologically, *worth-ship*, the recognition of worth. Religious experience is the apprehension of the Supreme Reality under the form of worth or value.

The philosophical idea of "value" has become fundamental in recent thought. Next to the idea of "evolution" it is perhaps the most important contribution of the nineteenth century to our apparatus of categories. We cannot here expound in detail the technical meaning of the term, but a few words are necessary. "Value" has always a primary reference to the satisfaction of human desires and the feeling of pleasure that accompanies such satisfaction. That is said to have value which is capable of satisfying some desire of our nature and is therefore felt by us to be "good" (in the broad sense of the term). It follows that value is not a purely objective property of the thing itself. It always stands for a certain relation of an object to a subject. It has reference to a mind capable of appreciating or enjoying the object. It thus stands in contrast to bare "fact," inasmuch as the latter is purely objective, and has in itself no necessary reference to the feeling of pleasure or pain, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which it evokes. For instance, "this is a rose," and "this rose is a large one," are statements of facts; but to say "this rose is beautiful" is to make a statement.

which has no meaning except in reference to a mind which appreciates or is capable of appreciating beauty. Hence "beauty" is a value.

This does not mean that values are purely subjective or wholly independent of objective facts. "Facts," "things," "events," represent the element of "given-ness" which is essential if our valuations are to be more than mental illusions. They supply the data or material of our value-judgments, and the nature of the data largely colours our estimate of their worth for us. But the facts as such are subsidiary to the claims and demands of a self-conscious subject—a subject which is a system of needs, interests, preferences, purposes, and not a mere impartial spectator in a neutral world. Probably in the last analysis there are no purely neutral facts present to consciousness, for that to which the mind attaches no significance or worth, or in which it has absolutely no interest, has for it no existence. Facts enter consciousness through the door of selective interest, and our interests are controlled by our system of values. But, although it may turn out that all known facts are *ipso facto* values, so that the distinction between facts and values may be provisional and relative and not *metaphysically* ultimate, even so, *psychologically*, there is an important difference between the mental attitude of description and that of appreciation, between explanation and valuation, between the acknowledgement of fact and the judgment of approval.

But further, we have to pass beyond the merely psychological to the normative level, beyond the point of view of mere individual desire and its satisfaction to that of intrinsic desirability and satisfactoriness. Men's valuations may be in need of transvaluation. To quote Bosanquet: "A man may be satisfied when he is drunk, but his satisfaction is not satisfactory." A man may desire to kill his neighbour, but what he desires is not desirable. Thus the primary valuations of individuals are themselves in turn to be evaluated in the light of universal norms or standards of value. We thus come to the idea of universal or absolute values. Absolute values, too, have reference to the satisfaction of desire—they must not be cut off from their psychological root in human nature if they are not to become the barest abstractions. But they refer to the desires not of the individual as such, still less of the individual at his worst (the appeal must ever be from Philip drunk to Philip sober), but of the normal or normative man, or man as he ought to be, regarded as continuous with men as they actually are though also transcending them.

When we are appealing to absolute values we are appealing to superindividual standards, or what Kant called "consciousness in general," as the highest court where the validity of our private appreciations and depreciations may be adjudged. This "consciousness in general" is, however, never a finished and static, but a growing and dynamic thing. Progressive individuals (prophets, seers, pioneers) represent this same universal human consciousness at its growing point.

Let us now return to the point from which we started. Religion is a value-experience. It is the apprehension of the Divine *sub specie valoris*, under the form of value, as the Being who is felt to be supremely satisfying and therefore "good" (in the broad, *i.e.* not merely ethical, meaning of that word). To the religious consciousness, God is much more than an objective "fact" believed in under the compulsion of sense-perception or logical argument. He is apprehended as the Being who satisfies the profoundest desires of the human heart—not merely of this or that individual (there are many individuals who are apparently devoid of a personal sense of God), but "the desire of all nations" and of man at his deepest and best. Such experience, it is true, implies belief in God as an objective reality, but God's significance for religion lies not so much in His factual existence as in His profound satisfyingness in relation to human need. His existence is not a mere discovery of the impartial intellect or a neutral fact which "leaves us cold." He is the supreme value demanded by the wants of the soul, to be possessed, possessed by, utilised, enjoyed, feared, loved, adored, worshipped, *worth*shipped:

"A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused."

This is not adequately defined (with Höffding) as "faith in the conservation of values," which may be only a kind of intellectual belief or "axiom." It is something far more personal and intimate; it is an actual experience of value, an inner appreciation and appropriation of God as supreme in worth.

But obviously there are different *kinds* of values. And the question arises: What kind of value enters more particularly into religious experience? The more important values may be classified thus: (1) Utilitarian or Economic Values—such as Food, Clothing, Wealth; (2) Hedonistic or Psychological Value—Pleasure or Happiness; (3) Ethical.

Value—Goodness (in the moral sense) ; (4) Intellectual Value—Truth ; (5) Æsthetic Value—Beauty ; (6) Otto has recently introduced another category of Value—Holiness (in a specialised sense, which we shall discuss later). The first of these can be left out of our present discussion, for obviously it is not the religious type of value (though religion may sanctify and utilise it). The second also may be omitted, because it enters as a factor into all the others as their psychological basis ; for, as we have seen, all values when present to consciousness evoke a feeling of satisfaction and therefore of pleasure. It is customary to regard the next three—the Good, the True, the Beautiful—as the ultimate, intrinsic and universal values. It is these three, together with the Holy (in Otto's sense), that we have to keep in mind in our subsequent discussion.

II.

Our question then is: What value (or values) enters characteristically into religious experience or constitutes its essence ? The answers that can be given to this question fall into two main groups. (1) We may deny that there is any such thing as a distinctively religious value. In that case we may either (a) assimilate religion to some other type of experience as a department or subdivision of the latter ; or (b) we may hold the view that its uniqueness lies in the way in which it *organises* the *whole* of experience round the idea of God, rather than in any elementary feeling peculiar to itself. (2) Or, on the contrary, we may regard religion as something *sui generis*, wholly unique, original, possessing at least relative independence and autonomy in human life, and not as a mere mode or department of any other type of experience, or even as an organism consisting of elements which are in themselves non-religious. We must briefly examine these views.

(1) If it is held that there is no such thing as a distinctively religious value, (a) the simpler plan is to reduce religion to some other type of experience. According to this view, what religion does is to adopt the valuation of some other aspect of human culture, and to give it a tone or complexion of its own.

For instance, it may be held that religion is a department of *morality* and apprehends the Divine under the form of absolute *Goodness* in the ethical sense. The outstanding exponent of this view is Kant, who sought in the moral consciousness and there alone the essence of religion. Both in

his *Critique of the Practical Reason* and in his *Critique of Judgment* he defines religion as "the recognition of our duties as divine commands." He denies that there are any special duties which we owe to God (*Hofdienste*, "court-services," he somewhat contemptuously calls them) over and above our ethical duties to our fellow men. In his posthumous work, the *Opus Postumum* (first published in 1920), he seems definitely to identify God with the Moral Law. "There is a God," he declares, "for there is a Categorical Imperative of Duty, before which all knees do bow, whether they be in heaven or in the earth or under the earth, and whose name is holy."¹ By his constant insistence on the moral aspect of religion as distinct from outward ritual, Kant doubtless rendered a valuable service, which may be compared to that of the Old Testament prophets. But in assimilating the religious sentiment to the moral, he ignored the real distinctness and relative independence of these two aspects of human life. In such a view a whole dimension of religious experience is strangely overlooked, viz. what may be called the mystical element, the soul's apprehension of God as a Supreme Value to be enjoyed for His own sake, that intimate fellowship with God which, though it reacts profoundly on moral conduct, is not simply to be subsumed under the term "Moral Law" in the sense of our duties to our fellow men. The purely religious consciousness can never acquiesce in the view that religion is a mere appendix or handmaid of morality, or that religious values and moral values, however closely inter-related, can be reduced into sheer identity. Religion is more than morality, though morality is an element in it.

Again, it may be held that religion is essentially a form of *knowledge*, a view of the universe, a kind of metaphysic of Reality. In that case its supreme value is *Truth*, which is also the normative value of science and philosophy. To Hegel religion was a kind of popular philosophy, or picture-thinking, couched in the concrete language of the imagination and the emotions, as distinguished from the more severely logical thinking of pure philosophy. Thus religion and philosophy differ in form but are identical in essential content. To the neo-Idealists, Croce and Gentile, who may be called the modern successors of Hegel, the human spirit is outgrowing the need of religion, the place of which is being taken by philosophy.² Now, religion does doubtless include

¹ Quoted by C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (1926), p. 197.

² E.g. Croce: "We must affirm that religion, so far as it is truth, is identical with philosophy, or as can also be said, that philosophy is the true.

or imply a *Weltanschauung*, a more or less metaphysical view of the universe which means to be *true*. Like metaphysics, it is a kind of a hunger and thirst for Ultimate Reality, a search for the noumenal beyond mere phenomena. The extreme mystic, it is true, discards all intellectual or logical methods, and claims to be able to apprehend Reality directly, *i.e.* without the help of intervening concepts ; yet what he does so apprehend he believes to be the Real, the inmost Truth of things. But the religious man as such does not approach the problem of truth in the severely detached, impartial or impersonal way of scientific and philosophical research. Reality is to him a religious value that answers to the deepest emotions of the heart and satisfies needs other than the purely intellectual. In a word, religion is not to be identified with knowledge ; it is more than knowledge, though knowledge is an element in it.

Similar remarks might be made about the view that religion is essentially an *æsthetic* feeling, a kind of beatific vision of Absolute *Beauty*, or an appreciation of the satisfyingness of the Universe as a kind of internally harmonious work of art. As we shall see, Schleiermacher has close affinities with this view. Now art has played a great part in the religious life of men, but religion is not identical with art or a department of it. It is more than appreciation of the Beautiful, though this, too, is an element in it.

(b) That religion is the *organisation of all values* rather than something which enshrines a distinctive value of its own, has been held by many modern psychologists and philosophers. For instance, Professor G. A. Coe, in his *Psychology of Religion* (1916), says :

“ Religion offers no particular value of its own. It is not co-ordinate with other interests, but is rather a reinforcement, unification, and revaluation of values as a whole, particularly in social terms ” (p. 41). “ Religion does not introduce any new value ; it is an operation upon and within all our appreciations. If we are to speak of religious values at all, we should think of it as the value of values, that is, the value of life organising and completing itself, or seeking a destiny, as against the discrete values of impulsive or unreflective existence ” (p. 70).¹

religion. . . . When religion does not dissolve into philosophy . . . it reveals itself as effective error.” See his *Logic*, English translation, pp. 439-447.

¹ The present writer has expressed a similar view in his book *The Philosophy of Religion* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), p. 68. It is because

And Professor Windelband, in his *Introduction to Philosophy* (English translation, 2nd edit., 1923), writes thus :

“ Logical, ethical, and æsthetic values [*i.e.* the True, the Good, the Beautiful], make up the entire range, for philosophical inquiry, of the human value-activity. . . . There can be, as regards content, no further universal values beyond these three, because in these three the entire province of psychic activity is exhausted. . . . When, in spite of this, we speak of a realm of religious values, which may be comprised under the title of the sacred, we mean that all these values may assume religious forms. . . . If we seek the common feature in all the valuations which can thus assume a religious complexion, we find it is always the relation of the values to a supramundane, superempirical, suprasensuous reality. This element of otherworldliness is characteristic of the essence of religion. . . . By the sacred we do not mean any special class of universally valid values, such as those which constitute the true, the good, the beautiful, but all these values together in so far as they are related to a suprasensuous reality ” (pp. 323 ff.).

Thus, according to Windelband, religion derives all its values from other fields, and the specific religious element is to be sought only in the relation of these to a supramundane reality.

The views thus expressed by Coc and Windelband contain an important element of truth which we must seek to conserve. Religion certainly claims to organise the *whole* experience of man, and therefore (as I shall emphasise later) to embrace *all* values within its own supreme valuation, and in the act of including them it “sublimates,” hallows and unifies them, and irradiates them with its own supramundane glory. Religion at its best is not a merely departmental function of life, marked off sharply from the provinces of ethics, art, science and philosophy, and the “secular” pursuits of daily life. It pervades all interests and sweeps all life into its orbit. But it is able to do this just because it has its own unique principle of valuation, which is more fundamental, ultimate and inclusive than any merely derived principle. It has its own original contribution to make to the system of values other than the function (important as this is) of relating the values which exist independently of it to the transmundane reality.

he now feels that the matter deserves a more careful treatment than he has been led to reconsider the whole question in this article.

(2) We now turn to the view that religion is a unique and distinct type of experience, which, as such, may be expected to enshrine a value of its own unborrowed from any other field of human activity. Schleiermacher was the first thinker to insist on the original or underived nature of religious experience, and so to seek to vindicate the independent status of religion as a fundamental function of life distinct from morality and knowledge.

“Only [he declared] when piety takes its place alongside of science and practice, as a necessary, an indispensable third, as their natural counterpart, not less in worth or splendour than either, will the common field be altogether occupied, and human nature on this side complete.”¹

In his *Reden* (1799) Schleiermacher endeavoured to “descend into the inmost sanctuary of life” in order to find an independent psychical basis for religion, and he found that basis in simple feeling in its primordial form, that is in that mystic moment of consciousness in which subject and object are merged in each other in undifferentiated unity. Religion was to him the immediate awareness of the Infinite in the finite, the Eternal in the temporal, the direct contact and fusion of the self with the Divine. It is thus rooted neither in knowing nor in acting, but in feeling. And yet Schleiermacher does not really succeed in safeguarding the uniqueness of religious experience, for he does not distinguish pious feeling from feeling in general. He goes so far as to say that all healthy feeling is religious. But it is certain that feeling enters into non-religious types of experience as well as into the religious. Further, he fails to discriminate religious feeling from mere organic sensation. Or in so far as the former is assigned a higher plane than mere organic consciousness, it has close affinities with æsthetic feeling or the sense of the beauty and internal harmony of the universe. In his later and riper work, *Der christliche Glaube* (1821), he gives a closer psychological characterisation of the nature of religious feeling, in the famous definition of religion as “the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or of being in relation with God.”² But even this does not sufficiently define the *nature* of that relation. The feeling of dependence is not specifically and exclusively religious. There is some point in Hegel’s

¹ The quotations are from the Second Address of the *Reden*, Dr Oman’s translation.

² Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith* (English translation, 1928), p. 12.

retort that if this be the nature of piety, then Schleiermacher's dog would be more pious than his master. In a word, what is wrong with his teaching, in spite of its great historical importance and profound suggestiveness, is that he has no adequate idea of *value*. His religious feeling has too much affinity with mere organic sensation, which is obviously on a sub-valuational or naturalistic plane.

It was Ritschl (following Lotze) who prominently introduced the idea of "value" into the discussion of religion. As is well known, Ritschl held that religious knowledge consists of value-judgments as distinguished from scientific or existential judgments: *i.e.* it is concerned with the object not as it is in itself, but as it affects the subject according to the pleasure or pain it excites.

"Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which relate to man's attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed to him by God, or feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end."¹

But Ritschl does not really help us to answer our question: What *kind* of value enters into the religious judgment as distinguished from other kinds of value-judgment, such as the moral and the æsthetic? What quality is it that gives the religious object its worth to man's consciousness? Is it felt to possess value because it is perfectly "good" in the ethical sense? How then are we to distinguish religion from morality? Or is it because it is apprehended as transcendently "beautiful"? How then does religion differ essentially from æsthetic taste? Or is it in virtue of some other quality which is neither moral nor æsthetic? In one important point Ritschl falls behind Schleiermacher. For him, on account of his deep-rooted antipathy to all forms of mysticism, the essential element in religious experience is not immediate consciousness of God, but man's "enjoyment of dominion over the world vouchsafed to him by God," "by whose help" man is able to "maintain his independence against" the world of Nature.² But this reduces religion to the non-religious, namely to man's relation to the world, and assigns to God a merely instrumental and not an intrinsic and immediate value for piety. On the whole, Ritschl's interpre-

¹ Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation* (English translation, 1900), p. 205.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 199.

tation was predominantly ethical and practical, as Schleiermacher's was æsthetic and mystical.

Rudolf Otto is much more successful than his predecessors in isolating the unique element in religious experience and in maintaining that religion enshrines a value of its own, distinct from the values which belong to other human interests and activities.

"If there is any single domain of human experience that presents us with something unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself, assuredly it is that of the religious life" (p. 4).¹

And the value peculiar to religion is *Holiness* or *the Sacred*. " 'Holiness'—'the holy'—is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion" (p. 5). "The Holy as a Category of Value" is the title of one of the chapters in Otto's famous book (ch. viii.). Now this word "holiness" has come to be used in the ethical sense of perfect goodness. But Otto would lead us back to its original meaning, conveying the sense of the ineffable and unfathomable mystery of the Divine Being as the "wholly other," which evokes in the worshipper a "creature-feeling" or emotion of self-abasement into nothingness before an overpowering absolute might—a *might* which is recognised as having at the same time the supremest *right* to make the highest claims on men and as being in an absolute sense (on other than moral and rational grounds) worthy to be praised. To convey this original meaning of "holiness" isolated from the moral element ("goodness") which later came to be associated with it, Otto invents the term "numinous," and he speaks of a "unique numinous category of value," "a category of valuation which has no place in the everyday natural world of ordinary experience" (pp. 7, 15). The impression at once of *awefulness* and of *fascination* which the holiness of the Divine leaves on the soul of the devotee is the absolutely primary and elementary datum of religious experience, and as such is non-rational, *i.e.* indefinable in terms of rational concepts. Moreover, this unique original feeling-response to the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* "can be in itself ethically neutral," and so claims recognition in its own right apart from moral considerations. Further, "religious feelings are not the same as æsthetic feelings" (p. 42 n.). Thus religion cannot be assimilated either to

¹ The quotations are from Otto's *Idea of the Holy* (English translation, 1923).

philosophy or to morality or to art, but is an autonomous activity of the human spirit in its felt relation to an absolutely unique Being, "the Wholly Other."

Such in briefest possible outline are Otto's characteristic views, which have now become widely known. There can be no doubt that he has made a very strong *primâ facie* case for "the holy" in the sense of the "numinous" as the distinctively religious category of value. He has rendered great service by reviving the religious sense of an independent, transcendent spiritual world, and by restoring the emotion of awe (or in the language of the New Testament, "reverence and godly fear") to its rightful place at the very centre of the life of piety. A distinctive mark of the religious consciousness is its sense of the august sublimity and transcendence of God as "the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is *Holy*" (Isa. lvii. 15), and its inmost emotion is expressed in the words of the scraphic adoration, "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of His glory" (Isa. vi. 3). But Otto's solution suggests many further problems. We must here limit ourselves to one main point, namely the question of the correlation and the unification of the values.

III.

The problem then is, In what relation do the four ultimate values (the Good, the True, the Beautiful, the Holy) stand to each other? Can there be four ultimates? Is the "Holy" (in the numinous sense) a fourth value existing side by side, so to speak, with the other three on equal terms, as an indispensable fourth (in place of Schleiermacher's "indispensable third")? Are the four values to be left in a state of independence or quasi-independence, like four parallel lines that never meet? In other words, is religious experience a fourth autonomous type of experience existing alongside of three others, equally autonomous, the moral, the rational and the æsthetic? Are we to have not only "art for art's sake," but also morality for morality's sake, etc., and likewise on the same terms religion for religion's sake, each department of human culture being complete in itself and an end in itself, governed by its own relevant value without interference or interpenetration by the values which are relevant to the other realms? Do the values at best constitute a kind of confederacy of co-equal principles? Even so, the question arises: On what basis are they confederated? If we can discover the principle of federation, is that prin-

ciple another value, or is it identical with one of those with which we have been dealing ?

It is at once obvious that the autonomy or mutual independence of the four values is relative only, and cannot be absolute. They must somehow co-inhere and interpenetrate within the unity of experience as a whole. Just as (if the analogy be permitted) patristic and scholastic theology endeavoured to safeguard the unity of the Godhead by the doctrine of *περιχώρησις* or reciprocal permeation and mutual inclusiveness of the Three Persons, and likewise sought to ensure the unity of Christ's person by the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* or interpenetration of the divine and human "natures" in Him, so we must think of the values of human experience as somehow interfused within the unity of life. Of course Otto himself fully recognises and emphasises this. He speaks of

"the intimate interpenetration of the non-rational [the numinous] with the rational elements of the religious consciousness, like the interweaving of warp and woof in a fabric" (p. 47),

which he compares with the interpenetration of the non-rational sex instinct by personal affection and of pure, non-rational music by the rational verbal text of the song, and which is the result of what he calls "the law of association of feelings" and "schematisation" (ch. vii). But is not the relation between them even more intimate? Must we not attribute the fusion to some principle more organic than the mere "association of feelings" which have wholly distinct origins?

The suggestion I wish to make is that "the Holy" is not so much a fourth value, co-existing on terms of equality with the other three so-called "ultimate values," but is, so to speak, the common plasm from which all the other values are differentiated, the matrix from which they are derived, their common *fons et origo*. Religion, being man's experience of supra-sensible and ultimate Reality (of course I do not mean that any human experience can *exhaust* that Reality), is the most inclusive type of experience, the richest in content and in potentiality, and therefore its category of value—the Holy—is the richest and most inclusive of all human values. Just as "the Good" (not in the restricted moral sense) was to Plato "the idea of ideas," that is, the ultimate and all-inclusive idea, so we may suppose that "the Holy" is the value of values, the ultimate, most fundamental and comprehensive value.

The values of Goodness, Beauty and Truth already exist *implicitly* or "in solution" in that of Holiness. In the course of social development they become *explicit* even to the extent of being isolated and cut off from their creative source and original home. To borrow Shelley's metaphor:

"Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of"

the Holy, by its prismatic diffraction of the pure light. This is in accordance with the general tendency of biological and sociological evolution, which is marked by an increasing differentiation of function in the course of which the "one" divides itself into the "many." In primitive society religion is not marked off from other interests or activities, but rather includes them all, such as magic (which is primitive science), art, law, morality. But gradually, as the organisation of life became more complex, these other aspects of culture, and the values which they enshrined, more and more asserted their autonomy as interests which exist in their own right. We then see science, art and morality withdrawing themselves from the sphere of religion and setting themselves up as independent disciplines, each with its own immanent laws and rights. This stage of differentiation is doubtless a necessary "moment" in human development, but it is at best a half-way house and not the end of the journey. It is the stage of antithesis, which must lead on to an effort towards a richer synthesis or re-unification of values at a deeper level of experience than the original unity. For religion aims at nothing less than the unification of the whole of life under the control of its own principle. Differentiation of function is necessary and is a real enrichment of life, provided it does not lead to a final separation of the various functions from the primal unitary source of all being, namely God, who is the object of the numinous experience. Such a separation would involve the acute secularisation of vast domains of life, and thereby religion would become a mere departmental activity of the human spirit unrelated to the rest of life. This would indeed be a disastrous result. Such result can only be avoided if it be realised that the moral, æsthetic and rational values all radiate from a common centre of light—the Holy—and that if we follow their rays back to their original source we are led back to that radiant centre. In a word, religion engages the whole personality of man and claims all values for its own.

Each type of value-experience is, so far as it goes, a valid

way of approach to the *religious* experience of the Absolute Reality. All values of Goodness, Beauty and Truth when elevated to the plane of the Absolute are *holy* or sacred. They are, so to speak, parallel lines that meet in infinity. Each value when raised to the *n*th power partakes of the quality of the numinous. Not one of them, nor even the three combined, are exhaustive of the whole content or character of the Holy, nevertheless each is an essential constituent of it. They are not, as Otto would have it, merely interfused with the Holy by association of feelings, but are organic and intrinsic elements within it. Each of the three "non-religious" modes of value-experience may take on a religious complexion and colour, and be suffused and saturated with the numinous quality, not by a kind of *communicatio idiomatum* of feelings which are of independent origin, but because each value emanates from God and partakes of His nature. That is why there can be a distinctively religious motive of conduct, a religious apprehension of truth, a religious appreciation of beauty.

Take, for instance, the *ethical* type of experience. I have criticised Kant for reducing religion into a subsidiary position as a mere handmaid of morality. And yet, as Professor Webb has recently pointed out, Kant's attitude to the moral law was itself a profoundly religious attitude.

"Whatever we may find wanting in Kant's relation of morality to other aspects of life, his own attitude towards the moral law is always profoundly *religious*, full of the sentiment of awe and self-prostration which we associate with the perception anywhere of what Professor Otto has lately taught us to call *das Numinose*."¹

I would refer again to Kant's own words which I have quoted above :

"There is a God, for there is a Categorical Imperative of Duty, before which all knees do bow, whether they be in heaven or in the earth or under the earth, and *whose Name is holy*" (italics mine).

Here Kant's attitude to the moral law is distinctively numinous. His mistake was in making duty, or goodness in the restricted moral sense, *the one and only* avenue of approach to God (although in the famous passage at the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason* he places "the starry heavens above" side by side with "the moral law within" as

¹ C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (1926), p. 58.

inspirers of "wonder and reverent awe"). Yet it is a permanent element of truth in his teaching that the Good is a main road to the Holy or Numinous. "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Mic. vi. 8),—justice and mercy in our dealings with men are highways to humility or reverence in our attitude to God and are essential to true religion. In this way we avoid the peril, from which Otto is not free, of making religion to be "wholly other" than morality, and of regarding the increasing "moralisation of the idea of God," which marks the progress of religion, as due to a mere infiltration (however intimate) into religion of something from outside rather than a necessary dialectic movement within religion itself. The moral insight of man when pursued to the uttermost leads straight to God, the perfect moral Being. The apprehension of God as absolute goodness is implicit in the religious consciousness as such, though it needs the discipline of life and history to make it explicit. God is certainly felt to transcend human goodness, but only in the sense that His goodness is *transcendent*, i.e. superlative, absolute, not in the sense that He is Himself "beyond good and evil" or morally neutral. Goodness in God is in principle the same as goodness in man. The transformation or sublimation of moral experience in God does not destroy its essential continuity with ours, any more than the transformation of mathematical knowledge in an Einstein destroys its continuity with that of the schoolboy who is only beginning to babble the multiplication table. And transcendent goodness is, I suggest, *holy*, awe-inspiring; absolute moral purity is a *sacred* quality which evokes a response of religious reverence. It should impress those who contemplate it with numinous *awe* as well as with a numinous feeling of its unique *fascination*.

A similar line of argument might be developed concerning the *rational* category of value (the True). Here also we have a real way of approach to the Holy, or to an element within the complex idea of the Holy. There are those to whom religion is primarily an apprehension of God through the higher intellect—an apprehension which is a genuine value-experience, in so much as it "satisfies" a human "desire" (in accordance with my definition of value at the commencement of this paper). Thinkers like Plato, Plotinus and Spinoza occasionally arrive at a high point in their argument where their philosophical thought becomes suffused with a distinctively religious glow. It is often inadequately realised

that St. Augustine's conversion was largely intellectual, as is evident from his *Confessions*. He embraced Christianity because it satisfied his earnest quest for truth in a way which Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism had failed to do, and his satisfaction expressed itself in religious adoration. The Beatific Vision which Dante had in the Empyrean (as described at the end of his *Paradiso*) is a direct intellectual knowledge of God. Both Aquinas and Dante accepted the Aristotelian doctrine that the satisfaction of the intellect is man's final beatitude, and that this satisfaction is found in the contemplation of God as Absolute Truth. It is true that the *natural* reason of man is incapable of reaching these heights.

"For the direct vision [of God] . . . nothing avails but a supernatural elevation of the natural intellect of man by an infusion into it of the Divine Intellect by grace, . . . by which the human intellect is raised above itself."¹

But even so it is implied that God is apprehended as *Truth*, and that truth so apprehended satisfies the soul and confers upon it a joy or beatitude which is essentially religious. It was his discovery of a scientific law that inspired Kepler to utter the prayer, "O God, we think Thy thoughts after Thee." It seems to me, then, that we must modify Otto's disproportionate stress on the non-rational element in religion, and as a corrective I would stress its implicit rationality. This does not mean that they are right who identify religion with philosophy. The intellect is one way, but only one way, of approach to God. Nor would I give the name religion to mere intellectual knowledge without the appropriate emotional response. But what is religious is the whole concrete experience, and not the mere emotion isolated from its intellectual content or concomitant.

Similarly it may be argued that *aesthetic taste* or the experience of the *beautiful* is a means of approach to the Holy. This way was typical of the ancient Greeks, so that Hegel, with much truth, characterised Greek religion as "the Religion of Beauty." The Greeks made great use of the sensuous forms of art—especially of sculpture and architecture—to body forth their ideas of the Divine and to express their religious sentiments, and so disclosed to the world the significance of beauty in religion. It is, of course, true that no sensuous form can adequately represent the *transcendent* spiritual world; art can only image forth the

¹ J. S. Carroll, *In Patria: An Exposition of Dante's Paradiso*, pp. 16 f.

Divine in so far as the Divine is *immanent* in the world of sense. But as is well known, Plato taught that Absolute Beauty, or Beauty in its pure, suprasensuous, eternal essence, and not merely in its visible manifestations, is the ultimate object of the soul's quest.

"Here [he declares] is to be found . . . the happy life, the ultimate object of desire to man ; it is to live in beholding this consummate beauty. . . . What, then, might we expect if we should see Beauty uncorrupted, pure and unmixed, not that of the corruptible bodily nature of men and colours, and all the rest of that perishing and fading trash, but the divine and unchangeable beauty itself ? Think you that the life of that man would be contemptible and mean who would ever fix his eyes on that beauty, and behold that which he ought to behold, and be conversant with it ? . . . Would he not become dear to the gods, and himself one of the immortals if ever man was ? " ¹

Here, then, we see that there is a type of mind for whom the pursuit of beauty leads to the Divine. We may well learn from Plato that Ultimate Reality is beautiful as well as good, that Beauty is an absolute value and as such an attribute of God. It is true that in the passage quoted the numinous sense of the *mysterium tremendum*, which Otto so emphasises, is not conspicuous, but only the element of fascination, which he also stresses. The Hebrew psalmist, however, combines the *tremendum* and the *fascinans* in those striking words, "O worship the Lord in the *beauty of holiness* ; tremble before Him, all the earth " (Ps. xcvi. 9, cf. xxix. 2). Here, then, in a highly numinous context, the feeling of the *beauty* of the divine holiness is expressed. And absolute Beauty is holy, wor(th)shipful, adorable.

Thus we seem justified in saying that the Good, the True and the Beautiful are all emanations, so to speak, from the Holy, and that, viewed from the human end, they are avenues of approach to God, which, if followed up, would lead to religious adoration. Eternal Life, says Baron von Hügel, in its

"outgoing movement will not only discover God as hidden in the deepest ideals and impulses of Ethics, but also in the fullest strivings of Art and in the wisest and most delicate attempts of the speculative and analytic reason. God is no less truly the ultimate

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, §§ 210-212.

Source, Sustainer and end of perfect Beauty and of utter Truth than of complete Goodness and of the purest Self-Donation.”¹

Holiness, then, I suggest, is the primal unitary value containing in itself the potentiality of all the ideal values of human experience. And the least we can say of God is that He is the synthesis of Goodness, Truth and Beauty, and that as such He is the thrice-holy One. For each of these attributes is in Him “holy” and so capable of evoking awe and adoration in the mind of man. How much more is this true of them in their living unity and original wholeness in the Divine Being?

But the question arises, Is the Holy analysable *without remainder* into these three values? Do these revealed qualities exhaust the being of God? Or to express it otherwise, are there no other ways of approach to the Object of religious experience? Is Holiness nothing more than the halo of Eternity which surrounds the other values when raised to the level of absolute perfection? Is it simply the summation and sublimation of Goodness, Truth and Beauty? Has it no other qualities beyond these?

Doubtless there is an overplus of mystery in the Supreme Object of religious experience. It would be presumption to claim that these three categories of value, even when raised to the *n*th power or to the plane of the Holy, are adequate to explain It. What is man that he may claim to have exhaustively analysed the Inexhaustible? The pious mind always recognises a mysterious Beyond which over-reaches all human categories. And this vivid consciousness of the ultimate mystery of things enters as a constituent into the characteristic religious attitude of awe, humility and adoration. “How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out, . . . to Whom be glory for ever, Amen” (Rom. xi. 33, 36). A kind of reverent agnosticism, *i.e.* a certain awareness of the inadequacy of all human modes of apprehension to grasp the stupendous mystery of being, together with a sense of awe and wonder in the presence of that mystery, accompanies all deep spiritual experience as a delicate background and presupposition. And yet this overplus of mystery confronts us, not as an ultimatum or a *ne plus ultra* assigning fixed boundaries to human thought, but as a challenge to the adventurous mind of man to explore further the nature of Eternal Being and to seek to interpret it in terms of the highest categories or values of human

¹ F. von Hügel, *Eternal Life*, p. 392.

experience. The apotheosis of blank mystery—non-rational, non-ethical, beyond good and evil—is in danger of resulting either in a reversion to primitive credulity and superstition, or in a fanatical plunge into the empty abyss of extreme mysticism in which God is conceived of in purely negative terms. I emphatically agree with Otto when he says that the

“process of rationalisation and moralisation of the numinous, as it grows ever more clear and more potent, is in fact the most essential part of what we call ‘Sacred History’ and prize as the ever-growing self-revelation of the divine” (p. 115).

But I would suggest that this process, which is so essential to religious progress, is the result, not (as in Otto’s theory) of the infusion into religion of values which are of independent origin, but of the immanent development of the supreme religious value (the Holy) itself. Further, Otto is right in his view that the *mysterium tremendum* of religious experience involves the feeling of the “might,” “power,” “absolute overpoweringness,” *tremenda majestas* of the Deity (p. 20). But overpowering Might is not worshipful—*worthshipful*—unless it be supremely good. An omnipotent Devil would not be worthy of “the blessing, and the honour, and the glory, and the dominion” which in the apocalyptic vision was offered unto the Lamb that sitteth upon the throne for ever and ever (Rev. v. 13). It is “the Lamb,” as symbol of the sacrificial love which rules on the throne of the universe, that is deemed “worthy” of religious adoration and praise.

To sum up: Holiness is not a simple, elementary value, but a compound and synthetic one, which includes, unifies, permeates and conserves all the other values of life. It is, so to say, the common protoplasm from which all the other values have been differentiated. Such differentiation was historically inevitable as a stage in the dialectic of life, so that ethics, science and philosophy, and æsthetics, have cast aside the leading-strings of religion and become independent disciplines. This is all to the good, in so far as it is a “moment” in the process which is to issue in a deeper unification. But the final quest of life must be for a unity which embraces all values while yet conserving them in their integrity, and such a unity is to be sought for on the lines of an ever-deepening and ever-expanding religious experience.

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EDUCATION IN GERMANY SINCE THE REVOLUTION.

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THE revolution which took place in Germany immediately after the war, though less spectacular than that of Russia, has had equally important consequences. This is especially true of its effects on education. Consciously or unconsciously, every political system uses its educational organisation to provide a moral basis for itself, and, in particular, a government established by revolution has to justify itself to the rising generation. Changes in the educational system of a country, therefore, provide an accurate barometer of the opinion underlying political changes. Moreover, a revolution affords greater opportunities for new experiments than exist under a stable government, and as the problems of education in Germany are very similar to our own, the solutions offered there are of particular interest to us at the present time.

The school system of Germany under the old *régime* was justly famous for its thoroughness and efficiency, but it suffered from some pronounced defects. In fact, a deputy stated in the Prussian Landtag in 1919 that if it were true that the Seven Weeks' War had been won by the Prussian elementary school teacher, it was equally true that the world war was lost in the secondary school. Education was controlled by each individual state, and consequently it failed to emphasise the unity of German national life and culture. Still greater was the division between the classes. Transference from the elementary school to the secondary school was extremely difficult; the elementary school was meant for the training of workers, the secondary school for the official classes. This was even reflected in the hostility which existed between the two types of teachers. Again, the diversity of secondary schools was almost bewildering; there

existed the classical Gymnasium, the semi-classical Realgymnasium, the scientific Realschule, and many variations of these three types. This diversity was increased by the control over education exercised by religious bodies, by the Lutheran church in Prussia and the Catholic church in Bavaria. In no sense, therefore, was education unified; neither was it national. The classical gymnasium in particular came in for criticism. Socially it was the most exclusive of the types of secondary school, and its predominant interest in the classics almost excluded all other subjects. Even the former Emperor, William II., is reputed to have said that he wished his schools to produce Germans and not Greeks.

The revolution, therefore, attempted to make education more democratic and more national. Certain principles were laid down by the Constitution of Weimar. Thus, education was to be free and compulsory. A child was to have at least eight years in school (commencing at the age of six), and it was intended that he should have part-time education from his fourteenth to his eighteenth year, but this clause has not been applied. More important still is the provision for compulsory elementary State-education for all. Before the war, the child destined to enter the secondary school spent his early years in a private preparatory school, but by the constitution all schools of this type were to be abolished. In spite of bitter opposition, the law came into effect in 1929, and now every German child has to attend a *Grundschule* for four years. After this he can continue in the elementary school (which 90 per cent. do), or proceed to one of the secondary schools. There was some consideration given to the provision of maintenance grants where necessary to support children in the secondary school, but this matter was also dropped, and at present a parent pays fees in proportion to his income tax. The constitution stated that all children should have the same right to education, and that this should be used as a means to attain social unity. Co-operation between the elementary school and the secondary was thus assumed. Added to this the constitution declared that denominational, interdenominational and secular schools should be provided, and that no teacher or pupil should be compelled to give or attend religious instruction.

The control of education by the Federal Government, desirable as it was from the point of view of national unity, broke down over the question of finance. The Reich was not willing to assume responsibility for the cost of education, and

as this fell on the various States, naturally they claimed absolute control. The result is that there are as many educational systems in Germany as there are political units, and they differ considerably from one another. Bavaria, the most reactionary of the States, has introduced changes in the matter of religious instruction which are contradictory to the Federal Constitution. On the other hand, Saxony and Hamburg have carried out radical reforms. Midway between these two extremes stands Prussia, and as the prestige of Prussia is so great with the lesser States, who follow its policy in most things, its educational system can safely be taken to be typical of most of Germany.

Prussian education is still highly organised on its administrative side, but great latitude is granted in the matter of teaching. This is particularly noticeable in areas where political opinion is most radical, as in Neuköln, the industrial section of Berlin. Here the most extreme experiments are carried out, and the schools concerned do not seem to suffer any lack of the necessary money. In recent years several of the elementary schools have adopted what is called *Gesamt Unterricht*, a method by which the unity of knowledge is emphasised by the rejection of any kind of time-table. The discussion of one subject is allowed to lead to that of another, and knowledge is imparted as the need arises. The result seemed to a foreign practical teacher to be merely chaos. It is as if the schools were allowed as much freedom as they desire, as a reaction against past centralisation, and in the hope that they will eventually attain stability. It is symptomatic that the new official handbook for teachers is called *Suggestions (Richtlinien)*, and not Instructions.

In the elementary school, as in the secondary school, the object is to acquaint the child with the cultural traditions of Germany. Great attention is therefore paid to the German language, to German literature, history and folk songs. The most interesting development has been in religious instruction. Religion is certainly a part of the cultural tradition of Germany, but there, even more than in England, it is also a controversial matter. Hence the three types of schools advocated in the constitution have been established. By far the greater number are interdenominational (*Simultanschulen*). A certain hour is provided for religion, and at that time the Lutheran pastor, the Jewish rabbi and the Catholic priest teach religion to the children of their respective confessions. There are a small number of secular schools (*Weltanschauungsschulen*), usually in the socialistic, indus-

trial areas. It is difficult to define the "world view" provided by these schools, but it is soon felt to be something positive, and not merely the absence of religious instruction. The children seem to be well aware of this. In a school in Neuköln I asked a little girl of eight where she lived. She mentioned a part of the city a considerable distance away, and said that she came to school by tram. I asked her why she did not attend a school nearer home, and she promptly informed me that it was because her parents did not wish her to be taught religion.

Since religion was not taught, it was interesting to inquire how far a sense of morality was imparted. The headmaster of the same school in Neuköln told me of the following incident. He had set one of his upper classes to write a short story as an exercise in composition. One girl described herself as walking along Unter den Linden, Berlin's main street. An expensively dressed woman came along and dropped her bag so that her money fell out on the street. The little girl promptly put her foot on one note, and while keeping it there officiously helped in picking up the rest of the money. When the woman had gone she put the note in her pocket and went home, but found that it was of the inflation period and therefore worthless. When this had been read out to the class it was discussed from the point of view of language and composition, but the headmaster carefully refrained from commenting on its morality, and as carefully deflected the children's attention from this aspect. His expressed purpose was to allow the child to develop its own sense of morality, but it could be felt that he wished tacitly to break down the traditional conceptions. The Weltanschauungsschulen are, in fact, schools of propaganda for a new social order.

In secondary education there has been a tendency towards the idea of a one-way or common school—a school which would provide a pathway from the elementary school to the University, and at the same time provide an education which would emphasise German culture. The movement began before the war, but subsequent events have given it a great impetus. The demoralisation of Germany through its defeat and the nightmare of the inflation period, its loss of confidence in itself, and particularly the feeling that the body of the nation had been maimed through its lost territories, all made the building up of a healthy national life a matter of vital importance. Such an education was to be provided in the new German High School (*Deutsche Oberschule*), which should replace all the other forms of secondary schools. At

least 50 per cent. of the time in this new school was to be devoted to German history, literature, geography, philosophy, art and religion. No Latin or Greek was to be taught, and the remainder of the time was to be divided equally between two foreign languages on the one hand, and mathematics and natural science on the other. The two languages were insisted upon by the universities, and it is to be noticed that in the majority of cases English has replaced French as the primary foreign language. The prestige of the older type of school was, however, too strong to allow of its complete replacement by the *Deutsche Oberschule*, and in this respect the movement for the one-way school only led to the compromise of the addition of one more type to the existing diversity.

At the age of ten, therefore, the child destined for higher education has to choose which type of school he will go to. In the *Gymnasium* about half his time will be devoted to Latin and Greek, and very little to modern languages. In the *Realgymnasium* he will still do Latin, but possibly no Greek at all, and the emphasis will be on modern languages. In the *Oberrealschule* he will devote considerably more time than in the other schools to mathematics and natural science. Judging by the statistics for Prussia, the number of humanistic *Gymnasien* has very slightly decreased since 1922; the number of *Realgymnasien* and of *Oberrealschulen* has considerably increased, and the number of *Deutsche Oberschulen* is still small, but is steadily increasing. Still, even in the older types, the movement for nationalising the schools has been successful in reforming the curriculum; and now they also devote at least one-third of their time to German history, geography, literature, etc. In teaching the classics the emphasis is no longer so much on linguistic study as on the contribution of antiquity to modern thought. Similarly modern languages are used as media to understand the culture of foreign nations, and thus afford comparison with that of Germany. In science, even, the technical side of the subject is subordinated to its cultural value.

The weakness of the system is that a child has to choose its school at the early age of ten—a difficulty which will also arise in the reorganised English schools. Ideally the choice should depend altogether on aptitude, but this is difficult to ascertain. The parent will therefore choose a school according to the career which he intends his boy to adopt, though accidental considerations such as proximity to a particular school will often decide. Transference from one school to

another later on is well-nigh impossible, though a gifted child (usually in rural districts where facilities for secondary education are not plentiful), after spending six years in a higher elementary school (*Aufbauschule*), may be transferred to a secondary school. The great advantage of the system is that once a boy has chosen his school, his education has a unity and continuity which are often lacking with us. In many of our schools a boy can drop any subject he does not like, without considering his education as a whole, until eventually his curriculum may consist only of a fortuitous collection of subjects. The waste which this involves is avoided in Germany by compelling the boy to follow a set course of instruction, once he has made the initial choice. It is true that the number of pupils who complete the eight years' course is relatively small.

It is difficult for anyone to enter into the spirit of the schools of a foreign country, and in particular of a country so recently hostile as Germany. It was part of the war propaganda in England to regard German schools as militaristic both in discipline and in outlook, and possibly this is what makes the complete absence of militarism so conspicuous. There is nothing in Germany to correspond to the Officers' Training Corps units which are attached to our schools, and which provide such a puzzle for visitors to our peace-loving country. History text-books and teaching are, it is true, far more concerned with the last twenty-five years than is the case with ours, but this is only natural. Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty placed the whole responsibility for the war on Germany and its allies, and the history books do their utmost to combat this accusation. Moreover the basis of German politics—the Constitution of Weimar—is of such recent origin that attention has to be paid to contemporary history. In all the schools I visited, the history text-books used were written since the Revolution. Attention was necessarily paid in them to wars—how otherwise could the growth of Prussia be explained?—but on the whole they seemed to carry out the decree of the Minister of Education (1922):

“It is necessary to create history text-books which—with strict preservation of historical truth—cause those facts and situations to stand out more strongly that are adapted to awaken and develop the consciousness of responsibility of the citizen of a republic for his place in the State and in society.”

Considerable space is devoted, in text and in maps, to the lost provinces and to Austria, the emphasis thus being on the nation rather than the State.

In the matter of discipline, the martinet type of teacher seems to have disappeared. Individual teachers explained this as the influence of the youth movement. The younger teachers are often products of the youth movement themselves, and in their wanderings come into contact with the boys in an informal way. Moreover it is the practice of many town schools to have a Landheim—a house in the country where each class in its turn spends a brief period every year with its teacher, and this cannot fail to produce a better feeling between them. The law also established in 1919 what are called Parent Councils (Elternbeiräte), to bring the schools into closer contact with the homes. Usually the parents of the pupils actually attending a school elect one of themselves for every fifty pupils to form a committee, and these advise with the teachers on matters of general welfare and discipline, though not on the curriculum. The position of the teacher himself is one of considerable dignity. He is a civil servant, and once appointed he cannot be removed except for moral reasons. He alone decides whether the pupils are to be promoted at the end of each year, for there is a laudable absence of examinations. The course lasts for eight years, and consequently the older pupils are capable of advanced work. Nevertheless the final examination is in the hands of the teacher. In German composition, modern languages, classics and mathematics, it is customary for him to prepare three sets of questions, one of which will be selected by the central authority. In all other subjects the examination is oral, conducted by the teacher in the presence of the headmaster and, if possible, of a Government Inspector. This does not seem to lower the standard of the examination, while it permits the teacher great latitude in the treatment of his subject, and still further extends the freedom which seems to be the main characteristic of present-day German education.

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GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

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FROM the individual to the group, from the group to the movement, from the movement to the agency, from the agency to the institution, represent a present social progress. The United States has passed, and is still passing, through such a trend. The last station in the fivefold hegira is now reached. The arrival, moreover, intimates an enlargement of the institutional conclusion. This enlargement, as found in several forms or fields of American society, deserves interpretation.

The first field which I seek to interpret is the Federal Government itself. For the Federal Government is of primary and fundamental importance. The instrument which represents the foundation of this Government, the constitution, has been, since its adoption in 1788, the object of constant debate and of legislation. The debate and legislation have been concerned with the powers, rights, duties of the Federal Government in relation to the individual commonwealth, and also with the rights, powers and duties of the individual commonwealth in relation to the Federal Government. The trend of all the discussion and of all the laws has been to strengthen and to enlarge the functions of the Federation and to narrow and to weaken the function of the individual commonwealth. This tendency, coming to its executive climax in the Civil War of 1861-65, has resulted in the comparative supremacy of the Government at Washington. The power of the Federal Government has constantly strengthened, and the power of the individual States has just

as constantly narrowed. In his thought of his Government the individual citizen has come to think chiefly of the United States, and in his political loyalty has come to feel his pledge given not to his State but to the United States. The Stars and Stripes has come to be his flag, and the flag of his commonwealth, even if it had one, commands no peculiar allegiance. In the year 1889, Bryce prophesied "the importance of the States will decline as the majesty and authority of the National Government increase."¹ The prophecy made forty years ago has with each succeeding year proved to be true.

The enlarged dominance of the Federal system become manifest in many forms and through a wide diversity of methods. Perhaps the most significant of all these forms and methods is seen in the creation of many so-called bureaux and commissions. These bureaux or commissions are independent forces which the general government has established, and through which it functions. They are neither legislative nor executive, nor judicial alone, but all combined. Their number and their manifold works are most impressive. The executive department of the Government in its divisions of the Cabinet has 20, the Treasury 17, the War 24, the Navy 19, the Post Office 21, Labour 8, Commerce 11, Agriculture 15, the Interior 9, and the Department of Justice 5. In addition there are some fifty commissions which represent a method and a force both legislative, executive, and judicial. These commissions are concerned with services as important and diverse as inter-State commerce, shipping, fine arts, the public lands and lighthouses.

Without reference to the legislative or the judicial functions which, existing from the beginning, have enlarged their field and their forces, the executive department has come to possess and to use powers of control, to cultivate fields of influence, to enlarge functions, which represent one of the great institutions of history and one of the mighty forces of the modern world. The Roman Empire covered and cultivated a wider area, but in a larger part of this area it failed to use so great a power as the United States uses in every part of its territory. The British Government to-day also covers a wider area, but in many parts of that area it declines to exercise the powers which the United States exercises in commonwealths as remote from its centre and from each other as are the commonwealths of Washington and of Florida, of California and of the State of Maine. The growth in and

¹ *The American Commonwealth*, by James Bryce. Vol. XI., p. 695.

toward a sense of institutionalism in the Federal Government is most significant and impressive. The growth is broad as well as fundamental, creative and formative of other institutions, and apparently ultimate in destiny. More and more completely does it become the *United States*.

In contrast with the general authority of the Federal Government there is a second institution, an institution which the Federal Government has so far consistently and firmly declined to direct, and that is the institution of education.¹ Education in the United States is a matter of the individual commonwealth. It is the State which gives education to its children. The chief form of education is public, supported from the kindergarten through all the grades to the university by public taxation. Of course, by the side of public education are found private schools, colleges and endowed universities. Education has become the consuming interest of the people, both in the public and in the specially chartered institutions. One-fourth of all the citizens of the United States are enrolled in her schools and colleges. No less than one million students are found in her colleges and universities. In the last forty years the increase in college enrolment has been eightfold. The increase in the cost of all schools has in a half-century been no less than thirtyfold. The present cost of public education is between three and four billions of dollars. The so-called higher education takes on two special forms: the one of establishment and administration by the State, as is manifest in fifty universities; and the other of the privately chartered institution, like Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia. The public universities are found in each of the great States, and in certain States, three, as in Ohio. Though the privately chartered institutions were of the earliest foundation, they have continued to grow with the growth of population and of resources. The growth, too, is commensurate with the growth of the State universities, like California, Illinois, Minnesota. Almost an even race are the great universities of each type, maintaining themselves, whether supported usually by public taxation or by fees and individual gifts and bequests. The university of the State has hardly developed more swiftly than have the historic, privately chartered institutions. Harvard and Columbia have in the last years each received annually not far from five million dollars. The State Universities have likewise spent commensurate sums in their annual administration.

¹ A few minor exceptions exist, as is seen in Alaska.

Their students, too, gathered from all parts of the world, represent an even more impressive evidence of institutional growth. New York University and Columbia enrol more than 30,000 students each in both internal and extra-mural classes.

The increasingly institutional character of the university is made yet more evident by the enlarging influence which it has gained on the manifold life of the whole community. All that concerns the community has come to concern the university. The many and diverse departments of the university serve communal needs as diverse and as fundamental. Its teachers' colleges train students to teach kindergarten, and also to pursuing research as a professional quest. It establishes and conducts schools as different as schools of business and of theology. The university, in fact, has become the crown of the broadest as well as of the highest intellectual life.

Carlyle's remark that a university is simply a great collection of books is a charming half-truth. Its half-truth represents a side of the institutional values of the university in American life. For the higher education in the United States is manifested in libraries having over 40 millions of volumes. These academic collections, however, are only a part, about one-fourth, of the nearly 10,000 libraries now established. Taken altogether, the public and academic collections constitute an institution which is helping to form, to reform, to transform, American life. The number of volumes in the public libraries exceeds 100 million copies. The annual expense for books and for administration is about 40 million dollars. Cleveland has 1,000,000 people, and a free library of more than 1,000,000 volumes. These volumes are wisely selected. The support is derived from public taxation. The administration is committed to 1,000 officers. The circulation represents eight volumes each year for each citizen. It has a central building, but also its usefulness is enlarged by more than 1,000 branches or agencies. Libraries of this general type are found in every American city. They are graduated to the diverse and manifold needs of the community. In thousands of towns and villages libraries of a similar efficiency, adjusted to the size and demands of the population are established. The American people are transmuting their American public library and the private collections into an institution. The American is usually described as primarily a reader of the newspaper. But he is also, and possibly more, a reader of books. That there are

wide areas without such services is a fact, and a fact also to be deplored. The constant tendency, however, is to give the book to every child and to every adult.

The printing-press, of which the book is a fundamental product, does, however, manifest itself most conspicuously in the newspaper. This manifestation becomes more and more institutional with each passing decade. The institutional relation of the newspaper movement takes on at least two aspects. One aspect concerns the material part. The material part is indeed both expressive and impressive. Of course the number of such publications, 25,000, is evidence of the trend. The number of issues, too, some 50 millions a year, is evidence yet more convincing. The fact, too, of the transformation of the individual newspaper into a chain of papers is evidence both unique and conclusive. No less than fifty newspapers, divided almost equally between two groups, represent the essential part of this new development. The chains stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, and from the northern lakes to the southern gulf. Subject to a general control by a central agency, they yet are permitted a certain degree of liberty in the selection of news to be published, and in editorial interpretation. These selections and interpretations are, be it added, determined largely by local conditions. The power of such aggregations is simply colossal in forming and guiding public opinion. It has been said that it was a chain of American newspapers under one control which made the Spanish-American War. The Yellow press, or the Red press, forceful selfish factors, imposing itself on the Yellow or Red emotions of the American people, emotions which are not thoughts, has power to cause harm which transcends belief. It is a press, sober in feeling and sober in mind, appealing to the thinking citizen, which is called upon to put down irrational and swiftly-stirred emotions. Usually such an appeal overcomes the emotional explosions in case time be sufficient. But often time is not sufficient. The explosion bursts forth, creating a popular demand. The people are made to feel that they must fight, as they did fight upon the sinking of the *Maine*.

Beside such institutional organisations as are seen in chains of newspapers, there are found organisations known as the Associated Press or the United Press. These corporations are formed to collect and to disseminate the news of the world. Several such associations exist, but of them, two are chief. The larger, the Associated Press, has 1,000 or more members. If there is a Yellow press or a Red press, the

Associated Press might be called the White press. For its whole purpose and its comprehensive method are to convey all news in the white light of truthfulness as clearly and fully as the able and unprejudiced mind can conceive.

There is, however, at least one respect in which the newspaper press of the United States is failing. It concerns leadership. There is no journal which commands the allegiance and the following of the people. It is hardly too much to say that there is no journal of opinion. There are, as I have indicated, vast forces, powerful, fair-minded, for collecting the news of the whole world, forces lodged in individual papers like the *New York Times* and in various press associations. But there is no journal comparable as a journal of opinion to the *New York Tribune* of the years when Horace Greely was its editor and dictator. The policy of trimming is now too common in many outstanding journals. In the United States is found no newspaper which commands the traditional place of the *London Times* as a journal of opinion, formative of public judgment. Possibly journals of opinion in America are to pass over from the field of daily, into the field of weekly issue.

As uniting both the governmental and certain popular elements of the tendency to establish institutions, the banks, the trust companies and other financial concerns present significant evidence. The new importance of the United States as a financial force is seen as both cause and result in the place which the banks have come to occupy in the whole life of the people. It is said that the United States holds one-third of all the gold of the world. The larger share of this value is controlled by banks. A constantly enlarging share is coming to be held by a few banks in a few great cities. This fact, however, should be linked with another fact, that one-half of all the people in the country are depositors in either savings or other institutions. Such a concentration and also breadth of capital is new to the world. American banks are, moreover, taking on new forms. Among them is the form of what is known as chain banks—in which one organising or supervising corporation maintains a certain advisory relation to many co-ordinated institutions. Another form is what is called branch banks, a system by which one central institution establishes several offices in one central city or at other capital points more or less widely scattered. This centralising movement of capital is most manifest at its highest degree of power in what is known as the Federal Reserve system. This system had its origin at

the time of the World War. The Federal Reserve system provided a means by which the enormous expenditures of the war could be met and the country's finances maintained on a stable basis. The expanding needs for currency were supplied by issuing Federal Reserve notes, partly secured by gold and partly by commercial paper. Banks were thus able to meet expanding needs for credit because they could supplement their reserves by borrowing from the Reserve banks or on customers' paper. The sum of money thus afforded was stupendous. It would have been sufficient to pay all the costs of the Federal Government from the year 1791 to the outbreak of the Great War. The previous expenditures for war were insignificant in comparison. The sum was equivalent to twenty times the national debt of the pre-war period.

Since the close of the war, the Federal Reserve system has been continued by wise methods and to results most beneficent. It has, as a fact, come to have a certain supervision over all the banking interests of the country, a supervision which at times seems to amount to control, even to effective control, and, I venture to add, to beneficent control.

Neither does such control or institutional consolidations relate alone to the present. They touch the long and indefinite future. For testators are more and more generally entrusting their estates to banks and trust companies. The individual administrator, executor, trustee, seem to be supplanted by the company or institution. The amount of property which is thus year by year, decade by decade, transferred to these fiduciary societies represents stupendous sums. At times it almost seems as if half of the property of the American people is becoming vested in these fiscal societies. In fact, it is said that no less than 100 billions of dollars represent the actual or potential assets and responsibilities of life insurance companies.

The institutional life of the United States, both as a fiscal and as a personal form of endeavour, is furthermore manifested in the agencies which the community has set up for the cause of charity and philanthropy. Of course the words charity and philanthropy have a connotation as comprehensive as humanity, and as diverse as humanity's needs. But in the United States in recent decades and years the enlargement and the increasing variety is most significant. So-called foundations, as Community Fund, Community Chests, Community Trusts, have since the beginning of the Great War come to number more than sixty, and with the resources of thirty-two societies established before the year

1914, have come to possess resources of above a billion dollars.

These foundations represent the filling of the diverse needs which arise in a communal life of all sorts and conditions. They belong to forces as different as agencies for the establishing of international scholarships, societies for research into the causes of disease, and associations for the promotion of peace, for the elevation of the depressed races, and for the uplifting of the "unprivileged classes." The 2,000 separate agencies for social betterment, established in New York, and the 100 agencies included in the Community Chest of a city like Cleveland, of 1,000,000 people, prove the place and power of the philanthropic and institutional movement. The individual donations of the two great givers of the United States, Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, illustrate the same trend. Mr. Carnegie endowed eight permanent foundations with no less than 350 millions of dollars, and the gifts of the Rockefellers, father and son, up to the present time aggregate 600 millions. The larger share of this sum has been assigned to the endowment of five permanent foundations. Both the Carnegie and the Rockefeller gifts represent institutions. Their very names prove the strength of the institutional tendency. Among such names are the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, and the Rockefeller General Education Board.

No small share of the charitable and philanthropic institutions of more recent foundation are devoted to medical research and to therapeutics. There is, however, yet another field of human service in which a still further form of the medical institution is coming to prevail. The profession of medicine, the most personal of all the professions, is taking on a special institutional relation. This relation is well summed up in the word Clinic. The clinic has long been recognised as an integral though subsidiary part of the hospital. It is now assuming a new form of human service. It is coming to mean a form in which several physicians are united for the examination and for the treatment of the sick. It stands for a union and for a sub-division of medical service. It is a transfer from a service in which the individual physician is the centre to a service in which several physicians are combined for diagnosis, for the healing and for the prevention of disease. Several clinics are established in various parts of the country, of which two are the more outstanding, the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, and the Cleveland Clinic in

the city of Cleveland, Ohio. This form of an institution is now already well founded, and be it said it is sure of coming to possess a great place in the healing forces and conditions of the American community.

The institutional trend of the United States is indicated, therefore, in these seven fields which I have sought, though briefly and summarily, to interpret: the Federal Government; the college and universities; the libraries; the newspapers; the financial institutions; the charitable and philanthropic institutions; and the medical foundations.

But there are two institutions which, it ought to be said, have not advanced in recent years. They are institutions central and constructive. They are the family and the Church. The family is both an historical and a social institution. It lies at the very heart of civilisation both old and new. It is not strengthening. It is attacked by the general enemy of excessive individualism. It is menaced by many and swiftly changing social forces. It is threatened by the so-called enlargement of women's rights, which, however good in itself, may for the time being injure the home. Women's enlarged rights have gone beyond the field of her duties. These disintegrating forces, many and different, come to their head in the increasing frequency and variety of divorces. Not far from one-fifth of the marriages in many commonwealths of the American Union end in divorce.

Likewise the Churches are not gaining in their institutional values and forces. I now write of the churches Protestant. With churches Roman Catholic this paragraph and this article is not concerned. The enrolment of members increases, although slowly. But the recognition given to the Church does not increase in degrees adequate to the increase of population. The Church has lost largely its former educational function. It has also transferred its function of charity to specific agencies. It still retains, and apparently is to retain, its function of worship and of preaching. The clergy are devoted, both in pastoral administration and in preaching. But the response of the congregation is not adequate to the allegiance and the faithfulness in which the minister and the priest serve. To consider the causes of the narrowing conditions, or of a condition which certainly does not enlarge, would carry one too far afield. It is sufficient for the present purpose simply to intimate that the Church and the family are not growing as institutions to the degree in which other institutions like education and philanthropy are gaining. Be it said, however, that these two institutions are primary and fundamental.

However, a sufficient number of important institutions have been brought forward to prove the greater place and enlarged function which these new foundations have gained for themselves in the United States. I therefore now turn to a problem more critical and constructive, namely, the causes and the conditions which have given birth to this tremendous result in the growth of institutions. Of the causes I wish to name three, and of the conditions two. These causes and these conditions, however, are hard, and perhaps unnecessary to discriminate. For causes flow into conditions, and conditions easily become causes.

The causes of the growth seem to me to be summed up in three, namely : efficiency, economy, complexity. The will for efficiency is a strong will in the American character. "The will to will" is a possible change in William James's great phrase. The will to will eventuates, through the union of personalities, in the institution. Along with this will, moreover, goes a desire for the smallest possible expenditure. Efficiency, moreover, stands for mass production, for comprehensiveness. It is opposed to the individualistic method. It is contrasted with æsthetic values. It represents the quantitative in contrast with the qualitative. It spells amounts. It connotes creativeness. Such a will, such economic and economical methods, place emphasis on a central and centralising government, on mass education, on huge financial agencies, on chains of newspapers, on aggregations of charities and philanthropies, on vast accumulation of books, and on a centralised medical service.

The third cause of the institutional growth lies in the increasing complexity of the community's life. Modern life has become complex, uniquely complex, disastrously or gloriously complex. Every morning ministers to or hinders the day's work of each citizen in the revelations of the doings of the globe. The telegraph, the telephone, the radio, deliver the world at every breakfast table. Such diverse and multitudinous offerings must be consolidated, classified, united. The individual cannot bear up against such offerings of individualised service, doings and imaginations. The foundation of institutions is therefore the normal method and conclusion of procedure.

Such causes get conditions for their creation and for their application from what I may call the mass : first, the mass of wealth ; secondly, the mass of population. Wealth has become, as I have intimated, enormous in this new country. Such massing of wealth nourishes the enlargement of the

general government and the foundation and increased power of the other institutions which I have considered. The massing of population, too, embodies and prepares the way for the foundation of institutions. Institutions like the higher education, or like the enormous banking consolidations, could not be founded or maintained in the thinly populated prairies of North America or on the more thinly populated pampas of South America. Such great populations do, indeed, represent individualisms and the whole individualistic movement of society. Such individualisms and such movements may create forces and make achievements of much worth. Of course, in the whole historic trend of society they have created such forces and such movements; but great wealth and great populations are also conditions necessary for forming great institutions.

A matter quite as essential as the question of the conditions and causes of this institutional movement, is the question of the results of it upon American society and life. Is this movement to permeate and to characterise all American forces and conditions? Is it to create groups of power, to influence, to gather up and to centralise the elements of these groups, and to project them into the whole American community? In this consolidation, is the individual to be submerged? Is the smaller to shrivel up into less, and into the least? Is the much to grow into the more, and the more into the most? Is America to form a race of many sub-men and of a few super-men? Is humanity to become, like the modern office building, narrower as it goes higher? Is the common man to become a mere cog in a colossal and swiftly-turning machine? Is the movement to become mightier than the men who compose the movement? Are men fabricating a Frankenstein, half conscious that the creature may prove to be a fiend which will ultimately turn on its fabricators and destroy them? Is force, material and executive, to become more and more forceful; and reflection just a shadow so far and so far only as may be necessary to guide this force, even if with dimness? Is the unhumanised system and the dehumanised group to rise or to fall into absolute monarchism?

Or is it to be recognised that these movements are above all else movements of, for, and by men? Is it appreciated that their origins, their progress, their failures, their consummations are human, humane, humanistic? Is it seen that the degrees of their merit, that the worth of their contributions, represent racial well-being and racial enrichment? Is

it understood that the enlargement of the individual is a symbol and method of the enlargement of the race, and that the withering-up of the individual is the minimising and shrivelling of all humanity? Is it felt that the economising in certain so-called lower forces and forms of life may give a freedom for the transmutation of these lower forms into terms of a loftier dynamics, dynamics which deserve the name of spiritual?

Such questions spring to the pen. In response to them I wish to say :

First : The present condition of American and of world society is one of experimentation—political, social, educational. Conditions are trying themselves out. Man, the experimenter wishes, and is determined to have, the best. No conclusion, therefore, is to be regarded as final and conclusive. Therefore, no lover of his kind need fear that the present consummation is to rest down on mankind with the weight of the mountains or to transfix mankind in the bonds of human iron and steel.

Secondly : Humanity is interested in terms of life, and not in terms of the lifeless. Its interest is to be interpreted in terms of development. It stands for growth. Behind both growth and development lies life.

Thirdly : The institutional movement represents association and adjustment. Each part of it ministers to every other part, and every part which receives ministers to every other. The civil government serves the educative, the philanthropic, the social, the financial, the domestic, and other forms of being. Each of these in turn serves the civil function, each serving every other. Of what worth any one of these institutions without education? Of what worth any one of them without the stabilising power of the civil government? Of what worth any one of them without the substratum of the financial? Each survives because the other survives.

Therefore, a comprehensive conclusion of this survey is fearlessness. American humanity is not to become a mere series of institutions unrelated, unassociated. Man is not to be made a *schema* of big, disconnected conglomerates. Man, putting his life into institutions, is thereby, if he be at all worthy, to find a life fuller, a character nobler, a comradeship more intimate, a usefulness broader and more continuous, a destiny which without loss of individuality becomes deeper and higher, and a prophetic sense of realisation more divine.

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THE MANDÆANS AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

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THE investigation of the Mandæan writings, and of the relation in which they stand to the Fourth Gospel, at first sight appears to suggest a journey along one of the by-paths of New Testament research, and for this reason it will be well to state the problem in its most challenging form. This problem will be indicated best by citing two passages from the sacred books of Mandaism.¹ The first is from the *Ginza*, or "Treasury," or, as it is sometimes called, "the Great Book":

"The true envoy am I,
In whom is no lie:
The true one in whom is no lie,
In him is no blemish nor fault.

"A vine are we, a vine of life,
A tree which cannot lie:
The tree of praise, whose fragrance stays
All men with breath of life."²

The second extract is from the *Book of John*:

"A shepherd am I who loves his sheep: I keep watch over my sheep
and my lambs:
Around my neck I carry the sheep, and they wander not from the
village.

¹ The two quotations are taken, with the author's kind permission, from Dr W. F. Howard's article, "The Fourth Gospel and Mandæan Gnosticism," in the *London Quarterly Review* for January, 1927. This invaluable article is shortly to be reprinted and supplemented in Dr Howard's forthcoming volume of *Essays on the New Testament* (The Epworth Press).

² M. Lidzbarski, *Ginza*, pp. 59 ff.

I bring them unto the fold, the good fold, and then with me they find pasture.

From the mouth of Euphrates, Euphrates the radiant, I brought them wonderful gifts.

"No wolf leaps into our fold, and of fierce lion they need not be frightened,

Of the tempest they need not be fearful, and no thief can ever assail us :

No thief breaks into their fold, and of the sword they stand in no terror.

When my sheep had lain down in peace, and my head on the threshold was lying,

Then opened a cleft in the height, and the thunder thundered behind me."¹

The passage goes on to tell how the sheep are threatened by a flood, and are in danger of drowning. But the shepherd comes with his boat and grasps with his hands each sheep which hears his call and gives heed to his voice. Those which do not hear, sink and perish in the waters.

Alike by their similarities and their differences, these passages compel us to think of the Fourth Gospel, and invite comparison with its terminology and leading ideas ; and the problem becomes especially acute when we find in the Mandæan writings frequent parallels to such characteristic Johannine conceptions as the mission of the Son to impart life to men and to lead them from darkness to life, the Redeemer's knowledge of His own who are chosen out of the world and for whom He prays, and the idea of a place which He has prepared for believers and to which He shows the way. At least three questions are at once suggested. Are the Johannine sayings in some way dependent on the Mandæan texts or the teaching they preserve ? Or do the Mandæan writings depend in part upon the Fourth Gospel ? Or, again, do these sacred books, together with the Fourth Gospel, rest upon common sources and draw from the same store of ideas, symbols and expressions ? A fourth possibility, that the parallelism is without any significance at all, may safely be excluded.

I.

It would be following the natural order of things to describe at once the history and origins of the Mandæans, but these questions are so complicated and so differently answered by scholars, that it may be best first to consider the sacred books of Mandaism and the principal religious

¹ M. Lidzbarski, *Das Johannesbuch*, pp. 44 ff.

ideas they contain. All that need be said of the Mandæans themselves is that they are a people who live in scattered communities in the small towns and villages along the lower courses of the Euphrates and the Tigris, in Eastern Irak, and farther east in Arabistan and Khuzistan; they are distinguishable from their neighbours by the tenacity with which they hold fast to the teaching of their fathers about Light and Life, and by their zealous observance of certain simple ceremonies of which the chief is that of immersion in freely running water. Two of the chief sacred books have already been mentioned, the *Ginza* and the *Book of John*; a third book, the *Qolasta* ("Quintessence"), consists mainly of songs and liturgies which have reference to baptism and the ascent of the soul to the higher world. The *Ginza* is the most valuable and the earliest writing; it consists of three collections of songs, and sixty-four sections which contain theological, ethical and historical matter, interwoven with revelations, prayers and hymns. From the presence of a few references to Islam, it is clear that this book in its present form is not earlier than the beginning of the eighth century A.D., but it would be rash in the extreme to suppose that its contents are so late. The presence of separate and much earlier documents is plainly discernible, and in the great majority of the tractates no knowledge of Muhammad or of his teaching is present. Many of the sections of the *Book of John* are concerned with the legend of John the Baptist and relate his experiences and his teaching, while others correspond more in character with the *Ginza*-documents of a later period. The *Qolasta* contains liturgies for the yearly feast of baptism and for masses for the dead, and its contents frequently rest upon matter derived from the *Ginza*. Parts of the manuscripts of these and other Mandæan writings found their way into European libraries from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards, but for long they lay neglected, partly owing to lack of interest, and partly to the difficulties of the language, which was supposed to be a Galilæan dialect, or even "Syriac jargon," and was first recognised by Th. Nöldeke as a form of Babylonian Aramaic. A new interest in these writings has been fostered by the researches of W. Brandt (*Die mandäische Religion*, 1889; *Mandäische Schriften*, 1893) and R. Reitzenstein (*Das mandäische Buch des Herrn der Grösse und die Evangelienüberlieferung*, 1919), and both the *Book of John* and the *Ginza* have been translated into German by M. Lidzbarski (*Das Johannesbuch der Mandäer*, 1905—15; *Ginza . . . das grosse Buch der Mandäer*, 1925).

II.

The background of the Mandæan writings is polytheistic, and against this, later ideas have been introduced without any real attempt to work up the whole into a uniform system. In his article, "Die Mandäer ihre Religion und ihre Geschichte" (Amsterdam, 1915; cf. *E.R.E.*, VIII. 380ff), W. Brandt mentions as primary divine beings "the Great Fruit," from which other unnumbered "fruits" originated, and "the Great Mana of Glory," who is described by many names, including "the First Life" and "the Great Life." From the latter many other Manas have sprung, including "his image," Manda d'Haya ("Knowledge of Life"), of whom we read again and again in the Mandæan books. Other divine beings who are often mentioned are Hibil, Sitil and Enoš, to whom the term *utra* ("Wealth") is applied. These divinities inhabit the lofty Ayar-land watered by "the great Jordan," which is described as a stream of "white water" and as the "living," the "shining and sparkling water." Far below lies the underworld, the world of darkness, or "the black water." The creation of the firmament, the earth and of man is assigned to Ptahil, who is thus the Mandæan Demiurge, and sometimes the evil spirits of the underworld are mentioned as sharing in the task. But whatever be the case as regards the body, the soul is heavenly in its origin; it is breathed into Adam by Manda d'Haya, or is sent down by one of the envoys from the 'Treasure-house of Life'; and for protection against the wiles of evil spirits man is instructed from the beginning about his origin and the nature of the true religion. It is evident that in these ideas we are dealing with a primitive type of Semitic Gnosticism; many of the names closely resemble corresponding Hebrew terms, as for example: Hibil (Abel), Sitil (Seth), Enoš (Enosh), and Adam. The question whether we have to do with a pre-Christian type of Gnosticism becomes burning, and naturally it receives very different answers. Brandt is of the opinion that the teaching is anti-Jewish or "pagan." He reminds us that the ideas of an original revelation and of the soul as the better and immortal part of man have a long history in the East, and that the "salvation" so often mentioned is not redemption from sin, but deliverance from the earthly material world. As for the references to the Jordan, he holds that the Mandæan authors have no clear conception of the Palestinian river, that the term "yardna" is a common noun, and that its use must be explained from a cult-import-

ance which the Jordan already possessed among the Gnostics whose writings the Mandæans adopted or used.¹ He is also of the opinion that the Jordan formed the subject of religious consideration independently of the Gospel narratives of John the Baptist and the Baptism of Jesus, and at an earlier period, and that the identification of Manda d'Haya with Jesus Christ is the work of a later time. These points, together with the consideration of other views, may be postponed, especially as it is necessary to review the monotheistic elements which stand out against the polytheistic background.

The monotheistic teaching centres round the doctrine of "the King of Light," who "sits in the high north," and is Lord of all Light-beings, the creator of all forms, and of endless greatness and goodness. Opposed to his rule is that of "the King of Darkness," a gigantic monster frightful in his fury, at the raising of whose eyes the mountains tremble, and at the whisper of whose lips the plains rock. Earth and sky, with all they contain, are brought into being at the command of the King of Light, or by means of his envoy, and the soul of man is his creation. Of Adam and his wife it is said: "And when the soul had fallen into their bodies, they were in every respect wise and understanding." Ethical teaching is associated with this strain of Mandæan thought. "In all your standing, sitting, going, coming, eating, and drinking, in all your work, name and praise the name of the high King of Light." Food laws are also laid down. The flesh of beasts killed otherwise than through slaughter is forbidden, also the taking of blood and of food and drink prepared by non-believers. More characteristically Mandæan elements appear in the commands regarding white clothing, the girdle, the baptismal bath and the washing of all foods. Finally, it is noteworthy how often this teaching is associated with a doctrine of envoys, Manda d'Haya, Enoš and others, who bring to true believers a knowledge of truth by which they live here and now, and by which after the death of the body they pass unharmed through the "wards" or "watches" of the spheres to the shining Place of Light. This "King of Light" teaching recalls similar strains of thought in Parseeism, Judaism, Jewish-Christianity and Manichæism; and naturally different views are held as to its origin. W. Brandt traces it to Jewish-Christianity; F. C. Burkitt to Manichæism. It certainly has the appearance of a later stratum, but this fact is of less importance, inasmuch as the teaching is really

¹ *E.R.E.*, viii., p. 383.

a kind of republication of ideas characteristic of Mandæan thought throughout. In this consideration we have the clue to Mandæan "borrowings." Catholic in their sympathies, the Mandæan priests and teachers had an instinct for taking over ideas which expressed their own beliefs more clearly. Ideas are borrowed as vehicles. This is especially true if, as Burkitt thinks, Enoš is really the Marcionite or Manichæan Jesus. The same genius for appropriation appears in the use made of the figure of the Baptist, and in later elements derived from Catholic Christianity by which the cultus was enriched, its sacramental observances multiplied, and its priesthood developed. We certainly gaze upon a strange welter of ideas in the records of ancient Mandaism, but at the same time there is a thread which runs throughout the multi-coloured fabric. This thread is the idea of a high World of Light, the home of the Great Life, whence the streams of "living water" descend, by which the soul of man, divine in its origin, is nourished during its earthly exile against the day when a Redeemer comes to lead it upwards through the celestial spheres to its true home of radiance and abiding glory. There is something so simple and primitive in this conception that attempts to divide the coat of many colours, in which later Mandaism is undoubtedly clad, can tell us only part of the story, and perhaps its least important part. The deepest secret of Mandaism is the evidence it reveals of the irrepressible impulse of the human spirit to explain its origin and its present lot, its relation to higher powers, and the high destiny in which it believes and to which it dares to aspire.

III.

Further examples may now be given of Mandæan passages which recall similar ideas and sayings in the Fourth Gospel. Already this evidence has been eagerly seized upon by scholars like R. Reitzenstein and R. Bultmann as throwing light on the origin of the Johannine sayings, while the second edition of W. Bauer's learned commentary on John¹ is profusely illustrated by quotations which are used for purposes of exposition. Unfortunately, no complete English translation of the sacred books of Mandaism has yet been made. The examples given below are English renderings of German translations of the ancient Mandæan script. This fact obviously calls for caution; it would not be safe to build too much on individual passages. It should also be remembered that an English or German rendering may have a much

¹ Tübingen, 1925; in H. Lietzmann's *Handbuch* series.

fuller and richer religious content than the corresponding Aramaic expression, as is notably the case in such terms as "Saviour," "salvation," and "redemption." The objection that the quotations represent material derived from various quarters and at different times is to a considerable extent met by the fact that in the main they appear to embody the ideas which are most characteristic of Mandaism and go far back in its historical development.

Parallels to the ideas of the Johannine Prologue (John i. 1-18) naturally claim attention first, especially as Bultmann has maintained the hypothesis that here a Baptist source has been used and worked up by the Christian Evangelist, who has added the passages which refer to the Baptist or to Jesus Christ in verses 6-8, 15 and 17. If, in the Prologue, we read of "the Word," we read also in the Mandæan writings of envoys who come from the Place of Light saying: "I am a word," or even "the word"; Manda d'Haya is designated as the "image of Life" and the One "who was from the beginning"; and again and again sections begin with the words: "In the name of the Great Life let the sacred Light be glorified," and close with the phrase: "And the Life is victorious" (p. 12).¹ The terms "radiancy," "light," and "glory" are used with the greatest frequency, while "truth" is constantly emphasised as the sum total of religious duty. As in the Prologue we hear of those who did not receive the Divine Word, so in the Mandæan writings we read of worlds which "know not" the name of Manda d'Haya, and "do not understand" his light (p. 13); we read also of "chosen ones" whom it is his mission to awake and to make disciples who long for the Place of Light (p. 19). There are even parallels to the idea of Incarnation, which may, however, be of later date, as when Enoš Utra is represented as coming into the world in bodily form, or when John the Baptist is mentioned as the last incarnation of the heavenly envoy (p. 21). The terminology of Sonship is also applied to Manda d'Haya: he is spoken of as the "Son of the Great Life," who "originated and went forth from the first Life," who is sent forth by the Father and endowed with radiance, power and light (p. 35).

Points of contact are to be found not only in the Prologue, but also throughout the whole Gospel. The condemnation of the world, for example, so characteristic of the Johannine writings, is often expressed. The world is a world of folly and lying, it is the world of darkness, hatred, jealousy and dis-

¹ The reference is to W. Bauer's commentary. Further references to this work are indicated in the present section by the page number.

cord. It persecutes believers who must separate themselves from it, and whose prayer to Manda d'Haya is "Deliver us from the world which consists wholly of sinners" (p. 18). As compared with "the Prince of this world" (John xii. 31), such terms as the "King of this world," the "King of this age," and "the Lord of the house" (= the world) are used in the *Book of John*, and reference is made to the Saviour who comes down from heaven to destroy the world-rulers. The Johannine attitude to the Jews is paralleled by signs of a bitter hostility which Reitzenstein believes to be older than the Fourth Gospel itself; and to the great indictment which closes the first half of the Fourth Gospel (cf. John xii. 38-40) Bauer (p. 159) cites a striking parallel in the words:

"They were blind and saw not, their ears were stopped, they heard not. Their heart was not awakened to behold the Great One in the house of perfection. . . . They hated the way of Life and loved the dwelling-place, the seat of the wicked."

The characteristic Johannine teaching about the Saviour who comes to impart "eternal life" to His own (cf. John iii. 15) can frequently be illustrated:

"Thou [Manda d'Haya] didst come down and let us dwell by the springs of Life. Thou didst pour into us and didst fill us with thy wisdom, thine insight, and thy goodness. Thou didst show us the way by which thou hast come from the house of Life. By it we desire to go the way of true believing men, so that our spirit and our soul may dwell in the Škina of Life, clothed with radiance, covered with light" (p. 53 f.).

Manda d'Haya is described as "the good man" "who forced his way through the worlds, came, parted the firmament and revealed himself" (p. 56):

"He separated the light from the darkness, separated the good from the bad, separated life from death. He separated the friends of his Kušta¹-name from darkness to life, from evil to good, from death to life, and set them upon the path of Kuštš and of faith" (p. 56).

"Thou didst show us [so the Mandæan Saviour is addressed] what the eye of no one beheld, thou didst permit us to hear what the ear of no man heard. Thou didst bring us from death to life, and didst unite us with the Life. . . . Thou didst show us the way of

¹ Kuštā = Uprightness, Truth. The term is sometimes personified.

life, and didst permit us to travel the paths of truth and faith " (p. 57).

In the last passage the use of the three terms "way," "truth," and "life" is noteworthy. Bauer says that the Mandæan writings speak again and again of a "way to the Place of Light"; the pious say, "Show us the way," and of the personified Kušta it is said: "Thou art the way of the perfect ones, the path, the one who mounts up to the Place of Light" (p. 174). At the close of the *Book of John* we read:

"Every one who hears me, Enoš Utra, and is believing, to him a place is prepared in the Place of Light. Who hears me, Enoš Utra, not, his place is removed from the Place of Light. His name is blotted out from my page, his form becomes dark and shines not" (p. 62).

In reading these words it is difficult not to be reminded of the substance of the words of John iii. 36: "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life; but he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."

It is natural to expect that in the Mandæan writings we shall read much of the "living water," and in point of fact this expression appears repeatedly. Of Baptism it is said in the *Ginza*: "Your token is the token of the living water, in virtue of which ye shall mount up to the Place of Light" (p. 65). The baptised person is not only immersed, but is also given water to drink, and the names of "the Life" and of Manda d'Haya are spoken over him. The words, "If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink," are recalled when Manda d'Haya is appealed to as "the spring of Life," and especially when we read: "Living water art thou; thou hast come from an exalted place . . .," and again: "This is the spring of Life, which sprang up out of the Place of Life, that we may drink from this spring of Life" (p. 109). Besides "water" we read also of "bread." By this the soul of man is nourished during its earthly pilgrimage, and since the man who eats the food of this world alone cannot mount up to heaven, the soul must bring food with it or receive it from beyond. This need the Mandæans believed was provided for by "the Treasure of Light, the great Helper of Life" when he created in secret their sacramental food (*pehtâ*, "opening" or "unlocking") and presented it to "the mighty First Life" (p. 97).

It will be seen that the Mandæan sayings are not so much verbal parallels to those contained in the Fourth Gospel as rather interesting and sometimes close *analogues*; they act

upon the mind like cues which by association of ideas prompt the recall of more familiar passages. When, for example, we read of "true believing men" before whom, while "still in the body," "the door of sins is shut and the door of light opened" (p. 57), we are reminded of the Johannine doctrine that "he that believeth on him is not judged" and that "he that believeth not hath been judged already" (John iii. 18); and when we hear the personified "Treasure of Life" summoning men "to Light" who "yet bury themselves in darkness" (p. 58), we recall the words of John iii. 19: "And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light." Again, when the pious man speaks of "a man who corrects" the wicked who rise up against him, "not with my power, but with the power of the mighty Life" (p. 82), we are reminded of One who has "authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man" (John v. 27); and the words: "Be ye my radiance, and I will be your radiance; be ye my light, and I will be your light" (p. 171), are to some extent reminiscent of the Johannine teaching about the mutual glorifying of the Father and the Son (John xiii. 32). A reference to the child which when born cannot return to the body of its mother (p. 50) re-echoes the famous question of Nicodemus (John iii. 4), and still more clearly is the saying of Jesus to Nathanael and the rest (John i. 51) suggested by a passage in the *Ginza* which reads:

"Moreover, he constructs a ladder, throws it from the ground to heaven, mounts up and down, hovers between heaven and earth, and speaks to you, 'See that I come from the high place; I am your Lord'" (p. 40).

But perhaps the most notable analogues of all are those in which the solemn "I-style" of the Fourth Gospel is employed in the utterances of various messengers from the Light-world, such as: "The envoy of Light am I"; "The true envoy am I"; "A shepherd am I"; "A fisherman am I"; "The Treasure am I" (p. 115). The following example, which is taken from the *Ginza*, is all the more important because it strikes at the same time a note of deep and genuine piety:

"The envoy of Light am I, whom the Great One has sent into this world. The true envoy am I, in whom is no lie. . . . The eyes of every one who receives his word (or 'discourse') into himself, are filled with light . . . , with exultation is his mouth filled, his heart is filled with wisdom" (p. 55).

Some account must finally be given of Mandæan sayings which are analogous to those in the Farewell Discourses and the Highpriestly Prayer in John xiv.-xvii. In xiv. 2, Jesus says : " In my Father's house are many mansions ; if it were not so, I would have told you ; for I go to prepare a place for you." Sayings which mention the " light-dwellings " of heaven, or the " dwelling of the blessed," or of the " great high Father's house," can be cited in abundance from the Mandæan writings (p. 172). The idea of " preparing a place " is suggested by such phrases as " the chamber which I have built for you " and " the chamber of the Great Life which I have made for you " (p. 173), and the conception of the Saviour who brings His own to Himself in heaven is reflected in such passages as : " We shall mount up with him to the Place of Life," and " I lead my friends . . . I guide them through the pathway of wickedness. . . . I and my friends of the Kušta will find a place in the Škina of life " (p. 173). These writings also know the figure of the " Helper " or " second." Brandt says that Jawar (= Helper) is so highly esteemed that in several tractates of the *Ginza* he can take the place of Manda d'Haya or is named beside him (p. 179), and Bauer illustrates John xiv. 18 (" I will not leave you desolate ") with the saying : " I [Manda d'Haya] desire to go away, to assign Iibil a place in the new chamber and come then quickly to you " (p. 178). A parallel to the language of John xv. about the Vine has already been given. It is by no means the only example of the use of this figure, and there are also references to the taking away of unfruitful branches and to the vine which bears fruit. To the saying of Jesus, that He has chosen His disciples out of the world (John xv. 19), there is an analogue in the saying of Manda d'Haya to the men of approved righteousness :

" I separated you from the peoples and generations, I desire to raise you up in the love for truth, and ye must be true ones before me in the light of life " (p. 188) ;

and to the idea of the hatred of the world to which the chosen disciples are exposed there is a resemblance in a line from one of the Mandæan liturgies : " Thou hast chosen us out and brought us out of the world of hate " (p. 188). In expounding the prayer of John xvii., Bauer reminds us that Enoš Utra prays to the Great Life, his Father, for " his disciples " and " the children of his disciples " who are persecuted in the world, and who yet keep the name of Manda d'Haya and the name of Jawar in their heart and on their lips (p. 202). Other

parallels to the prayer are cited, but they are not very close. The last example which Bauer gives is :

“ Now pray we to thee with a prayer of the Utras and we entreat thee with a petition of the Great Ones for us, our friends, the friends of our friends Bring to us of thy radiance, increase to us of thy light. . . . We desire to abide (or ‘ continue standing ’) with thy name. . . . Kušta is thy name, Manda d’Haya is thy name. . . . Victorious is thy name, victorious are the words of Kušta, which come forth out of thy mouth, and victorious are all thy works ” (p. 202).

IV.

Perhaps this is the best point at which to raise the question : “ Who are the Mandæans ? ” ; although it is to be feared that the answer can be little more than a summary of differences of opinion. The boldest hypothesis is the view that the Mandæans are the descendants of a Baptist sect which originated in the district east of the Jordan, or even within Palestine itself. The suggestion, which has appealed to a number of continental scholars, is that in course of time this sect migrated to the lower courses of the Euphrates, and that there beliefs of an originally Jewish-Gnostic character combined with Babylonian-Persian ideas to form a syncretism which reached its summit in the Parsee doctrine of the King of Light. The objections to this speculative construction are formidable, but can only be summarised here. (1) In the first place, the references to the Baptist legend appear in the later *Book of John* ; in the *Ginza*, in its original form, John is mentioned once only, and then merely as the typically wise man. (2) Again, the Jewish elements in Mandaism do not appear to have been obtained directly from the Jews ; the spelling of names, for example, suggests that the medium is literary. (3) It is also significant that the Mandæan posture for prayer is toward the north, not toward Jerusalem, and that there is no trace of any observance of the Sabbath. (4) Finally, the interest in John the Baptist has the appearance of a later development ; it was certainly fostered by contact with Islam and Catholic Christianity, and, in some respects, seems to be dependent on the story of Luke i.¹

¹ Cf. F. C. Burkitt : “ From the point of view of the modern investigator of Christian origins, the Mandæan accounts of the Baptist are both too fantastic and too near in some details to the Christian tale preserved in Luke to be regarded as in any sense independent tradition,” *Encyclopædia Brit.*, 14th ed. (1929), XIV., p. 788.

How far the Mandæans were hospitable to Christian ideas is a disputed question, but of their bitter hostility to official Christianity there can be no doubt. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries pressure to effect their conversion was brought to bear on them first by Portuguese Jesuit missionaries and later by Italian Carmelites, but the Mandæan books bear eloquent testimony to a fierce hatred provoked by persecution before the Arabic conquest of Mesopotamia. How much, for example, is implied in such a passage as the following from the *Ginza* (I. 200) :

“He [Jesus] says : ‘I am God, God’s Son, whom my Father sent here.’ He explains to you, ‘I am the first envoy, I am Hibil-Ziwa, who have come from the height.’ Nevertheless, confess him not ” !

And again, how much is told by the following, also from the *Ginza* (XXVIII. 16) :

“When he forces you, say, ‘We are thine’; but in your hearts do not confess him, and deny not the saying of your Lord, the high King of Light : for what is hidden is not manifest to the lying Messiah ” !

Jesus is described as becoming wise through the wisdom of John, and then as distorting his teaching and preaching wickedness and deceit in the world.

The oldest statement we possess about the origin of the Mandæans is that of Theodore bar Konai (c. 800 A.D.), who describes them as a sect founded by a beggar from Adiabene named Ado, and traces their teaching to the Marcionites and the Manichæans. Brandt thinks the account “unworthy of belief” : “Ado” is a corruption of “Adam,” and the statement is due to bar Konai’s habit of regarding alien religions as sects derived from a distinct founder. A different view is taken by F. C. Burkitt in an extended review of *Mandæan Studies* (1926) by Svend Aage Pallis.¹ Burkitt thinks that the statement can be “reasonably interpreted,” and that Theodore is right in thinking that the Mandæans inherited from the Manichæes and the Marcionites a Christian tradition parallel to, but very different from, the tradition of the Catholic Church. This does not mean that the Mandæans are Marcionites or Manichæans. In the fact that marriage is commanded, Burkitt reminds us, Mandaism is distinctive, as also in the fact that Baptism is often repeated.² It should

¹ Cf. *The Journal of Theological Studies*, for April, 1928, pp. 225-85.

² These points are also stressed by Brandt, who urges that the funda-

also be added that he thinks it would be a "hopeless perversion" to derive all Mandæan mythology and praxis from Mesopotamian Marcionite Christianity alone; and that he suggests for consideration the view that some of the very different "Gnostic" systems may have come from a common understanding of some of the actual facts which ultimately gave rise to the pseudo-science of Astrology. It is, I think, to be regretted that he ends his review with the opinion that, while Mandaism may be interesting in itself, it is useless to go to it as a key to unlock the mysteries of early Christian development. This verdict is a just protest against those who find in Mandaism a master-key; but we are confronted not with one lock, but with many, and to some of these the Mandæan sayings probably do offer us a key.

V.

The opinion just expressed brings us finally face to face with the question: "What view are we to take of the relation of the Mandæan sayings to those of the Fourth Gospel?" Here I desire to summarise certain conclusions which the reader may estimate in the light of the parallels collected in Section III.

(1) *The Johannine sayings are not directly dependent on the Mandæan sayings, and the latter are not directly dependent on the Fourth Gospel.* Striking as the parallels sometimes are, they are not close enough to suggest dependence; they are not verbal correspondences, but analogues which employ the same forms, figures and symbols, and in some cases similar religious conceptions.¹

(2) *Further, we are compelled to recognise the immense superiority of the Johannine sayings, their greater depth and inwardness, their wider range, their ampler wealth and power.* As Dr Carpenter pointed out, when comparing the Johannine Prologue with similar ideas in the Hermetic writings. "the Gospel had the immeasurable advantage of founding itself on a real person."² While both the Gospel and the Mandæan books use the ideas of Light, Life and Truth, they differ

mental dualism of the Manichæan system, which makes the creation of the world a soteriological undertaking and involves an ascetic mode of life, is far removed from the Mandæan view. Cf. *E.R.E.*, VIII., p. 385.

¹ The view that the Evangelist adopted Mandæan sayings as vehicles for the expression of his own thoughts about Jesus seems to me the kind of hypothesis which is formed in the first flush of discovery, on slender evidence, and with a lavish use of the imagination.

² *The Johannine Writings*, 1927, p. 312.

fundamentally in their conception of "salvation"; and the One Saviour of the Gospel stands out peerless against the many envoys who come down from the House of Light.

(3) *The Mandæan authors use forms of religious expression which have a long history behind them, extending probably into Johannine times.* These forms consist of utterances in terms of Light, Life and Truth; of the employment of characteristic figures of speech, such as the Vine, the Shepherd and the Way; and, above all, of the use of the sacred "I-style" for the messages of divine envoys. This position is not to be turned by uncertainties about the early date of the Mandæan sayings. It must be remembered that similar forms of religious expression appear in the writings of Philo, the Odes of Solomon, the Manichæan Fragments, and the Hermetic Writings. In these matters controversy has centred too much on questions of date, with the result that only Pyrrhic victories have been won. When it is proved that all these writings, with the exception of those of Philo, are post-Johannine, the real problem only begins; for the number and variety of these works prove the antiquity of the forms and conceptions they so freely use and share. The common ideas and modes of expression represent a form of religious language current in various parts of Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor.

(4) The relationship, then, between the Johannine sayings and those of Mandaism lies in the fact that both the Evangelist and the Mandæan authors have *independently* drawn upon the same stock of common forms, symbols and figures, and to some extent of ideas as well. In other words, *the importance of the Mandæan sayings is that they are echoes of a world of thought and speech in which the Evangelist habitually lived.*¹

It is a point of considerable importance that the views just stated broaden the basis for the modern conception of the genesis of the Johannine sayings. Most modern critics believe that the Evangelist's mind is too rich and too active for verbatim reproduction. He begins with traditional words of Jesus, but after half a century of reflection, experience and teaching, these sayings no longer emerge in his consciousness in their primitive Galilean form, but rather transformed and

¹ Cf. W. Bauer, who says that "in no case is the similarity of such a kind that we are obliged to assert the dependence of the one entity upon the other. Rather must both have sprung from the same cycle of thought (view), and have shared in the same store of terms, symbols, and figures, especially of religious conception and speech," *Das Johannevangelium*, p. 4.

interpreted ; and it is in their new shape, adopted without conscious design, that he first whispers them to himself, then utters them in the hearing of his contemporaries, and finally transcribes them on papyrus sheets. The basis for this view is the Evangelist's personality, as it is reflected in the Gospel, and the relation in which he appears to stand to contemporary thought. While he is a Jew and is deeply indebted to Judaism,¹ he is also a spiritual citizen of the Gentile world, responsive to its best thoughts and receptive to its noblest ideas. A masterful personality, he is also a thinker who, without being a professed philosopher or a painful student of books, is keenly alive to prevailing philosophical and religious tendencies. This is evident from his Prologue and from the fact that he is more than sympathetic to some of the Gnostic ideas against which he fights in the conviction that the Word really tabernacled human flesh and dwelt amongst men. It is also the view which does most justice to the actual form of the Johannine sayings, to the differences between them and the Synoptic sayings, and the similarities between them and the language of the Prologue, the Baptist's speeches and the Johannine Epistles. Such, then, is the view taken by those who can explain the sayings of the Fourth Gospel neither as the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, nor as the product of free invention. It is obvious that the basis for such an estimate is widened by the study of the Mandæan writings, for in these we actually see the forms, figures and concepts which lay at the Evangelist's disposal, and into which he transposed the primitive tradition. It is no loss, then, to hear Johannine strains along the watercourses of the Euphrates : we have not lost the celestial music because its range is wider than we had thought. Rather do we turn with fuller appreciation to hear its classic tones and richer cadences in a music all the more divine because it is universal, the first notes of which were breathed among the Galilean hills and beneath the shining walls of Herod's Temple.

VINCENT TAYLOR.

ABERDEEN.

¹ This view has been strongly, but one-sidedly, urged in two recent learned German works : *Johannes und der hellenistische Synkretismus* (1928), by Fr. Büchsel, and *Das Johannesevangelium—eine Missionsschrift für Israel* (1928), by K. Bornhäuser.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

BY PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS, F.B.A.

By the sudden death, on June 21st last, of Professor L. T. Hobhouse, at the age of sixty-four years, English philosophy and science have sustained an irreparable loss. He combined in rare measure the critical and constructive power of an acute metaphysical thinker and the capacity for careful, patient examination of empirical fact needful for investigation in the domain of natural science. As Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London since 1907, he may be said to have laid the foundations of sociology as a scientific pursuit; he made contributions of the highest value to genetic psychology, and he worked out an ethical theory which is destined to play an important part in the ethical discussions of the present century. His earliest work, published in 1896, was purely philosophical, an elaborate and exhaustive treatise on *The Theory of Knowledge*. It was the first serious attempt to call in question some of the basal principles of the then prevalent idealistic systems and to prepare the way for realism of a critical kind. He showed that at no point in the development of knowledge do we discover thought as such determining the nature of the reality which it thinks. Each judgment claims to be true of reality, and makes that claim on the ground of its special relation to the given, "The understanding makes knowledge, but it does not make nature." At the same time, he gave no countenance to the tendency to strip the mind as bare as possible and translate everything so far as the elasticity of language will permit into physical terms. If the *esse* of things is not *percipi*, neither is it true that *percipi* is *esse*. The object is not a mode of knowing, but, on the other hand, knowing is not a mode of the object. In other words, the reality of the conscious subject must be no less recognised than the reality of the physical object; and the former has a nature of its own which requires to be taken into account in any effort towards philosophical construction. In his next book, *Mind in Evolution*, published in 1901, Hobhouse traced the growth of mental life from its earliest beginnings in the lower forms of organic beings to its higher stages in which deliberate purpose and conceptual

thinking make their appearance. The general function of mind is, he contended, correlation, in cognition a correlation of experience leading up to a harmonious system of thought, in practice a correlation of endeavour leading up to a harmony of experience and feeling. Then followed in 1906 the great work *Morals in Evolution*, in which his object was to distinguish and classify the different forms of ethical ideas—in fact, to construct a morphology of ethics comparable to the physical morphology of animals and plants. In 1913 the volume entitled *Development and Purpose* appeared, largely a piece of metaphysical investigation of singular originality and suggestiveness. Here he tries to show that, although not coextensive with Reality, Mind is the principle of orderly growth within it. It is, in fact, that aspect of the Real in which all other elements are correlated, the principle of interconnection among elements, each with tendencies of its own, by which it is strictly conditioned. We have, in short, to conceive a mediating unity on which the entire effort of correlation rests for its final consistency. In a further series of works, Hobhouse sought to apply this conception to the problems of social life. In *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, published in 1918, he submitted the Hegelian theory to searching criticism, and prepared the way for a social philosophy that would find room at once for individual development and the requirements of the common welfare. The greatest happiness will not be realised unless in a form in which all can share, in which, indeed, the sharing is for each an essential ingredient. In *The Rational Good*, that appeared in 1921, he worked out his view of the good as “happiness in the fulfilment of vital capacities in a world adapted to mind.” Finally, in his two last books, *Elements of Social Justice*, 1922, and *Social Development*, 1924, he applied his ethical principles to the problems of economics and politics and the forms of social organisation. This bare recital of his work is sufficient to show the extent of his unwearied intellectual activity. Several times he expressed to me his wish to devote the concluding years of his life to purely philosophical investigation. That the world should be deprived of the results of his ripe reflection upon the problems that absorbed his earlier years and which were never far from him is a calamity it is hard to estimate. And all who knew him feel the poorer now that a personality of striking strength and beauty of character is withdrawn from their midst. An interesting account of his contributions to science and philosophy will be found in an article by his pupil, Dr Morris Ginsberg (*J. of Phil. Studies*, October, 1929).

Another lamentable loss to philosophical research has to be recorded. Mr F. P. Ramsey, the eldest son of the President of Magdalene College, Cambridge, died on January 19th, at the early age of twenty-six years. At the time of his death he held a University lectureship in Mathematics and was a Fellow and Director of Studies of King's College, Cambridge. Mr Ramsey was a mathematician of exceptional gifts, but his main interest lay in the difficult problems of the borderland between mathematics and logic. He had already

published in the Journal of the London Mathematical Society two important papers on "The Foundations of Mathematics" (1926) and on "A Problem of Formal Logic" (1929); and his article on Universals (*Mind*, October, 1925) was referred to, at the time, in these pages. Had he lived he would certainly have become one of the leading philosophical thinkers of his time; and, by his death, a brilliant young intellect, full of power and promise, has been taken from us.

It is with a genuine feeling of thankfulness that one announces at length the appearance of the long-promised translation by Professor N. Kemp Smith of *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1929, 25s. net). Hitherto, the only two English versions available have been those of Meiklejohn and Max Müller, the former suffering from inadequacy of acquaintance with the niceties of German idiom and the latter from an inadequate knowledge of the fundamental conceptions of the critical philosophy. Professor Kemp Smith has brought to the task of translation competent linguistic equipment and the results of a prolonged study of the Kantian system in all its various ramifications. The text which has been followed, without doubt rightly, is that of the second edition, although a translation is also given of all the first edition passages which were in the second either altered or omitted. Professor Kemp Smith tells us that he has found his task facilitated by the invaluable edition of the *Critique* edited by Raymund Schmidt, which appeared in 1926, and which it is unfortunate Benno Erdmann could not make use of for the Berlin Academy edition. The translation is an immense improvement upon those which preceded it, and will unquestionably be the standard English text for a long time to come. The study of the *Critique* can never be a light matter; but the English reader has now at his disposal a version in the preparation of which every care has been taken to express Kant's meaning as lucidly and precisely as possible. We welcome also the translation by Mrs. Loewenberg, in the "Library of Philosophy," of Emile Meyerson's important volume *Identity and Reality* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930, 16s. net), which was reviewed in the HIBBERT JOURNAL when it originally appeared in 1908. In the preface which he has written specially for this translation the author apologises for the fact that his book may not appear to recognise fully the more recent scientific ideas, and pleads in extenuation that since his research has to do, not with the actual results of the physical sciences, but with the processes of thought by which they have been attained, the deductions made from a certain phase of scientific knowledge cannot be regarded as useless because some parts of it have been superseded. No; but during the past twenty years the change of scientific outlook has been of a very revolutionary character, and one cannot help wondering whether, for instance, the three principles of conservation—the principle of inertia, the conservation of energy and the conservation of matter—seem to the author now as confirmatory of his main conception of identity as they did in 1908. However that may be, the work, the

object of which is to examine the fundamental concepts of scientific thought and to justify the continuity in method between science and common sense, is undoubtedly one of permanent value, and well worthy of a place in Professor Muirhead's "Library." The translation has been extraordinarily well done. In connection with Meyerson's book, reference may be made to an interesting article by Mr J. B. Kent on "The Problem of Epistemology" (*Phil. R.*, January 1930). The writer maintains that the claim to objective knowledge can only be upheld on the assumption of a relation of identity in difference between given experience and objective reality. The business of epistemology is to discover a principle of relation which will make it possible to distinguish those aspects of immediate experience which science regards as veridical from those which are not.

Professor A. N. Whitehead's volume of Gifford Lectures, *Process and Reality* (Cambridge, University Press, 1929, 18s. net) is, it need not be said, a work of great power and originality, which, however, requires to be read and re-read in order to get at its meaning. It will be reviewed in these pages later. Meanwhile, let it be noted that the lectures are intended to set forth a scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by appeal to the facts of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms of which all particular features find their interconnections. It is significant to observe Professor Whitehead asking himself whether in the end the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some of the main doctrines of absolute idealism on to a realistic basis. "All relatedness has," we are told, "its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living—that is to say, with objective immortality, whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming." In an able and lucid article on "Professor Eddington's Gifford Lectures" (*Mind*, October 1929), Mr R. B. Braithwaite discusses the views there propounded of physical laws and the things with which they deal. With reference to the notion of entropy as a measure of "randomness" or "disorganisation," he argues, in opposition to Eddington, that, so far from the introduction of a random order in the place of arrangement being the only thing which Nature cannot undo, it follows as a direct consequence of Bernouilli's theorem in the calculus of probability that given time enough it is almost certain any physically possible organisation will occur even by the operations of purely random processes. Mr Braithwaite insists further that what Eddington really means by "pointer readings" is what Russell and Whitehead call "events"; and that, if he had made this clear, he would have obviated many of the criticisms which his book has called forth. I would call the attention of philosophical students to an extremely valuable little volume in the "Home University Library" by Professor G. P. Thomson, of Aberdeen, on *The Atom* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1930, 2s. 6d. net), in which the new wave

theory of mechanics and atomic structure, which owes its origin to De Broglie and Schrödinger, is explained with as much clarity and precision as is possible without the aid of complicated mathematics. Professor Thomson thinks that from the philosophical point of view the most important feature of the recent quantum mechanics is its strong sway from determinism. Whether this really strengthens an ethical theory of individual freedom is, however, a very doubtful matter.

Professor W. B. Urban has written a very suggestive and interesting defence of what he calls the "great tradition" in philosophy under the title of *The Intelligible World: Metaphysics and Value* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929, 16s. net), which forms one of the new volumes of the "Library of Philosophy." By the "great tradition" Professor Urban means philosophy of the more constructive kind, beginning with Plato and finding its most recent expression in the writings of Hegel and his followers. It has been characterised, he thinks, by certain pre-suppositions and by a common form; in particular it has been characterised by the conception of an intelligible world, in some sense "beyond" the sensible and the phenomenal, and by the recognition that intellect is oriented towards significance and value. All the vital problems of philosophy depend, it is argued, upon the view that is taken of the nature of space and time. By traditional philosophy the intelligible world has been uniformly conceived as non-spatial and non-temporal; space and time have been interpreted as somehow "phenomenal" of value in its ultimate sense, as the necessary forms in which values are realised, while yet the values themselves transcend these forms. Professor Urban tries to show that even in the sub-human world space and time relations are intelligible only with reference to a non-temporal and non-spatial order, although it is only through space-time processes that qualities and meanings emerge; and that this is still more evident in the realm of persons and their relations. He insists that, strictly speaking, it is nonsense to talk of the universe in its entirety as evolving. There is development, evolution, *in* the world, but not *of* the world. Any concept of total evolution can be conceived only as a timeless development of the *Idea*, to use Hegel's term. The notion of "system"—the orderly relation of parts within a significant whole—is absolutely necessary for intelligibility, and the ideal of philosophic system is that intelligibility which attaches alone to "the inherent impulse of the *Idea*," the *nisus* of a something acting in the direction of meaning and value. The interest of Professor Urban's work lies, however, in his careful working out of these conceptions; it certainly deserves to be widely read and pondered over. Professor J. A. Gunn's elaborate treatise on *The Problem of Time* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929, 16s. net) is mainly historical in character; he starts with a consideration of the notion of time and change in pre-Socratic philosophy and ends with a discussion of the notion in contemporary metaphysics. The treatment is accurate and discriminative, and it ought to be useful to philosophical students. The writer concludes

by contending that Time is in the Universe, not the Universe in Time. Time, as a real feature *within* the Universe, does not create events, but events create Time. *Being* is creative of events and, therefore, of Time. Readers of Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's two volumes of Gifford Lectures, and indeed many others, will turn with lively anticipation to his new book, *Mind at the Crossways* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1929, 10s. 6d. net), and will be rewarded by finding in it some of the author's ripest reflection. Professor Lloyd Morgan seeks, first of all, to delimit the field of purely scientific research. He excludes from the domain of science all questions of agency, and regards science as a purely relational treatment of natural events. All events without exception—mental no less than physical—are susceptible of scientific interpretation. But scientific interpretation is not exhaustive. We are bound, at least when we come to the realm of persons, to recognise the presence of agency, of purposive activity, and here to bring into requisition that mode of explanation which Professor Lloyd Morgan speaks of as "dramatic." He maintains, on philosophical grounds, that if there were no personal agency, human and other than human, immanent in nature, there would be nothing for us to interpret in relational terms. Now, the dramatic creativity which is centred in human persons who act with purpose does afford a partial explanation of the acts of men and women under human fellowship. It affords, however, no explanation of the organisation of the living body; of the sub-reflective organisation of the mind; of anything that happens at a lower level than that of the natural person. Accordingly, Professor Lloyd Morgan feels himself constrained to postulate God as creative Agent; and, on this basis, to apply the conception of agency throughout the whole series from the lowest to the highest. So conceived, God is not the *terminus ad quem* of evolutionary interpretation; God is the *terminus a quo* of dramatic explanation.

Attention should be called to an extremely able article by Professor H. J. Paton on "Self Identity" (*Mind*, July 1929). By an examination of what is involved in the awareness of change or succession, Professor Paton reaches the conclusion that there must be one self which is the same self in its different acts of apprehension, if there is to be apprehension of any temporal object, and still more if there is to be knowledge of an objective and ordered world. But the identity which is thus attributed to the self is not the identity which belongs to an object *quâ* object. There can be nothing more misleading than to confuse the question of the necessary identity of the self as *knowing* with the quite different question of the identity of the self merely as *something known*. The distinction upon which Professor Paton is laying stress seems to me vital and fundamental and is a distinction upon which I have frequently insisted.

Several articles bearing on questions in the history of philosophy call for notice. Professor J. E. Boodin writes on "Cosmology in Plato's Thought" (*Mind*, October 1929 and January 1930). He tries to show that the cosmological point of view is a logical working

out of Plato's philosophy, and that the conception of structure cannot be separated from soul and mind in a teleological interpretation of reality. God is required as the personal embodiment of the good and as the creative genius of the universe. Mr A. K. Stout deals with "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes" (*Mind*, July and October 1929), and maintains that the general rule "what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true," supposed to be inferred from the *Cogito* and confirmed by God's veracity, does not occupy the place in Descartes' epistemology which is commonly assigned to it. According to Descartes, each clear and distinct perception is self-evident, and needs no rule to guarantee it. The *Cogito* proves nothing but itself; it is not the first piece of firm ground appearing above the waters of universal doubt, on which the whole edifice of science is to be rested. For Descartes there was no Atlas to bear the world of human knowledge. Two papers on Spinoza should be noted—one by Mr Thomas Whittaker on "Transcendence in Spinoza" (*Mind*, July 1929), in which he discusses Spinoza's doctrine of immortality, and the other by Mr Joseph Ratner, entitled "Spinoza on God" (*Phil. R.*, January 1930). Mr Reginald Jackson contributes a valuable paper to the January number of *Mind* on "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception," in which, I think, he succeeds in proving that Locke did not identify "ideas of primary qualities" with those qualities themselves.

Admirers of John Dewey—and all philosophical students do admire him—will cordially welcome the two volumes of his popular essays in social and political philosophy which Mr Joseph Ratner has edited, under the title of *Characters and Events* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929, 21s. net). The volumes contain over 100 separate essays; and, although, of course, they vary in interest, they are all well worth preserving in book form. The twelve opening ones are sketches of different personalities, those on Matthew Arnold, Renan, Herbert Spencer, Emerson, and William James, being particularly striking. Then there are studies of national problems, the author's personal knowledge of Japan and China and Turkey serving him in good stead. Finally, the discussions of post-war questions and of the tasks of an enlightened democracy are characterised by the shrewd common-sense and reflective insight of a thinker who has, as the editor observes, "constantly used his philosophy as a basis for analyzing and interpreting current social and political affairs."

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REVIEWS.

The Gospel and Its Tributaries. By Ernest Findlay Scott, D.D.,
Professor of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary,
New York.—Published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1928.—
Pp. xi + 295.—10s. net.

THIS book is a brilliant and highly successful attempt to provide a synthesis which rises above and includes the opposing views which have long been held regarding Gospel Origins. For some years now scholars like R. Reitzenstein, W. Bousset, and A. Loisy have familiarised us with the thesis that the Gospel suffered a sea-change when it passed out of its Palestinian environment into the Gentile world; the Gospel of Jesus became a Gospel about Jesus, the story of a Redeemer-god who, like other cult-gods, became the object of worship and faith. The usual reply has taken the form of a depreciation of the alleged Hellenistic elements and a stressing of the Jewish foundations, in order to show that Christianity is the Faith once for all delivered to the saints. Professor Scott accepts neither of these views; or rather, it may be said, he combines both in a third view. He admits that Christianity has changed, but holds that the change is a transposition rather than a complete transformation. "Through the manifold changes it has undergone during two thousand years it has preserved an unmistakable character, and while borrowing incessantly has placed its own impress on all that it has borrowed" (p. viii). "It has borrowed more than any other religion, but has always changed into its own likeness what it has borrowed" (p. 71). This fascinating solution, which bears on its face an unmistakable Hegelian impress, is clothed in the limpid style and developed with that facility of illustration which make Professor Scott's books such a delight to read. Quotations and footnotes are singularly few, but, as the discerning reader soon finds, this is only because the author has passed through his own mind the information usually conveyed by these means, and has expressed it in his own speech.

Professor Scott's survey is limited to the period covered by the New Testament. He begins with a study of the old and new elements in the Gospel, and then discusses the Jewish Inheritance and the Message of Jesus. On this basis he treats such themes as the Nature of the Church, the Hellenistic Influence, the Contribution of Paul, the

Alexandrian Influence, the Conflict with Heresy, and the Rise of the Catholic Church. A final chapter, *The Gospel as Borrowed and Creative*, gathers up the results and discusses alternative theories.

Each chapter might be described as a variation upon the original theme. Jesus, for example, did not formally initiate the Church, but it is not a new departure contrary to His plan. It is true that the existence of the Church reacted on the message, entailing a certain loss of freedom, externalism, and the necessity of construing the Gospel in a statutory form ; but, on the other hand, the Church gave reality to the social and ethical ideas of Jesus, safeguarded what was central in Christian thought and practice, and kept the new movement in touch with the surrounding world. The change accomplished under the Hellenistic influence was really "an effort to state the original message with a different emphasis." Professor Scott maintains that the Jewish longing for redemption was in essence the same as the Hellenistic longing, and that the roots of the new attitude to Jesus, who is no longer a Prophet, or even the Messiah, but a divinity, are plainly discernible in the Synoptic Gospels. Much the same process is seen in the contribution of Paul. Hellenist and Jew, he does not think of himself as consciously reinterpreting the Gospel, and not even his bitterest enemies, the Jewish emissaries who dogged his steps, attacked his theology. Certainly much of Paul's thought belongs to a particular age. "It rests on the Hellenistic belief that man, as a creature of earth, is in bondage, and seeks deliverance from all the tyrannous powers which oppress him" (p. 151). But too much weight has been given to the details of Paul's thinking. His doctrine is fundamentally simple. "It is summed up in the great conception that through Christ a divine power entered into the world. By faith we lay hold of this power, which creates in us a new life" (p. 153). This belief, Professor Scott says, is in full harmony with the thought of Jesus, and indeed *is* His vital message.

The Alexandrian influence provided a doctrinal framework at a time when the Gospel was in danger of losing its identity. The process, begun in Colossians and Hebrews, is completed in the Fourth Gospel. Here the whole purport of the Christian message is construed in a Hellenistic sense, but there is no distortion of Christian teaching. With the aid of the borrowed ideas the Evangelist "brings to light" "the truth which had always been inherent in the message itself" (p. 184). As for the conflict with Gnostic heresy, Professor Scott holds that it gives the decisive answer to the theory that historical Christianity broke away from the authentic Gospel and is a product of first-century Syncretism. In the light of the conflict we can see what had been happening earlier. The Christian message had been the controlling factor in its own transformation. By a sort of magnetic power it had selected what was in harmony with its intrinsic nature ; stamping a new character on what it borrowed. "When this was no longer possible . . . the reaction began" (p. 219). Professor Scott does not think that the rise of the Catholic Church is correctly

described as a great apostasy ; on the contrary, it resulted from an effort to return to the original conception of the Church. It cannot be denied that serious modifications were introduced. The new religion was now grounded on authority and its original message was obscured by the preponderant weight thrown on form and ritual. None the less, elements in the teaching of Jesus now came to their own for the first time, such as the unity of various types of belief, the ideal oneness of the Christian brotherhood, and the message of the Kingdom of which the Church is the pledge. "The Catholic movement, therefore, made for the conservation of the great Christian interests" (p. 253).

Professor Scott's argument is so fascinating that many readers will want to read his book more than once in order to discover whether they have fallen victims to the spell of his dialectic. Is the thesis too good to be true ? Is there a catch somewhere ? Where are its limits and where does it break down ? Would a skilful apologist be able to use it to find a valid basis for Apostolic Succession, Transubstantiation, and the like ; and, if not, why not ? Not the least part of the appeal which the book makes is the privilege it extends of living in two worlds, of placing one foot firmly in the camp of orthodoxy and the other among the tents of liberalism, or even the boon of reigning apart—

" a quiet king,
Still as, while Saturn whirls, his stedfast shade
Sleeps on his luminous ring."

It is just here that we have reason to regret that Professor Scott did not carry out his original intention of extending his survey to the Council of Nicæa, for the farther one moves in the story of development, the more clearly the issues are seen. The principal difficulty concerns the somewhat elusive "it" which, through change, remains the same. It is not altogether a valid objection that our curiosity upon this point is not satisfied. For, by the nature of the case, the new and constant element in the Gospel is organic ; and to isolate it and describe it in detail at any point in the development is to treat it as static. At the same time I think that the reader has the right to expect more than is actually given. Professor Scott finds the peculiar gift of Christianity in what the New Testament writers describe as "the power of the Gospel," and he urges that Jesus thought of Himself not as the herald of the Kingdom, "but as in some manner instrumental to its coming" (p. 57). This, I think, is the conception which needs to be argued, and grounded more firmly, if it is to be established that the subsequent development is transposition rather than radical transformation. The primary aim of Jesus, we are told, "was not to instruct or enlighten, but to do something which would make the Kingdom possible" (p. 63). What is this "something" ? Professor Scott does not tell us. His nearest approach is the refreshing and confident affirmation that the idea of Messiahship was implicit in the consciousness of Jesus from the first.

He thinks it is impossible to penetrate the motive of Jesus when He set His face to go up to Jerusalem, but holds that "there is no contradiction between the great closing act and the work of teaching which had preceded it." "As Paul was to recognise, and as all generations have felt since, the whole message was concentrated in the Cross, and apart from it would lose its convincing power" (p. 61). These things are finely and truly said, but the claim of the book will hang somewhat in the air unless we can penetrate more deeply into the motive and mind of Jesus when confronted by death. The real want here seems to be the absence of any treatment of the idea of the Suffering Servant in relation to the Messianic consciousness of Jesus. I should gather that Professor Scott views the Servant Idea in Christianity as a later development (cf. p. 107). This, of course, is a highly controversial subject, but it is controversial because it is a decisive issue. If Jesus did modify the idea of the Apocalyptic Messiah in the light of the Servant teaching, He did think of Himself and of His death as necessary to the coming of the Kingdom. The rest then follows very much as Professor Scott argues: New Testament Christianity is the attempt to express in various forms what is true from the beginning.

There can be no doubt that Professor Scott's book is much the most important contribution to the question of Gospel Origins which has been made for many a long day. While not without its special difficulties, the position taken is in every way superior to the two views it seeks to displace. It is the supreme merit of the book that it treats Christianity as such an intensely living thing, and nowhere is this so evident as in the contention that change was of the utmost value to its life. Christianity, it is claimed, "has ever been creating for itself a new body." "For no other reason than that it has this capacity for endless borrowing, it is the absolute religion" (p. 290).

VINCENT TAYLOR.

ABERDEEN.

The Jews in the Christian Era. From the First to the Eighteenth Century, and their Contribution to its Civilisation. By Laurie Magnus.—London: Ernest Benn, 1929.—Pp. ix + 432.—15s. net.

THE above title is the only definite indication of the purpose with which this book was written; and that this indication is not sufficient is shown by the fact that the contribution of the Jews to civilisation has been described in other books very unlike the one at present under review. It has neither preface nor introduction which might explain what exactly the writer set out to do; and the dedication of his book: "To the confluence of Influences and the Hope of Union," cannot be said to be very enlightening. The reader is thus left to plunge into the book hardly knowing what to expect in it, or in what direction he will be led. If he declines the task of finding out, he will be the loser; for the book is brilliant, stimulating and at times even

provocative, but not on a single page dull or commonplace. The author had probably no intention of teasing his readers, but the table of contents is a series of titles of chapters which might serve for the cantos of an epic poem, and which only deepen the elusive mystery of the book. From the point of view of the plain man, it is to be regretted that the author has made it so hard for him to learn what this book has to teach.

The title of the book at once suggests the *Legacy of Israel*, in which a detailed survey is given of the various ways in which Jewish influence has made itself felt in the development of civilisation. Mr Magnus was himself one of the contributors to the *Legacy of Israel*, so that he wrote his present book with a clear purpose of doing something which was not done in the *Legacy*.

In that collection of essays the subject was dealt with under separate heads, each essay being complete in itself, and within its own limits following the chronological order. That order is not indeed wholly disregarded in the present book. It begins with the first century and reaches the eighteenth, but it does not go straight along from one to the other. It flashes sudden allusions to earlier or later periods of history, often with brilliant effect, but not to the mental ease of the reader. In fact, the reader must not expect to find ease in this book. He must prepare himself for a bracing exertion of mind, and then he will find that he is following a most delightful guide, who will show him many things that he had never noticed before, and old scenes with a fresh light upon them. After making that journey twice, the present writer can speak from experience of the absorbing interest he has found in it, and can confidently encourage others to go and do likewise.

Two main themes seem to have been before the author's mind when writing his book. One, obvious enough, is the actual contribution which Jews have made from time to time to the common stock of thought and knowledge; the other, the prospect of an ultimate synthesis of the Hebraic with the Hellenic elements in civilisation. Of these two themes, the second is, if we mistake not, the more important in Mr Magnus' view, and the one which, though seldom made prominent, really determines the form of his book and the course of its argument. The story he has to tell is not merely the chronicle of Jewish history, as it can be read in Graetz or Dubnow, but the survey of the process by which the mind of Israel was variously drawn to and repelled from the Greek and Latin culture in the midst of which it lived. He shows how the feeling of dislike of Jews by their Gentile neighbours was present before Christianity had made its influence felt, his earliest witness being Cicero, who certainly made no secret of it. And the Jews on their side followed the lead of the Pharisees in shunning the attraction of the Greek culture and turning their whole attention on the Torah as the clue to their whole conception of life.

Mr Magnus writes of the Pharisees with justice and generosity, but yet he seems to feel that they made a "great refusal" in closing

the door against the Greek culture. For he has a whole section about Philo, whose main object in all his writings was to establish a harmony between the Hebraic and the Hellenic modes of thought. He admits, what is of course well known, that Philo's work was not recognised by the leaders of Judaism in his time, who were laying down the lines of the Mishnah, and eventually of the Talmud. Philo therefore holds but a small place in a survey of the Jewish contribution to civilisation, if indeed he can claim a place there at all. But, for Mr Magnus, he is extremely important as a pioneer, opening out the path which should eventually lead to reconciliation between Hebraism and Hellenism. Philo failed in his time, and the Talmud confirmed the ban against the "Greek learning." But Saadiah in the tenth century, who again has a section to himself, is important because he once more opened the way which led to the study of Greek; for Saadiah brought in the influence of Arabic philosophy, which meant the knowledge, however imperfect, of the work of Aristotle. Saadiah was thus the forerunner not only of the translators who made Aristotle accessible to Christian students in the Middle Ages, but also of the great company of thinkers, poets and scientists who were the glory of Jewish Spain from the eleventh to the fourteenth century. These, under the name of Sephardim, form the subject of three whole chapters, the general effect of which is to show how they approached very closely to the sources of thought and knowledge outside the Jewish bounds, how they might have hoped to succeed in effecting a reconciliation, and how they failed when the expulsion in 1492 destroyed that hope along with almost every other. The lead passed from Spain to Germany, from Sepharad to Ashkenaz, from Aristotle to the Talmud, and in part to the Kabbala.

The "reconciliation" theme becomes prominent again after the relation of Jewish contributions to the Renaissance has been duly illustrated. There is a whole chapter about Spinoza, whose contribution to philosophy was of course enormous, but yet hardly to be called without qualification a specifically Jewish contribution. But he finds a prominent place in Mr Magnus' book, if we are not mistaken, as marking another stage in the reconciliation of Hebraism with Hellenism. Whether in fact that can be truly said of him is open to question, but if that be not the explanation of Mr Magnus' unusually full reference to him, it is hard to account for that reference. That Moses Mendelssohn should appear as the avowed advocate of reconciliation is a matter of course.

We have tried to sketch what seems to us the thread which runs continuously through the book. It is interwoven with many other threads into a rich and varied pattern, and can sometimes be scarcely detected. Taking the book as a whole, it may be described as an attempt to extract from the facts presented in the *Legacy of Israel* their underlying significance. To do so is a very difficult task, as Mr Magnus must have often felt, and perhaps he has not overcome all the difficulties. But he has produced a most interesting and stimulating book; and, in a second edition, he may perhaps

make it easier for the plain man, in the ways indicated above, to benefit by what he has written and enjoy the pleasure of reading it.

R. T. HERFORD.

KELSALL, CHESHIRE.

The Christian Task in India. By Various Writers. Edited by the Rev. John McKenzie, M.A., with an Introduction by the Most Rev. the Bishop of Calcutta.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1929.—Pp. xvii + 297.—7s. 6d. net.

THE writers of this co-operative volume have not set themselves the larger task which the title might suggest. "Their object is the much more limited one of trying to give, primarily with Christian readers in view, an account of the most important organised Christian activities which are being carried on in India and of the purposes which underlie them." Yet the necessities of the last clause of this explanatory sentence do open out upon large vistas and bring before the reader tremendous problems.

This is a missionary book. The writers are, or have been, actively engaged in the work of which they write. They are Christians, and are convinced that India's supreme need is what the Christian gospel has to give. Principal Higginbottom, in the chapter on "The Problem of Poverty," declares that his considered thought, after all objections have been carefully eliminated by the logical method of exhaustion, is "that a thoroughgoing acceptance of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord, and just as thoroughgoing an application of His gospel to all the affairs of life, will bring India to her rightful place among the nations and solve her poverty problems." There is nothing of hysteria or even exaggeration either in their statement of India's problems, or in their estimates of the influence of Christian penetration. There is, perhaps, in some cases evidence of hesitation and timidity when the Eastern attitude to the Western presentation of Christianity cannot be evaded. Even when the question of Church unity is discussed by the Bishop of Bombay, in the last chapter, it is taken for granted that Western ecclesiasticism, modified only so far as the Lambeth proposals allow, must be preserved.

Of the seventeen writers, including women as well as men, who contribute to this book, some are much better-known than others, and the value of their contributions differ. Yet, somehow, the composite picture they present conveys a sense of reality. Miss Mayo's much-debated *Mother India* is not canvassed; one reference there is to a statement concerning young Indian students who "brood over files of fly-blown Russian pamphlets," on which the comment is: "She was describing what only existed in her anti-Bolshevich imagination." A more serious charge is launched in dealing with the problem of India's child-wives and child-widows. "Probably the degradation of India's womanhood has done more than anything else to lower India's prestige in the eyes of the world, but there is no subject on

which there is greater need of accurate information on the part of those who would effect reform, a condition unfortunately not fulfilled in Miss Mayo's *Mother India*, which deals with some of these subjects." The recent publication of Mr. G. S. Dutt's book, *A Woman of India: Being the Life of Saroj Nalini*, enables those who desire to know the views of an educated Indian, herself the leader of reform from within the sanctions of her own religion, on this matter of urgent concern. The chapter in this volume on "Public Questions," by the Rev. J. F. Edwards, gives the facts, but he can see no possibility of a satisfactory solution of the problem in orthodox Hinduism. Still it is significant that two writers quote with approval from Mr. F. L. Brayne's *Village Uplift in India* this testimony to the importance of women: "In order to spread the elementary principles of health and hygiene in as many villages as possible, and to uplift the people with the greatest possible speed, it is necessary to concentrate on improving the ideas of the women on these subjects rather than of the men. The women will pass the ideas on naturally to their children, and will spread them far more than men, as they are personally and vitally interested in them." Denunciation of custom accomplishes nothing; understanding custom and its religious sanctions is the beginning of real reform. This attitude attests the sanity of these contributions to India's welfare.

The religious problem, however, is the dominant concern of this volume. And it is here that divergent voices make decisions as to what India's need demands difficult, while at the same time the complexity of the situation is revealed. It is recognised that India is the most religious of all lands. The statement of the Bishop of Calcutta—Dr Foss Westcott—that "we need to present the Christian religion far more as a way of life than we have done, and as such it must cover the whole of life in all its diverse activities and relationships," leaves little to be desired. This finds corroboration by other writers. Christianity has made more conquests of late years among the outcastes—the "untouchables," of whom Mr Gandhi speaks as "our shame and our sin"—than from any other class. For these concern in matters of dogma and ritual count little. They understand a faith in Christ as a person for whom they would die, but their discipleship has little regard for the problems of the Christian creeds. Yet when the Bishop of Bombay comes to discuss Unity of the Churches in India, it is matters ecclesiastical that are most prominent. Western ecclesiasticism—the creeds, the sacraments, and certainly episcopacy—is essential. On the other hand, a Baptist missionary is quoted who agrees that "the simple Gospel message" alone is necessary. Only, he adds, adult baptism is part of that message. In another chapter a fear is expressed that a reduced Christianity should be proposed such as even a Unitarian could accept. It is all very well to propose schemes of union. What is most significant is not that discussion in limited areas and with ecclesiastical limitations does go on, nor even that inability to surmount the barriers ecclesiasticism impose does not unduly discourage those who meet for this purpose.

These only take up their frustrated hopes and endeavour to penetrate new areas of service—life and work they call it. The really significant thing is that, there is no maddening consciousness of the future demanding a more effective and widely distributed dynamic. It is difficult to learn the lesson that there may be need to leave ecclesiasticism in order to preserve Christianity.

Failure of nerve, where Christian truth is committed to the keeping of Indians, emerges, for all the bold statement that Christianity is "a way of life." Mr J. Arthur Davies, in the chapter on "An English Layman's Contribution," gives a most intelligent and the most pertinent presentation of the case for freedom. "The modern Christian layman," he says, "who has won for himself a modified freedom from ecclesiastical shackles can have no desire to impose them on others." It may be that India has ability to evolve a new type of Christianity, apart from the dogmas and symbols of the West, and thus may enrich the West by giving something new to the modern presentation of Christianity as well as taking what the West has gathered for its enrichment and enslavement through the centuries. Can the West understand this? If so, its endeavour to plant Christianity in India may be a great and increasing blessing. If not, it is difficult to discern any possibility of much advance. And in this volume, somehow, the open path becomes a *cul-de-sac*.

Christianity has had to make a fight for its hold on India. The facts, both historical and circumstantial, given in this book testify to this. Some other matters, also regarded as facts, would be urged by writers hostile to Christianity. But it can be taken for granted, at least, that no part of the world can afford to do without the Christian contributions to thought and purposive action, or that in it which aims at the purgation of evil. The attitude of aloofness—watching events without any will to show interest or to co-operate with those engaged in the Christian task—cannot hold back the coming crisis; this only makes for unpreparedness in the day when India is ready to assert herself mistress in her own land.

Missionaries make mistakes. Some are apt to regard purely spiritual work as alone important. Here, however, the larger view is taken, as the topics indicate—education, literature, healing, poverty, public questions. One matter is missed. It is that Christian missions to India ought to operate among Indians who visit and study in the West. But a right proportion is kept. Mr McKenzie says: "I would say that almost as much harm has been done to the Christian cause by people who have praised missionary work as a tranquillising political influence or as an auxiliary to trade, as by those who have roundly condemned it as exercising influences that make people more difficult to govern and less amenable to commercial exploitation. Praise and blame of this kind are very largely irrelevant. The Kingdom of God is not a tributary to any of the Kingdoms of this world, whether they be political or economic." Those who are concerned for the future of India, and especially those who believe that institutional Christianity must put its house in order to meet the

needs, which presently will be demands, of the awakened Eastern peoples, will do well to ponder over this book.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

LONDON.

Some Exponents of Mystical Religion. By Rufus M. Jones. London : The Epworth Press, 1930.—Pp. 222.—6s. net.

DR RUFUS JONES has written many books on religious experience, and the sanity as well as the understanding revealed in these makes him a welcome guide in regions of spiritual life where many are conscious only of "moving about in worlds not realised." His latest book contains lectures delivered last year at the University of Southern California on the Modern Era Scholarship Foundation. One, on the Mystical Element in Walt Whitman, was not delivered for lack of time, but its inclusion in this volume is a distinct gain.

At the outset an endeavour to define the meaning given to the term "mystical" is made. The tendency to limit its use to describe an experience which centres on ecstasy is not approved. "Ecstasy is a rare and unusual experience." The *viâ negativa* on which it emerges has little meaning for everyday life. Dr Jones asserts that Christian experience in the New Testament is saturated with mystical elements. And "mysticism," he claims, "is a form of religion that builds primarily on consciousness of acquaintance with God through direct and immediate experience of Him, instead of on logical and forensic argument about Him, or on a scribal interpretation of ancient records that tell of Him." This claim made for the validity of implicit knowledge of God is illustrated variously and convincingly in the studies that follow. Not that all the exponents of mystical religion can be brought within the compass of this definition—Meister Eckhart accepts most decisively the *viâ negativa* as the supreme bliss for life, while Plotinus tells of a wonderful experience in which "there were not two things, but seen and seen were one." The author, however, makes clear his own position, and there are many signs to-day that if Christianity is to commend itself as a religion with a future, such a conception of its meaning for life must be pressed home. No sort of "knowledge about"—either scientific, philosophical, ecclesiastical, or theological—is sufficient to satisfy religious capacity. "Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless until we rest in thee," is the record of longing that is as old and new as human nature's self.

The surprise of this volume will be the place given in it to Walt Whitman. It would seem that the day of vilification is past for Whitman, and a new era of appreciation is about to arrive. Dr Jones is a recent convert to the cult of the poet's champions, and he has all the enthusiasm of a convert. Even though in passing through the crucible of his fertile mind Whitman has—

"suffered a sea-change
Into something rich and strange,"

it must be admitted that Dr Jones makes out a good case. His mysticism "is not the mysticism of the great Christian saints. He knows little of the great mystics of history. He is always more concerned to *start* something than to repeat or copy the past. What one really finds in Whitman is the rapture, the thrill and wonder of a joyous, naïve soul, whose whole being floods with life and light, and who feels in great moments the tides of God's ocean of spiritual reality sweeping back into the channel of his own individual stream of life—and suddenly he is ready to venture ship and cargo and helmsman out on the high sea!"

The gem of this volume is the lecture on Plotinus—not a Christian, but the father of Western mysticism. One of the romances in the history of thought and one of the most hopeful signs of the times is the emergence of Plotinus. His own expression of his deep thought can never become popular; yet it cannot be disregarded. The illuminating interpretation given by Dr Jones would make a fitting introduction to Dean Inge's great exposition of the experience and teaching of Plotinus. In Eckhart, mysticism becomes an altogether negative matter—formless, void, and altogether impossible as a philosophy for life. He would accept such a way of life with joy, and read into nothingness the essence of reality, but for ordinary people the desert in which he finds delight would be a desert, and nothing more. It is strange that the common people flocked to hear Eckhart's sermons. Dr Jones writes: "I often wonder, as I am slowly, patiently creeping along through these sermons of Eckhart, what would happen if he could appear among us again and preach his messages to a modern audience!"

Luther and Robert Browning are the subjects of other lectures. The last lecture is devoted to a survey of Mystical Life and Thought in America. This gives a useful list of recent books, and makes the claim that "practicality" is not the only mark of American life. "We are like Jacob of old; we can see where lies our main chance for good returns, and yet on occasion we too can see angels, as he did, and feel them tugging at us, to pull our better self free." The outlook for religion is hopeful. For every one who writes a book on mysticism there are hundreds who practise the presence of God. "Wherever I go in America and stay long enough to know the people of any community in city or in rural sections, I always find some of these practical mystics."

A healthy-minded book, sanely optimistic, helpful for all who, amidst chance and change, would fain enter the experience of eternal life.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

LONDON.

A Free Church Book of Common Prayer.—London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1929.—Pp. xvii + 552.—3s. 6d. net.

THE publication of such a book as this—even if it should express the views of only a small minority of Free Churchmen—is a remarkable

sign of the times. If it were true to its name, and really represented the Free Churches, it would signify a revolution.

It is not a new thing for the Free Churches to find a need of set prayers. Even the Presbyterians in Scotland have recently published a book of prayers, though the share of the congregation seems to be limited to saying "Amen." A really liturgical book (*The Book of Worship for Youth*) has been published with Congregationalist and Baptist support. But this new book is something far more advanced. It contains not merely forms of set services for special occasions, but sacraments, rites and ceremonies. In its way, it covers as wide a field as the Anglican Book of Common Prayer. Indeed, it is, to a large extent, high Anglicanism without the bishop. The "minister" takes his place. Not only does he administer the sacraments with a ceremony similar to that in the Anglican communion, but he confirms and ordains in truly episcopal fashion.

Nor is that all. The Editors have not only drawn upon the Prayer Book (and, of course, many other sources), but on the new Prayer Book of 1928. The House of Commons would by no means pass their publication. As they would be the first to say, they have no need to ask the House of Commons. The Communion Office, in its general order, follows the lines of the 1928 book. It is not a slavish imitation: but it is ordered in a similar way. It would, however, be much more true to say that this book goes far beyond the Prayer Book of 1928. The Prayer of Humble Access comes after, and not before, the Consecration. There is the *Agnus Dei*: and there is a time set apart, after the Consecration, and before reception, for "Silent Adoration." One could imagine the reception of this by that staid Anglican body, the Church Assembly! There are Proper Prefaces for Corpus Christi and All Souls' Day set in the actual service itself: and there are prayers for the departed, much more definite, and more individual, than anything in the Anglican Book.

It is only necessary to add that provision is made for Reservation of the Sacrament, for anointing the sick, and for the ancient services of Prime and Compline.

A curious feature of the book is that, with its frank ritualism, it has a modernism of its own. It even provides a service for non-believers: not, indeed, for non-believers in God, but for non-believers in the Christian revelation. "To attain," says the Foreword, "the greatest possible breadth of comprehension and express the primal sympathies and affinities of all world-religions, one Order of Worship has been boldly designed so that it may be used by non-Christian as well as by Christian Theists." The compilers can justly claim to have acted "boldly"; but whether they will win general approval is another matter. These are days in which, very rightly, we treat with respect the religious convictions of other men and races; and we give them the same liberty of conscience as we claim ourselves. But Christianity, with all its varieties of form, has a very definite message of its own, which is central and vital to it; and few people will be disposed to treat it as a sub-species of Theism. Such an

attitude lays itself open to the gibe of the cynic who said that, in our modern efforts towards unity, we might quite well include the atheist. The theist says : There is a God : and the atheist : There is not a God. It is only a different way of looking at the same thing ! Without admitting the truth of this cynicism, the most ardent workers for Christian unity will be the first to hold that there are limits to comprehensiveness.

As might be expected, the original prayers in this book vary in their quality. Some are exceedingly good. Free Churchmen, like other people, have shown that they are not unable to write modern prayers worthy to be compared with those splendid models, the old Latin collects. One is surprised to find that some of these new prayers are not included in this book. Others, on the contrary, tend to spread themselves, with a result which is not very happy. "Ineffable Creator . . . grant me acumen in understanding" is not first-rate. Nor is "O God . . . the uncomprehended Enlightener of the darkness." But these are only a few defects among a great deal that is really good.

The claim of the compilers is that the history of the Free Churches neither began nor was arrested at the Reformation and what followed it. Hence they are free to develop themselves. But whether they are actually developing on these lines is another question. As the ancient philosopher said, all things are in a state of flux ; and even the Free Churches are not static. But we should be slow to believe that many of them are quite as fluid as this. Some may resent the adoption, in this book, of a title so comprehensive.

G. W. BRIGGS.

THE RECTORY, LOUGHBOROUGH.

A Miscellany, Addresses and Papers. By A. C. Bradley, LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A.—London : Macmillan & Co., 1929.—Pp. 267.—10s. 6d. net.

OUR sense of gratitude to Mr Bradley grows with the years. His *Shakespearian Tragedy* appeared in 1904 and the *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* in 1909, and there can be few lovers of literature who, having read these once, have not felt themselves drawn to read them again and yet again, as they read and re-read the great poetry he interprets. As I wrote last year in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, in a notice of a work of W. P. Ker, he—Ker—and Walter Raleigh and Mr Bradley have probably had the most influence on students of English literature in the last generation ; each has made his separate appeal, but Mr Bradley is the most philosophical—the most lovable—as he leads us in true Platonic fashion through ourselves to fuller and juster appreciations. We are ashamed when we read him of half-understandings, of an eye that does not direct itself towards the light.

This Miscellany consists, for the most part, of lectures delivered at a date not much later than that of the Oxford lectures ; they are

of the same kind, and will make the same appeal. His "Coriolanus" (1909), at once analytical, comprehensive and illuminating, will rank with his great Shakespearian studies; "Inspiration" (an address read in a Glasgow church) is nobly inspired, and "English Poetry and German Philosophy in the Age of Wordsworth" (1909) is a most philosophic exposition of the ideas or, we might rather say, the faith that gave England Wordsworth and Germany Hegel. This lecture ends on a note of melancholy as Mr Bradley, who, we feel, has always wanted us to see and love as he has seen and loved the highest, compares that great age with a lesser age, content with lesser achievement. He writes, "And yet, if I may descend to personal opinions, I believe in that Age. Every time, no doubt, has the defect of its qualities; but those periods in which, and those men in whom, the mind is strongly felt to be great, see more and see deeper, I believe, than others. Their time was such a period, and ours is not. And when the greatness of the mind is strongly felt, it is great and works wonders. Their time did so, and ours does not. How should it? From causes totally unknown to us, it seems that after about 1840 for many years scarcely any men of the highest genius, if any, were born in this country or elsewhere on the earth. Perhaps that is one reason why some of us now doubt the greatness of the mind, and others take middling minds for great. We have the past to judge by, but most of us judge by the present."

Entirely charming and in somewhat lighter vein are the essays on Feste the Jester in *Twelfth Night*, and on Jane Austen. How delightful is the fancy with which he concludes his essay on Feste! He quotes the lines with which the play ends:—

"But that's all one, our play is done
And we'll strive to please you every day."

and calls us to perceive how appropriate the song is to the singer and how in the last line the jester repeats an expression used a minute before in his last speech: "I was one, Sir, in this interlude; one Sir Topas, sir; *but that's all one*," and he continues: "We owe these things, not to the players, but to that player in Shakespeare's company who was also a poet, to Shakespeare himself—the same Shakespeare who perhaps had hummed the old song, half-ruefully and half-cheerfully, to its accordant air, as he walked home alone to his lodging from the theatre or even from some noble's mansion; he who, looking down from an immeasurable height on the mind of the public and the noble, had yet to be their servant and jester, and to depend upon their favour; not wholly uncorrupted by this dependence, but yet superior to it and, also, determined, like Feste, to lay by the sixpences it brought him, until at last he could say the words, 'Our revels are now ended,' and could break—was it a magician's staff or a Fool's bauble?"

The essay on Jane Austen is really the perfect essay on Jane Austen, the last, if not the latest, word on Jane Austen, and this is making a great claim when so many of the "faithful," among whom

Mr Bradley counts himself, have said or written of their best about her. How entirely just is his character-sketch of Emma! "This young lady, who is always surpassingly confident of being right, is always surpassingly wrong. She is reputed very clever, and she *is* clever; and she never sees the fact and never understands herself," and so he proceeds in an admirable summary of her campaign to put her little world to rights till she discovers her love for Knightley and his for her. "She has reached a fact at last, but only by the benevolence of Fortune, who crowns her kindness by taking the heart of Harriet and flinging it like a piece of putty at her original lover." On that perennial sedition in the camp of the faithful arising from the contested claims of *Emma*, *Mansfield Park* and *Pride and Prejudice* to be considered the best of the novels, Mr Bradley writes at once with valour and discretion. Each of the three parties will feel that he does justice to their championship. None can definitely claim him as on their side against the others.

The latest of these essays bears a date of nine years ago. Mr Bradley is now an old man, and we may not reasonably expect much more—if any more—work from him. But it is a privilege to be allowed to pay one's tribute of regard and admiration to the work of a wise man, work which, we may feel, has a lasting value and may help to dispel our doubts in the greatness of the mind, even in the present age.

LAWRENCE SOLOMON.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

Une Famille du Refuge. Par Blanche Biéler.—Edition "Je sers."—Clamart, Seine, France, 1930.

It is a happy coincidence that 1930, the tricentenary of Agrippa D'Aubigné's death (1552–1630), the soldier and poet of the Huguenot cause, sees also the publication of a book whose author, combining scholarship with literary charm, relates the story of a family descended from the great Huguenot hero, culminating in the imposing personality of one of the foremost historians of the Reformation: Jean-Henri Merle D'Aubigné.

Descended on the father's side from a working-man's family of French Protestants settled in Geneva, on the distaff side from the brilliant friend of Henri IV, scholar, fighter, staunch upholder of his faith and author of *Les Tragiques*, an epic poem dealing with the sufferings of his co-religionists, Merle D'Aubigné combined both the democratic humility and fearlessness of the stern Calvinist with the exactness of the modern historian and the seductive charm of the French littérateur.

His *History of the Reformation During the Time of Calvin* is still a standard work to which the great scholar Armand Garnier pays generous tribute in his monumental work: *Agrippa D'Aubigné et le parti protestant*. But it is more than a mere pragmatic story of

Calvinism, it is the work of a God-seeker to whom his faith is a living force. Two paragraphs from the preface of Merle D'Aubigné's *History* make this clear :—

"I am going to prove that the aim of the Reformation was not so much to *destroy* what was superfluous, superstitions, etc., but to *give* what had become lost, a new, sanctified life, the very essence of Christianity, to revive or rather to create faith."

"The history of the Reformation is something else than the history of Protestantism. In the first, everything points to a regeneration of Humanity, a radical change in religious and social outlook, emanating from God; in the second one finds only too often a degeneration of basic principles, party strife, sectarian spirit, briefly, the imprint of small individualities. The history of Protestantism might, after all, be of interest to Protestants only—the history of the Reformation enlists that of all Christians, nay, of all men."

That this breadth of scientific and religious outlook would bring him into conflict with his ecclesiastic superiors was inevitable. His studies in Germany, stimulated by such eminent theologians as Neander and Schleiermacher, not only provided him with the tools of scientific research, but widened his horizon as historian, thus making him still less pliable to the conservatism of narrow Calvinism. His experiences as pastor in Hamburg and Brussels were intensified during his work as professor of theology in Geneva, where his single-minded striving after unity amongst all Christian creeds led eventually to secession and the foundation of the Oratoire.

The theologian D'Aubigné became more and more absorbed in the historian whose fame spread over England, Scotland, America, etc., and tribute was universally paid to his scholarship and nobility of character. He was, amongst other things, instrumental in creating the Croix rouge de Genève.

Mme C. Biéler is to be congratulated upon her well documented, delightfully written and copiously illustrated book, which will form an excellent basis for a more extended study of the great Swiss divine's life and work.

M. JOUBERT.

LONDON.

A Study in the Logic of Value. By Mary Evelyn Clarke, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.—London: University Press, 1929.—Pp. x + 330.—7s. 6d. net.

DR MARY CLARKE has performed a very useful piece of work in her able exposition and acute criticism of the types of value theory to which the general name "Psychologismus" has been given, in particular those the tendency of which is to identify ethical theory with the psychology of moral values. The problem whether values are subjective or objective, an opposition which is frequently treated as identical with that of relative and absolute, is, as, of course, Dr

Clarke recognises, almost as old as ethical reflection. But it may fairly be considered to have been raised in a new and forcible way by that special development of naturalism and subjectivism to which thinkers of greater or less importance have contributed, amongst the chief being, Ehrenfels, Meinong, and Professor Urban, though the two latter are by no means merely exponents of "Psychologismus." The major portion of the book consists of criticism, for, though its aim is to indicate and defend a logical view of value in which the writer follows Professor Moore closely, the method adopted is mainly that of demonstrating the inadequacy of all rival theories. The issue between logic and "Psychologismus" is admirably stated in the first chapter in connection with a criticism of Professor Baldwin's attempt (in his work *Thought and Things*) to show logic itself as having a genetic origin in psychical processes, begging the whole question of validity. On parallel lines he argues that "the good is that aspect of the actual whereby it fulfils or terminates a personal interest." A good example of Dr Clarke's critical method is exhibited in her analysis of the confusion involved in the theory that would account for the principle of universality involved in the moral judgment by means of a doctrine that "feeling exhibits a development in the direction of generality."

Thus she indicates (a) the failure to recognise certain non-empirical elements in logical thought which cannot be genetically described, (b) the opposite error of failing to distinguish the affective elements in a psychical complex from the cognitive factor. Similarly, at a later stage of the argument (Chapter II), Miss Clarke's penetrating analysis of the method, by which Meinong and Urban account for the complex emotions of what would be called by other philosophers, experience of the higher values, as in Meinong's doctrine that feelings have their own objects over and above the objects of the activities (personal, etc.) to which they attach, reveals the unconscious implication to be the intellectual elements which are not admitted in these theories. Thus, "even if we are prepared to endorse the curious theory that feeling has an object distinct from that of cognition, it is surely obvious that this object must derive its character entirely from the object of cognition"; and, "however essential the emotional ingredients may be, it is really its intellectual aspect which gives value experience its specific character, and not any qualitative difference itself." In reference to the theories criticised, this interpretation appears wholly justified. The possibility of a real difference in the original quality of the value-feeling is not, it seems, admitted by these writers; and Dr Clarke can forcibly argue that the position to which their explanation points is that the primary factor, when the feeling seems different in quality, is not feeling at all, but judgment. Thus, many value-psychologists, following Meinong in his later work, make the specific differentia of value-feeling to be "that it demands as its presupposition the judgment that the object exists." By a skilful treatment of Meinong's argument, Dr Clarke makes clear that the judgment involved is not the bare judgment that the object exists, but a second

cognitive presupposition that the existence of these objects is a good. She concludes that every attempt to account for value in psychological or naturalistic terms involves a rather subtle form of question-begging. Our pleasure in an object, not being itself value, "we are tacitly assuming that the object is worthy to excite pleasure, *i.e.* a judgment of value is presupposed."

It is evident that other forms of criticism are demanded to meet the new forms of the doctrine which discovers the essence of value to be in some relation of the object to the subject, and Miss Clarke's work is an excellent illustration of these new methods. The treatment of the "affective volitional" theory of value as interest, in Chapter III, is not less searching. Dr Clarke's refutation of Professor Perry's refutation of the opponents of naturalism appears particularly effective, especially in view of her obvious determination to state it fairly and do justice to its strong points. It is not possible, however, to do more than refer to this, and the examination of other forms of the subject-object theory, including those of Dewey and of Alexander.

After discussing various objective theories of value, the book concludes with an interesting consideration of the metaphysical implications of the view adopted that value is a "unique determination of objects apprehended through judgment, but subsisting, like any other predicate, independently of the judging subject." Here there is a strenuous effort to demonstrate that there is no implication in this view of a spiritual doctrine of reality, such as is involved in Rashdall's position that "apart from mind there is no such thing as good or value." It is, perhaps, just because the writer's argument is stated with such admirable clearness, that the question cannot be dismissed, whether the problem is not in the end epistemological. Must it not be primarily a question for the interpretation of the cognitive act, whether we can regard the knowledge of value as of a like character with the knowledge of mathematical truths? In the end, the individual knower must provide the criterion, and the answer seems inevitably to be of a dogmatic type, similar to that of Descartes in his appeal to the "natural light" showing him the certainty of truths that are clear and distinct. Again, since value, though indefinable, is recognised as that which ought to be, or "a property attaching to a great variety of different objects that are alike only in the fact that we recognise them as worthy to be" (Chapter V, p. 231), we may ask of a theory of value that it should make intelligible the influence of the cognition upon practice. The difficulty, I feel, in regard to Dr Clarke's defence of the logical theory has a certain kinship with the notorious difficulty of Kant's formalism in ethics, in spite of the wide difference in the respective epistemological standpoints. The problem of explaining how the logical reason can give a motive to the will seems cognate to that of understanding how the purely intellectual judgment that something ought to be, can be the source of all the forces of distinctively human action, for this is action as determined by the consciousness of value. It is allowed that the

judgment is accompanied by feeling, but this feeling does not appear to be conceived as different in kind from the pleasure-pain feeling of the value-psychologists. That the theory of value which Dr Clarke advocates tends to an intellectualism which fails to account for the facts of the greatest practical experience seems suggested by the pre-eminent place it constrains her to give to the æsthetic values. "Value-objects that are valued as ends in themselves are normally acts such as evolve the contemplative attitude of æsthetic enjoyment" (p. 309). For if we are to regard as the primary value that which is most universal in human experience, most productive of effects in human history, and in raising man's existence to a higher plane, we must agree with McTaggart that this is the value of love. That the realistic doctrine which does not allow value to be epistemologically, or ontologically, dependent upon mind, cannot admit this, may be one ground for questioning its validity.

Such considerations are in no way adduced in detracton from the merits of Dr Clarke's work. We may entirely agree that "the primary aim" of dispelling "some of the clouds that the prevailing Psychologismus has cast about the problem of value" has been attained, and commend the book to all who wish for a disentanglement and searching analysis of this many-headed modern argument which "murders to dissect" the experience of good.

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Plato and His Contemporaries. A Study in Fourth-Century Life and Thought. By G. C. Field, M.A., B.Sc., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bristol.—London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1930.—Pp. xi. + 242.—12s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR FIELD has written precisely the book that was needed by students of the Platonic philosophy, a book that will serve as an admirable supplement to the treatise on Plato by Professor Taylor, published in 1926. It is divided into three Parts, dealing with Plato's life and work, the moral and political background of the dialogues, and their literary and philosophical background respectively; while in the three scholarly Appendices the questions of the authenticity of the Platonic Epistles, of the interpretation of Aristotle's account of the origin of the theory of Ideas, and of the character of the Post-Aristotelian tradition as to the relation between Socrates and Plato, are handled in some detail. The work as a whole is characterised by a brightness and lucidity of style which, combined with the great interest of its subject-matter, keeps the reader's attention from beginning to end.

A vivid picture is drawn of Plato's career and personality. On the strength of what is said in the Seventh Epistle, Professor Field considers we are warranted in assuming that up to the death of Socrates in 399, Plato's interests and ambitions were mainly poli-

tical, although it is clear from what Aristotle tells us that his philosophical studies at this period extended beyond anything he learnt from Socrates. There is, it is contended, no evidence that Socrates propounded any particular metaphysical doctrine; his was rather a critical influence, inducing others to think out thoroughly the grounds of their own theories, but not himself producing any positive contribution. And upon Plato the influence of Socrates would appear to have been chiefly of a moral nature; it was as the embodiment of his ideal of the righteous man that Socrates pre-eminently impressed him. Gradually, however, Plato came to realise that the mere contemplation of practical problems could never by itself bring about the radical change in State-administration which he desiderated, that a systematic study of the principles of conduct was requisite, and that these would have to be traced back to something more fundamental still. Somewhere about the year 385, after Plato's return from his first Sicilian journey, the Academy was established with the object of turning out "philosophers who could rule and rulers who were capable of philosophy." In trying to depict the kind of activity that was carried on there, Professor Field throws out several suggestive hints which help us to reconstruct in imagination this earliest prototype of a modern college, with its Master and Fellows and Scholars. There must, he points out, have been great differences amongst those who were working within its precincts. Some would have been engaged in special lines of study and research, others would have treated it as a place of education preparatory to a more active life, and it is not at all impossible that there would have been lectures or courses of instruction open to the general public. And, besides being the home of philosophy, the Academy contributed in no small measure to the development of mathematics and mathematical astronomy, Theaetetus and Eudoxus being two of its most prominent members. But, throughout the period of Plato's leadership, the Academy was essentially a training ground in the science of statesmanship; and by the end of his life it had become a real political influence in the Greek world.

So far as the chronology of the Dialogues is concerned, Professor Field follows in the main the order suggested by Constantin Ritter. According to this arrangement, the Dialogues fall into three groups. The latest group consists of the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and the *Laws*; a middle group comprises the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*, and probably the *Parmenides*; while the rest go into the first group, at the end of which probably come the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*. Ritter's classification is based on stylistic investigations; and it is, I think, doubtful whether these ought to be allowed altogether to outweigh considerations of a different kind. For instance, it is, at least, open to question whether the strong argument that is based upon the eminently constructive character and the wide scope of the *Republic* does not point to a relatively later position for this dialogue than Ritter assigns to it, although I agree with Professor Field that in all likelihood the first Book was com-

posed earlier than the rest and used afterwards as an introduction to the larger dialogue. The gravest difficulty is, however, with respect to the *Parmenides*; and here, unfortunately, our author has little guidance to offer. To me, I confess, it seems, on internal grounds, to be amongst the earliest of the middle group; and to represent Plato's advance upon, and criticism of, Megarian views.

In the second Part of the volume, Professor Field is concerned with the special aspects of Greek history that throw light on the environment in which Plato grew to maturity and began his speculative work. The gradual assertion of the unity of the city-state and of its supreme claim, as against minor associations within it; the development, particularly in Athens, of democracy as a system of government; the strengthening of the belief that a code of laws is normally a complete code of morality,—all these points are tersely brought out and impressively illustrated. Emphasis, too, is laid upon the demoralisation which the Peloponnesian War occasioned in Greek social life, upon the consequent mistrust of democratic theory, and upon the rise of the Sophistic distinction between *φύσις* and *νόμος*. Professor Field singles out for comment three general characteristics of ordinary Greek thought about politics, as compared with our own at the present day. In the first place, he notes what he calls its "rationalism." "The Greek normally preferred to see where he was going, and the idea that we are continually drifting along in a direction which we cannot foresee or control would have been abhorrent to him" (p. 94). In the second place, he specifies what he terms its "Utilitarianism," its disregard, namely, of vested interests or individual rights, when the good, as it was thought, of the State was at stake. And, in the third place, he indicates its "limitedness," its assumption that, as contrasted with larger country-states such as those of Persia and Macedonia, the city-state was the highest form of political organisation. Coming more specifically to the fourth century, Athens, it is pointed out, exhibited a wonderful power of recovery after the disaster of the Peloponnesian War. Yet no statesman made his appearance who was able to secure a permanent leadership, the result being that there was no continuity of policy. There was a constant tendency for class-division to manifest itself between the richer citizens, supported by the agricultural population, who in general wanted peace, and the poorer inhabitants of the towns, who cherished dreams of a revival of the vanished empire which had been to them a profitable source of income. In particular, that mode of thought which found expression in terms of the distinction between *φύσις* and *νόμος* was making headway. Ideas and institutions which had hitherto been taken for granted were being criticised. Protests against the function of the State and its laws extending beyond the protection of the citizens from violence and wrong-doing, as also against ideals of patriotism, were becoming common. Members of the Cynic movement were preaching the gospel of absolute self-sufficiency, and calling upon their hearers to attain the life "according to nature" by renouncing all that the world could

give in the way of wealth and comfort, of social intercourse or political activity.

Plato's attitude towards these tendencies consisted largely in reasserting the claims of an organised community, in attempting to show how such a community might be so re-modelled as once again to be the chief moral agent. Professor Field insists, and I think with perfect justice, that the mere fact of the setting of a dialogue being in a past period is no indication whatsoever that it was not meant to bear upon the conditions of the time of writing. No one, for instance, can suppose that Plato would have exempted the statesmen of his own age from the criticism he brings to bear in the *Gorgias*. So, again, in the eighth and ninth Books of the *Republic* there are descriptions of existing constitutions so characteristic of the fourth century that his readers could not but have taken them to apply to their own time.

The third Part of Professor Field's work is occupied with a discussion of the various trends of philosophical reflexion prevalent at the period in which Plato was living.

With respect to Pythagorean influence, the considerations brought to bear are sufficiently conclusive against the tendency to find Pythagoreanism everywhere in Plato's metaphysical and cosmological speculation. Stress is laid upon the fact that, although there seems to have been a vigorous propaganda going on for some generations after Plato's death, the aim of which was to claim the credit of numerous philosophical and scientific developments for Pythagoras and his followers, yet from the evidence available we do not get a very exalted idea of the ability of those who were leading the movement at the beginning of the fourth century. The one outstanding personality amongst them would appear to have been Archytas of Tarentum, a mathematician of real eminence, with whom Plato was on terms of intimate friendship. In fact, it does not seem likely that the Pythagoreans of Plato's age were adding much of importance to purely philosophical speculation. It is true that Aristotle found a close resemblance between the Platonic theory and the Pythagorean. But when he comes to specify the resemblances and the differences between the two, the differences would appear to be at least as vital as the resemblances. And, except on one subsidiary point, Aristotle never associates the Pythagorean theory with the doctrine of Ideas which he criticises; on the contrary, he rather tends expressly to distinguish them.

As regards Plato's relation to Socrates, the facts are more difficult to unravel. There is no doubt truth in Professor Field's contention that the picture presented by Xenophon is, on the whole, correct, so far as it goes. But there were certainly features in the teaching of Socrates that Xenophon was incapable of appreciating. There was involved in it, for example, the general philosophical principle that in concepts or notions (*λόγοι*) is to be found for human thinking the truth of things, while in isolated sense-perceptions there lies the ground of error or illusion. In other words, there is to

be discerned in the Socratic teaching the thought of an ideal human knowledge, from which the crude opinions of ordinary perceptive experience may widely diverge. From this implicit thought to the theory of Ideas was, it is true, a far cry; but it may well have seemed to Plato that, when resolutely worked out, it necessarily led to the view which he so often puts into the mouth of Socrates.

Professor Field tends, I notice, to ascribe more to Megarian influence than it is now customary to do, and I think with good reason. There seems to be so close a resemblance between the view of the *ἐιδῶν φίλοι* delineated in the *Sophist* and what can be gathered of Megarian teaching from other sources as to lend strong probability to the hypothesis that Plato is here examining one side at least of Megarian doctrine. Certainly in the face of what we know about the arguments of Diodorus against motion, it is impossible to suppose, as Burnet appears to do, that the Megarians consistently and undeviatingly adhered to the Eleatic position of the oneness of Being. Indeed, not only in the *Sophist*, but also in the *Parmenides*, Plato would seem to be wrestling with problems forced upon him by the Megarian thinkers, and to be working out his own theory by criticism of theirs.

I have been able to touch only on a few of the topics with which Professor Field deals. But I have said enough to make manifest the great value and importance of his work. It is a book which every lover of Plato should read; and from which none can fail to derive much that is helpful, stimulating, and suggestive.

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